Friday, December 15, 2023

IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 15, 2023

 SOURCE: 

(   )  IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 15, 2023:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-15-2023


   IRAN UPDATE, DECEMBER 15, 2023

Brian Carter, Ashka Jhaveri, Nicholas Carl, Johanna Moore,

Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, Alexandra Braverman, and Kathryn Tyson

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

  1. Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to demonstrate their capability to control a key maritime route and chokepoint in the Middle East.
  2. The Houthis have conducted almost daily drone and missile attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb since December 9.
  3. The Houthi attack campaign signals to the international community that the Axis of Resistance can imperil ships around the Bab al Mandeb in addition to the Strait of Hormuz.
  4. Israeli forces destroyed the headquarters of Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion in the northern Gaza Strip.
  5. Israeli clearing operations may be disrupting Palestinian militia fighters’ ability to frequently communicate with each other.
  6. Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 11 cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.
  7. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters in Tel Aviv that Israel will transition to the next phase of the war, which will focus on targeting leadership and intelligence operations rather than high-intensity clearance operations.
  8. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Iraq.
  9. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi released a statement justifying resistance against the United States in Iraq.

 

Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” are exploiting the Israel-Hamas war to demonstrate their capability to control a key maritime route and chokepoint in the Middle East. The Houthis have conducted almost daily drone and missile attacks against commercial vessels transiting the Bab al Mandeb since December 9. The most recent attacks occurred on December 15, when the Houthis struck two vessels off the coast of Yemen.[1] The Houthi military spokesperson framed these attacks as part of their ongoing attack campaign targeting all commercial maritime traffic headed to or affiliated with Israel and vowed to continue these attacks.[2]

The Houthi attack campaign signals to the international community that the Axis of Resistance can imperil ships around the Bab al Mandeb in addition to the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran has long worked to establish the military capabilities and posture necessary to disrupt traffic around these strategic chokepoints. US officials and Western media have reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is directly involved in planning and executing the attacks with the Houthis.[3] The IRGC similarly threatens international shipping around the Strait of Hormuz to impose pressure on foreign adversaries.[4] The IRGC, for instance, conducted an attack campaign around the Strait of Hormuz in 2019 that is similar to the one that the Houthis are now waging.[5]

These attacks are disrupting all traffic in the Red Sea, not just traffic bound for Israel. Several of the vessels that the Houthis have attacked were headed to destinations other than Israel, demonstrating the threat that the Houthis pose to global shipping more broadly.[6] Major international shipping companies, such as Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd, have responded to the Houthi attacks by pausing their operations through the Red Sea and routing ships instead around Africa.[7] Maersk alone accounts for roughly 17 percent of global shipping.[8] Other companies are reportedly scaling back their operations in the Red Sea as well.[9]

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces destroyed the headquarters of Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion in the northern Gaza Strip. Israeli air, artillery, and engineering forces took over the compound in Shujaiya after ground forces clashed with Palestinian militia fighters.[10] Palestinian fighters in a tunnel shaft attempted to detonate an improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces in Shujaiya.[11] The IDF responded by destroying the tunnel.[12] The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—and the al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—did not claim any attacks on Israeli forces in the Shujaiya neighborhood on December 15. CTP-ISW previously reported that Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion remains capable of executing its defense mission in Shujaiya, indicating that it is not combat ineffective.[13] This is despite several Israeli military sources reporting that Hamas’ Shujaiya Battalion is “dismantled” and lost its “command and control” capabilities.[14] IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi told Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip on December 14 that they are facing challenging terrain in the Shujaiya and Zaytoun neighborhoods.[15] An Israeli journalist embedded with the IDF’s Kfir Brigade in Shujaiya reported on December 11 that Hamas forces in Shujaiya are ”waging a guerrilla war” and have not ”abandoned the fight.[16]

Israeli clearing operations may be disrupting Palestinian militia fighters' ability to frequently communicate with each other. The disruption of Palestinian fighters’ communications would make it more difficult for fighters to transmit reports to the media officials responsible for generating attack claims. This disruption may be contributing to the lower rate of attack claims in Shujaiya, for example. Residents told Reuters on December 15 that there is intense fighting across the northern Gaza Strip, including Shujaiya, Zaytoun, and Tuffah where Israeli forces are attempting to dismantle the Shujaiya Battalion.[17] The al Quds Brigades posted on its Telegram channel on December 15 that it had resumed contact with its forces east of Gaza City.[18] The ground forces relayed their various attack claims. The al Qassem Brigades have similarly posted several times in the past week that its forces relayed their various kinetic engagements after returning from the front lines in the northern Gaza Strip.[19] CTP-ISW did not observe the militias using language that suggests that there is a significant strain on communication networks at any other point in the war.

The residents also reported fighting in Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, southwest of Jabalia city where Israeli forces have been operating since November 18.[20] The al Quds Brigades claimed that its fighters targeted three military vehicles with tandem shells in Beit Lahiya, northwest of Jabalia city.[21] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades claimed two clashes with Israeli forces in the Jabalia refugee camp and Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, southwest of Jabalia city.[22]

Israeli forces mistakenly identified three Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip as a threat and killed them during clearing operations in the Shujaiya neighborhood of Gaza city. The IDF confirmed the incident and the identities of the hostages on December 15.[23] The Israelis were taken hostage during Hamas’ October 7 attack.[24]

Palestinian militia fighters attempted to lure Israeli forces into a tunnel using simulated sounds of children.[25] The IDF reported on December 15 that its forces encountered a tactically sophisticated Hamas ambush involving a speaker system set up outside a tunnel system that runs through civilian infrastructure, including a school, clinic, and mosque.[26] Israeli forces identified anti-tank positions and a minefield during the operation.[27] The ambush demonstrates that Hamas retains a degree of tactical effectiveness that allows its fighters to undertake complex tactical tasks.

Palestinian militias continued attacks on Israeli forces behind the Israeli forward line of advance in the northern Gaza Strip, which is consistent with the nature of clearing operations. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its fighters clashed with Israeli forces inside an Israeli combat outpost in the Juhor ad Dik area.[28] The militia separately claimed that it fired a thermobaric rocket at an Israeli-held building in Juhor ad Dik.[29] Israeli forces crossed into the central Gaza Strip from near Juhor ad Dik at the beginning of the ground operation.[30] Palestinian militia fighters have claimed several indirect fire attacks on Israeli forces south of Gaza City, which suggests that they are attempting to harass and disrupt the Israeli ground lines of communication that support offensive operations in the northern Gaza Strip.

Palestinian militias continued to resist Israeli advances in the southern Gaza Strip on December 15. Al Qassem Brigades fighters detonated a house-borne improvised explosive device targeting Israeli forces east of Khan Younis on December 15.[31] The al Quds Brigades also posted videos showing its forces mortaring Israeli units east of Khan Younis.[32]

Palestinian media reported that Palestinian militias engaged Israeli forces with small arms east of Rafah on December 15.[33] CTP-ISW has not previously observed ground clashes in eastern Rafah after Israeli forces entered the southern Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces targeted Hamas military infrastructure in Khan Younis and Rafah as part of Israeli efforts to degrade Hamas’ military capacity. IDF special operations forces and ground forces units continued raids and clearing operations in the southern Gaza Strip.[34] The IDF said that it discovered tunnel shafts in Khan Younis, including one tunnel shaft with motorcycles inside that the IDF said Hamas used in the October 7 attacks.[35] An IDF raid also targeted the home of Hamas’ North Khan Younis Battalion rocket artillery commander.[36] The IDF reported that it killed the North Khan Younis Battalion commander on October 27.[37] Hamas‘ formal military structure means that it will likely rapidly replace the rocket artillery commander with his deputy, ensuring continuity of command and rapid reconstitution of Hamas‘ military forces.[38]

Israeli forces conducted airstrikes targeting Hamas military infrastructure near the Egyptian-Gaza Strip border in Rafah governorate. The airstrikes targeted buildings and other areas that the IDF said Hamas uses for smuggling weapons.[39] Hamas has historically used a system of tunnels to smuggle weapons into the Strip, rather than formal border crossings.[40]

 

US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters in Tel Aviv that Israel will transition to the next phase of the war, which will focus on targeting leadership and intelligence operations rather than high-intensity clearance operations.[41] Sullivan was in Israel to meet with a number of Israeli officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.[42] Sullivan declined to specify a time frame for the end of high-intensity clearing operations to avoid “telegraph[ing] for the enemy what the plan is.”[43] A senior administration official said on background in a White House press briefing that ”reporting on timeframes” for the phases of the war was ”not entirely accurate.”[44] The New York Times cited four US officials on December 14 who claimed that Biden wanted the war to shift to a more targeted, narrow campaign in about three weeks.[45]

Palestinian militias conducted six indirect fire attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on December 15.[46] The al Qassem Brigades fired a barrage of long-range rockets at Jerusalem for the first time since October 22.[47] The al Quds Brigades claimed that it fired rockets at Jerusalem on December 1.[48] The al Quds Brigades claimed three rocket attacks into southern Israel on December 15 including at an Israeli military site.[49][50]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces three times in the West Bank on December 15.[51] This rate of activity is less than the daily average of 9.7 attacks per day. The Jenin Battalion of the al Quds Brigades claimed that it conducted an attack using small arms fire and explosives on Israeli forces at a checkpoint to Mevo Dotan.[52] The militia fighters also claimed that they placed an anti-personnel explosive device in an Israeli military vehicle and then detonated it.[53] This is the first time that the al Quds Brigades has claimed such an attack since the Israel-Hamas war began.

Hamas in the West Bank successfully organized protests in Nablus on December 15. Hamas distributed a flyer on December 14 calling for Palestinians in Nablus to protest after Friday prayers in support of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.[54] Palestinian sources published footage of marches in Nablus with Hamas flags and posters of Hamas fighters who had died since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[55]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed fighters, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 11 cross-border attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel on December 15.[56] LH targeted Israeli military sites in northern Israel eight times, including two attacks using Burkan rockets.[57] The warheads for Burkan rockets range from 300 to 500 kilograms, making them a more lethal weapon system than the smaller rockets LH typically employs.[58] LH separately fired rockets and mortars at the IDF’s Ramim barracks in northern Israel.[59] The IDF said it intercepted a drone from southern Lebanon over Israeli airspace.[60] A second drone fell near an IDF post.[61]

LH published a summary of its attacks into Israel since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[62] LH claimed that it has conducted over 500 operations in over 50 locations in northern Israel since October 8. LH’s attack claim is mostly consistent with CTP-ISW's documentation of approximately 440 total attacks since October 8.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Iraq on December 15. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq said that it targeted US forces at Ain al Assad airbase with a one-way drone.[63]

Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh met with interim Ninewa Governor Abdul Qadir al Dakhil on December 15 to discuss improving security in the province for the upcoming provincial elections.[64] Dakhil worked as head of the Supreme Council for the Reconstruction of Mosul. Kataib Hezbollah members also escorted Dakhil in Ninewa Province after Dakhil was appointed as acting governor.[65] Fayyadh and Dakhil’s meeting is notable in the context of other Iranian-backed proxy activity in Ninewa. The Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated 47th Brigade’s 2nd Regiment deployed to Sinjar, Ninewa province on December 14.[66] This regiment is reinforcing other 47th Brigade units that were ostensibly providing security for voting centers during the provincial elections. The Soufan Center reports that Iranian-backed militias intimidated voters during the 2021 federal elections.[67] Ninewa province locals warned that the militias prevented political opposition from registering to run for provincial elections.[68]

Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba (HHN) Secretary General Akram al Kaabi released a statement justifying resistance against the United States in Iraq following the arrest of unspecified individuals tied to the December 8 attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad.[69] Spokesperson for the Iraqi Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Major General Yahya Rasool announced on December 14 that Iraqi security forces arrested individuals connected to the rocket and mortar attacks targeting the US Embassy.[70] US Ambassador to Iraq Alina Romanowski thanked Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al Sudani for arresting the individuals “responsible for the terrorist attacks” on the embassy.[71] Kaabi claimed that the United States stole resources and interfered in Iraq’s internal affairs and argued that he was justified and “expressing popular will” by conducting attacks on the United States.[72] He declared that if this made him a terrorist, then “let the world witness that I am a terrorist.” Kaabi is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US Department of the Treasury.[73]

The Balochi Salafi-jihadi group Jaish al Adl conducted a two-stage attack targeting a police station in Rask, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on December 15.[74] The Jaish al Adl fighters raided the police station, which prompted Iran’s Law Enforcement Command to dispatch a quick reaction force (QRF). The fighters then laid an ambush targeting the QRF. The two-stage attack killed at least 11 LEC officers and injured eight more. The LEC killed two Jaish al Adl fighters during the attack. Jaish al Adl conducted a similar attack on a police station in Zahedan, Sistan and Baluchistan Province on July 8 that killed two LEC officers.[75] Jaish al Adl said after the July 8 attack that civil disobedience is insufficient to secure Balochi rights and it vowed to conduct more ”targeted and harmful” attacks in the future. Jaish al Adl issued threats against the regime in October 2022 following security forces’ violent suppression of protesters in Zahedan on September 30, 2022, an event that became known as “Bloody Friday.”[76]

The Iranian deputy foreign affairs minister discussed the Israel-Hamas war with his Chinese and Saudi counterparts in Beijing on December 15.[77] The deputy foreign affairs ministers of all three countries emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and an independent Palestinian state. The overall purpose of the meeting was to discuss recent progress in the Chinese-mediated normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf spoke on the phone with Algerian Assembly President Ibrahim Boughali about the Israel-Hamas war on December 15.[78] Ghalibaf reiterated his desire to hold a meeting of the Permanent Committee on Palestine to examine practical solutions for the Palestinian people. 

 

 


[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uk-maritime-agency-probing-rep...

[2] https://twitter.com/army21ye/status/1735654693651505290

[3] https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/06/politics/us-monitor-iran-spy-ships/index.... ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-involved-planning-executi...

[4] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/pivot-to-offense-how-iran-i...

[5] https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/attribution-intent-and-resp...

[6] https://maritime-executive.com/article/hapag-and-msc-containerships-atta...

[7] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67731853; https://www.cnbc.c...

[8] https://www.reuters.com/business/maersk-posts-q2-profits-above-forecast-...

[9] https://www.ft.com/content/3f5d2519-94cb-4f37-9049-4e0e936212e2

[10] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735562483400618421; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1735564537561067675

[11] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735562483400618421; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1735564537561067675

[12] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735562483400618421

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-13-2023

[14] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1734872801314546125; https://www.timesofisrael.com/ten-soldiers-including-two-senior-officers... https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1734264932714058134

[15] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735351596886663458

[16] https://www.ynet dot co.il/news/article/yokra13709771

[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-stresses-safety-gaza-civili...

[18] https://t.me/sarayaps/16947

[19] https://t.me/qassambrigades/29526; https://t.me/qassambrigades/29523; ... https://t.me/qassambrigades/29494

[20] https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1725887408934154628; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-stresses-safety-gaza-civili...

[21] https://t.me/sarayaps/16941

[22] https://t.me/kataebabuali/10542; https://t.me/kataebabuali/10543

[23] https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1735725832377688475; https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1735725834235732332

[24] https://twitter.com/IDFSpokesperson/status/1735725834235732332

[25] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735630862186594541

[26] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735630872215224506

[27] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735630872215224506

[28] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/854

[29] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/856

[30] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/281 ; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/285 ; https://t.me/AymanGouda/5830

[31] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/857

[32] https://t.me/sarayaps/16944

[33] https://t.me/QudsN/344233

[34] https://www.idf dot il/162485

[35] https://x.com/GLZRadio/status/1735560388538736681?s=20

[36] https://www.idf dot il/162485

[37] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1717826689076531446

[38] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the-order-of-battle-of-hamas-iz...

[39] https://www.idf dot il/162360

[40] https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/11/middleeast/hamas-weaponry-gaza-israel-pal...

[41] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-stresses-safety-gaza-civili...

[42] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/15/world/middleeast/jake-sullivan-will-m... https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/12/14/back...

[43] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/15/world/middleeast/jake-sullivan-will-m...

[44] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/12/14/back...

[45] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/14/us/politics/israel-gaza-hamas-us.html

[46] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/852; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/858; https://t.me/sarayaps/16945;

https://t.me/sarayaps/16948; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/859

[47] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/sirens-triggered-in-jerusalem-following-long-range-rocket-fire-from-gaza/; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/859; https://t.me/qassambrigades/28695

[48] https://t.me/sarayaps/16766

[50] https://t.me/sarayaps/16948; https://t.me/sarayaps/16945

[51] https://t.me/QudsN/344347 ; https://t.me/almanarnews/140027 ; https://t.me/QudsN/344398

[52] https://t.me/almanarnews/140027

[53] https://t.me/almanarnews/140027

[54] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/48940

[55] https://t.me/QudsN/344360 ; https://t.me/QudsN/344372

[56] https://t.me/C_Military1/41730; https://t.me/C_Military1/41732; https://t.me/C_Military1/41739; https://t.me/C_Military1/41744; https://t.me/C_Military1/41744; https://t.me/C_Military1/41747; https://t.me/C_Military1/41756; https://t.me/C_Military1/41758; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735664251023278104; https://t.me/C_Military1/41764

[57] https://t.me/C_Military1/41730; https://t.me/C_Military1/41758

[58] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hezbollah-says-front-with-isra...

[59] https://t.me/C_Military1/41747

[60] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735664251023278104

[61] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1735664251023278104

[62] https://central-media dot net/36920/631/; https://t.me/C_Military1/41760

[63] https://t.me/elamharbi/161

[64] https://t.me/teamsmediawar_1/95345

[65] https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%81%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%87%D8%A7%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8-%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%88%D9%89-%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%A9 ; https://twitter.com/antfadt/status/1730184341404151962 ; https://www.ina%20dot%20iq/125552--.html

[66] https://al-hashed.gov dot iq/?p=515941

[67] https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2021-june-7/

[68] https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-religion-iran-elections-united-st... ; https://almadapaper dot net/view.php?cat=298165

[69] https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/131

[70] https://www.ina dot iq/199237--.html ; https://www.ninanews dot com/Website/News/Details?key=1095313

[71] https://twitter.com/USAmbIraq/status/1735339068521635908

[72] https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/131

[73] https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=11170

[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/12/15/3006805; https://www.iranintl dot com/202312150182; https://www.iranintl dot com/202312151934; https://www.iranintl dot com/202312152058; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/09/24/3006762 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-4 ;...

[75] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/iran-militants-attack-police-station-... https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/07/08/2922412

[76] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-crisis-update-october-4 ; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-july-10-2023

[77] http://www.farsnews dot ir/news/14020924000437/; https://english.alarabiya dot net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/12/15/Saudi-Arabia-Iran-committed-to-Beijing-Agreement-Statement

[78] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/en/news/2023/12/15/3006969/iranian-parliament-speaker-calls-for-urgent-meeting-on-gaza-crisis

Tags

Thursday, December 14, 2023

THE HIGH PRICE OF LOSING UKRAINE

 SOURCE: 

(   )  THE HIGH PRICE OF LOSING UKRAINE :     https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/high-price-losing-ukraine

 https://youtu.be/ogH0wRD0Vkw

The High Price of Losing Ukraine

Military-Strategic and Financial Implications of

                            Russian Victory

Frederick W. Kagan, Kateryna Stepanenko, Mitchell Belcher,
Noel Mikkelsen, and Thomas Bergeron

December 14, 2023

The United States has a much higher stake in Russia's war on Ukraine than most people think. A Russian conquest of all of Ukraine is by no means impossible if the United States cuts off all military assistance and Europe follows suit. Such an outcome would bring a battered but triumphant Russian army right up to NATO’s border from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean. The Ukrainian military with Western support has destroyed nearly 90% of the Russian army that invaded in February 2022 according to US intelligence sources, but the Russians have replaced those manpower losses and are ramping up their industrial base to make good their material losses at a rate much faster than their pre-war capacity had permitted.[1]

A victorious Russian army at the end of this war will be combat experienced and considerably larger than the pre-2022 Russian land forces. The Russian economy will gradually recover as sanctions inevitably erode and Moscow develops ways to circumvent or mitigate those that remain. Over time it will replace its equipment and rebuild its coherence, drawing on a wealth of hard-won experience fighting mechanized warfare. It will bring with it advanced air defense systems that only American stealth aircraft—badly needed to deter and confront China—can reliably penetrate. Russia can pose a major conventional military threat to NATO for the first time since the 1990s in a timeframe set to a considerable extent by how much the Kremlin invests in its military. Since Moscow has already committed to an ambitious post-war military expansion program the US cannot be confident that the timeframe will be very long.[2]

The overall military potential of the United States and its NATO allies is so much greater than that of Russia that there is no reason to doubt the West’s ability to defeat any conceivable Russian military even assuming that Russia fully absorbs Ukraine and Belarus. But as Americans consider the costs of continuing to help Ukraine fight the Russians in the coming years, they deserve a careful consideration of the costs of allowing Russia to win. Those costs are much higher than most people imagine.

To deter and defend against a renewed Russian threat following a full Russian victory in Ukraine the United States will have to deploy to Eastern Europe a sizable portion of its ground forces. The United States will have to station in Europe a large number of stealth aircraft. Building and maintaining those aircraft is intrinsically expensive, but challenges in manufacturing them rapidly will likely force the United States to make a terrible choice between keeping enough in Asia to defend Taiwan and its other Asian allies and deterring or defeating a Russian attack on a NATO ally. The entire undertaking will cost a fortune, and the cost will last as long as the Russian threat continues—potentially indefinitely.

Almost any other outcome of the Ukraine war is preferable to this one. Helping Ukraine keep the lines where they are through continuous Western military support is far more advantageous and cheaper for the United States than allowing Ukraine to lose. “Freezing” the conflict is worse than continuing to help Ukraine fight—that would simply give Russia time and space to prepare for a renewed war to conquer Ukraine and confront NATO. Helping Ukraine regain control of all or most of its territory would be much more advantageous, as it would drive Russian forces even further to the east. Best of all, supporting Ukraine to its victory and then helping it rebuild would put the largest and most combat-effective friendly military on the European continent at the forefront of the defense of NATO—whether Ukraine does or does not ultimately join the alliance.

In all these scenarios Americans should keep in mind that Ukraine is not Afghanistan. Afghanistan in 2001 was one of the poorest countries in the world with no industry to speak of and a poorly-educated population. Ukraine is highly industrialized with a modern, urban, and highly educated population. Restored to its 1991 borders Ukraine’s economy is large enough to support its own military. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has recently committed his country to establishing its own military industry including by establishing joint ventures with Western firms to benefit Ukraine and its partners.[3] A victorious Ukraine would not be a permanent ward of the West. It can instead be truly independent and contribute greatly to NATO’s security and the West’s economy.

The following maps illustrate four military situations related to this war and its outcomes and consider their military-strategic and financial implications for the United States.

Situation 1: Pre-February 2022

Before the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022 non-Baltic NATO states faced no serious conventional military threat from Russia. The Russian ground forces had one airborne division and a mechanized infantry brigade near the Estonian and Latvian borders and the equivalent of a division in the exclave of Kaliningrad, which is physically separated from Russia and a poor launching pad on its own for an attack on Poland and Lithuania, which it borders.[4] The next closest Russian forces to Poland were about 360 miles to the east on the far side of Belarus. No Russian troops threatened Slovakia, Hungary, or Romania.


The Russians had been building an air defense network relying on their advanced S-300 and S-400 long-range anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems to hinder NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic States. They had been expanding that network over much of the Black Sea using their bases in occupied Crimea. However, their network suffered from a large gap across southern Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania because they could not base their systems in Ukraine. Even their air defense coverage over Poland relied heavily on systems in Kaliningrad, the most vulnerable and exposed part of Russian territory. Kaliningrad’s small size deprives Russian air defense systems of one of the important elements of their survivability, in fact. The systems are fully mobile with all of their components mounted in trucks. They are designed to be able to move around and thereby make it harder for an adversary to locate and destroy them. Trapping these systems in a small exclave reduces that advantage and facilitates NATO efforts to disrupt and defeat them.

 

Map 2: Current situation as of December 12, 2023

Ukraine’s defeat of the initial Russian invasion in 2022 has kept the eastern borders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania free of the threat of major Russian ground attack. Ukraine’s liberation of western Kherson Oblast has kept the nearest effective Russian troops about 220 miles and a large river away from the Romanian border. Most of Russia’s troops are more than 350 miles from Romania and further still from Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. The war is fully occupying nearly half a million Russian troops—just about all of Russia’s available ground combat power. The Russians are steadily completing their long-running efforts to secure control over Belarus and to base Russian forces there, but Russia still poses no conventional ground threat to NATO today because its military is tied up in Ukraine.

 

Map 3: Hypothetical situation if Russia fully occupies Ukraine

NB: The following estimate of the forces Russia might deploy in Ukraine and Belarus if Moscow intended to be prepared for a short-notice serious attack on NATO is very conservative. It assumes that the Russians move to the NATO borders two armies newly-created for the current war, one of which is already designated to be stationed in Crimea, and two others that were deployed on the eastern borders of Ukraine and Belarus and whose stationing at those locations would lose its strategic purpose following a full Russian victory in Ukraine. It assumes that most of the Russian army currently in Ukraine will return to bases within the current boundaries of the Russian Federation after the war. Most of the Russian army’s home stations are Soviet-era garrisons whose locations are not optimized for Russia’s current strategic context. The Russians could well bring considerably more combat power toward the NATO frontiers than is discussed below and depicted on this map following a victory over Ukraine without any strategic cost if they were willing to pay the financial price.

The sudden collapse of Western aid would likely lead sooner or later to the collapse of Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russian military. Russian forces could push all the way to the western Ukrainian border in such a scenario and establish new military bases on the borders of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The Russians are preparing occupation military forces to handle the almost inevitable Ukrainian insurgency while leaving front line troops free to threaten NATO.

The Russians have expanded their army’s structure to fight the war and have indicated their intention of retaining the larger structure after the war.[5] They could readily station three full armies (the 18th Combined Arms Army and the 25th Combined Arms Army newly created for this war and the 8th Guards Combined Arms Army) on the borders of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania.[6] They would likely build out the component divisions in those armies to normal complements of three regiments each, drawing on formations further in the rear to bring these frontline units to nearly their full strength of roughly 6 mechanized divisions (18 regiments) in Ukraine.[7] They could move divisions that had been stationed on the eastern Ukrainian borders into Ukraine itself as reserves for the front-line divisions. The Kremlin has made great strides in its long-term project to gain control of the Belarusian military, and victory in Ukraine would likely get it the rest of the way.[8] The Russians would thus likely deploy either permanently or in a nominally rotational way an airborne division (three regiments) and a mechanized infantry division (likely three regiments) in southwestern and northern Belarus as well. They would be able to threaten a short-notice mechanized offensive against one or several NATO states with at least 8 divisions (21 mechanized or tank regiments and brigades and three airborne regiments), backed by significant reserves including the 1st Guards Tank Army, which would be reconstituted around Moscow and was always intended to be the premier strike force against NATO. They could make such an attack and still threaten the Baltic States and Finland with the forces already present there and reinforcements they have announced they intend to station along the Finnish borders.[9] Russian ground forces would be covered by a dense air defense network of S-300, S-400, and S-500 long range anti-air and anti-missile systems with overlapping coverage of the entire front.

NATO would be unable to defend against such an attack with the forces currently in Europe. The United States would need to move large numbers of American soldiers to the entire eastern NATO border from the Baltic to the Black Sea to deter Russian adventurism and be prepared to defeat a Russian attack. The United States would also need to commit a significant proportion of its fleet of stealth aircraft permanently to Europe. NATO defense strategy relies on air superiority not merely to protect NATO troops from enemy attack but also to use air power to offset smaller NATO ground forces and limited stocks of NATO artillery. The United States would have to keep large numbers of stealth aircraft available in Europe to penetrate and destroy Russian air defense systems—and keep the Russians from re-establishing effective air defense—so that non-stealthy aircraft and cruise missiles can reach their targets. The requirement to commit a significant stealth aircraft fleet to Europe could badly degrade America’s ability to respond effectively to Chinese aggression against Taiwan since all Taiwan scenarios rely heavily on the same stealth aircraft that would be needed to defend Europe.

The cost of these defensive measures would be astronomical and would likely be accompanied by a period of very high risk when US forces were not adequately prepared or postured to handle either Russia or China, let alone both together.

 

 

Map 4: Full Ukrainian Victory

Re-establishing Kyiv’s control over all Ukraine’s territory including Crimea is important for the United States and NATO as well as Ukraine. Russia’s possession of Crimea makes Russia the dominant power in the Black Sea and allows Russian aircraft to threaten the southeastern NATO flank as well as to deploy long-range air defenses on the peninsula. The positions in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast that Russia currently controls provide bases even further west of Crimea. NATO will have to meet these challenges whenever the war ends if those areas remain in Russian hands. If Ukraine regains its 1991 borders, however, the pressure on NATO eases dramatically. The nearest Russian troops to Romania would be almost 500 miles away. The Black Sea would become very nearly a NATO lake. Moscow would likely complete its military control of Belarus and base its forces there even in this scenario. The threat to NATO of such bases, however, would take on a very different cast in a scenario in which Belarus is a large salient with NATO forces on two sides and a large and powerful independent Ukraine all along its southern border. The task of defending northeastern Poland and the Baltic States from Russian troops operating out of Belarus, Kaliningrad, and Russia itself is a much more manageable and less costly proposition than that of defending the entire NATO line from the Black Sea to the Arctic Ocean.

 

 

Conclusion

This brief paper evaluates only the narrow question of some of the military-strategic and financial tradeoffs of various possible outcomes of the Russian war in Ukraine. We have considered elsewhere the important question of possible Russian escalations in the face of defeat and we do not minimize those considerations.[10] We have argued strongly that American values align with American interests in Ukraine and that there is a strong and cogent values-based argument for helping Ukraine liberate all its land and its people.[11] We still believe that that is true.

But the American people are being asked to spend a lot of money helping Ukraine fight Russia, and it is not unreasonable for them also wonder what the financial cost of not helping Ukraine would be. This essay is meant solely to serve as a departure point for a data-driven and realistic discussion answering that question.

Note on the maps:

Map 1 depicting the pre-2022 deployments of Russia and NATO reflects publicly-available reports of the locations of NATO units of brigade/regiment echelon and above and ISW’s assessment of the locations of Russian units at those echelons and above.[12]

Map 2 depicts ISW’s best current assessment of the locations of Russian units of brigade/regiment echelon and above fighting in Ukraine.[13] ISW does not currently assess that Russia retains combat effective ground forces maneuver units outside of Ukraine beyond those engaged in training at this time.

Map 3 depicts a hypothetical array of Russian units following a complete Russian conquest of Ukraine. The text accompanying the map explains why we chose to show the Russians stationing the number of armies, divisions, and brigades on our map and why we chose the particular Russian formations to move around. The Russians could and almost certainly would make other concrete choices at every level, including the precise tactical dispositions of individual regiments and brigades. We placed many of those in locations previously used by the Soviet Union or Ukraine; others in locations that seem suitable as jumping-off points for an attack on one or more NATO countries. The purpose of the illustration is to show a conservative estimate of a Russian force disposition intended to threaten NATO with a credible invasion, not to argue for any specific Russian unit array or that the Russians would deploy in precisely such a pattern.

Map 4 depicts a hypothetical Russian disposition following a full Russian defeat in Ukraine. We assume that Moscow would adjust its pre-2022 permanent deployment to one arrayed to pose a constant threat to Ukraine, and so would be much more heavily concentrated around Ukraine’s borders. It is already apparent that the Russian Black Sea Fleet will withdraw to Novorossiisk if Russia loses Crimea, and so we have stationed it there on this map along with most of the ground forces currently stationed in Crimea. This map is also, of course, notional, and Moscow would almost certainly make different choices.

 


References

[1] https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/12/politics/russia-troop-losses-us-intellige... https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/12/us/politics/russia-intelligence-asses...

[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign...

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-launch-joint-weapons-produc... https://www.kmu dot gov.ua/en/news/arsenal-vilnoho-svitu-pidsumky-pershoho-mizhnarodnoho-forumu-oboronnykh-industrii

[4] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20...

[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-volunteer-units-an... ru/politics/articles/2023/04/13/970694-v-armiyu-razreshili-brat-kontraktnikov-srazu-posle-shkoli; https://tass dot ru/politika/18274017; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-...

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-... https://amalantra dot ru/18-armiya-rossii/

[7] Russia's formations are all currently understrength due to losses in Ukraine, and pre-February 2022 many brigades and regiments were smaller than their doctrinal end strength would suggest. Newly established Russian formations may for a time possess less than their full complement of on-paper men and equipment, but the Russian MoD will likely prioritize reinforcing these formations to their full strength as soon as possible.

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-august-18-au...

[9] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia%E2%80%99s-military-...

[10] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/if-west-cuts-aid-ukraine-russi... ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/weakness-lethal-why-putin-... https://time.com/6300772/ukraine-counteroffensive-can-still-succeed/

[11] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/west-must-help-ukraine-fre...

[12] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-regular-ground-for...

[13] https://t.me/dmytrogordon_official/35755; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/...https://t.me/rybar/54082 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign... https://t.me/vdv_za_chestnost_spravedlivost/717 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Dec%202%20Russian%2... https://bmpd dot livejournal.com/4742046.html; https://t.me/marzoev_oleg/4711; https://amalantra dot ru/18-armiya-rossii/; https://t.me/t_artm/1713 ; https://t.me/pnvcomment/7750213 ; https:/... https://t.me/rusich_army/11471 ; https://ru dot espreso.tv/nachinaetsya-nastoyashchaya-konkurentsiya-mezhdu-inostrannymi-proizvoditelyami-v-postavkakh-novykh-vooruzheniy-dlya-vsu-kolonka-sergeya-zgurtsa; https://vk.com/wall-83221497_1387371; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1406... https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/23417 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/55489 ; https:/... https://myrotvorets dot center/criminal/volodkevich-yurij-vitalevich/; https://t.me/RusskijSoyuz/6520 https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1438 ; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57540 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/12764 ; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11348; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/57540; https://t.me/... dot ru/news/267527; https://vk.com/wall-214698748_105110 ; https://fair dot ru/voenkor-sladkov-osvobozhdeniya-marinki-ostalos-sovsem-23120914271670.htm; https://t.me/sashakots/43069 ; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1381 ; h...https://x.com/mon_mon_1064552/status/1720456635238564236?s=20; https://... https://t.me/nwindpro/209 ; https://t.me/astrapress/41044; https://t.me/nm_dnr/11253; https://t.me...

https://www.dovod dot online/muromskaya-inzhenerno-sapernaya-brigada-ponesla-tyazhelye-poteri-na-vojne-s-ukrainoj/; https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/17864325; https://vn dot ru/news-andrey-panferov-putin-nagradil-ordenom-zhukova-24-brigadu-spetsnaza-gru-iz-novosibirska/; https://vk.com/wall-29483096_9195 ; https://vk.com/wall-95865483_304017 ; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-63134219https://donpress dot com/news/04-12-2023-korotko-po-avdeevke-putinu-ne-udastsya-v-novogodnem-obraschenii-k-rossiyanam; https://zmaps dot ru/rubric-lossesvsu/flyeye-sbitzapadnee-g-kremennaja/ ; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1706903544190689630; https://t.me/... dot ru/daily/27573/4842239/; https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1714517813665112349 ; https://t.m... https://news.bigmir dot net/ukraine/7320023-vsu-prodvigayutsya-v-donetskoj-i-zaporozhskoj-oblastyakh-isw; https://vk.com/wall-168283237_20045 ; https://t.me/vrogov/12667 ; ht... https://colonelcassad dot livejournal.com/8818816.html?page=2#comments; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/1311; https://kh.vgorode DOT ua/news/sobytyia/a1245415-voennyj-obozrevatel-rasskazal-chto-proiskhodit-sejchas-na-kupjanskom-napravlenii; https://patrioty dot org.ua/blogs/ostanni-zminy-v-chastyni-uhrupuvannia-viisk-zapad-protyvnyka-zoseredzhenoho-na-kupianskomu-napriamku--mashovets-486127.html; https://ua.redtram dot com/news/community/615493805/;

https://t.me/kharkivlife/67326; https://t.me/mod_russia/28694 ; https... info/analitica/peregrupuvannya-rosijskih-vijsk-v-krimu-ta-na-donbasi-dani-grupi-is/; https://vk.com/wall-170770667_203231; https://osintua dot eu/@ua/111266458943242751#; https://www.unian dot net/war/vozmozhen-li-perelom-v-voyne-v-polzu-rf-general-ocenil-shansy-rossiyan-novosti-vtorzheniya-rossii-na-ukrainu-amp-12478920.html; https://vk.com/wall-222136319_15504; https://vk.com/wall-119368900_1652... https://24tv dot ua/ru/chernigov-raketnyj-udar-po-dramteatru-kakaja-rossijskaja-brigada_n2422736; https://vk.com/wall-218739770_214; https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4088;

 Tags


 Ukraine Project

 File Attachments: