SOURCE:
http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-eyes-18-overseas-naval-bases
BY
http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analysis/china-eyes-18-overseas-naval-bases
GEOPOLITICS
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China Eyes 18 Overseas Naval Bases |
MONIKA CHANSORIA
These developments are in sync with China’s much
pronounced Maritime Silk Route strategy.
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With the recent challenging of the notion of the
Indian Ocean Region (IOR) being India's "strategic
backyard", China is gradually upping the ante in the
maritime realm around India — a traditional
strategic nerve centre for New Delhi. Beijing is
sending a tacit signal, wherein it "recognises India's
special role in stabilising the strategic Indian
Ocean Region, but the perception that it is India's
'backyard' may result in clashes..."
The caution thrown in by China needs to be read in
conjunction with the cumulative maritime activity of
the PLA Navy (PLAN) and its mounting forays into
the Indian Ocean — the third largest water body in
the world. The expanding strategic naval footprint in
the Indian Ocean by means of acquiring more
maritime bases and berthing facilities is a core
pillar of China's ports Policy. The PLAN's presence
and deployment in the IOR have been on the rise
since 2014, when a Song-class conventional
submarine docked in the Colombo harbour along
with a Ming-class diesel-electric nuclear submarine.
Striking, was the fact, that the submarine docked at
Colombo's South Container Terminal that is built,
run, and controlled by China Merchants Holdings —
thereby raising queries as to why did it not choose to
dock at the Sri Lanka port Authority in Colombo,
which is mandated to accommodate foreign military
vessels? The emphasis to dock at a minuscule
"Chinese facility" well within a Sri Lankan
administered harbour, merits careful analysis.
Given its strategic placement, Sri Lanka is fast
becoming the pivot of rising Chinese naval
presence in the IOR, in that, China also has a
substantial controlling stake in the Hambantota
port, withColombo agreeing to grant Chinese state-
ownedcompanies operating rights to as many as
four berths in exchange for an easing of loan
conditions.Besides, there are unconfirmed reports
of construction of a Chinese-run aircraft
maintenance facility near Hambantota in order to
service PLAAF assets based in Sri Lanka. In
neighbouring Pakistan, the docking of a Chinese
submarine in Karachi, following the handing over of
the port's operational control to China Overseas port
Holdings is another step towards consolidating
Chinese permanent navalpresence in South Asia.
These developments, significantly, are in sync with
China's much pronounced Maritime Silk Route
strategy — a prominent feature of the upcoming 13th
Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). The maritime route is a
proposed sea network of ports, coastal
infrastructure projects beginning in Quanzhou in
the Fujian province and culminating in the northern
Mediterranean Sea. By virtue of this fresh strategy,
Beijing seeks to gain greater access to the strategic
pathways of the Indian Ocean, alleviated access to
the Gulf oil — which consequently shall reduce its
dependence on the passage through the Straits of
Malacca — a key potential vulnerability for China in
the event of a future conflict.
China recognises fully well that in order to boost its
naval power projection capability, it will have to gain
greater access to ports and berthing facilities. This
is being increasingly reflected with China's covert
strategy of granting huge loans to smaller coastal
island nations that are in dire need for
developmental funds to improve infrastructure. The
pattern that China is following, almost unvaryingly
for handing out these loans, is that there are "no
conditions and/or transparency measures" while
issuing the loan. As soon as the island nation in
question reaches the stage where it is unable to
repay the loan on time, China thereafter "offers" to
"waive off/relax" loan conditions in exchange for a
"few berths" for that particular naval facility. The
Maldivian project is a case in point, in which China
is developing the iHavan Integrated Development
Project in the northernmost main sea line of
communication joining Southeast Asia and China to
West Asia and Europe. The iHavan project is riding
on huge concessional loans/aid financing from
China and it is being forecast that Maldives shall
almost certainly default on payments, thereby
allowing China to seize a few berthing facilities
there.
This pattern could well be adopted in the future with
many other countries, especially since official Chinese publications including Xinhua have advocated and "advised" the PLA Navy to build as many as 18 overseas naval military bases in the greater Indian Ocean area, possibly including: Chongjin port (North Korea), Moresby port (Papua New Guinea), Sihanoukville port (Cambodia), Koh Lanta port (Thailand), Sittwe port (Myanmar), Dhaka port (Bangladesh), Gwadar port (Pakistan), Hambantota port (Sri Lanka), Maldives, Seychelles, Djibouti port (Djibouti), Lagos port (Nigeria), Mombasa port (Kenya), Dar-es-Salaam port (Tanzania), Luanda port (Angola) and the Walvis Bay port (Namibia).
The long shadow of China's ports policy in the Indian
Ocean being currently driven and characterised by both, state- and private-sponsored "infrastructure investment", foretells strategic ramifications militarily as these facilities shall end up becoming communication and surveillance facilities, in addition to being repair and replenishment centres for the Chinese Navy — underscoring the intransigent course of Beijing's influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. |