Thursday, October 26, 2023

IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 25, 2023

 Source:

 ( )  IRAN UPDATE, OCTOBER 25,2023:     https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Gaza%20IDF%20Battle%20Map%20Draft%20October%2025%2C2023.png

  (   ) How does Hamas' "Operation Al Aqsa Flood" have Relevance ...:  


                                                                         https://youtu.be/b9aOl5mb_sc



 (  )  https://youtu.be/ZPzTzI7ukh0

SIMPLY HORRENDOUS. JEWS HAVE BEEN PERSECUTED EVEN BEFORE THE WRITING OF THE OLD TESTAMENT AND EVEN TODAY DESPITE THEIR APPROACH OF LIVE & LET LIVE THE WORLD IS IN TOTALITY .ARROGANT TOWARDS THEIR RIGHTEOUS RIGHT TO LIVE.



Iran Update, October 25, 2023

Nicholas Carl, Brian Carter, Kathryn Tyson, Johanna Moore, Amin Soltani, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, and Andie Parry

Contributor: Cosima von Moltke

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Oct 25, 2023 - ISW Press

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are pursuing a coordinated strategy to (1) deter Israel from trying to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip, (2) prevent Israel from destroying Hamas if deterrence fails, and (3) deter the United States from providing military support to Israel’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Iran and its proxy and partner militias throughout the Middle East seek to ensure Hamas’ long-term survival, as Israel has indicated that it will soon launch a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas. The Iran-led effort to prevent this outcome is occurring along four main geographic axes: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and the broader Middle East. The following text examines the campaign objectives that CTP-ISW assesses that the Axis of Resistance is pursuing on each axis in support of its strategic objectives of deterring Israel and the United States.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are pursuing a coordinated strategy to (1) deter Israel from trying to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip, (2) prevent Israel from destroying Hamas if deterrence fails, and (3) deter the United States from providing military support for Israel’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip.
  2. Hamas is conducting attacks targeting population centers and conducting an information operation to erode the will of Israel’s political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip.
  3. Palestinian militias are trying to drive anti-Israel unrest in the West Bank to draw in IDF assets and resources and fix them there.
  4. The Axis of Resistance is harassing IDF forces with indirect and direct fire along the Israel-Lebanon border, which aims to draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel while setting conditions for successive campaigns into Israel.
  5. Iran and the Axis of Resistance are trying to demonstrate their capability and willingness to escalate against the United States and Israel from multiple fronts.
  6. Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders will need to adjust their strategy and the subordinate campaigns if Israel launches a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip.
  7. Palestinian militias continued attacks at the usual rate from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 25. Hamas fired two long-range rockets Haifa and Eliat as part of its effort to erode the Israeli political establishment’s will to support a ground operation into Gaza.
  8. West Bank residents demonstrated and took up arms against the IDF in response to calls from the Lions’ Den—an Iran-linked West Bank militia.
  9. The IDF conducted airstrikes against two Syrian military positions in southwestern Syria on October 24 and an airstrike on the Aleppo International Airport runway on October 25. Militants are likely to respond with indirect fire attacks, which is the consistent response pattern to Israeli airstrikes in Syria since the war began.
  10. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two attacks targeting US forces based at Abu Hajar Airport, Hasakah Province, Syria on October 24 and 25.
  11. Hamas, LH, and PIJ appear to be coordinating and making final contingency preparations ahead of an Israeli invasion of Gaza.

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are pursuing a coordinated strategy to (1) deter Israel from trying to destroy Hamas in the Gaza Strip, (2) prevent Israel from destroying Hamas if deterrence fails, and (3) deter the United States from providing military support to Israel’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip. Iran and its proxy and partner militias throughout the Middle East seek to ensure Hamas’ long-term survival, as Israel has indicated that it will soon launch a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas. The Iran-led effort to prevent this outcome is occurring along four main geographic axes: the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and the broader Middle East. The following text examines the campaign objectives that CTP-ISW assesses that the Axis of Resistance is pursuing on each axis in support of its strategic objectives of deterring Israel and the United States.

Hamas is conducting attacks targeting population centers and conducting an information operation to erode the will of Israel’s political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip. Hamas and its partner militias have conducted mass rocket barrages against Israeli population centers daily since the war began.[1] Hamas and its partners across the Axis of Resistance are also messaging that they will defeat Israel’s ground operation and kill and capture Israeli soldiers.[2] IRGC-affiliated news agencies and Iranian state media highlighted “significant challenges” facing the IDF in Gaza, which they claimed would cause heavy IDF casualties, poor relations with the Arab world, and declining public support.[3] This messaging effort supports the Palestinian militants’ military operations by questioning Israeli military capabilities and Israel’s ability to successfully defeat Hamas to undermine political and popular will. It also buoys the groups’ supporters by highlighting Israel’s vulnerabilities and emphasizing the strength of Hamas and its partners.[4]

Hamas and its partners also use messaging and indirect fire targeting IDF units to degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip. Hamas and its partners are targeting military positions surrounding the Gaza Strip, including artillery batteries, airbases, and “concentrations” of IDF soldiers.[5] Saraya al Quds spokesperson Abu Hamza highlighted that Israeli soldiers are “worn out” by these attacks, suggesting Hamas and its allies aim to demoralize IDF forces while simultaneously degrading IDF material.[6] The Palestinian militant groups are coupling their military efforts with a messaging effort that highlights the groups’ strong defensive capabilities in the Gaza Strip, as well as the friction between the Israeli political leadership and military leadership.[7]

Palestinian militias are trying to drive anti-Israel unrest in the West Bank to draw in IDF assets and resources and fix them there. These militias have repeatedly called for Palestinians there to mobilize and join the fight against Israel. Hamas, for instance, released a statement on October 14 calling for the establishment of “popular protection committee” in all cities and towns in the West Bank to target Israeli settlers.[8] Hamas added that all Palestinians have a duty to actively participate in the fighting against Israel. Iranian state media has recirculated Palestinian militia calls for greater violence in the West Bank.[9] Unspecified armed militants have used small arms to target Israeli forces and anti-Israel protests have occurred daily in the West Bank, but it is unclear how much of this activity the Palestinian militias facilitated. Palestinian militias have cooperated to fight Israeli forces in some limited instances.[10] Palestinian militias have increasingly used improvised explosive devices against Israeli forces since October 18.[11]

The Axis of Resistance is harassing IDF forces with indirect and direct fire along the Israel-Lebanon border, which aims to draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel while setting conditions for successive campaigns into Israel. Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) is using indirect and direct fire to target Israel's civilian and military infrastructure while messaging that Israel will pay a “high price” when a ground operation begins.[12] These military operations aim to fix IDF units along the northern Israeli border to prevent their ability to support Israel’s ground operation in the Gaza Strip. LH’s deputy leader said on October 21 that LH’s operations in southern Lebanon aim to “weaken the Israeli enemy and let them know we are ready."[13] He claimed that LH has fixed three Israeli divisions in northern Israel.[14] LH’s attacks simultaneously create conditions for successive operations against the IDF in northern Israel by targeting critical Israeli signals facilities and communications infrastructure.[15] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that targeting these sites aims to create opportunities for LH in the event it decides to conduct ground operations into Israel by degrading signals intelligence and communications.[16]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are trying to demonstrate their capability and willingness to escalate against the United States and Israel from multiple fronts. The Islamic Resistance of Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—has attacked US military positions in Iraq and Syria daily since October 18. The group has used drones and rockets in these attacks, which have killed one US contractor and injured dozens. The group has continually hit certain locations, such as the Ain al Asad airbase in Iraq, while also gradually expanding its attacks to new locations in Iraq and Syria. An Iranian-backed militia threatened on October 24 to further expand attacks to US positions in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The Houthi movement in Yemen separately on October 19 tried to conduct a drone and cruise missile attack into Israel. A US Navy destroyer and Saudi air defenses intercepted the attack over the Red Sea before it struck Israel.[17]

Iran and the Axis of Resistance are preparing for the possibility that the war in Israel will expand into a regional conflict fought on multiple fronts. They are trying to build up their force presence in Syria and Lebanon to this end. The IRGC Quds Force has coordinated the deployment of hundreds of Iranian-backed militants in southern Lebanon and southwestern Syria since the war began.[18] These militants include military engineers and missile experts, among others.[19] Israel has furthermore conducted several airstrikes on the Damascus and Aleppo international airports since October 12 and indicated that the airstrikes are meant to prevent Iran from moving weapons into Syria and/or opening a front against Israel from there.[20]

Iran has been messaging that the United States and Israel are to blame for any further escalation of the war while deflecting any responsibility from itself. Iranian officials and media have repeatedly emphasized the role of the United States and Israel in instigating the war and contrastingly messaged that Iran is a responsible and non-escalatory actor.[21] This narrative ignores the fact that Iran has already facilitated the expansion of this war to Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen by directing its proxy and partner militias in these countries to attack US and Israeli targets. Iranian officials and media have separately messaged that they have popular support to fight a regional war against the United States and Israel if one erupts.[22]

Iranian and Axis of Resistance leaders will need to adjust their strategy and the subordinate campaigns if Israel launches a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip. They will likely reorient from attempting to deter a ground operation into the Gaza Strip to prevent it from succeeding and eroding US, Israeli, and international support for the ground operation to cause Israel to terminate it prematurely.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance Campaign Objectives

  • Erode the will of Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Palestinian militias continued attacks at the usual rate from the Gaza Strip into Israel on October 25. The al Qassem Brigades—Hamas’ militant wing—claimed responsibility for seven indirect fire attacks.[23] Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed responsibility for six rocket attacks.[24] The National Resistance Brigades —the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed responsibility for two mortar and rocket attacks.[25] Axis of Resistance-affiliated media reported two other unclaimed rocket attacks.[26] This rate of attacks is consistent with the rate that CTP-ISW has observed in recent days.

Hamas fired two long range rockets at cities in northern and southern Israel as part of its effort to erode the Israeli political establishment’s will to support a ground operation into Gaza. Hamas continues to fire mortars and rockets at a mixture of IDF military targets near Gaza and civilian towns farther from Gaza. The attacks follow the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps deputy commander's October 23 threat that Iran would launch missiles at Haifa “if necessary.”[27]

  • Hamas fired one R160 rocket targeting Haifa in northern Israel on October 25.[28] This is the third time Hamas has fired R160 rockets targeting Haifa since October 11. The IDF stated the rocket exploded in the air south of Haifa.[29] Hamas produces the R160 rocket, which has a 160km range, locally in Gaza.[30] Iran has provided equipment and technical knowledge to help Hamas expand and improve its ability to domestically produce longer-range rockets.[31]
  • Hamas also fired one Ayyash 250 rocket targeting Eliat in southern Israel on October 25 for the first time. Israeli social media accounts reported the rocket landed in an open field near Eliat.[32] The Ayyash 250 rocket has a 250km range that Hamas produces locally with Iranian assistance.[33]

IDF airstrikes continue to kill Hamas leadership and operatives in Gaza. The IDF announced that it killed a battalion commander for Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades, in Khan Younis, Gaza, on October 25.[34] The IDF stated this commander previously served as the head of Hamas’ naval forces. CTP-ISW previously reported the IDF is degrading Hamas’ naval capabilities which Hamas could use to target Israeli gas rigs and other infrastructure.[35]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.



Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance Campaign Objectives

  • The Jenin Battaliona component of PIJ’s Al Quds Brigadesclaimed responsibility for an ambush targeting the IDF in Jenin.[41] The battalion also claimed responsibility for a sniper attack on IDF personnel.[42] The IDF conducted an airstrike on the camp during the ambush and extended clashes.[43]
  • October 25 was the highest level of militant and popular activity in the West Bank since Hamas issued a mobilization call on October 20. [44] The increase in activity demonstrates the ability of the Lions’ Den to mobilize action across the West Bank. Elevated levels of clashes and demonstrations draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank.

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance Campaign Objectives

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

The IDF conducted airstrikes against two Syrian military positions in southwestern Syria on October 24, marking the first time the IDF has publicly targeted the Syrian military since the Israel-Gaza war began. The IDF has used artillery in response to militant attacks from Syria to northern Israel since October 7. CTP-ISW has recorded three instances of Iranian-backed militants in Syria firing rockets at northern Israel since October 7.[45] The IDF has responded by firing artillery into Syrian territory.[46] The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) also conducted a mortar strike into the Golan Heights after IDF airstrikes on the Aleppo and Damascus international airports on October 12.[47] The IDF has used artillery to strike SAA positions in southwestern Syria on several occasions in 2023.[48]

  • The IDF targeted the Syrian 5th Division, including the 12th Armored Brigade, in Izraa, Daraa Province, southwestern Syria.[49] The IDF also struck SAA weapons depots and radar systems in Qarfa, Daraa Province, southwestern Syria. Syrian state news agency SANA reported the strikes killed eight SAA soldiers and wounded seven others.[50] The IDF said the airstrikes were in response to rocket attacks from Syria into northern Israel.[51]
  • The IDF dropped leaflets claiming that the SAA is responsible for attacks from Syria to Israel and warned that attacks from Syria would be met with an “iron hand.”[52] The statement specifically blamed a Syrian commander in the 112th Mechanized Brigade, which is a component of the Syrian 5th Division.[53]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike on the Aleppo international airport runway on October 25 for the fourth time since October 7.[54] This was the sixth strike on Syrian airports total since October 7. Militants will likely respond with indirect fire attacks, which is the consistent response to Israeli airstrikes into Syria since the war began.[55] Iranian-backed militants continued to move into areas in Syria bordering the Golan Heights on October 24.[56]

Iranian-backed militants, including LH, conducted six attacks as part of an ongoing attack campaign against IDF forces and assets on October 25. These attacks create opportunities for additional Iranian-backed ground attacks into Israel and increase the risk of further escalation, as CTP-ISW previously noted.[57] LH conducted three anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attacks targeting IDF military barracks and infrastructure.[58] The IDF responded with multiple artillery strikes and airstrikes in southern Lebanon and on the Israel-Lebanese border, including against ATGM squads.[59]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance Campaign Objectives

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two attacks targeting US forces based at Abu Hajar Airport, Hasakah Province, Syria on October 24 and 25. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq reported that both rocket attacks “hit their target.” The group released footage of a rocket launch it claimed targeted US forces stationed at the airport, however, the footage did not depict any impact.[60] The United States has not confirmed any attack on US forces at Abu Hajar Airport as of 3:00 PM ET. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed 17 of the 19 reported attacks on US forces in the Middle East since October 18.[61] The October 24 attack was the first by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq against US forces at Abu Hajar Airport. US forces use the Abu Hajar Airport to support Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) counter-ISIS operations according to a 2016 Voice of America (VOA) report, however, US officials reported that it is not a US base.[62] 

Hamas, LH, and PIJ appear to be coordinating and making final contingency preparations ahead of an Israeli invasion into Gaza. LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, Hamas Deputy Political Bureau Chief Saleh al Arouri, and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah met in Beirut on October 24 to discuss implementing “appropriate measures... at the current critical stage.”[63] Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reported that Israeli forces will conduct a ground operation into the Gaza Strip “soon” during a televised speech on October 25.[64] The Wall Street Journal cited an unidentified informed source who reported that Israel has delayed its ground operation into Gaza for at least another two days until the United States finished deploying air defense systems to US forces stationed in the Middle East.[65] Hamas, LH, and PIJ coordination suggest that actors within Iran’s Axis of Resistance are planning a coordinated response to an Israeli ground operation.

Iranian officials and media are calling for a “ceasefire” in the Hamas-Israel war and accusing the United States, France, and the United Kingdom of using their permanent membership in the UN Security Council (UNSC) to prolong the conflict. Iran’s Permanent Representative to the UN Amir Saeid Iravani called for an immediate ceasefire in a speech at the UN Security Council’s first open debate on the war on October 24.[66] Iravani also claimed that the United States has vetoed over 40 UNSC resolutions and that the UNSC’s “inaction” is emboldening Israel to commit “more egregious crimes” against the Palestinians. Iranian state media separately accused the United States, France, and the United Kingdom of prioritizing Israel’s right to self-defense over stopping Israeli attacks against Palestinians in Gaza.[67]

CTP-ISW assesses that Iranian officials are likely using the term “ceasefire” to refer to the cessation of the Hamas-Israel war in its current state. It is in Iran’s interest to end the war in its current state because Hamas has inflicted losses on the IDF, the Israeli government, and Israeli society. Israel, on the other hand, is preparing a ground operation into the Gaza Strip to destroy Hamas.

Iran’s efforts to frame Western countries as the antagonists in the war and itself as a promoter of peace are part of the regime’s ongoing information operation to deflect responsibility for any further escalation of the conflict away from Iran. This information operation ignores the fact that Iran has already facilitated the expansion of this war to Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen by directing its proxy and partner militias in these countries to attack US and Israeli targets.[68]

The Iranian regime is facing a message-control problem in its ongoing information operations. The IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency published an article stressing that Hamas’s rocket attacks against Israel would not be as successful as they are were it not for Iran’s extensive support during previous years.[69] Iranian officials and media have been rejecting claims of Iranian involvement in the Al Aqsa Flood operation since October 9, however, arguing that credit for Hamas’ “successful” operation belongs “solely” to the Palestinians themselves.[70]

Iran is simultaneously engaged in separate information operations aimed at two distinct audiences which could explain the conflicting messaging. Iran is attempting to deter further escalation with the United States. The IRGC-affiliated Fars News Agency argued on October 24 that Axis of Resistance attacks on American bases in Iraq and Syria are only meant to deter further American involvement in the Israel-Hamas war, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[71] Iran is also attempting to message its support for Hamas to other members of its Axis of Resistance. Western media reported on October 22 that Iranian officials are concerned about preventing the perception among members of their Axis of Resistance that Iran is not sufficiently supporting Hamas.[72]

The Wall Street Journal separately reported on October 25 that IRGC Quds Force officers trained hundreds of Hamas fighters inside Iran in the weeks leading up to the October 7 attack.[73] The Washington Post similarly reported on October 9 that Iran provided Hamas with weapons and training prior to the attack.[74] These reports are inconsistent with Tasnim’s claim that Iran has only supported Hamas capabilities in distant years not recent weeks. The IRGC has previously armed and trained Hamas operatives inside Iran since the early 2000s.[75]



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[61] https://twitter.com/Tammuz_Intel/status/1714590969046175912 ; https://...

[62] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-confirms-involvement-in-syria-airport-expan...

[63] https://www dot farsnews.ir/en/news/14020803000608/Lebanese-Palesinian-Resisance-Leaders-Discss-Ways-Achieve-%E2%80%98Real ; https://www dot tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1402/08/03/2977725/%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%B1%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA-%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%DB%8C%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%A7-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B5%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AA%D8%A3%DA%A9%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B1-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%86%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D9%87%D9%87-%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%88%D9%85%D8%AA ; https://www dot presstv.ir/Detail/2023/10/25/713381/Lebanese-Palestinian-resistance-leaders-discuss-cooperation-against-Israel ; https://www dot timesofisrael.com/nasrallah-senior-hamas-and-pij-leaders-talk-of-achieving-victory-over-israel/

[64] https://www dot timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-following-war-everyone-will-have-to-answer-for-failures-including-me/

[65] https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/israel-hamas-war-palestinians-news/card...

[66] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4029352

https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2023/10/25/us-resists-ceasefire-call-in-un-security-council-debate-on-israel-gaza-war

[67] https://www.iribnews dot ir/fa/news/4029205

[68] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-october-24-2023

[69] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/08/03/2973161

[70] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-9-2023...

[71] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-october-24-2023

[72] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-quandary-how-stay-out-is...

[73] https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/hamas-fighters-trained-in-iran-bef...

[74] https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/09/iran-support...

[75] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-iran-fuels-hamas... https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/irans-increasingly-decentralized-axis-...

 

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Wednesday, October 25, 2023

SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT WEEKLY UPDATE, OCTOBER 25, 2023

Source :

   (  )  SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT WEEKLY UPDATE, OCTOBER 25, 2023:        https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-october-25-2023




Salafi-Jihadi Movement Weekly Update, October 25, 2023: Malian Junta and Its Wagner Group Allies Are Unprepared for Ongoing UN Withdrawal

Author: Liam Karr

Data Cutoff: October 25, 2023, at 10 a.m.

Contributor: Charlie Towle

Key Takeaway: The Malian junta and its Wagner Group auxiliaries cannot backfill withdrawing UN forces in northern Mali while maintaining pressure across the country, which will likely create gaps for al Qaeda­–affiliated militants to exploit in central Mali. Al Qaeda–affiliated militants and the Tuareg rebels are at least tacitly supporting each other operationally in northern Mali and may explicitly be coordinating some attacks, which will prolong the conflict and further strain the junta’s capacity issues.

The Malian junta cannot backfill withdrawing UN forces in northern Mali while maintaining pressure elsewhere, which will likely create gaps for al Qaeda–linked militants to exploit in central Mali. Nearly 13,000 UN peacekeepers began leaving Mali in July after the Malian junta pressured the UN Security Council to end the peacekeeping operation. The UN peacekeepers will have departed Mali by the end of 2023.[1] The UN mission helped protect major population centers in central and northern Mali during the past decade and held together the tenuous 2015 peace agreement between separatist Tuareg rebels and the Malian government.[2]

Malian soldiers and their Kremlin-funded Wagner Group auxiliaries are now competing with al Qaeda’s regional affiliate Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) and Tuareg separatist rebels to fill the resulting security vacuum.[3] Wagner’s 1,000-strong contingent does not have the manpower or capabilities to replace UN forces and is carrying out atrocities that fuel support for JNIM and the rebels.[4] Malian forces have sharply decreased their rate of operations in central Mali since giving priority to northern Mali, showing they also lack the capacity to backfill UN forces without taking risks elsewhere.[5]

  • The UN functioned as a neutral arbiter in northern Mali and facilitated dialogue between Malian and rebel officials.[6] Separatist Tuareg rebel leaders warned that the end of the UN mission would be a “fatal blow” to the peace deal in June.[7] Malian forces began to move into UN bases as UN forces withdrew in August, which the rebels viewed as a violation of the 2015 peace deal.[8] The rebels began contesting control of newly vacated UN bases and declared war on September 11.[9] The rebels have overrun at least five Malian bases since the start of September.[10] Malian and Wagner forces have continued to give priority to assuming control over additional UN bases in the Kidal region—a rebel and JNIM stronghold—and sent a large convoy to the area in early October.[11]

  • The Malian army and Wagner Group have committed at least 11 human rights violations against Tuareg civilians since October 5.[12] Locals claimed that Wagner soldiers have perpetrated most of the atrocities, including beheadings, immolation, and booby-trapping the bodies of their victims.[13] JNIM has used Wagner atrocities in other parts of the country to improve its local support since 2021. JNIM has also repeatedly offered, since early 2023, to ally with separatist groups and northern communities in the Kidal region as a protector from Wagner Group in the Malian army.[14]

  • The Malian army has significantly decreased its rate of activity in central Mali as it has shifted focus to northern Mali. Malian army and Wagner forces have conducted at least 20 operations in the northern regions since the beginning of August, which nearly equals their total in the area for the rest of 2023.[15] This occurred while security forces in central Mali carried out only two operations since the beginning of August, which is less than the average of five operations per month from April to July, and conducting large counterterrorism offensives in the first quarter of 2023.[16]

Figure 1. Malian Army and Wagner Group Shift Focus to Northern Mali in August 2023

Source: Liam Karr.

JNIM and the Tuareg rebels are at least tacitly supporting each other operationally and may explicitly be coordinating some attacks. This will prolong the conflict and further strain the junta’s capacity issues. JNIM and the rebels have attacked the same locations in northern Mali within one day on two separate occasions since the beginning of October.[17] JNIM also detonated an improvised explosive device (IED) targeting UN forces withdrawing from a northern Malian town in October on the same day that rebels captured the newly vacated UN base in the town.[18] The close timing and proximity of these activities suggests that the groups are giving at least tacit approval to each other’s operations.

This pattern also indicates they are taking advantage of—if not explicitly coordinating—each other’s activity to amplify their impact. The two factions have a shared goal of removing Malian forces from the area, a history of working together, and extensive human network connections stretching from the leadership to the fighters.[19] The Malian government failed to contain the previous jihadist-rebel coalition in 2012 and does not have the capacity to defeat a new one given the expanded threat the Salafi-jihadi insurgency now poses in central and southern Mali compared to 2012.[20]

  • The JNIM emir and other al Qaeda–linked militants now in JNIM initially fought alongside the rebel groups during the 2012 Tuareg rebellion.[21] The al Qaeda–linked faction sidelined the rebels in 2013 and expanded into central Mali, which prompted the French-led intervention in 2013 that pushed back the insurgents and helped split non-jihadist rebels from the al Qaeda–linked militants.[22] However, connections between the two sides remain intact, as the groups have cease-fire agreements in their shared support areas and have membership overlap, and they have operationally coordinated against the Islamic State’s Sahel Province since 2021.[23] The factions’ leaders also have relationships dating back to at least the 1990s.[24]

  • JNIM and the rebels have attacked the same locations within 24 hours two separate times since the beginning of October. Rebels claimed to shoot down two Malian planes near Tarkint in the Gao region on October 3.[25] JNIM claimed an IED attack against Malian and Wagner forces in the same area on the same day.[26] JNIM also claimed an IED attack on a Malian-Wagner convoy along the RN18 road in the Gao region on October 4, and the rebels said they repelled an attack by a Malian-Wagner convoy along the same stretch of road on October 5.[27] JNIM claimed another IED attack against UN forces withdrawing from Aguelhok in the Kidal region on October 23, the same day that rebel forces captured the newly vacated UN base in the town.[28] The lack of JNIM IED attacks against rebels indicates that the rebels already know where the IEDs are or that JNIM militants are intentionally not detonating them against rebels.

Figure 2. JNIM and Tuareg Separatist Rebel Attacks on Security Forces in Northern Mali

Source: Liam Karr.

Figure 3. The Salafi-Jihadi Movement in Africa

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

 


[1] https://apnews.com/article/mali-un-peacekeeping-troops-withdrawal-wagner...

[2] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/minusma-crossroads

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-meltdown-militants-advance-un-...https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-s...https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-s...

[4] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231010-des-civils-d%C3%A9capit%C3%A9s-%C...https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi...https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-u...

[5] Author’s database of significant activity (SIGACT). Available on request.

[6] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/minusma-crossroads

[7] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/mali-rebels-warn-un-peacekeeping-de...

[8] https://apnews.com/article/mali-junta-rebels-jihadi-peacekeeping-coup-in...

[9] https://www.voanews.com/a/un-force-in-mali-quits-base-early-over-insecur...https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2023/09/12/mali-former...

[10] Author’s SIGACTs. Available on request.

[11] https://www.voaafrica.com/a/malian-authorities-troops-are-being-redeploy...

[12] Author’s SIGACTs. Available on request.

[13] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20231010-des-civils-d%C3%A9capit%C3%A9s-%C...https://x.com/Ag_Adghagh/status/1716183865050427498?s=20

[14] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/how-the-wagner-group-is-aggravating-the-jihadi...https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2023/02/01/au-mali-rencontres-sec...

[15] Author’s SIGACTs. Available on request.

[16] https://twitter.com/ocisse691/status/1700930417262542854?s=20https://twitter.com/Inkinane1/status/1716093406374424804https://twitter.com/FAMa_DIRPA/status/1629217234408144896?s=20https://twitter.com/FAMa_DIRPA/status/1635048259990482944?s=20; author’s SIGACTs. Available on request.

[17] https://x.com/AzwadyQlm/status/1709532259504492609?s=20; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Claims Attacks on FAMa and PMC Wagner Group Convoys in Gao and Segou, Capturing Base in Koulikoro,” October 3, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.comhttps://x.com/abdalaag2022/status/1709907071578030321?s=20; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Claims Ambush on Gov-Aligned Burkinabe Militias in Soum, Series of Attacks Targeting Malian Army and Wagner Mercenaries in Gao,” October 9, 2023, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[18] https://x.com/Inkinane1/status/1716443839207002353?s=20

[19] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4019115https://jamestown.org/program/anarchy-azawad-guide-non-state-armed-group...

[20] https://www.hudson.org/danger-senegals-gates-jihadist-expansion-toward-s...https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mali-catastrophe-accelerating-under-j...

[21] https://jamestown.org/program/anarchy-azawad-guide-non-state-armed-group...

[22] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/between-islamization-and-secession-the-contest...https://jamestown.org/program/anarchy-azawad-guide-non-state-armed-group...

[23] https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4019115https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20230130-mali-iyad-ag-ghaly-rencontre-les-...https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/laccord-dalger-cinq-ans-ap...

[24] Alexander Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel: Local Politics and Rebel Groups (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 107, 110, 114, 118, and 130.

[25] https://x.com/AzwadyQlm/status/1709532259504492609?s=20

[26] SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Claims Attacks on FAMa and PMC Wagner Group Convoys in Gao and Segou, Capturing Base in Koulikoro.”

[27] https://x.com/abdalaag2022/status/1709907071578030321?s=20; SITE Intelligence Group, “JNIM Claims Ambush on Gov-Aligned Burkinabe Militias in Soum, Series of Attacks Targeting Malian Army and Wagner Mercenaries in Gao.”

[28] https://x.com/Inkinane1/status/1716443839207002353?s=20

 

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