Thursday, April 23, 2015

China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Emerging Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army

SOURCE:
https://www.academia.edu/150498/The_Evolution_of_China_s_Military_Strategy



        China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs:
       Emerging Trends in the Operational Art
                                                            of
         the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
                                                Edited by
                                                                                         James Mulvenon
                                  and
                              David M. Finkelstein

                                                               December 2005

                                   The CNA Corporation
                                                                                                                                                                 Alexandria, Virginia




PLEASE CLICK TO OPEN THE pdf  FILE
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  PROLOGUE

                                                                                                                                                                                                David M. Finkelstein
                                                                                                          

 

The decade of the 1990s was a period of tremendous change for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On nearly every front, this massive defense establishment was engaged in a myriad of reforms aimed at making it a more professional force in a corporate and institutional sense as well as a more operationally capable force.These changes affected every facet of the PLA—force structure, equipment, personnel reform, and yet another rectification of the defense research and development establishment, to name just a few.

Of particular significance, the 1990s was also a decade of tremendous doctrinal ferment. Having just spent the decade of the 1980s refining its approaches to combined arms operations, the PLA, throughout the 1990s, found itself impelled by observing external military events to rethink its own approaches to the operational art and the prosecution of campaign-level operations
  
          
 
In particular, the performance (both successful and otherwise) of U.S. military forces and coalition partners throughout the 1990s, and the challenges faced by various developing militaries in the face of high-technology warfare helped to crystallize andrefine the PLA’s conceptualization of what it terms “Local Wars Under Modern High-tech Conditions” (and with the publication of its December 2004 defense white paper,what they now refer to as “Local Wars Under Modern Informationalized Conditions.”)So too did the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs,” much written about in the Westand subsequently in China, also give PLA operations professionals and theorists causefor pause and self-reflection. Clearly, the emergence of a new type of warfare required a new 
type of operational doctrine   
 
 
At the same time, China’s changing assessments of its external security situation provided added impetus to the need for doctrinal change. China’s perception of it own changing security landscape during this period was highlighted by the need to enhance itsability to deter Taiwan’s drift away from the mainland. It was also influenced by an increasing distrust of U.S. intentions toward China, concerns about India’s ambitions as arising regional power, increasing uncertainty over Japan’s evolving role in regionalsecurity and military affairs, as well as unresolved competing claims for maritime resources in the South China Sea with various Southeast Asian nations. All of these concerns and uncertainties underscored the need for a reexamination of PLA war fighting concepts in an age of high speed, high lethality, and high technology warfare
 
 
 
Driven by these afore mentioned capabilities-based and contingency-based requirements and assessments, the PLA set about to adjust its approaches to the conduct of operations. In 1999, after nearly a decade of study, research, and presumably experimentation in the field, a new and apparently large corpus of officially promulgated doctrinal guidance was issued under the collective title of
 
“The New GenerationOperations Regulations”
 (xin yidai zuozhan tiaoling ,新一代作战条令).
 
 
As aresult it appears that the PLA intends to change how it thinks about the conduct of campaign-level operations and adjust other supporting activities such as field training regimens, the curricula at institutions of professional military education, force structure organization, and personnel requirements.
 
In recognition of the ongoing “revolution in Chinese doctrinal affairs,” a two-day conference on the PLA’s changing approaches to the operational art was co-hosted by The CNA Corporation and The RAND Corporation in December 2002. The timing was right for a conference focused exclusively on changes in PLA doctrine on two accounts.
 
 First, by the year 2000, the potential significance of what had transpired doctrinally in the PLA was becoming evident to serious students of Chinese military affairs.
 
Second, for most of the previous decade the PLA itself had generated a tremendous amount of  professional  literature on the subject, thus providing a more than adequate amount of data to justify serious explorations of the subject.
 
 The chapters that follow are the results of the conference.
 
There is still much that is not understood about the PLA’s ongoing doctrinal paradigm shift. However, as a body of scholarship, the papers in this volume offer a rich source of insight into the initial outlines of the PLA’s changing approaches to the conductof operations. All of the authors used a body of professional materials published by thePLA in the original Chinese that represent some (but clearly not all) of the key writings to come out of this period of doctrinal reexamination. The papers likely represent the most current thinking on the PLA’s changing operational doctrine as can be found anywhere to this point in the English language.
 
What is unique about this volume is that it focuses on PLA doctrine at the operational-level of warfare—the very level of conflict at which the PLA itself has put itsown emphasis in its new doctrinal literature. It is this level of warfare—the realm of campaigns—that provides the operational linkage between the strategic objectives of aconflict (the desired political-military end state) and the battles and engagements thatdefine the tactical level of combat. It is at this level of conflict at which the operational art is practiced, at which campaign design is paramount, and at which the highest order of generalship is required to take carefully crafted and complex operations plans from thedrawing boards to the various battle space dimensions and into contact with the enemy
 
 
Of special note, we were especially fortunate, and honored, to have as our conference’s keynote speaker General Donn A. Starry (U.S. Army, Retired), former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command and one of theU.S. Army’s most prominent and influential doctrinal experts. As one of the “Founding Fathers” of 
 
 AirLand Battle doctrine, and the driving force behind the Army’s watershed 1982Field Manual, Operation(FM100-5),
 
General Starry provided much appreciated insight into the real world issues associated with what it takes to change a military’s doctrine as well as thoughtful commentary on the philosophical and intellectual aspects of thinking through such a complex endeavor
 
 
It is our hope that the readers of this volume will come away with a greater appreciation for the sea changes that are underway in PLA operational thinking, anappreciation for PLA military science researchers and operations specialists as professionals in their own right, and an appreciation for the art of the possible in the fieldof Chinese military studies in the first years of the  21 st Century.
 

 
 PLEASE CLICK TO OPEN THE pdf  FILE
 
 
 
 
 
     
 





















 

Why Terrorists Target Schools and Universities

Source:
http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/other/why-terrorists-target-schools-and-universities/ar-AAasAqB




                 Why Terrorists Target
                 Schools and Universities
                                   By
                      Jake Flanagin







 
Kenyan security forces patrol the fenced border around Garissa University College.©
Provided by Quartz Kenyan security forces patrol the fenced border around Garissa University College. 
 
Early on the morning of Apr. 2, 2015,
a squad of gunmen, reportedly affiliated with Somalia’s al-Shabab jihadist-terror group, entered Garissa University College in Garissa, Kenya, killing 147 and wounding dozens.
 
 
“The assault on Garissa—a poor, pastoral area that is home to many Somali refugees—stands in stark contrast to the group’s deadly 2013 attack on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping center, which was frequented by expats and rich Kenyans,” write Lily Kuo and Hanna Kozlowska for Quartz. It’s part of a perceptible shift in modern terror tactics; increasingly, the world’s terror organizations seem to be turning away from attacks on subway cars and airport terminals, to focus lethal attention on institutions of learning.
 
 
Seven gunmen affiliated with an offshoot of the Taliban brutally murdered 145 people at a school in Peshawar, Pakistan, in Dec. 2014. A self-proclaimed al-Qaeda operative shot and killed seven outside a Jewish school in Toulouse, France, in Mar. 2012. In October of that year, Pakistani education advocate Malala Yousafzai was shot in the face by a masked gunman while she rode a bus home from school. Militants linked to the Chechen separatist insurgency in the Russian Federation killed 334 people and held over 1,000 hostage at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, in Sept. 2004. And Boko Haram, of course, first rose to global prominence for kidnapping 276 schoolgirls in the Nigerian town of Chibok in Apr. 2014.
 
 
 
One reason that “terrorist organizations might choose to target educational institutions is that schools and school children act as powerful symbolic targets,” wrote Emma Bradford and Margaret A. Wilson, forensic psychologists at the University of Liverpool, in a 2013 analysis for the Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology. “Attacks on these targets evoke a strong emotional response.”
 
 
 
“Schools and other educational institutions represent ‘soft targets,’” they added. “A soft target is a relatively unguarded site where people congregate, normally in large numbers, thus offering the potential for mass casualties.” But practicalities aside, there are also specific, political and cultural reasons a terrorist cell might target a school or university. And this is where such acts diverge from the usual modes of modern terror.
 
 
Though bombing public transport takes months, if not years of intensive planning, it is intended to make the act appear random—anyone could become a victim by passing through at the wrong time. The terrifying power of this particular terror tactic is, after all, its unpredictability. An ideological message is usually announced in the aftermath.
 
 
Attacking schools, however, is predictable because the act is the message. Terrorists who attack schools intend to deplete the number of institutions disseminating philosophies ostensibly contradictory to their worldview;
 
 “Boko Haram,” roughly translated from the Hausa language means Western education is forbidden.”
 
 
 
 
“They’re attacking what they see as the institutions of culture, and in particular the institutions of Western culture,” Ebrahim Moosa, professor of Islamic studies at the University of Notre Dame, told The Christian Science Monitor following the attacks in Peshawar. “They see that the process of Westernization begins at school, so schools that violate strict Islamic education become targets.”
 
 
It’s not difficult to see why Garissa was targeted. Kenyan schools consistently rank toward the best in the region, and the overall Kenyan population demonstrates one of the highest literacy rates on the continent. It is also a highly diverse place, with regards to religion and ethnicity, not unlike many African countries occupying the borderlands between Muslim-dominated North Africa and the Christian-dominated south. Consequently, Kenyan schools and universities are well-positioned for the maximal exchange of cultures, politics, and ideas—a concept that stands in direct opposition to the rigid ideologies of groups like al-Shabab.
 
 
Al-Shabab has a history of interfering in local education. In areas of Somalia under the group’s control, once co-ed schools have been gender segregated, with the majority of girls being intimidated against enrolling, if not forcibly removed from schools all together. Whole classes of boys have been pulled out of schools and conscripted into its ranks.
 
 
 
In an audio message released following the attack at Garissa, Ali Mohamoud Raghe, a spokesperson for al-Shabab, said, “the university had been targeted because it was educating many Christian students in ‘a Muslim land under colony,’” according to The New York Times, “a reference to the large ethnic Somali population in a part of Kenya that Somalia once tried to claim. He called the university part of Kenya’s ‘plan to spread their Christianity and infidelity.’” Which makes al-Shabab’s objective crystal-clear, and all too familiar: to wipe out a generation of ideological non-adherents.
 
 
You can follow Jake on Twitter at @jakeflanagin. We welcome your comments at ideas@qz.com.
 
 
Quartz is launching in Africa in June 2015. Sign up for announcements and updates here.
 
 
 

Wednesday, April 22, 2015

Saudi Arabia's New Muscular Foreign Policy

SOURCE:http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32381798







   Saudi Arabia's New Muscular Foreign Policy


From the section Middle East
Saudi army fires towards Yemen (15/04/15)
                       
Saudi Arabia sees threats around the region and has taken the lead against rebels in Yemen

The border with Yemen is a 10-hour drive from the Saudi capital, or a two-hour flight, but Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen is on everyone's mind in Riyadh.

 
Officially it is a Saudi-led military operation with coalition partners including the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and other Sunni countries.


But most Saudis see it very much as their war, with the fighting right across their border, in Yemen. Over 70% of the sorties by jets pounding rebel targets in Yemen are Saudi.


Officially, the war is also limited in its scope and goals: restore the internationally recognised President Mansour Abdrabbuh Hadi to power and undo the territorial gains of Yemen's Zaidi Shia rebels, known as Houthis, who allied themselves with remnants of the former ruler, Ali Abdallah Saleh.


But almost every conversation with Saudis about the Yemen military operation leads to a wider discussion about the region, the kingdom's new role as the leader of a military coalition and in many cases, people's desire to see this translate into action elsewhere.
At a bowling alley in Riyadh one evening, I met a young couple enjoying an evening out. The man was in the military so he would only give his name as Hamed. His eyes lit up when I asked him whether he supported the war.

"We support the king's decision to go to war 100%, it's long overdue. Hopefully, we will move to help Syria next, and bring down President Assad who has been causing so much death and destruction for his people," he said.


Wave of Patriotism

Saudi Arabia has accused regional rival Iran of arming the Houthis - a charge both the Houthis and Iran have denied.
Saudis and Sunnis in general feel they have been taking a beating by Shia Iran across the Middle East as Tehran tries to solidify its influence from Baghdad to Beirut.


Portrait in Riyadh of Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz on a billboard to support the Saudi-led operation in Yemen (15/04/15)
                       
Billboards in Riyadh shows patriotic pictures in support of the Saudi-led operation 
                   
The victim narrative is an odd one considering the power of countries like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in general and the fact that an overwhelming majority of Muslims in the world are Sunni.
So there is an interesting wave of patriotism on display in the kingdom these days and a sense of pride that Saudi Arabia, under new King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, is asserting itself in a way it has not in the past.


"Saudi Arabia is a reference and a leader for the Arab and Muslim world and we are proud of that," said Hamed.


Some Saudis do quietly express concern about the country entering into a war with no apparent end game. But no-one wants to be openly critical as they ponder the possibility it could all wrong and the kingdom could find itself in a long protracted war.


Already reports of civilian casualties in Yemen and warnings of a humanitarian catastrophe are on weighing on people's minds, anxious about a backlash against the kingdom.


So far there have been only a handful of Saudi casualties and the state is promising compensation for the families of the ''martyrs'' including 1m Saudi riyals ($266,000; £178,800) as well as other benefits.



US-Style Briefings

 
Every evening at seven o' clock, Saudis can tune into national television to watch the live transmission of a news conference detailing the progress of the military campaign.


It starts with a short music video of a patriotic song about the nation, as tanks, marching soldiers and jets in action are projected on the screen.
Gen Ahmad Assiri (27/03/15)
                       
Gen Assiri gives daily news conferences on the progress of the campaign
Gen Ahmad Assiri, the coalition spokesperson, conducts his briefing US-style, with slides and black-and-white footage of air strikes, and takes questions from the media. There is no pre-screening of the questioners or the questions. The briefing usually starts with an assurance that all is going according to plan.
After a briefing, I had a more candid exchange with Gen Assiri when I asked him whether he was proud of his country's leadership role in this war.


"It is always a very difficult decision to get a country in war or in a military operation; it is never an enjoyment for any country," he said. "We never had any ambition in Yemen but the situation had to be addressed to avoid Yemen becoming a failed state and ungoverned space."

 

Sending a Message

But the war is also Saudi Arabia's way of pushing back against what it sees as Washington's cosying up to Tehran during the nuclear negotiations and a feeling that the US is stepping away from the region and leaving a void, a feeling shared by Sunni allies in the coalition.


"The majority of people feel that King Salman has taken the right decision, primarily because it is sending a message to Iran: 'We are not weak, we are not reluctant and our national security will exceed our border, south and north if needed'", said Abdel Aziz el Sager, chairman of the Jeddah-based Gulf Research Center.


If the Yemen operation is successful, this new, more muscular foreign policy will have a positive impact on other parts of the region where Iran also wields influence, like Lebanon, Iraq and Bahrain, Mr Sager added.
  
Anti-Saudi protest in Tehran (13/04/15)
                       
Iran has accused Saudi Arabia of aggression in its campaign in Yemen 
                   
Everything is seen through the prism of the rivalry with Iran and it boils down to sheer power - the sectarian angle is a useful tool to whip up sentiments on all sides but it puts Saudi Arabia's Shia population, a large minority, in a difficult position.
"Whenever there is war in the Middle East it impacts badly on Shias in Saudi Arabia, because if any war happens in Iraq or Syria they interpret it as a sectarian war, and [a war] against Iran," said Nassima el Sada, a prominent Saudi human rights activist in the town of Qatif in the mostly Shia Eastern Province.

She complained that if Saudi Shias declared their support for the war, they were dismissed as deceitful, and if they dared criticise it they were branded traitors.


"We love our country, we are Arab and we belong in this land, and we have nothing to do with Iran but no one is listening to us, we keep facing this sectarian war against us in social media and in the national media," she added.


With Saudi Shias made to feel like a fifth column, with Sunni allies like Pakistan and Turkey reluctant to fully join the coalition, and with no end in sight for Operation Decisive Storm as the war has been dubbed, Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen will be a tough test of its ability to take on this more assertive role without dragging the region deeper into sectarian chaos.

India’s Military Modernization: Plans and Strategic Underpinnings

SOURCE:
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=275



        India’s Military Modernization: 

         Plans and Strategic Underpinnings

                                      By

                     Gurmeet Kanwal





September 24, 2012


As a key player in Asia and a large democracy with which the United States shares common interests, India is emerging as an important U.S. strategic partner. There is a broad national consensus in India on the contours of this emerging relationship with Washington, particularly with respect to enhanced defense and civil nuclear energy cooperation. During his visit to New Delhi in June 2012, U.S. defense secretary Leon Panetta identified India as a “linchpin” in Washington’s emerging “rebalancing” strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. While there was no reaction from the Indian government, it is clear that these two large democracies need to work together militarily in order to maintain freedom of the seas in the Indian Ocean region and to ensure peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific more generally. Should China experience political instability or behave irresponsibly in asserting its territorial rights—as it has shown a tendency to do in the South China Sea—both India and the United States will need strong strategic partners to face worst-case scenarios effectively.


In order to meet future threats and challenges and achieve interoperability with U.S. and other friendly armed forces for joint operations in India’s area of strategic interest, the Indian military needs to modernize and create force structures that are capable of undertaking network-centric warfare on land, at sea, and in the air. Gradually, but perceptibly, the Indian armed forces are upgrading their capabilities, enhancing their kinetic effectiveness and command and control, and improving interoperability.




This brief analyzes the threats and challenges that India must address, the measures being adopted to modernize the country’s armed forces, and the strategic underpinnings behind this slow but steady modernization effort.


Preparing for a Two-Front War



South Asia is among the world’s most unstable regions due to the ongoing war against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In addition, growing fundamentalist terrorism; creeping “Talibanization” in Pakistan; political instability in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang; narcotics trafficking; and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons are also destabilizing factors. Unresolved territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan, over which India has fought four wars; internal security challenges in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the northeastern states; and the rising tide of the Maoist insurgency in the heartland further vitiate India’s strategic environment. Further, many Indian security analysts worry that China is engaged in the strategic encirclement of India through its nuclear and missile nexus with Pakistan; the sale of military hardware to Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka; and a “string of pearls” strategy to surround India with naval bases in the northern Indian Ocean region. 

 
India-China relations are stable at the strategic level. Resolution of the territorial dispute is being discussed by India’s national security adviser and China’s vice foreign minister, military confidence-building measures are holding up, bilateral trade has increased to $60 billion, and both countries are cooperating in international forums like the World Trade Organization and the UN Climate Change Conference. However, the relationship is more contentious at the tactical level. For example, China refuses to issue proper visas to Indian citizens of Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing denied the commander-in-chief of India’s Northern Command a visa for an official visit because it believes that J&K is a disputed territory, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been making frequent forays across the Line of Actual Control into Indian territory simply to push Chinese territorial claims. China has also rapidly developed military infrastructure in Tibet to allow for quicker induction of troops and their sustenance over a longer period of time. Another destabilizing factor is the large Chinese presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. These developments do not augur well for long-term peace and stability.


The prevailing strategic environment has forced India’s armed forces to prepare for the possibility of a “two front” war, while the army and other security forces are engaged in fighting an ongoing “half front” internal security war. Even though the probability of conventional conflict remains low due to steadily improving relations and military confidence-building measures with China and Pakistan, this possibility cannot be completely ruled out. Nuclear deterrence also plays a positive role in conflict avoidance, but the prevailing wisdom in India is that there is space for conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold. There is now increasing realization that unless India takes immediate measures to accelerate the pace of its military modernization, the gap with China, which is only a quantitative gap at present, will soon become a qualitative gap, given the rapid rate of PLA modernization. Likewise, the slender edge that the Indian armed forces now enjoy over the Pakistani armed forces in conventional conflict is being eroded as Pakistan is spending considerable sums of money on its military modernization under the garb of fighting radical extremism. [1]



Although the Indian armed forces have drawn up elaborate plans for modernizing and qualitatively upgrading their capabilities for future combat, including the (a) ability to secure the sea lanes of communication and project power in India’s area of strategic interest,  (b) the pace of modernization has been slow due to the lack of adequate funding, delayed decision-making, and a low-tech defense industrial base. India’s defense budget is pegged at less than 2% of its GDP at present, and the bulk of the expenditure is on the revenue account—that is, pay and allowances, rations, fuel, oil and lubricants, ammunition, and vehicles. [2]  Very little remains in the capital account to be spent on modernization. In the case of the army, spending on modernization is as little as 20% to 25% of total capital expenditure in 2012–13. [3]  According to Indian defense minister A.K. Antony, “New procurements have commenced...but we are still lagging by 15 years.” [4] Nonetheless, an inadequate defense industrial base—imports constitute 70% of defense acquisitions—and bureaucratic inefficiency, rather than lack of funds, are the main causes of the slow pace of modernization.  India is expected to procure defense equipment worth $100 billion, most of it imported, over the next two five-year plans. Simultaneously, however, efforts are being stepped up to enhance indigenous capabilities and thereby reduce India’s dependence on imports by an order of magnitude.   The following three sections will survey India’s modernization of its army, navy, and air force.

Army Modernization: Enhancing Capabilities without Reducing Manpower



With personnel strength of 1.1 million soldiers (6 regional commands, a training command, 13 corps, and 38 divisions), the Indian Army has kept the nation together through various crises, including four wars since independence, Pakistan’s “proxy war” in J&K since 1989–90, and insurgencies in many of the northeastern states. [5] Given its large-scale operational commitments on border management and counterinsurgency, the army cannot afford to reduce its manpower numbers until these challenges are overcome. Many of its weapons and equipment are bordering on obsolescence and need to be replaced. The next step would be to move gradually toward acquiring network-centric capabilities for effects-based operations so as to optimize the army’s full combat potential for defensive and offensive operations.

The army is also preparing to join the navy and the air force in launching intervention operations in India’s area of strategic interest when called on to do so in the future. 



Lieutenant General J.P. Singh (retired), former deputy chief of the army staff (planning and systems), stated in an interview with the CLAWS Journal that

 “the critical capabilities that are being enhanced to meet challenges across the spectrum include battlefield transparency, battlefield management systems, night-fighting capability, enhanced firepower, including terminally guided munitions, integrated maneuver capability to include self-propelled artillery, quick reaction surface-to-air missiles, the latest assault engineer equipment, tactical control systems, integral combat aviation support and network centricity.” [6]

The army’s mechanized forces are still mostly “night blind.” Its artillery lacks towed and self-propelled 155-mm howitzers for the plains and the mountains and has little capability by way of multi-barrel rocket launchers and surface-to-surface missiles. Infantry battalions urgently need to acquire modern weapons and equipment for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations to increase operational effectiveness and lower casualties. 



Main battle tanks (MBT) and infantry combat vehicles (ICV) are the driving forces of India’s conventional deterrence in the plains. This fleet is being modernized gradually by inducting two regiments of the indigenously developed Arjun MBT and importing 310 T-90S MBTs from Russia. A contract has also been signed for 347 additional T-90S tanks to be assembled in India. The BMP-1 and BMP-2 Russian ICVs, which have long been the mainstay of the mechanized infantry battalions, need to be replaced as well. The new ICVs must be capable of performing internal security duties and counterinsurgency operations in addition to their primary role in conventional conflicts. 


Artillery modernization plans include the acquisition of towed, wheeled, and self-propelled 155-mm guns and howitzers for the plains and the mountains through import as well as indigenous development. The Corps of Army Air Defence is also faced with problems of obsolescence. The vintage L-70 40-mm air defense (AD) gun system, the four-barreled ZSU-23-4 Schilka (SP) AD gun system, the SAM-6 (Kvadrat), and the SAM-8 OSA-AK, among others, need to be replaced by more responsive modern AD systems that are capable of defeating current and future threats. 


The modernization of India’s infantry battalions is moving forward but at a similarly slow pace. This initiative is aimed at enhancing the battalions’ capability for surveillance and target acquisition at night and boosting their firepower for precise retaliation against infiltrating columns and terrorists hiding in built-up areas. These plans include the acquisition of shoulder-fired missiles, hand-held battlefield surveillance radars, and hand-held thermal imaging devices for observation at night. A system called F-INSAS (future infantry soldier as a system) is also under development.

One infantry division has been designated as a rapid reaction force for employment on land or in intervention operations and will have one amphibious brigade and two air assault brigades.


Similarly, the Indian Army proposes to substantially enhance the operational capabilities of army aviation, engineers, signal communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition branches in order to improve the army’s overall combat potential by an order of magnitude. Modern strategic and tactical level command and control systems need to be acquired on priority for better synergies during conventional and sub-conventional conflict. Plans for the acquisition of a mobile corps-to-battalion tactical communications system and a battalion-level battlefield management system likewise need to be hastened. Despite being the largest user of space, the army does not yet have a dedicated military satellite for its space surveillance needs.  Cyber-warfare capabilities are also at a nascent stage. The emphasis thus far has been on developing protective capabilities to safeguard Indian networks and C4I2SR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance) from cyber-attack. Offensive capabilities have yet to be adequately developed.  All these capabilities will make it easier for the army to undertake joint operations with multinational forces when the need arises and the government approves such a policy option.





 

Naval Modernization: Major Fleet Expansion



The Indian Navy’s ambitious Maritime Capabilities Perspective Plan seeks to dominate the Indian Ocean region by acquiring blue water operational capability while effectively countering current and emerging threats closer to the coastline. There is a perceptible shift in emphasis from an increase in the number of platforms to the enhancement of capabilities. According to a report tabled in the Indian Parliament in the last week of April 2012 by the Standing Committee on Defence, the navy’s modernization plan seeks to achieve the following objectives:
  • Augment airborne maritime surveillance, strike, anti-submarine warfare [ASW] and air defence capability through induction of shore-based aircraft, integral  helos, carrier based aircraft, space based [assets] and UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles], along with suitable weapons and sensors.

  • Develop ASW capability through induction of suitable platforms, weapons and sensors.

  • Build adequate stand off capability for sea lift and expeditionary operations to achieve desired power projection force levels, influence events ashore and undertake military operations other than war.

  • Induct assets and develop suitable infrastructure to augment forces available for low intensity maritime operations (LIMO), protection of off-shore assets and [for] coastal security. 


  • Induct force multipliers like satellite based global communications, reconnaissance and network enabled platforms to achieve battle-space dominance capability and perform network centric operations. 
 
  • Induct state-of-the-art equipment and specialized platforms for special forces to enhance niche capabilities to conduct maritime intervention operations and other envisaged roles.
 
  • Develop support infrastructure in island territories to support the planned force levels as well as support infrastructure for ships/submarines/aircrafts at ports and airbases. [7]

According to Admiral Arun Prakash (retired), former chief of naval staff, India’s naval modernization plans are designed to meet the following aims:[8]
  • Acquiring a capability for maritime domain awareness in the area of responsibility, including space-based surveillance, maritime reconnaissance, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), and UAVs

  • Developing the capability for expeditionary and joint warfare, supported by special operations

  • Acquiring reach and sustainability through long endurance, tankers, turnaround facilities in friendly foreign ports, and longer intervals between maintenance cycles

  • Acquiring modern capabilities in fields of tactical aviation, ASW, anti-air/anti-missile, land-attack, mine countermeasures, and electronic warfare

  • Networking ships, submarines, and airborne platforms via satellite

  • Committing to self-reliance and indigenization, with the objective of harnessing national strengths in shipbuilding, engineering, electronics, and IT


The Indian Navy has two operational fleets—the Eastern Naval Command and Western Naval Command—and has proposed to center both fleets around an aircraft carrier. Eventually the navy plans to graduate to three carrier battle groups. The INS Chakra, a nuclear-powered submarine leased from Russia, will join the fleet later in 2012, while the INS Arihant, the first of three to four indigenously designed and developed nuclear-armed submarines, is expected to become fully operational by late 2014. India has also begun to induct Russian Nerpa-class submarines, which will give the navy a much needed fillip to the submarine fleet and considerably enhance sea-denial capabilities. Three stealth frigates have only recently been added to the fleet. 

 
The Indian Navy’s modernization plans, though much delayed, have thus finally begun to pick up steam.

Pointing out the navy’s role as a key facilitator in promoting peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region, Defence Minister Antony observed while commissioning a stealth frigate in July 2012 that the present operating environment of the Indian Navy

“dictates that we balance our resources with a strategy that is responsive across the full range of blue and brown water operations....The maintenance of a strong and credible navy and strengthening cooperation and friendship with other countries to promote regional and global stability is the need of the hour.” [9]


The navy plans to expand to a fleet of 150 ships in the next ten to fifteen years, with 50 warships now under construction and 100 new vessels in the acquisition pipeline. The navy is also engaged in setting up operational turnaround bases, forward-operating bases, and naval air enclaves with a view to enhancing India’s surveillance efforts in the Indian Ocean region. Plans for accretions to the naval aviation fleet are likewise progressing smoothly: Boeing 737 P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft have begun to be inducted, and 5 additional Kamov Ka-31 AEW helicopters will be added to the existing fleet of 11 helicopters. Further, the navy’s amphibious landing capability has been enhanced considerably by the acquisition of the INS Jalashwa (ex–USS Trenton) and other landing ships, and additional capabilities for amphibious warfare are being rapidly developed. As a result of these efforts, the Indian Navy is on the cusp of acquiring the capabilities necessary to join key strategic partners such as the U.S. Navy in safeguarding the sea lanes of communication in the northern Indian Ocean and ensuring unfettered freedom of the seas for trade and commerce.




 

Air Force Modernization: Air Dominance and Force Projection



Until recently, India’s traditional strategic sphere lay between the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca; but with India’s global footprint expanding, the Indian Air Force should be ready to serve wherever the country’s future strategic interests lie. The air force is gearing up to provide the strategic outreach that India needs as a growing regional power and to project power where necessary in order to defend vital national interests. According to Kapil Kak, a retired air vice marshal and senior defense analyst, although there is a gap between vision and capability with regard to shaping India’s strategic neighborhood, forward movement is now visible. In his view, the modernization plans of the air force are aimed at achieving the following objectives: [10]
  • Air dominance and control of the air

  • Deterrence, by both denial and punishment

  • Long-range offensive reach—penetration, precision, persistence, and parallelity—in simultaneous operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels

  • Strategic air-lift capability for power projection through both hard and soft power, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations and diaspora evacuation

  • Build-up of capability for coercion

  • Acquisition of force enablers and multipliers and related combat-support systems, including networking for tri-service command and control

  • Capability of conducting cyberspace and information operations

  • Indigenization of future capabilities for design and development

From a sanctioned strength of 39 (42) squadrons, the Indian Air Force is down to 34 squadrons at present, due to decades of neglect, but hopes to enhance its strength to 45 squadrons by 2022. Yet plans to acquire 126 multi-mission, medium-range combat aircraft—in order to maintain an edge over the regional air forces—are stuck in the procurement quagmire.


 Tejas, the indigenously designed light combat aircraft, which is expected to replace the obsolescent Mig-21, is still a few years away from becoming  fully operational.


 India is also developing a fifth-generation fighter jointly with Russia and aims to fly it in 2015. New fighter bombers include a fleet of 272 Sukhoi-30 MKIs, half of which have already been built. AEW aircraft are being acquired from Israel as well as being developed indigenously. India has also acquired 6 C-130J Super Hercules aircraft for its special forces and will likely order 6 more from the United States. C-17 Globemaster heavy-lift aircraft are also likely to be acquired shortly, which will take India’s defense cooperation with the United States to a new level. Although a contract has been signed with a Swiss firm for 75 Pilatus PC-7 basic trainer aircraft, India’s fleet of jet trainers continues to be deficient. In the rotary-wing category, the indigenously manufactured Dhruv utility helicopter has entered service. The air force is also in the process of acquiring medium-lift transport helicopters and attack helicopters. 



In keeping with developments in the region, India’s strategic forces are also modernizing at a steady pace. The Agni-I and Agni-II missiles are now fully operational. Immediate requirements include the Agni-V intermediate-range ballistic missile, which has a 5,000-km range, and nuclear-powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles to provide genuine second-strike capability. As noted above, the INS Arihant, India’s first indigenously built nuclear submarine, will likely become fully operational by late 2014. While India’s emphasis is on mobile missile launchers, a small number of hardened silos are also being constructed.

The armed forces do not currently have a truly integrated tri-service C4I2SR system suitable for network-centric warfare, which would allow them to optimize their individual capabilities; however, plans have been made to develop such a system in the next five to ten years. In fact, all new weapons and equipment acquisitions are now being planned on a tri-service basis to ensure interoperability.





 

India’s Quest for Strategic Outreach



Given its growing power and responsibilities, India has been steadily enhancing its expeditionary and military intervention capabilities, which have been amply demonstrated in recent times. During the 1991 Gulf War, India airlifted 150,000 civilian workers, who had been forced to leave Iraq, from the airfield at Amman, Jordan, over a period of 30 days. This was the largest airlift since the Berlin airlift at the end of World War II. During the 2004 tsunami, the Indian armed forces were at the forefront of rescue and relief operations. Over 70 Indian Navy ships transported rescue teams and relief material to disaster zones in less than 72 hours, even though the country’s eastern seaboard had itself suffered considerable casualties and damage.
Likewise, Indian Navy ships on a goodwill visit to European countries during the Lebanon war in 2006 lifted and brought back 5,000 Indian civilian refugees. 

 
From the ongoing modernization plans described above, it is evident that India is preparing to join the world’s major powers in terms of the ability to undertake out-of-area contingency operations. Further, the acquisition of SU-30 MKI long-range fighter bombers with air-to-air refueling capability, C-130J Hercules transport aircraft, and airborne-warning-and-control-system and maritime-surveillance capabilities over the next five to ten years will give India considerable strategic outreach.
New Delhi has consistently favored military interventions only under a UN umbrella. Though that position is unlikely to change in the near term, India is likely to join future coalitions of the willing even without UN approval when vital national interests are threatened and need to be defended.
Shiv Shankar Menon, India’s national security adviser, stated in a speech in August 2011:

 “As a nation state India has consistently shown tactical caution and strategic initiative, sometimes simultaneously. But equally, initiative and risk-taking must be strategic, not tactical, if we are to avoid the fate of becoming a rentier state.” [11] He went on to mention that India was cooperating extensively with other militaries to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa. Such cooperation will increase in the future as India adds to its intervention capabilities. 

 
Given that India faces complex strategic scenarios and is located in an increasingly unstable neighborhood, it is in New Delhi’s interest to encourage a cooperative model of regional security and work with all friendly countries toward that end. At the same time, New Delhi finds it pragmatic to hedge just in case worst-case scenarios—such as the collapse of China or China’s use of military force for territorial gains—begin to unfold and threaten India’s economic development or territorial integrity. The increasing emphasis on maritime cooperation, particularly with the United States, is part of India’s continuing efforts to fulfill growing obligations and responsibilities as a regional power. New Delhi is now working to cooperate with all the major Asian powers in order to maintain peace and stability in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific more generally, though without aligning militarily with any one power. Toward this end, the armed forces are working together to achieve joint warfare capabilities for intervention operations in India’s area of strategic interest.

 In sum, a rising India will soon become a net contributor to security in the Indian Ocean region, together with strategic partners such as the United States.


Nonetheless, India’s modernization plans are moving ahead at a very slow pace. Policy paralysis in New Delhi due to the vagaries of coalition politics in a parliamentary democracy, along with the reduction in the defense budget as a share of India’s GDP due to sluggish growth in the economy, has further exacerbated the difficulties in increasing the pace of modernization.

However, the process is certainly underway, and there is hope that it will receive bipartisan support across the political spectrum because of the realization that no alternative exists for addressing emerging threats and challenges but for India to quickly modernize its armed forces.



India’s military modernization, however slow it might be, will lead to a qualitative increase in defense cooperation with the United States and other strategic partners by enhancing the capabilities of the Indian armed forces for joint coalition operations, if they are in India’s national interest. Overall, India will gradually acquire the capability to act as a net provider of security in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. This positive development will allow strategic partners like the United States to reduce their military commitments to the region to a limited extent. Hence, India’s modernization efforts will enhance and further cement U.S.-India relations.


Endnotes

[1] The India-Pakistan combat ratio is assessed by this author as 1.2 to 1.0 in India’s favor.


[2] Laxman K. Behera, “India’s Defence Budget 2012–13,” Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), IDSA Comment, March 20, 2012, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2012-13_LaxmanBehera_200312.


[3] Ibid.


[4] Gurmeet Kanwal, “Indian Army’s Modernisation,” India Strategic, January 2012.

[5] This section draws from the author’s analysis in “Indian Army Modernisation Needs a Major Push,” India Strategic, February 2010, http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories482.htm.


[6]“Modernisation Thrusts of Indian Army: Interview with Deputy Chief of Army Staff,” CLAWS Journal (Winter 2010): 1, http://www.claws.in/CJ-winter-2010.pdf.


[7] Standing Committee on Defence, Indian Ministry of Defence, “Demands for Grants (2012-2013),” April 30, 2012, 70-71, http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Defence/FINAL%20DFG%20%20REPORT%20-2012-13.pdf.


[8] Author’s email interview with Admiral Arun Prakash (retired), July 27, 2012.


[9] Vinay Kumar, “Credible Navy Need of the Hour: Antony,” Hindu, July 21, 2012.


[10] Author’s email interview with Kapil Kak, July 27, 2012.


[11] Shiv Shankar Menon, “India and the Global Scene” (16th Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, August 11, 2011), http://www.maritimeindia.org/article/india-and-global-scene.