ISRAEL–HAMAS WAR (IRAN UPDATE)
This page collects the refocused Iran Updates that ISW began publishing on October 7, 2023. ISW and The Critical Threats Project (CTP) have refocused the Iran Update to cover the Israel–Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision making of the Iranian regime. ISW and CTP at the American Enterprise Institute provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Johanna Moore, Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Andie Parry, & Nicholas Carl
Key Takeaways:
- Palestinian militias continued drone and indirect fire attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel, on October 16. The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants dropped slightly on October 16 after peaking on October 13.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned on October 15 and 16 that a multi-front war against Israel is becoming more likely and that Iranian-backed militias may take preemptive actions against Israel in the “coming hours.
- The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is trying to improve its operational security in eastern Syria likely as part of an effort to move advanced military systems into Syria and Lebanon. 250-500 Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces arrived in Syria and Lebanon on October 16.
Gaza Strip
Palestinian militias continued indirect fire attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel, on October 16. Hamas’ militant wing, the al Qassem Brigades, claimed responsibility for 18 mortar and rocket attacks.[1] Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) militant wing, Saraya al Quds, claimed responsibility for another six mortar and rocket attacks.[2] The militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the National Resistance Brigades, claimed two mortar attacks into Israel from Gaza.[3] CTP-ISW recorded 10 unclaimed mortar and rocket strikes as well.[4]
CTP-ISW did not record any reports of infiltrations or small arms clashes in southern Israel on October 16.
West Bank
The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants dropped slightly on October 16 after peaking on October 13. CTP-ISW recorded nine clashes and four marches in the West Bank compared to 32 clashes recorded on October 13.[5] Israeli forces arrested 20 individuals affiliated with Hamas in the West Bank and seized various small arms and ammunition.[6] CTP-ISW previously suggested that arrest campaigns in the West Bank may be contributing to the declining violence.[7] Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed six attacks on Israeli positions in Northern Israel on October 16 and fired an anti-tank missile at an Israeli tank.[8] CTP-ISW recorded one mortar attack into Israeli territory from Lebanon, a decrease compared to seven recorded on October 15.[9] The IDF said that there were multiple small arms clashes on Israel’s northern border.[10] CTP-ISW also recorded one small arms clash between LH and Israeli security forces across Israel’s northern border on October 16.[11] LH released a video on October 16 showing LH militants shooting at Israeli surveillance equipment on the Lebanese border.[12] LH members were seen shooting at Israeli Army radio towers and cameras at outposts along the Israel-Lebanon border.
Israel’s National Emergency Authority (NAE), which falls under the Israeli Ministry of Defense, evacuated Israeli citizens from 28 towns on the Israel-Lebanon border to create a two-kilometer buffer zone.[13] Lebanese Hezbollah steadily increased its activity along the Israeli border between October 7 and 15.[14] CTP-ISW has also reported several unconfirmed reports of militia infiltrations into northern Israel.[15]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned on October 15 and 16 that a multi-front war against Israel is becoming more likely and that Iranian-backed militias may take preemptive actions against Israel in the “coming hours.” Abdollahian stated in an interview with Al Jazeera on October 15 that Israel’s continued siege of Gaza is making a multi-front war “increasingly more probable.”[16] Abdollahian similarly posted on X (Twitter) on October 16 that “the time for political solutions is coming to an end” and that the expansion of the Israel-Hamas war to new fronts is becoming “inevitable.”[17] Abdollahian also warned on October 16 that resistance groups may take “preemptive measures” against Israel in the “coming hours.”[18] Iranian state media recirculated Abdollahian’s warning in English, indicating that their intended audience is the United States and Israel. [19] CTP-ISW will continue to closely monitor the Israel-Hamas war to forecast whether a multi-front war is becoming more or less likely.
- The Iranian regime continues to signal its unwillingness to enter a direct conflict with Israel. Iran’s Mission to the United Nations emphasized that Iran will not intervene in the Israel-Hamas war if Israel refrains from attacking Iranian territory, interests, and nationals in a statement on October 15.[20] CTP-ISW previously reported that Iran has articulated its red line for directly intervening in the Israel-Hamas war as an Israeli attack on Iran.[21]
- Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are preparing for the Hamas-Israel war to expand into a regional conflict. Iranian-backed militants have deployed to southern Lebanon and southwestern Syria.[22] These militants include Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces units, and the Afghan Fatemiyoun and Pakistani Zeynabiyoun divisions. The IDF has conducted airstrikes on Damascus and Aleppo international airports to disrupt Iranian military shipments to Syria and Lebanon.
Iran would likely provide material and financial support to its proxies to fight Israel rather than get directly involved in the Israel-Hamas war were this war to expand into a regional conflict. Direct Iranian involvement would lead to escalation with Israel, which Iran seeks to avoid. Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani warned Israel against attacking Iran on October 9, threatening a “devastating response” to any attack.[23] Iran has historically used its proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen to advance its regional objectives—such as expelling the United States from the Middle East—while retaining a degree of plausible deniability.[24]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is trying to improve its operational security in eastern Syria likely as part of an effort to move advanced military systems into Syria and Lebanon. Iran typically takes steps to reinforce operational security along its ground lines of communication in Syria to protect military shipments from Israeli airstrikes.[25] Israel has conducted airstrikes on the Damascus and Aleppo international airports in recent days, which Israeli media and officials have indicated is meant to disrupt the transfer of Iranian military systems to Syria and Lebanon. CTP-ISW is monitoring Iran positioning its proxies in the Levant to support the Palestinian militias fighting against Israel.
- The IRGC commander of eastern Syria prohibited cell phones at IRGC headquarters in Deir ez Zor city in one of several security measures to protect infrastructure and foreign fighters against airstrikes, according to local media.[26] The IRGC attempted to disguise its activity in eastern Syria by providing personnel with civilian cars and rebranding facilities as Syrian Arab Army positions.[27] CTP-ISW previously noted that the IRGC and LH deployments to Deir ez Zor indicated the militias have struggled to preserve operational security as they expand operations in Syria.[28]
- Israel conducted multiple airstrikes on Damascus and Aleppo international airports on October 12 and 14 which disrupts critical aerial nodes through which Iran funnels military equipment and personnel into the Levant.[29] Iran transfers weapons through these airports, as was the case in February 2023 when it sent air defense equipment to Aleppo along with earthquake relief shipments.[30]
- A senior official at the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry indicated that the air strikes in Syria are part of an Israeli effort to prevent Iran from moving weapons into Syria and/or opening a front against Israel from there.[31] Israeli media reported on October 16 that Israel detects an intensive Iranian effort to transfer advanced weapons to LH in Lebanon.[32]
An Iraqi-based open-source intelligence account claimed on October 16 that 250-500 Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces arrived in Syria and Lebanon. This is consistent with CTP-ISW’s tracking of Iranian-backed foreign fighters deploying to border areas with Israel.[33] Iranian-backed militants have deployed to the southwestern Syrian border since the war began on October 7.[34] These militants also include members of the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division and Pakistani Zeynabiyoun Division, according to Israeli media.[35] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani was in Syria coordinating some of these deployments as of October 15, according to an Iran-based journalist.[36] LH similarly redeployed militants from Mayadin to Damascus as part of an effort to transfer LH members throughout Syria to the southwestern border.[37]
Iran has pursued greater coordination with Palestinian groups during the past year. Iranian officials, Lebanese Hezbollah, and Palestinian militant groups held meetings, visits, and calls in the year leading up to Hamas’s October 7 attack. The coordination included Iran providing explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), which militants in the West Bank used in attacks against the IDF. This is consistent with comments from the PIJ leader in Lebanon, Ihsan Ataya, who acknowledged as recently as September 28 that Iran supports PIJ with money, weapons, and “everything it needs to confront Israel.”[38] The coordination also occurred after Hamas began planning its October 7 attack on Israel. The group’s spokesperson claimed the group began planning its attack in 2022.[39] The graphic below demonstrates this coordination with senior Iranian political and strategic leadership, as well as Hamas and PIJ military developments.
Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, and Nicholas Carl
Key Takeaways:
- Palestinian militias continued drone and indirect fire attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel. CTP-ISW did not record any reports of infiltrations or small arms clashes in southern Israel.
- The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants has continued to fall after peaking on October 13.
- LH expanded its campaign against Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in terms of pace, location, and actors involved. The IDF spokesperson stated that Iran has instructed LH to escalate against Israel and thereby impose pressure on the IDF while it prepares for ground operations into the Gaza Strip.
- The IDF conducted an airstrike on the Aleppo International Airport, marking the second time that the IDF has struck this location since the war began on October 7.
- Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdollahian met with senior Hamas and Qatari officials during an official visit to Doha.
Gaza Strip
Palestinian militias continued drone and indirect fire attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel, on October 15. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for two one-way drone attacks and 12 mortar and rocket attacks.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for another 12 mortar and rocket attacks.[2] The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine militia claimed that it conducted two mortar attacks.[3] CTP-ISW recorded reports of five unclaimed mortar and rocket strikes as well.[4] This rate of fire is consistent with CTP-ISW’s previous reporting that Hamas has reduced the frequency of its attacks to conserve its munitions stockpile and prepare for a prolonged war.[5]
CTP-ISW did not record any reports of infiltrations or small arms clashes in southern Israel on October 15.
West Bank
The rate of small arms clashes between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants has continued to fall after peaking on October 13. CTP-ISW recorded eight clashes on October 15 and 13 clashes on October 14—significantly less than the 32 clashes recorded on October 13. Israeli forces are conducting arrest campaigns in the West Bank, which may be contributing to the declining violence.[6] Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however.[7]
Fatah—the dominant Palestinian political party in the West Bank—organized a march in Ramallah on October 15 to denounce IDF attacks into the Gaza Strip.[8] CTP-ISW has recorded five instances of clashes and four instances of marches in Ramallah since October 7.[9]
South Lebanon and Golan Heights
LH expanded its campaign against Israeli forces along the Israel-Lebanon border in terms of pace, location, and actors involved on October 15. The IDF spokesperson stated that Iran has instructed LH to escalate against Israel and thereby impose pressure on the IDF while it prepares for ground operations into the Gaza Strip.[10]
- LH engaged in small arms clashes with Israeli forces in five border towns and military posts.[11] LH also fired anti-tank missiles at Israeli targets in at least five instances.[12] LH claimed responsibility for these attacks for the third consecutive day. This activity marks a slight uptick in the rate of attacks compared to previous days and an expansion of attacks westward along the Israel-Lebanon border. Most LH attacks on Israeli targets have occurred around Shebaa Farms since the war began on October 7.[13]
- Hamas’s al Qassem Brigades claimed to launch 20 rockets into northern Israel on October 15.[14] LH probably approved the attack in advanced given the extent to which LH controls southern Lebanon and coordinated with other Iranian-backed groups there. The al Qassem Brigades furthermore released a statement on October 15 claiming that its militants infiltrated northern Israel and clashed with Israeli forces.[15]
The IDF conducted an airstrike on the Aleppo International Airport on October 14, marking the second time that the IDF has struck this location since the war began on October 7.[16] The IDF similarly conducted an airstrike on the Damascus International Airport on October 12.[17] A senior official at the Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry indicated that the strikes are part of an Israeli effort to prevent Iran from moving weapons into Syria and/or opening a front against Israel from there.[18] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has long used commercial airliners affiliated with the Iranian regime for military transports to Syria throughout the civil war there.
Unidentified militants conducted a rocket attack from Syria into the Golan Heights following the IDF airstrike on Aleppo, possibly as symbolic retaliation.[19] Israeli forces intercepted the rockets and fired artillery back into Syria.[20]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that Iran will intervene in some unspecified way if Israel continues its attacks into the Gaza Strip and especially If the IDF conducts ground operations there, according to Axios.[21] Abdollahian issued this warning during a meeting with UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor Wennesland in Beirut on October 14. CTP-ISW reported on this meeting at the time, noting that Abdollahian called on the United Nations to stop IDF attacks into the Gaza Strip before it is “too late.”[22]
- Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have deployed to the Israel-Lebanon border in recent days. Fighters from Asaib Ahl al Haq announced on October 8 that they are joining the war against Israel.[23] Prominent Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have broadcast on social media their presence near the border since then.[24] These militants include Abu Alaa al Walaei—the leader of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Seyyed ol Shohada.[25]
- Iranian-backed militants have deployed to the southwestern Syrian border in recent days. These militants include military engineers and missile experts.[26] These militants also include members of the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division and Pakistani Zeynabiyoun Division, according to Israeli media.[27] IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani is currently in Syria coordinating some of these deployments, according to an Iranian journalist.[28] The journalist claimed that Ghaani was in Iraq meeting with Iranian-backed militias three days prior to traveling to Syria.
Abdollahian met with senior Hamas and Qatari officials during an official visit to Doha on October 14-15.
- Abdollahian met with senior Hamas officials, including its Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, in Doha.[29] Abdollahian during the meeting implicitly threatened Israel if the IDF continues to attack targets in the Gaza Strip. Abdollahian is visiting Qatar after concluding a diplomatic tour of Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. CTP-ISW assessed that the tour was part of an Iranian effort to coordinate politically with senior leaders of Axis of Resistance vis-Ã -vis the Hamas-Israel war.[30]
- Abdollahian met separately with Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani and Prime Minister Mohammad bin Abdul Rahman al Thani in Doha.[31] Iranian readouts of the meetings focused primarily on the Hamas-Israel war. Abdollahian may have discussed Iranian financial assets currently held in Qatar. Western media reported on October 12 that the United States and Qatar have agreed to prevent Iran from accessing $6 billion of its financial assets in Qatari banks.[32] South Korea transferred the assets to Qatari banks for Iran to access as part of the prisoner swap deal that the United States and Iran reached in August 2023.
Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 3:00 pm EDT
Key Takeaways:
- Hamas continued its ground and rocket attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel. Palestinian militants are continuing limited attempts to infiltrate southern Israel via land and sea.
- Clashes in the West Bank between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias decreased after peaking on October 13. Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however.
- Lebanese Hezbollah claimed attacks on the IDF for the second consecutive day as part of its ongoing harassment of Israeli forces. LH messaging indicates that the group will conduct additional attacks against Israeli forces in the coming days.
- Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdollahian traveled to Qatar, likely to meet with Hamas leadership and discuss Iranian financial assets with Qatari officials.
Gaza Strip
Hamas continued its ground and rocket attacks into Israel, primarily southern Israel, on October 14. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for conducting rocket attacks on 12 locations, including Tel Aviv.[1] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for launching rockets on seven locations in southern Israel.[2] Hamas has reduced its rate of rocket fire into Israeli territory since October 12 to conserve its stockpile and prepare for a prolonged war.[3]
Palestinian militants are continuing limited attempts to infiltrate southern Israel via land and sea. Militants engaged in small arms clashes with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) at least four times in Israeli territory surrounding the Gaza Strip on October 14. These militants used an anti-tank missile in one of these instances.[4] The IDF Navy separately interdicted speedboats trying to enter Israeli territory.[5] Hamas previously used speedboats to launch its assault into Israeli territory on October 7.[6]
Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) are messaging that Hamas is prepared to defend the Gaza Strip effectively against the IDF. Hamas published messages on October 14 boasting about its anti-armor capabilities and defensive preparations.[7] LH-affiliated al Mayadeen similarly published remarks from an unspecified Palestinian militant stating that Palestinian militias have a comprehensive defense plan for the Gaza Strip.[8] The militant also stated that the militias have enough manpower and weapons to fight the IDF for months in the Gaza Strip. Below are some of the factors that Hamas could exploit in fighting the IDF in the Gaza Strip.
- Hamas maintains around 480 kilometers of tunnels under the strip.[9] The Washington Institute for Near East Policy wrote that “Hamas has had 15 years to prepare a dense ‘defense in depth’ that integrates subterranean, ground-level, and aboveground fortifications.”[10] Hamas could use these tunnels to quickly maneuver around the battlespace and facilitate the movement of fighters and weapons.
- Hamas has manufactured and used Iranian-designed explosively formed penetrators (EFP) in the Gaza Strip since 2007.[11] Hamas could use EFPs to constrain the movement of the IDF in the urban environment and threaten Israeli troops. Iran exported EFPs to its proxy and partner militias in Iraq as late as 2004, which these militias then used extensively in their attacks on US servicemembers in Iraq.[12]
- Hamas took around 150-200 individuals hostage during its initial attack into Israeli territory on October 7.[13] The al Qassem Brigades spokesperson has threatened to execute hostages in response to Israeli attacks, although CTP-ISW has not yet recorded any such executions.[14] CTP-ISW previously reported on how Hamas uses civilians as human shields, intentionally putting them in danger to protect Hamas’ military infrastructure and weapons.[15]
West Bank
Clashes in the West Bank between Israeli forces and Palestinian militias decreased on October 14 after peaking the previous day. CTP-ISW recorded 13 small arms clashes across the West Bank on October 14—significantly less than the 32 clashes recorded on October 13. Israeli forces are conducting arrest campaigns in the West Bank, which may be contributing to the reduced violence.
Hamas remains committed to expanding the war to the West Bank, however. Hamas has repeatedly called for Palestinians to mobilize and escalate against Israeli forces in the West Bank in recent days.[16] Hamas released a statement on October 14 calling for the establishment of “popular protection committees” in all cities and towns of the West Bank to target Israeli settlers.[17] Hamas stated that it is the duty of all Palestinians to actively participate in the war against Israel.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
LH claimed attacks on the IDF for the second consecutive day on October 14 as part of its ongoing harassment of Israeli forces. LH claimed to have conducted missile and rocket attacks against five IDF positions in the Shebaa Farms.[18] The IDF furthermore conducted a drone strike on the border targeting a group of militants preparing to fire an anti-tank missile toward Israel.[19] Former IDF Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Tamir Tayman stated that LH is conducting attacks against Israel to reduce IDF pressure on Hamas.[20]
LH messaging indicates that the group will conduct additional attacks against Israeli forces in the coming days. LH released separate statements on October 14 emphasizing that Israeli attacks against Lebanese security will not go unanswered and that LH has given permission to its members to fight Israel.[21]
Israeli, Lebanese, and UN officials have warned in recent days that the Hamas-Israel war could expand to Lebanon. Hayman stated that LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is putting Lebanon at serious risk by continuing to conduct attacks against Israeli forces.[22] Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati has similarly warned that LH may enter the war against Israel.[23] Finally, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres stated that IDF airstrikes along the Israel-Lebanon border risk spreading fighting into Lebanon.[24]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Iran and elements of its Axis of Resistance are messaging that the Hamas-Israel war could expand geographically into a multi-front conflict. CTP-ISW is closely monitoring the situation to forecast whether such a scenario is becoming more or less likely.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian warned that the Axis of Resistance has its “hands on the trigger” and will respond to Israel “at an appropriate time” if the United Nations does not stop IDF attacks into the Gaza Strip.[25] Abdollahian made these comments during a press conference in Beirut on October 14. Abdollahian similarly called on the United Nations to stop IDF attacks before it is “too late” during a meeting with UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Tor Wennesland in Beirut on October 14.[26]
- Iranian-backed Iraqi militants have broadcast their presence in Lebanon in recent days. Fighters from Asaib Ahl al Haq announced on October 8 that they are joining the war against Israel.[27] Abu Azrael—an Iranian-backed Iraqi fighter with a prominent social media presence—later claimed on October 12 that he is near the Israel-Lebanon border and waiting for “any opportunity” to enter Israel.[28] A Syrian journalist on October 13 claimed that elements of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces have entered Lebanon via Syria.[29]
- The IRGC and LH deployed forces to the southwestern Syrian border on October 13, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[30] The IRGC transferred elements of its engineering units from Albu Kamal to the Golan Heights. LH similarly redeployed militants from Mayadin to Damascus as part of an effort to transfer LH members throughout Syria to the southwestern border.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian traveled to Qatar on October 14, likely to meet with Hamas leadership and discuss Iranian financial assets with Qatari officials.
- Senior Hamas officials, including its Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, are based in Qatar.[31] Abdollahian is concluded a diplomatic tour to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria before traveling to Qatar. CTP-ISW assessed that the tour was part of an Iranian effort to coordinate politically with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance.[32]
- Western media reported on October 12 that the United States and Qatar have agreed to prevent Iran from accessing $6 billion of financial assets in Qatari banks.[33] South Korea transferred the assets to Qatari banks for Iran to access as part of the prisoner swap agreement that the United States and Iran reached in August 2023.
Ashka Jhaveri, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl
Key Takeaways:
- Hamas continued conducting rocket attacks into Israel at a lower rate of fire compared to previous days. The group also urged Palestinian civilians to remain in place in response to Israeli calls for civilians to evacuate the northern Gaza Strip.
- Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli security forces across the West Bank at a higher rate, which is consistent with Hamas’ call for escalation.
- The Iranian regime is messaging that US and Israeli actions could expand the war beyond Israel and the Palestinian territories while trying to intensify violence against Israel in the West Bank.
Gaza Strip
Hamas continued conducting rocket attacks into Israel at a lower rate of fire on October 13 compared to previous days. Hamas began reducing its rate of attacks on October 12 to conserve its rocket stockpile and prepare for a prolonged war, as CTP and ISW previously reported. Hamas targeted northern, central, and southern Israel on October 13. Hamas’ military spokesman announced that the group fired 150 rockets at Ashkelon, 50 rockets at Sderot, and bombed the Ben Gurion Airport in central Israel.[1] Israeli civilians have evacuated the periphery areas of Gaza.[2] Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades claimed that the rocket barrages are in response to Israel’s displacement and targeting of civilians.[3] The IDF’s operational update on October 13 notes that militants have launched 6,000 rockets from Gaza.[4] CTP-ISW previously reported that Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have expended around 33 percent of their rocket arsenal since the war began.
- The IDF intercepted an Ayyash 250 rocket that Hamas launched from the Gaza Strip toward the IDF Northern Region Command headquarters in Safed. Safed is the furthest location that Hamas has targeted since the war began on October 7.[5]
- CTP-ISW also recorded several other rockets launches by PIJ and the al Qassem Brigades into Israel as of October 13, including the al Qassem Brigades launching two al Zouari one-way attack drones at IDF soldiers in Saad and a Mutabar 1 air defense missile at an Israeli drone flying over Gaza.[6]
CTP-ISW recorded one clash between Palestinian militants and Israeli security forces in Israeli territory on October 12. This reflects a decrease compared to the first few days of the war, when Hamas militants engaged in fierce fighting across southern Israel.[7]
Hamas urged Palestinian civilians to remain in place in response to Israeli calls for civilians to evacuate the northern Gaza Strip on October 13.[8] The IDF informed the UN on October 12 that the 1.1 million residents in northern Gaza should relocate within the next 24 hours.[9] The IDF said in the coming days it is expected to continue to operate significantly in Gaza City and wants to avoid harming civilians.[10] Hamas spokesperson Abu Ubaida described the call as “psychological warfare” against Palestinians and urged locals to stay.[11] Hamas continues to use civilians as human shields, which intentionally puts these civilians in harm's way, to protect Hamas’ military infrastructure and weapons.[12] Civilians leaving the northern Gaza Strip en masse would risk depriving Hamas of the ability to use regular civilian activity to mask its military activities. The UN reported that 423,000 out of 2.3 million people in Gaza are now internally displaced.[13]
West Bank
Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli security forces across the West Bank at a higher rate on October 13, which is consistent with Hamas’ call for escalation. CTP-ISW recorded 32 instances of small armed combat between locals and Israeli security forces or Israeli settlers on October 13. A US-based research analyst similarly noted an increase in violence in the West Bank.[14] Hamas released a statement on October 12 celebrating clashes with Israeli security forces in the West Bank and called for continuation and further escalation.[15] PIJ released a statement announcing the launch of a campaign to conduct widespread attacks in Jenin, a Palestinian militant stronghold in the northern West Bank.[16] PIJ has established several subunits, which operate in Tubas, Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm.[17]
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Jordan on October 13.[18] Abbas called for an end to Israeli aggression and stated that the displacement of people from Gaza would constitute a “second catastrophe for our people” in the meeting.[19] Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen framed the meeting as “tense” and cited Palestinian leadership, who claimed Abbas told Blinken that the Israeli displacement in Gaza is a prelude to plans to displace residents in the West Bank.[20] ISW cannot corroborate the report. The report is consistent with Hamas’ stated objective for the Al Aqsa Flood operation to extend to the West Bank.[21]
South Lebanon and the Golan Heights
Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) claimed to attack four Israeli positions in northern Israel on October 13. LH said the attacks were in response to Israeli attacks on several southern Lebanese towns. The IDF responded by striking LH-affiliated targets with a drone.[22] CTP-ISW recorded two reports of unspecified militants approaching the border and clashing with Israeli security forces.[23] A correspondent for Al Jazeera noted that the IDF shelling is more extensive than previous days and that Palestinian groups are believed to be behind the infiltration attempts.[24] The Lebanese Army also engaged in small arms combat and artillery fire with Israeli security forces along the Israel-Lebanon border. This level of attacks is a slight uptick from the previous days’ levels of kinetic activity around Israel’s northern border.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and LH deployed forces to the southwestern Syrian border on October 13. The IRGC transferred elements of its engineering units from Albu Kamal to the Golan Heights.[25] LH redeployed militants from Mayadin to Damascus, which is part of its effort to redeploy all members from the Syrian provinces to Quneitra and Damascus, according to a locally based opposition outlet.[26] The Iranian- and LH-directed deployments are consistent with the scenario in which the current conflict in Israel expands into a multi-front war surrounding Israel.
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
The Iranian regime is messaging that US and Israeli actions could expand the war beyond Israel and the Palestinian territories while trying to intensify violence against Israel in the West Bank. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian repeatedly emphasized that a continuation of the Israeli “war crimes” against Palestinians could expand the conflict to the region during several meetings with Lebanese and Lebanese Hezbollah officials on October 13.[27] He similarly argued that the expansion of the conflict to other fronts would depend on Israeli actions during his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani in Baghdad on October 12.[28] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other regime officials emphasized that Iran had no role in the October 7 Hamas attack.[29]
- Abdollahian criticized the United States for supporting Israel to “kill Palestinians on the one hand” while calling for others to “exercise self-restraint on the other hand” during a press conference in Beirut on October 13.[30] Abdollahian warned that “any possibility is conceivable” were this situation to continue.[31] Abdollahian also stated that the United States must control Israel in order to avoid the outbreak of regional war during his meeting with Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati in Beirut on October 13.[32]
- IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami emphasized the American role in “managing” Israeli operations against Gaza during his Friday prayer sermon in Tehran on October 13.[33] Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi similarly pointed to the American “complicitly” in Israeli actions during a trip to Fars Province on October 13.[34]
- Iranian Intelligence and Security Minister Esmail Khatib and Interim Tehran Friday Prayer Leader Ahmad Khatami called for the “Palestinian resistance” to deliver greater responses to Israeli aggression on October 13.[35] IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency recirculated calls from PIJ to expand the conflict beyond Gaza and “intensify” the resistance in the West Bank against Israeli “invaders” on October 12.[36]
Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 3:00 pm EDT
Key Takeaways:
- Hamas continued rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel but reduced the rate of these attacks.
- Small arms clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces increased slightly across the West Bank, as Palestinian militias try to stoke conflict there.
- CTP-ISW recorded three rocket strikes into Israeli territory from Lebanon.
- Unidentified Iranian officials implicitly threatened to direct proxy attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria if the United States re-freezes Iranian financial assets abroad.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is conducting a diplomatic tour to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, possibly to coordinate politically with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance.
- Iran is conducting a diplomatic campaign to unite Muslim countries against Israel.
Gaza Strip
Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Hamas continued rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel but reduced the rate of these attacks on October 13.[1] An IDF commander stated that Hamas is trying to conserve its rocket stockpile and prepare for a prolonged war.[2] Israel estimates that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have expended around 33 percent of their rocket arsenal since the war began on October 7.[3]
Hamas appeared to reduce the rate of its infiltrations into Israeli territory as well. CTP-ISW recorded one small arms clash between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces along the border of the Gaza Strip on October 12—a decrease from the six clashes that ISW recorded across October 10 and 11.[4]
Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Hamas spokesperson Abu Ubaida released a video statement on October 12 describing the planning and objectives of the al Aqsa Flood operation.[5] Ubaida claimed that Hamas began planning the operation in 2022 and conducted extensive analysis of Israeli forces and the terrain throughout the planning process. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency recirculated reporting that the Palestinian resistance has prepared itself for a long-term battle, including offensive operations in Israeli territory.[6] Ubaida stated that the objective of the operation was to destroy the IDF Gaza Division and facilitate further attacks into southern Israel.[7] Hamas’ militant wing has continued attacks on Israeli territory as far north as the Haifa District and has called on Palestinian militants in the West Bank to mobilize.
West Bank
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and marches in the West Bank.
Small arms clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces increased slightly across the West Bank on October 12, as Palestinian militias try to stoke conflict there.[8] Clashes occurred in around 21 locations.[9] Leaders from Hamas, PIJ, and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade separately issued calls on October 11 and 12 urging individuals in the West Bank to mobilize and join the fight against Israel, highlighting their desire to expand the war geographically to the West Bank.[10] PIJ spokesperson Abu Hamza boasted that the West Bank has entered the fight and called for militants to increase the rate of attacks against Israeli forces.[11] Iranian state media recirculated these calls and celebrated the ongoing clashes.[12]
Hamas has called for a surge in anti-Israel activity on Friday, October 13, which risks driving further clashes.[13] The West Bank-based Lions’ Den militia previously succeeded in mobilizing supporters to hold marchers and clash with Israeli forces on October 11, as CTP-ISW previously reported, suggesting that Hamas may see similar success.[14] It is furthermore common for public participation in marches and protests in the Middle East to increase on Fridays, as such activities often follow Friday prayers.
South Lebanon and the Golan Heights
Recorded reports of rocket fire; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
CTP-ISW recorded three rocket strikes into Israeli territory from Lebanon on October 12.[15] This level of rocket fire is consistent with previous days’ levels of kinetic activity around Israel’s northern border.[16]
The IDF conducted airstrikes on the Damascus and Aleppo international airports on October 12, disrupting critical nodes through which Iran funnels military equipment and personnel into the Levant.[17] The IDF struck the airport runways. The Syrian Arab Army conducted a mortar strike into the Golan Heights after the attacks, possibly as symbolic retaliation.[18] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has long used commercial airliners affiliated with the Iranian regime for military transports to Syria throughout the civil war there.[19]
A Mahan Air flight was en route from Tehran to Damascus around the time of the IDF airstrikes and then changed course back to Iran.[20] The United States has sanctioned Mahan Air for transporting military personnel and materiel on behalf of the IRGC Quds Force to Syria to support the Iranians' efforts to defend the Bashar al Assad regime and entrench the Iranian military influence around the Levant.[21]
Iran and the Axis of Resistance
Unidentified Iranian officials implicitly threatened to direct proxy attacks against US forces in Iraq and Syria if the United States re-freezes Iranian financial assets abroad. These Iranian officials told UK-based Amwaj Media that the August 2023 prisoner swap deal between the United States and Iran involved a broader understanding in which Iran would pause proxy attacks against US positions in exchange for the United States allowing the release of $6 billion worth of frozen Iranian financial assets in South Korean banks.[22] Western media reported similar details on this broader understanding at the time.[23] South Korea has gradually transferred that money to Qatari banks for Iran to access since the agreement was reached. Western media has reported that the United States and Qatar have reached an agreement to refreeze the Iranian financial assets in response to the Hamas ground and air attack into Israel.[24] CTP-ISW is updating its chart on Axis of Resistance red lines based on these reports.
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian is conducting a diplomatic tour to Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, possibly to coordinate politically with senior leaders in the Axis of Resistance. Abdollahian traveled to Baghdad and met with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji on October 12.[25] Abdollahian stated that Israel cannot commit “war crimes” against Gaza civilians "without expecting a response” during his meeting with Araji.[26] Abdollahian additionally commented on the possibility of the opening of a new front against Israel during his meeting with Sudani, stating that “everything depends on [Israeli] actions in Gaza.”[27] Abdollahian will travel to Beirut and Damascus in the coming days. Abdollahian recently met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus on August 31.[28] Abdollahian also met with Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah, and Hamas Political Bureau Deputy Chairman Saleh al Arouri in Beirut on September 1.[29] Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati additionally held separate phone calls with Haniyeh and Nakhalah on October 11.[30] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei commonly uses Velayati as his personal envoy abroad and especially to members of the Axis of Resistance and Palestinian groups.[31]
Iran is conducting a diplomatic campaign to unite Muslim countries against Israel. Senior Iranian officials conducted a flurry of phone calls to foreign leaders on October 11 and 12 to discuss the war in Israel. President Ebrahim Raisi held separate phone calls with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and Syrian President Bashar al Assad.[32] The call with Mohammad bin Salman is particularly noteworthy given that it is the first call between them since Iran and Saudi Arabia normalized ties in March 2023. Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian has held phone calls with his Emirati, Egyptian, Filipino, Hungarian, Iraqi, Omani, Qatari, Russian, and Turkish counterparts since October 7.[33] Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has held phone calls with his counterparts in Algeria, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Turkey, and the UAE.[34] Tehran has historically sought to rally Muslim countries against Israel and frame itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. Iran conducted a similar diplomatic campaign to this end when tensions rose between Israel and the Palestinian militias in April 2023, which CTP previously reported.[35]
Andie Parry, Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, and Amin Soltani
Information Cutoff: 3:00 pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates daily. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the war in Israel. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance.
Key Takeaways
- Incursions by Hamas into southern Israel have slowed since October 9. Palestinian militias in Gaza are using drones and rockets to strike towns in northern and southern Israel.
- The Lions’ Den—a West Bank-based Palestinian militia—mobilized supporters to hold marches and engage in small arms clashes with Israeli security forces. Hamas is calling on its supporters in the West Bank to storm Jerusalem on October 13.
- Lebanese Hezbollah fired missiles, including anti-tank munitions, at Israeli security forces in northern Israel.
- Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have articulated the thresholds at which they would intervene in the war against Israel. These threats highlight the risk of the war expanding throughout the region.
Gaza Strip
Hamas incursions into southern Israel by land and sea have slowed since October 9.[1] Palestinian militant groups are now relying on rocket barrages and attack drones to hit towns in northern and southern Israel.[2] Rocket fire from Gaza extended north to Haifa and multiple barrages have hit Tel Aviv.[3] The Hamas spokesperson warned Israeli civilians to evacuate Ashkelon near the Gaza border before the group launched hundreds of rockets on October 10, claiming the attack was retribution for Israeli airstrikes on Gaza.[4] Hamas warnings have not preceded such rocket barrages previously. Israel conducted strikes in over 1,270 locations in Gaza and killed at least three Hamas leaders over the two-day period.[5] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) spokesperson stated early on October 10 that its forces regained control of the Gaza border.[6] Clashes continued in isolated pockets immediately north and east of the Gaza Strip on October 10 and 11, however.[7]
West Bank
The Lions’ Den—a West Bank-based Palestinian militia—mobilized supporters to hold marches and engage in small arms clashes with Israeli security forces. Small arms clashes and marches took place in approximately 19 locations across the West Bank in response to the Lions’ Den call for supporters to take to the street at 10:00 am EST.[8] Hamas released a statement separately from the Lions’ Den calling on its supporters in the West Bank to storm Jerusalem on October 13.[9] These separate calls may indicate that Palestinian militias are struggling to coordinate their mobilization efforts across Gaza and the West Bank.
- Supporters of The Lion’s Den last responded to the group’s calls to demonstrate and conduct attacks on military and civilian targets on October 9, as CTP and ISW previously reported.[10] CTP and ISW reported that leadership from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Fatah, and the Al Quds Brigade were quick to pledge their support to Hamas’s operation and issued various calls for militia members and civilians to take up arms.[11] These groups have refrained from explicitly calling on supporters to conduct acts of violence against Israelis, however.
South Lebanon and the Golan Heights
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) fired missiles, including anti-tank munitions, at Israeli security forces in northern Israel. LH claimed responsibility for firing anti-tank missiles at IDF positions in northern Israel on October 10 and 11, which prompted Israeli retaliatory attacks into Lebanon.[12] LH said an attack using a guided missile on October 11 was a firm response to the killing of its fighters in an Israeli airstrike on October 9.[13] LH launched an attempted infiltration to capture an Israeli town on its northern border on October 11.[14] Unspecified militants also launched rocket barrages into open areas in northern Israel on October 9 and 10.[15]
The IDF responded to the attacks by conducting airstrikes on LH-affiliated military sites.[16] The IDF announced on October 11 that there was no incursion into Israeli airspace following reports of the Israeli Red Alert sirens sounding in several towns.[17] CTP and ISW previously reported that LH conducted artillery strikes into Israel for the second consecutive day, and at least six PIJ members attempted to cross into Israeli territory from southern Lebanon from October 8-9. CTP and ISW also previously assessed that LH clashes with Israeli security forces in addition to attacks in the West Bank could expand the war into a second front.
Unidentified militants launched rockets into Israeli territory from Syria on October 10.[18] The IDF responded to the launches with artillery and mortar fire into Syria.[19] UK-based opposition media Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said a Palestinian group working with LH in Syria territory was responsible for the attack.[20] Palestinian militants in Syria conducted rocket attacks from the Golan Heights into Israel in April 2023 in retaliation for Israeli security forces raiding the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.[21] A pro-regime milblogger reported on October 10 that Syria will target Israeli airbases to reduce the Israeli Air Forces’ ability to operate.[22] A Syrian Arab Army soldier held up a sign praising Palestinians and pledging support.[23] The rocket fire is the first time that militants in Syria have attacked Israel during the war and is consistent with the threat of a multi-front war against Israel.
Pro-Syrian regime forces have deployed to the border between Syria and Israeli territory since October 9. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party’s (SSNP) militant wing, the Eagles of the Whirlwind, deployed forces and promised support on October 9.[24] The SSNP is an ally of LH and has fought alongside LH militants in Beirut during the conflict in 2008.[25] LH personnel left Deir ez Zor Province for Lebanon on October 10 although ISW cannot confirm the intention behind the deployment.[26] The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced on October 11 that it seeks to recruit 1,000 men from Deir ez Zor Province for a 20–30-day training before deploying to Israel.[27] Iran has sought to achieve total hegemony over Deir ez Zor Province since May 2023 and uses its military positioning there to threaten the US force presence in eastern Syria.[28] The deployment to southern Syria suggests Iran is giving priority to amassing forces in southern Syria, which is consistent with the threat of another front opening in the war on Israel.
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance have articulated the thresholds at which they would intervene in the war against Israel. The top leadership from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Seyyed ol Shohada, Ashab al Kahf, Asaib Ahl al Haq, Kataib Hezbollah, and the Badr Organization threatened to strike US targets if the United States intervenes in Hamas’ war with Israel.[29]
- Head of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization Hadi al Ameri threatened to attack US forces if the United States intervenes in the war to support Israel. Ameri’s statement came after the United States announced it will send a carrier strike group to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to support Israel and will supply Israeli forces with military equipment and ammunition.[30]
- An Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry official warned on October 9 that Iran would give a “devastating response” if Israel hit Iranian territory by attacking from Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen—implicitly drawing in actors from Iran’s Axis of Resistance.[31]
Iranian officials and media accused Israel of committing war crimes in Gaza, promoted a multi-front offensive against Israel, and emphasized Israel’s military and intelligence failure on October 11. Iranian state media and officials accused Israel of using white phosphorous bombs against Gaza civilians and described Israel’s siege of Gaza as a “genocide” and “massacre.”[33] White phosphorous is an incendiary chemical substance that the IDF used in military operations in Gaza between 2008 and 2009.[34]
- Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian described Israel’s siege as a “systematic war crime against humanity” during a phone call with International Red Cross head Mirjana Spoljaric Egger.[35] Iranian state television also published a video depicting the IRGC, Hamas, LH, and Badr Organization preparing to attack Jerusalem.[36]
- Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Committee member Abbas Golrou stated that the continuation of Israeli strikes on Gaza could drive non-Palestinian Arabs and LH to join the war against Israel.[37] Golrou added that the Syrian people could use the current conflict to try to “liberate” the Golan Heights from Israel.
- IRGC-affiliated media similarly argued that an American intervention would escalate and expand the existing conflict.[38] Iranian officials and media also echoed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s October 10 claim that Israel has suffered an “irreparable” military and intelligence failure.[39]
Iran is messaging the above to advance the following objectives:
- Unravel the Israel-Saudi Arabia normalization process. Western media reported throughout August and September 2023 that Israel and Saudi Arabia may be close to reaching a normalization agreement that would include security cooperation and mutual defense.[40] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei warned regional states on October 3 not to “gamble” their security on normalizing relations with Israel.[41] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian has furthermore been leading a political effort since October 8 to unify Arab countries in condemning the Israeli attacks on Gaza.[42] Iranian media has similarly saturated the regional media space with articles arguing that an Israeli-Saudi normalization is now impossible given Israel’s military-intelligence failure and the “genocidal” Israeli response in Gaza.[43]
- Portray Israel as weak. Senior Iranian political and military officials, including Supreme Leader Foreign Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri, and IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami, have subsequently echoed Khamenei’s warning, arguing that the October 7 Hamas attack demonstrated Israel’s military weakness and therefore its inability to provide security to the states seeking to normalize relations with it.[44]
- Generate momentum for further conflict. Iranian officials and media have since October 8 repeatedly referenced Israel’s military weakness and intelligence failures during the Hamas surprise attack, portraying Israel as vulnerable.[45] These same officials and media have used the Israeli response to the attack to portray Israel as “genocidal.”[46] Several Iranian-backed militant groups and other non-Iranian-backed groups have since expressed interest in joining the conflict with Israel. Western and Israeli officials and media have expressed concern about the potential expansion of the conflict to areas beyond Gaza and to groups other than Hamas.[47] Iranian officials have previously outlined Iran’s long-term strategy to eventually embroil Israel in a multi-front war.[48]
Iranian officials continued to deny on October 10 and 11 Iran's involvement in Hamas’ ground and air attack against Israel. The Wall Street Journal reported on October 8 that Iran had helped plan the Al Aqsa Flood Operation in meetings with representatives from Hamas, LH, and PIJ in Beirut since August 2023.[49] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei praised Hamas’ attack but denied any Iranian involvement in a speech at the Imam Ali Army Officer University in Tehran on October 10.[50] Khamenei stated that individuals who believe Iran was involved “underestimate” the Palestinians’ ability to conduct attacks on their own. Khamenei stressed that Israel brought the attack upon itself by committing crimes against Palestinians “for many years.” Hardline and reformist officials reiterated Iran’s non-involvement in the conflict on October 11.[51]
Ashka Jhaveri, Annika Ganzeveld, Johanna Moore
Hamas is expanding its incursions into southern Israel as Palestinian militias in the West Bank and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) clash with Israeli security forces in the northern province of the country. The situation could expand the war to a second front. Hamas launched a surprise ground and air attack into Israel on October 7 which included sending hundreds of fighters into Israel to attack nearby border posts, military sites, and residential areas. Israel is conducting airstrikes in Gaza to retaliate. Iran’s Axis of Resistance is aligning itself with Hamas’ operation, however.
- Hamas’ militant wing the Al Qassam Brigade launched an attack into the Israeli town of Rahat, which is approximately 30 kilometers east of Gaza on October 9. The Al Qassam Brigade also fired rockets into Israeli territory on October 9, including into Jerusalem as Hamas called on people in the city to attack Israelis and be at the forefront of resistance.[1]
- Palestinian militias conducted attacks against Israelis in the West Bank on October 9 in response to calls from The Lions’ Den (TLD), a West Bank militia that Israel Hayom claims is receiving funding from Hamas.[2] These attacks are consistent with Hamas’ stated objective for the Al Aqsa Flood Operation to extend to the West Bank.[3]
- The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducted airstrikes on more than 500 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)-affiliated positions, including operational headquarters in Gaza on October 9.[4] The Israeli defense minister imposed a “complete siege” on Gaza, which cut off over two million people from electricity, food, water, and fuel.[5] Israel has mobilized 300,000 military reservists in Israel amid reports of preparations for a ground incursion into Gaza.[6]
Members of the Axis of Resistance have issued threats that may lead the war between Israel and Palestinian militias to expand into the region. Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani said separately on October 9 that Iran would give a “devastating response” to any Israeli attack on Iran. This follows a warning from an unidentified Iranian official that Iran would respond to an Israeli attack on Iran with missile strikes from across the Middle East. ISW previously assessed that LH and Palestinian militia attacks could expand Hamas’s war with Israel into a second front.[7]
- An unidentified Iranian official told Western media on October 8 that Iran would respond to an Israeli attack with missile strikes on Israel from Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen.[8] Missile strikes from Lebanon and Yemen would require the Iranian-backed militants in these countries—LH and the Houthi movement, respectively—to conduct the strikes. The official added that Iran would send fighters into Israel from Syria to attack northern and eastern Israel.
- Head of the Iranian-backed Badr Organization Hadi al Ameri threatened to attack US forces if the United States intervened in the war to support Israel.[9] Ameri’s statement came after the United States announced it would send a carrier strike group to the eastern Mediterranean Sea to support Israel and supply Israeli forces with military equipment and ammunition. Iranian-backed militias in Iraq attacked US forces in Syria in March while Ameri advocated for diplomatic engagement with the United States to resolve issues in Iraq.[10]
- LH conducted artillery strikes into Israel for the second consecutive day and at least six PIJ members attempted to cross into Israeli territory from southern Lebanon.[11] The Israeli government threatened to attack LH with the assistance of the US carrier strike group if LH continued to engage in the war with Hamas. Israel also warned that it would consider striking Damascus, Syria.[12]
The war in Israel is the focus of international attention, and Iran may exploit the situation to advance one or more of its strategic objectives. The table below lists some of Iran’s strategic objectives, their status, and how Iran could advance them.
The Iranian regime is categorically denying Iran’s involvement in Hamas’s ground and air attack against Israel. The Wall Street Journal reported on October 8 that Iran helped plan the Al Aqsa Flood Operation in meetings with representatives from Hamas, LH, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Beirut since August 2023.[18] Iran’s Mission to the United Nations emphasized Iran’s “unflinching support” for Palestine but denied any Iranian involvement in the Al Aqsa Flood Operation in a statement on October 8.[19] Political advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Ali Shamkhani similarly described the Palestinian resistance movement as an “independent movement” on October 8.[20] Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani responded directly to the Wall Street Journal’s allegations on October 9, describing them as “based on political motives."[21]
- US and Israeli officials have responded cautiously to reports of Iranian involvement in Hamas’s attack. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated on October 8 that the US government has not yet seen evidence that Iran directed or was behind the October 7 attack. Blinken noted, however, that Iran and Hamas have a “long relationship.”[22] Israel Defense Forces spokesperson Brigadier General Daniel Hagari stated on October 9 that the Israeli military cannot yet determine whether Iran was involved in planning or training for the attack.[23]
- Iran and Hamas improved relations in 2014 following a series of disagreements on regional developments in the early 2010s.[24] Iran has since then provided extensive material and financial support to Hamas. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant claimed in April 2023 that Iran annually sends $100 million to Hamas, $700 million to LH, and tens of millions of dollars to PIJ.[25]
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) deployed forces to the southwestern Syrian border on October 9, however. Iran has built up a large military footprint in Syria to include weapons storage facilities, headquarters, and barracks to house its affiliated militias. The Iranian and LH-directed deployments are consistent with the scenario in which the Gaza War expands into a multi-front war surrounding Israel.
- Iran instructed the IRGC in eastern Syria to deploy militants to Quneitra Province on October 9.[26] The IRGC transferred 50 foreign fighters to Damascus on October 9 who are capable of using anti-aircraft missiles and rockets.[27]
- An IRGC officer oversaw the deployment of Syrian Arab Army and IRGC deployments to the border strip with Israeli territory from Sayyida Zeinab which Iran uses as an operational headquarters.[28] The LH Radwan Unit, which is a special unit focused on infiltrating Israeli territory, arrived in Syria to spread out along the border with Israel as well.[29]
Johanna Moore and Ashka Jhaveri
Palestinian militias in Gaza responded to calls from Hamas to join in fighting against Israeli security forces on October 8. Hamas and its militant wing, Al Qassem Brigade, called on fellow Palestinian militias and members of the Axis of Resistance to join in its fight against Israel on October 7 following its ground incursion into Israel from Gaza.[1] Palestinian militias quickly pledged their support in fighting against Israeli security forces and clashed with Israeli security forces at border points and within Israeli territory.[2] Most clashes between Palestinian militias and Israeli security forces have been concentrated in southern Israel with Hamas reporting that it rotated new forces into Israeli territory to continue the fight against Israeli security forces on October 8.[3]
- The Al Qassem Brigade clashed with Israeli security forces in Sufa Kibbuts, Holeit Kibbuts, Ofakim, Sderot, Yad Mordechai, Kfar Azza, Kissufim, Be’eri military post, and Ezre in southern Israel on October 7 and 8.[4] The brigade also conducted two separate rocket attacks on Sderot and Ashkelon of 100 rockets each, according to the group’s Telegram channel.[5] Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) also fought against Israeli security forces with the Al Qassem Brigade in several towns in southern Israel.[6]
- PIJ backfilled Hamas’s Al Qassem Brigade in Israel’s South District on October 8, which allowed the Al Qassem Brigade fighters to rest and refit. Hamas Spokesperson Abu Ubaida reported that Hamas rotated new forces into Israeli territory to continue the fight against Israeli security forces in a statement on October 8.[7] The Al Qassem Brigade appears to be the most active Palestinian militia operating in the vicinity of Gaza.
- Non-Iranian affiliated Palestinian militias also supported the offensive. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade conducted rocket strikes into Israeli territory on October 8.[8] The brigade previously coordinated attacks with Hamas and PIJ in 2008.[9] The Popular Resistance Committee’s military wing claimed it used one-way attack drones to attack Israeli targets.[10] ISW cannot independently verify either group’s claim.
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and Palestinian militias also conducted attacks on Israeli positions from south Lebanon and the West Bank, respectively, which could expand the war to a second front. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh claimed on October 7 that the Al Aqsa Flood Operation began in Gaza and will extend to the West Bank.[11] That the Axis of Resistance coordinated the operation with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and through a Palestinian joint operations room suggests that LH and the Palestinian militants planned to open a second front.[12] Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant warned on April 20 that a multi-front war with Iran and its proxies was more likely than limited conflict and emphasized the threat of a simultaneous attack.[13]
- The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade reported that its fighters clashed with Israeli security forces on October 7 in Bat Hefer, Hefer Valley Regional Council, Central District.[14] Bat Hefer is located within Israeli territory, bordering the West Bank.
- Unspecified Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli security forces on October 7 at the Salem checkpoint, Darwish Salem, Haifa District. Salem checkpoint is one of the checkpoints leading from Israel to Jenin in the northern West Bank.[15] Unspecified Palestinian fighters targeted an Israeli military outpost on October 8 in Hebron in the southern West Bank.[16]
- LH conducted an artillery and guided missile strike into Shebaa Farms on October 8. Shebaa Farms is recognized as disputed territory between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria.[17] LH stated that it was not a neutral party in the current conflict and claimed that its strike on Shebaa Farms was on its path to “liberate what remains of occupied Lebanese land.”[18] The strikes hit a radar site and two unspecified positions in Zabdin and Ruwaisat at Shebaa Farms.[19]
Special Edition, October 7, 2023
Nicholas Carl
Hamas has launched a surprise ground and air attack into Israel, marking the most significant escalation between the two sides in decades. Hundreds of Hamas fighters crossed from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory and attacked nearby border posts, military sites, and residential areas on October 7.[1] The group also launched a series of large-scale rocket attacks from the strip into Israeli territory throughout the day.[2] This operation has injured and killed hundreds of Israeli civilians thus far.[3] Israeli leaders have responded by describing the attack as an act of war and have given every indication that they will respond decisively.[4] Previous Israeli response patterns suggest that Israel would likely conduct a ground operation into the Gaza Strip meant to rout Hamas completely. Hamas leaders almost certainly considered this strong possibility when planning their attack. But they have no reason to believe that they could successfully defend against such an operation, given the relative strength of the Israeli military. This observation raises the question: what is Hamas’ theory of victory? This special edition explores three possible explanations—none of which are mutually exclusive—that may be driving Hamas’ current actions.
1. Hamas leaders may expect the conflict that they have ignited to expand to include other Palestinian militias as well as Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Iranian leaders use this term—the Axis of Resistance—to describe their international partner system of state, semi-state, and non-state actors.[5] This coalition includes Lebanese Hezbollah, Syria’s Bashar al Assad regime, Yemen’s Houthi movement, and myriad militias operating in Bahrain, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, all of which Iran supports financially, materially, and politically.[6] Other Iranian-backed Palestinian militias have expressed their readiness to join the fight against Israel, but there are no indications at this time that non-Palestinian members of the Axis of Resistance are involved in the conflict.[7] The Axis of Resistance is nevertheless well-positioned to intervene if its leaders chose to do so given its military footprints in Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank. In fact, encircling Israel has been one of the key motivations for Iran’s extensive investment in supporting proxy and partner militias in these locations.[8]
The fact that Hamas launched its operation on the anniversary of the 1973 Yom Kippur War lends credence to the possibility that it expects support from others against Israel. One of the key features of that war was that Egypt’s surprise attack heralded a multi-front war.
2. Hamas may have based its current operation on Iranian leaders’ thinking about defeating Israel. Major General Hossein Salami—the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)—presented in August 2022 the most explicit articulation from an Iranian official yet on how to destroy Israel.[9] Salami downplayed the role of drones and missiles and instead argued for Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian militias to conduct more ground operations and urban combat inside Israel. Salami asserted that such activities would generate internal displacement and sow chaos, which would ultimately destabilize Israel and lead to its decline. Hamas’ decision to conduct a ground attack into Israel and how it went about doing so are noteworthy in this context. The group indiscriminately killed, abused, and abducted civilians in the towns its fighters reached and posted images and videos of the acts online, likely in part to instill terror among Israelis.[10]
3. Hamas may have sought to disrupt the US-led negotiations to normalize ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. The attack into Israel has understandably focused international attention once again on Israel-Palestine dynamics. The Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry released a statement on October 7 advocating for the Palestinian cause and affirming Riyadh’s support for a two-state solution.[11] This attack and whatever fallout ensues will likely complicate the normalization talks and could delay or even disrupt them.
One of the most dangerous courses of action Iran could pursue would be to exploit Israeli focus on the Gaza Strip in some way in the coming days and weeks. Iranian leaders will almost certainly look for opportunities to take advantage of the conflict even if they did not direct it. Iran could exploit Israeli distraction by moving advanced military systems into Lebanon and Syria or making significant advances in its nuclear program. This scenario is less likely than others at the moment, but it warrants consideration because it could set conditions for even more significant escalations or geopolitical changes. Incidents like Hamas’ attack no longer remain confined to the immediate area in which they occur. Each now carries the potential to grow into a larger phenomenon with ripple effects throughout the Middle East and even beyond.
The United States and its allies must remain vigilant against the danger that Iran and its partners may seek to expand the crisis caused by the Hamas attacks on Israel and must avoid the tendency to become narrowly focused on Gaza and the immediate Israeli response to this attack. Iran has been pursuing an offensive strategy in the Middle East aimed at expelling the United States, among many other things, for years, as CTP has previously assessed.[12] The October 7 Hamas attack could be a part of that larger effort.
