I Corps (Pakistan)

 SOURCE:

(  )   I Corps (Pakistan) :  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Corps_(Pakistan)#Structure 

(   )An Atlas of the 1971 India - Pakistan : War   https://www.sanipanhwar.com/An%20Atlas%20of%20the%201971%20India%20-%20Pakistan%20War%20,%20The%20Creation%20Of%20Bangladesh.pdf   

(  )  India’s Politico-Military Strategy for the 1971 India–Pakistan War:     https://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds/15_4_J.S.%20Cheema.pdf  

(  ) INDO-PAK WAR 1971 EVOLUTION OF DECISION MAKING for the  WAR:     https://www.claws.in/static/MP_90-India-Pakistan-War-1971.pdf

                        I Corps (Pakistan)

From Wikipedia, 

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I Corps
Active	1958 – Present
Country	Pakistan
Allegiance	Pakistan Army
Type	Corps
Size	50,000 approximately (though this may vary as units are rotated)
HQ/Command Control Headquarter	Mangla, Mirpur District, Azad Kashmir
Nickname(s)	I Strike Corps, Mangla Corps[1]
Colors Identification	Red, white and yellow
Anniversaries	1 July 1957
Engagements	Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 Indo-Pakistani War of 1999 2001–2002 India–Pakistan standoff
Decorations	Military Decorations of Pakistan Military
Commanders
Corps Commander	Lt. Gen. Ayman Bilal Safdar
Chief of Staff	Brig. Zulfiqar
Notable commanders	General Pervez Musharraf Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan Lt Gen Ghulam Mustafa Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad Lt Gen Mohammad Aslam Shah Lt Gen Shamsur Rahman Kallu Lt Gen Tariq Khan Lt Gen Umar Farooq Durrani
Insignia
War Flag

The I Corps, also known as I Strike Corps, of the Pakistan Army is headquartered in Mangla, Azad Kashmir Territory of Pakistan. Known as         I Strike Corps, it is one of two strike corps within its ten-manoeuvre Army corps. The I Strike Corps is one of the oldest and major formations of Pakistan Army.

Active in Indo-Pakistan wars, the I Strike Corps subordinated administrative units played an integral role in Kargil war, and also served in current War in North-West Pakistan. Its current Corps-Commander is Lieutenant General Ayman Bilal Safdar .^[2]

History[edit]

The corps headquarters was raised in Abbottabad in 1958.^{[citation needed]} Lt Gen Azam Khan was its first commander. It was the first Pakistani corps ever to take to the field.

1965 War[edit]

During the 1965 war, the corps was one of two corps in action. It commanded all Pakistani troops north of Lahore and in Kashmir. During this time however, because of the sheer number of formations under its command, (8 divisions), it was found easier to split the formations into corps level task forces, as a result in the 1965 war it acted essentially as a Field Army.

1971 war[edit]

I Corps began the 1971 war with a force of two divisions forward supported by an armoured brigade, holding the Shakargarh salient.^[3] 15th Infantry Division was on the left side of the corps' frontage around Sialkot, 8th Infantry Division on the right east of the Degh Nadi, and 8th Armoured Brigade in support. Further back, but titularly part of the corps, was Pakistan's Army Reserve North of 6th Armoured Division and 17th Infantry Division. India planned a major attack in the sector, managed by I Corps, but when the war broke out, the lead Indian formation, 54th Infantry Division only managed to advance a few kilometres – a total of 13 kilometres (8 mi) in two weeks of operations.

Meanwhile, while the Indian attacks went on, the reserve formations did little. 6th Armoured Division remained near Pasrur waiting for orders, while 17th Infantry Division had significant detachments sent off to 23rd Infantry Division on the left and IV Corps on the right.^[4]

Yet the fighting in Shakargarh, while ultimately successful as the Indian aims were thwarted, resulted in 8th Armoured Brigade's heavy loss of armour and some territory was also lost.^[5] As a result, its commander, Lt Gen Irshad Khan, was recommended for court martial and dismissal; this was ultimately not carried out.

Structure[edit]

The corps has not been in action since 1971, though its subordinate units have served on the Line of Control and the war on terror, on secondment to other formations. Its ORBAT is:

Structure of I Corps
Corps	Corps HQ	Corps Commander	Assigned Units	Unit Badge	Unit HQ
I Corps	Mangla	Lt. Gen. Ayman Bilal Safdar	6th Armoured Division		Gujranwala
			17th Infantry Division		Kharian
			37th Infantry Division, Kharian		Kharian
			Independent Infantry Brigade		U/I Location
			Independent Armoured Brigade		U/I Location
			Independent Artillery Brigade		U/I Location
			Independent Air Defence Brigade		U/I Location
			Independent Signal Brigade		U/I Location
			Independent Engineering Brigade		U/I Location

List of corps commanders[edit]

#	Name	Start of tenure	End of tenure
1	Lt Gen Azam Khan	July 1957	1958
2	Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana	1958	1966
3	Lt Gen Abdul Hamid Khan	1966	March 1969
4	Lt Gen Tikka Khan	March 1969	August 1969
5	Lt Gen Attiqur Rahman	August 1969	February 1970
6	Lt Gen Irshad Ahmed Khan	February 1970	1972
7	Lt Gen Abdul Ali Malik	1972	1974
8	Lt Gen Azmat Baksh Awan	1974	March 1976
9	Lt Gen Ghulam Hassan Khan	March 1976	March 1980
10	Lt Gen Ijaz Azim	March 1980	April 1981
11	Lt Gen Shah Rafi Alam	April 1981	April 1982
12	Lt Gen Shamsur Rahman Kallu	April 1982	April 1986
13	Lt Gen Mohammad Aslam Shah	April 1986	May 1988
14	Lt Gen Zulfikar Akhtar Naz	May 1988	May 1992
15	Lt Gen Khalid Latif Mughal	May 1992	October 1995
16	Lt Gen Pervez Musharraf	October 1995	October 1998
17	Lt Gen Saleem Haider	October 1998	September 1999
18	Lt Gen Tauqir Zia	September 1999	April 2001
19	Lt Gen Ghulam Mustafa	April 2001	April 2002
20	Lt Gen Javed Alam Khan	April 2002	April 2006
21	Lt Gen Sajjad Akram	April 2006	April 2008
22	Lt Gen Nadeem Ahmad	April 2008	April 2010
23	Lt Gen Mohammad Mustafa Khan	April 2010	October 2010
24	Lt Gen Tariq Khan	October 2010	October 2014
25	Lt Gen Mian Mohammad Hilal Hussain	October 2014	September 2015
26	Lt Gen Umar Farooq Durrani	September 2015	April 2017
27	Lt Gen Azhar Saleh Abbasi	April 2017	October 2018
28	Lt Gen Nadeem Zaki Manj	October 2018	November 2019
29	Lt Gen Shaheen Mazhar Mehmood	November 2019	September 2022
30	Lt. Gen. Ayman Bilal Safdar	September 2022	Till Date

References[edit]

1. ^ "Azhar Abbasi promoted, posted as Mangla Corps Commander". pakobserver.net. Archived from the original on 10 January 2019. Retrieved 10 January 2019.
2. ^ "Appointments in army: Lt Gen Asim Munir new DG ISI". thenews.com.pk. 10 October 2018.
3. ^ Gill, An Atlas of the 1971 India-Pakistan War, NESA (NDU), p.48
4. ^ Gill, p.49
5. ^ Brian Cloughly, A History of Pakistan Army

External links[edit]

• GlobalSecurity.org, Global Security Website about the I Corps
• This shows the Formations Insignia

Pakistan Army
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Combat commands	Manoeuvre corps I Corps II Corps IV Corps V Corps X Corps XI Corps XII Corps XXX Corps XXXI Corps Corps-level formations Air Defence Strategic Forces Other forces 34th Light Infantry Division Special Service Group
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Category:Pakistan Army

Categories: 

• Corps of the Pakistan Army
• Military units and formations established in 1957
• 1957 establishments in Pakistan

• This page was last edited on 29 January 2023, at 06:06 (UTC )

The Coming Fight will be Different:

 SOURCE: 

(   ) The Coming Fight will be Different:  

https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/FMfcgzGsltKcLLBwDQfwplrsnrPPFGKk

 (   )  Military assistance to Ukraine since the Russian invasion :   https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9477/CBP-9477.pdf?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email

       The Coming Fight will be Different

                                  By

            Mick Ryan, AM from Futura Doctrina

How Ukraine's Next Offensives Will Differ From Its previous Campaigns

APR 4 2023

An Assault Breacher Vehicle (Image: US Marine Corps)

For those who follow the provision of United States’ military assistance to Ukraine closely, over the past several months a new pattern in support has emerged. One aspect of this new pattern is the provision of armored and protected vehicles in ‘battalion sets’ (enough to equip one battalion of infantry or armor troops). But perhaps more importantly, since the end of 2022, there has been a significant amount of American support that consists of battlefield mobility capabilities.

 Reviewing the multiple US military assistance packages since 14 October 2022, there has been a large effort to equip Ukrainian combat engineers for their coming efforts to identify, reduce and move through the dense obstacle zones constructed by the Russian Army in eastern and southern Ukraine. Demolitions munitions, obstacle reduction and mine clearance equipment, mobile bridging capabilities (Armored Vehicle Launched Bridges) as well as Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles and artillery delivered anti-tank mines, have featured on the publicly released lists of American supplied military assistance.  At the same time, the UK has provided a ‘manoeuvre support package’ including minefield breaching and bridge laying capabilities. Other armies from Germany, Canada, Finland, Slovakia, and Norway have provided equipment like combat engineering vehicles based on the Leopard tank chassis.

This significant uplift in mobility and survivability support to the Ukrainian army tells us that not only have battlefield conditions changed since the beginning of the war, but that the coming offensives by the Ukrainians will look different to those that have been conducted north of Kyiv, in Kharkiv and in Kherson in 2022. While these previous Ukrainian offensives may offer some insights into the fight ahead, there are many reasons to expect that the coming months may see an evolved approach by the Ukrainians.

The Ukrainian Offensive Will Be Different

The first reason for this is that the Ukrainians are facing a different Russian Army now than compared to 2022. Not only does it have a different commander in General Gerasimov, but there is a different balance of professional and mobilised troops. While much ink has been spilled about how mobilised troops are better at defensive than offensive operations, the reality is that the coordination of a scheme of defence over several hundred kilometres of front line is still a complex and fraught undertaking. It is certainly a more substantial undertaking than just plopping troops in trenches with anti tank weapons!

The reality is that the Russians have constructed multiple layers in their defensive zones. Some of these will be augmented with obstacles including anti-tank ditches, mines, wire and dragon’s teeth. There will be different densities of troops in each zone. Whether it will be a more static approach, or features more mobile defensive mindsets from Russian leaders remains to be seen. But, we can reasonably assume that the Russians will have reserves in troops and munitions for counter attack and counter penetration missions across the frontline. They are also very likely to have an extensive ISR plan that is focused on detecting and interdicting concentrations of Ukrainian troops before they cross their lines of departure in any attack.

While this might paint a picture of Russian military professionalism that has rarely been glimpsed in this war, it is militarily prudent to make assumptions along these lines. It is always better to prepare for a more dangerous opponent rather than a less dangerous one. As General Zaluzhny noted in a recent interview on the Russian forces: “They are not idiots.” If the Russians are able to conduct a more competent mobile defence in the coming months, it will be a different enemy than the one the Ukrainians have fought in the past 14 months. They may be weary from their current offensive, but should not be underestimated. War is too unpredictable to make such errors.

Another difference with the coming offensives is likely to be Ukrainian force structure. Over the past few months, they have been raising, equipping, manning and training three new formations for the coming offensives. These new formations, which are likely to resemble reinforced combined arms divisions, have probably been the beneficiaries of the large numbers of armored and motorised equipment provided by the US and Europe in the last few months.

How they are commanded may also be new. So far, the Ukrainians have largely fought at the brigade and below level in this war, with higher level coordination being undertaken by geographical commands. The new division size formations introduces a new and more complex combined arms formation to the Ukrainian order of battle. They are much more capable than other approaches in the past 14 months, but it will also take time to train commanders and staffs to employ them effectively. That said, the Ukrainians have demonstrated continuously throughout this war how quickly they can absorb new knowledge and systems. I expect something similar with their uptake of division level operations.

A third difference from what has come before is the dense series of obstacle zones that the Russians have constructed in Ukraine. Good armies try to avoid being committed to breaching through such areas because that is exactly what the enemy wants you to do. However, if they lie in the path of an important operational objective, there are times when breaching and fighting through  such obstacle zones cannot be avoided.

Assault Engineering Equipment Provided to Ukraine (Images: Military-Today, EDR Magazine)

And there should be no doubt about the complexity of such operations. Indeed, there is no military endeavour that is more difficult to plan, orchestrate and execute than combined arms obstacle breaching. It requires every element of an army’s combined arms team - artillery, engineers, infantry, tanks, electronic warfare, ground and aerial reconnaissance and attack (including with drones and loitering munitions), logistics, intelligence and the list goes on. Indeed, the best combat brigades in armies focus on training in such operations because if they can master these activities, they can essentially do anything.

Such complex combined arms undertakings make the special forces-centric operations of the past two decades look very simple. Mastering them by the Ukrainian army will take training, good leadership, excellent planning, much rehearsal and real time learning and adaptation. They are inevitably bloody undertakings for both sides.

A fourth reason why the future offensives will be different is because both sides have continuously evolved - and improved - capabilities for reconnaissance and strike. Both sides now employ an almost countless number of drones of many types and capabilities as well as loitering munitions. The Ukrainians have even established multiple drone attack companies in their brigades. The number and density of such systems has increased throughout the war. Both sides now operate in an environment of almost pervasive surveillance, where the ‘detection to destruction’ time has been significantly reduced. This means that deception before the operation will be vital for the Ukrainians to conceal key objectives and axes of advance, logistics holdings, troop concentrations as well as the locations of critical items such as engineer equipment and artillery.

It will also require a clever scheme of manoeuvre before and during the offensive to deceive the Russians about the locations and timing of the offensives. And it will demand ongoing efforts by the Ukrainians to conceal force concentrations, artillery, HQ and logistics as they begin their break-in battles (and hopefully exploitation) once the offensives commence. It could also mean we will see lots of smaller mini-offensives than a couple of large ones just to confuse the Russian targeting cycle and to deceive them about Ukraine’s main effort.

A final reason the coming offensives will be different is because of the strategic stakes involved.  The Russians seek to draw out the conflict (I actually think this is a flawed assumption on Putin’s part, but that is another article). The Ukrainians know that the strategic clock is possibly ticking in Washington DC. With an election year likely to distract the war principle aid provided in 2024, this year will be decisive for Ukrainian battlefield operations.

Not only do they need to demonstrate decisive victories over the Russians, they must show they are effective users of all the military assistance provided in the past six months or so. The fickle politics and public’s in western nations have become less engaged in the war’s progress. The Ukrainians understand that the offensives to come must once again show the people of the west that not only is Ukraine worth supporting, but with ongoing military assistance in 2023 and beyond, they can defeat the Russian invasion.

An Evolved Offensive Campaign by Ukraine

Whether they are launched tomorrow, next week or next month, the Ukrainian offensives will be different to those we have seen already. The Russian enemy and their operations have evolved over time. The Ukrainian equipment and force structure has adapted to changes in Russian tactics and western assistance. And the battlefield continues to evolve based on how the Russians and Ukrainians interact as well as injections of new technologies.

But we can reasonably assume one thing will remain the same. As they have since the beginning of this war, the Ukrainians will continue to show the world that with their sense of purpose, adaptive mindset and pride in defending their nation, they are unbeatable.