Saturday, October 14, 2023

Israel seems poised for a massive invasion of Gaza rather than prolonged attrition.

SOURCE:

  (  )   INVASION OF GAZA PREPARATION : https://theconversation.com/israel-seems-poised-for-a-massive-invasion-of-gaza-rather-than-prolonged-attrition-215584

  (  ) VIDEO: Iyer Mitra on Israel Ground Attack on Gaza :- https://youtu.be/bF7rZwV0S7Y



            ___________________________




Israeli soldiers head towards the Gaza Strip border in southern Israel on Oct.13. 



In the days since the Oct. 7 surprise attack by Hamas, Israel has counted its dead and secured its borders. The country now faces a grim choice.

Will it continue trading air strikes and rocket fire with Hamas militants for a prolonged period? Or will it launch a ground invasion of Gaza that triggers more casualties among Israeli soldiers and Palestinian civilians while risking a two-front war?

The conflict so far already has been bloody. Israel reports 1,300 dead and 3,300 injured, with perhaps 150 more held hostage in Gaza. Israeli officials also say 1,500 Hamas militants who entered Israel have been killed.

Gaza similarly reports 6,600 injured and 1,500 dead, enough to overflow its morgues.

Israel has now secured its border against further Hamas attacks on land. But the rockets keep flying overhead.

A building in ruins after being hit by a rocket fired from the Gaza Strip is seen in Ashkelon on Oct. 9, 2023. (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)

Sustained rocketry

Israel has counted 6,000-plus incoming rockets so far. After the first day’s 2,500-rocket barrage, it’s now about 700 per day. Given their estimated stockpiles of between 14,000 and 30,000 rockets, Hamas militants could sustain such rates for many weeks.

The current rocket total has already surpassed the 4,380 reported during the Israel-Gaza conflict in 2021. Similarly, the current 700-rocket daily rate easily beats the 434 average of that 2021 conflict.

Total rockets reportedly fired at Israel per conflict, showing each conflict’s Israeli name and year. Israeli government reports.

Israel’s Iron Dome rocket interceptor systems have consequently been busy. They might even have been overwhelmed on the first day.

The interceptor systems have clearly expended ample ammunition. I estimate they’ve launched roughly 2,300 interceptor missiles so far. Assuming costs of about US$100,000 dollars each, that’s US$230 million spent in six days.

The country’s interceptor stockpile is presumably running low. But Israel will likely receive more interceptor missiles via ammunition resupply flights from the United States that have already begun

Israel’s Iron Dome missile defence system fires interceptors at rockets launched from the Gaza Strip in Ashkelon, southern Israel, in May 2023. (AP Photo/Tsafrir Abayov)

Despite most rockets reportedly being intercepted or landing in open fields, we know some did not. Based on past conflicts, I suspect at least 120 rockets have hit Israeli communities. That implies dozens of civilian deaths, as well as more injuries and much damage.

And each day the barrage continues, Israel suffers perhaps 10 more rocket hits and consumes another US$26 million of interceptors.

The rocketry hurts Israel’s economy too. Businesses lose productivity whenever employees must take shelter. And tourists won’t visit while rockets are falling near airports.

Meanwhile, Israeli warplanes have been pounding Gaza.

Airstrikes and mobilization

They’ve so far dropped 4,000 tonnes of explosives on Gaza.

But my research indicates that airstrikes didn’t slow the rocket fire during previous Gaza-Israel conflicts. Only ground assaults did that.

Warplanes also typically run out of worthwhile targets after about a week. And they’re more likely to kill hostages than to free them.

That’s partly why ceasefires took effect after eight days of fighting in 2012 and 10 days in 2021. And why Israel invaded Gaza on Day 8 of the conflict in 2009 and Day 11 in 2014.

(Oct. 14 will ominously mark Day 8 of this conflict. The clock is ticking.)

Meanwhile, Israel has mobilized 360,000 reservists, giving it half a million soldiers ready for action.

Israeli tanks are parked at the rave party site where scores were killed near the Kibbutz Re'im, close to the Gaza Strip border fence, on Oct. 10, 2023. (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)


That’s expensive. The military must pay those extra people, while their normal civilian employers must go without them.

Altogether, the current fighting’s direct and indirect expenses could cost Israel at least $7 billion, or 1.5 per cent of its annual economic output. That’s assuming it doesn’t escalate.

A Northern Front

One place fighting could escalate is Israel’s northern border. In recent days, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic jihad militants in Lebanon and Syria have repeatedly fired at Israeli forces. Combatants on each side have been killed.

These attacks were small. But they force Israel to deploy some military units there instead of near Gaza. That includes at least one Iron Dome system.

The attacks also signal that Hezbollah could join the war if Israel invades Gaza. That group has far more soldiers than Hamas does. And its arsenal reportedly contains between 100,000 and 130,000 rockets, including some guided missiles.

So, what happens next?

Smoke rises following an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City on Oct. 11, 2023. (AP Photo/Fatima Shbair)

Decision time

That largely depends on the Israeli government.

Its current situation is painful. The daily rocket salvos harm civilians in Israel, while the airstrikes hurt civilians in Gaza. And the Israeli economy bleeds cash every day the fighting continues.

Meanwhile, Israel’s air force has likely done all it can against Hamas. And the mobilized army is far too large for anything short of a Gaza invasion. The government surely feels pressured to “do something.”

An invasion seems imminent. Israel has told civilians in northern Gaza to flee somehow to the south as Israeli forces move in, presumably to give their soldiers clearer fields of fire.

We might still hope a ceasefire will somehow be brokered. But it appears Israel is about to launch a bloody ground campaign.


Friday, October 13, 2023

IRAN [HAMAZ ] UPDATE, OCTOBER 12, 2023

 SOURCE: 

(  )  IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 12, 2023: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-12-2023

(  ) IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 11, 2023:  HTTPS://WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG/BACKGROUNDER/IRAN-UPDATE-OCTOBER-11-2023

(  )  IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 9, 2023:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2023

(  )    https://youtu.be/6VY0N4E3298


        IRAN [HAMAZ ] UPDATE, OCTOBER 12, 2023


Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 3:00 pm EDT

      The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the war in Israel. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance.


Key Takeaways:

  1. Hamas continued rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel but reduced the rate of these attacks.
  2. Small arms clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces increased slightly across the West Bank, as Palestinian militias try to stoke conflict there.
  3. CTP-ISW recorded three rocket strikes into Israeli territory from Lebanon.
  4. Unidentified Iranian officials implicitly threatened to direct proxy attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria if the United States re-freezes Iranian financial assets abroad.
  5. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is conducting a diplomatic tour to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, possibly to coordinate politically with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance.
  6. Iran is conducting a diplomatic campaign to unite Muslim countries against Israel.

Gaza Strip

Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact. 

Hamas continued rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel but reduced the rate of these attacks on October 13.[1] An IDF commander stated that Hamas is trying to conserve its rocket stockpile and prepare for a prolonged war.[2] Israel estimates that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have expended around 33 percent of their rocket arsenal since the war began on October 7.[3]

Hamas appeared to reduce the rate of its infiltrations into Israeli territory as well. CTP-ISW recorded one small arms clash between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces along the border of the Gaza Strip on October 12—a decrease from the six clashes that ISW recorded across October 10 and 11.[4]

Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Hamas spokesperson Abu Ubaida released a video statement on October 12 describing the planning and objectives of the al Aqsa Flood operation.[5] Ubaida claimed that Hamas began planning the operation in 2022 and conducted extensive analysis of Israeli forces and the terrain throughout the planning process. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency recirculated reporting that the Palestinian resistance has prepared itself for a long-term battle, including offensive operations in Israeli territory.[6] Ubaida stated that the objective of the operation was to destroy the IDF Gaza Division and facilitate further attacks into southern Israel.[7] Hamas’ militant wing has continued attacks on Israeli territory as far north as the Haifa District and has called on Palestinian militants in the West Bank to mobilize.

West Bank

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and marches in the West Bank.

Small arms clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces increased slightly across the West Bank on October 12, as Palestinian militias try to stoke conflict there.[8] Clashes occurred in around 21 locations.[9] Leaders from Hamas, PIJ, and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade separately issued calls on October 11 and 12 urging individuals in the West Bank to mobilize and join the fight against Israel, highlighting their desire to expand the war geographically to the West Bank.[10] PIJ spokesperson Abu Hamza boasted that the West Bank has entered the fight and called for militants to increase the rate of attacks against Israeli forces.[11] Iranian state media recirculated these calls and celebrated the ongoing clashes.[12]

Hamas has called for a surge in anti-Israel activity on Friday, October 13, which risks driving further clashes.[13] The West Bank-based Lions’ Den militia previously succeeded in mobilizing supporters to hold marchers and clash with Israeli forces on October 11, as CTP-ISW previously reported, suggesting that Hamas may see similar success.[14] It is furthermore common for public participation in marches and protests in the Middle East to increase on Fridays, as such activities often follow Friday prayers.

South Lebanon and the Golan Heights

Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact. 

CTP-ISW recorded three rocket strikes into Israeli territory from ebanon on October 12.[15] This level of rocket fire is consistent with previous days’ levels of kinetic activity around Israel’s northern border.[16]

The IDF conducted airstrikes on the Damascus and Aleppo international airports on October 12, disrupting critical nodes through which Iran funnels military equipment and personnel into the Levant.[17] The IDF struck the airport runways. The Syrian Arab Army conducted a mortar strike into the Golan Heights after the attacks, possibly as symbolic retaliation.[18] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has long used commercial airliners affiliated with the Iranian regime for military transports to Syria throughout the civil war there.[19]

A Mahan Air flight was en route from Tehran to Damascus around the time of the IDF airstrikes and then changed course back to Iran.[20] The United States has sanctioned Mahan Air for transporting military personnel and materiel on behalf of the IRGC Quds Force to Syria to support the Iranians' efforts to defend the Bashar al Assad regime and entrench the Iranian military influence around the Levant.[21]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance

Unidentified Iranian officials implicitly threatened to direct proxy attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria if the United States re-freezes Iranian financial assets abroad. These Iranian officials told UK-based Amwaj Media that the August 2023 prisoner swap deal between the United States and Iran involved a broader understanding in which Iran would pause proxy attacks against US positions in exchange for the United States allowing the release of $6 billion worth of frozen Iranian financial assets in South Korean banks.[22] Western media reported similar details on this broader understanding at the time.[23] South Korea has gradually transferred that money to Qatari banks for Iran to access since the agreement was reached. Western media has reported that the United States and Qatar have reached an agreement to refreeze the Iranian financial assets in response to the Hamas ground and air attack into Israel.[24] CTP-ISW is updating its chart on Axis of Resistance red lines based on these reports.


Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is conducting a diplomatic tour to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, possibly to coordinate politically with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance. Abdollahian traveled to Baghdad and met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji on October 12.[25] Abdollahian stated that Israel cannot commit “war crimes” against Gaza civilians "without expecting a response” during his meeting with Araji.[26] Abdollahian additionally commented on the possibility of the opening of a new front against Israel during his meeting with Sudani, stating that “everything depends on [Israeli] actions in Gaza.”[27] Abdollahian will travel to Beirut and Damascus in the coming days. Abdollahian recently met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus on August 31.[28] Abdollahian also met with Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah, and Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on September 1.[29] Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati additionally held separate phone calls with Haniyeh and Nakhalah on October 11.[30] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei commonly uses Velayati as his personal envoy abroad and especially to members of the Axis of Resistance and Palestinian groups.[31]

Iran is conducting a diplomatic campaign to unite Muslim countries against Israel. Senior Iranian officials conducted a flurry of phone calls to foreign leaders on October 11 and 12 to discuss the war in Israel. President Ebrahim Raisi held separate phone calls with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[32] The call with Mohammad bin Salman is particularly noteworthy given that it is the first call between them since Iran and Saudi Arabia normalized ties in March 2023. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian has held phone calls with his Emirati, Egyptian, Filipino, Hungarian, Iraqi, Omani, Qatari, Russian, and Turkish counterparts since October 7.[33] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has held phone calls with his counterparts in Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Turkey, and the UAE.[34] Tehran has historically sought to rally Muslim countries against Israel and frame itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. Iran conducted a similar diplomatic campaign to this end when tensions rose between Israel and the Palestinian militias in April 2023, which CTP previously reported.[35]

References

[1] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-slow-rate-of-rocket-fire-suggests-hamas-readying-for-long-war

[2] https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/34752; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1712354608717115418

[3] https://twitter.com/IsraelRadar_com/status/1712377982562562481

[4] https://twitter.com/IsraelReliefAid/status/1712534961075662993; https://twitter.com/sentdefender/status/1712099042384044251; https://twitter.com/JoeTruzman/status/1712113917332537610; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/34568; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/34574; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/34568; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/34626

[5] https://t.me/spokesman_2020/47

[6] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/19/2969811

[7] https://telegram.me/s/hamasps

[8] https://t.me/Tura313/45338 ; https://hamas dot ps/ar/p/18260

[9] Data available upon request.

[10] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/20/2970393 ; https://t.me/Tura313/45338 ; https://hamas dot ps/ar/p/18260

[11] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/10/12/2970690/islamic-jihad-says-resistance-operation-against-israel-could-expand-beyond-gaza; https://t.me/almanarnews/129983 www.presstv dot ir/Detail/2023/10/12/712566/Palestine-Israel-Spokesman-al-Quds-Brigades-armed-wing-Islamic-Jihad-resistance--Abu-Hamza-Operation-al-Aqsa-Storm-Lebanon

[12] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/20/2970393/%D8%B3%D8%AE%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%88%DB%8C-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%B3-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A2%D8%AA%D8%B4-%DA%AF%D8%B3%D8%AA%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%B1-%D9%85%DB%8C-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%86%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%AF%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%AF%DB%8C%DA%AF%D8%B1-%DA%A9%D8%B4%DB%8C%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D8%B4%D8%AF ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/20/2970398/%DA%A9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%87-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D9%BE%D8%A7-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%88%DB%8C%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%DB%8C%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%B5%D9%87%DB%8C%D9%88%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B3%D8%AA

[13] https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/34461 ; https://t.me/hamasps/16601 ; https://t.me/hamasps/16608 ; https://hamas dot ps/ar/p/18260

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-2023

[15] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1712470506451112030 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1712470506451112030 ; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1712470506451112030

[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-11-2023

[17] https://www.facebook.com/mod.gov.sy/posts/pfbid0WpU9dTfBpMVHbobWo4kwZEiV... ; https://t.me/mihwar_almuqawama/34798 ; https://t.me/maymun5/52141 ; https://twitter.com/AuroraIntel/status/1712523324922667203

[18] https://twitter.com/rien4djri/status/1712470496124797348 ; https://twitter.com/nourabohsn/status/1712511236187857080

[19] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/irans-airbridge-to-syria

[20] https://twitter.com/AuroraIntel/status/1712427349147312129

[21] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1098#:~:text=On%20July%2...'s%20support%20to%20proxy

[22] https://amwaj dot media/article/inside-story-will-biden-join-trump-in-reneging-on-us-deals-with-iran

[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear-progra... ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-launches-quiet-diplomatic-push-with-ira... ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-slows-buildup-of-near-weapons-grade-en... ; https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/10/us/politics/iran-us-prisoners-nuclear...

[24] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/10/12/iran-oil-fund-us-israel/ ; https://www.forbes.com/sites/mollybohannon/2023/10/12/iran-barred-from-a...

[25] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85256316 ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85256451 ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85256416

[26] https://www.mashreghnews dot ir/news/1535405

[27] https://www.eghtesadnews dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-57/603624-%D9%87%D8%B4%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%B1%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AA%D9%84-%D8%A2%D9%88%DB%8C%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%85%D9%87-%DA%86%DB%8C%D8%B2-%D8%A8%D8%B3%D8%AA%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%DB%8C%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%AF

[28] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/10909692

[29] https://www.almanar dot com.lb/10913597 ;

https://www.almanar dot com.lb/10912673

[30] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/19/2970346

[31] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-february-27-2023

[32] https://president dot ir/fa/147086 ;

https://president dot ir/fa/147088

[33] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/5906400 ;

https://www.dailysabah dot com/politics/diplomacy/fm-fidan-discusses-israel-palestine-tensions-with-counterparts ;

https://www.farsnews dot ir/en/news/14020717000297 ;

https://www.irna dot ir/news/85253127 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/17/2969142 ;

https://en.isna dot ir/news/1402071912863 ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/07/18/2969785 ;

https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/731261

https://mfa dot ir/portal/newsview/731320

[34] https://www.irna dot ir/news/85256286

[35] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-april-7-2023

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