NUKES & GEOPOLTICS : Why Afghanistan is a Big Winner In The U.S.–Iran Deal

SOURCE:
http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/why-afghanistan-is-a-big-winner-in-the-us-iran-deal/?singlepage=1

                 Why Afghanistan is a Big Winner

                                          In

                           The U.S.–Iran Deal

                                          By

                                                        Michael Kugelman 

 

  

July 29, 2015 · in Analysis

 

 

In the days since the United States and Iran concluded their landmark nuclear accord, much has been said about the deal’s geopolitical implications.

Most U.S. media coverage has focused on ramifications for the Middle East: How will Iran’s nemeses Israel and Saudi Arabia respond? Will Mideast sectarian tensions increase? Will the accord embolden Iran and cause it to intensify its dealings with the likes of Hezbollah, or will it lead Iran to moderate its destabilizing activities in the Middle East? Will the deal serve as a springboard for greater U.S.–Iran cooperation in combating the Islamic State terror group? And, above all, will the accord actually halt Iran’s march toward becoming a nuclear power?

Far less attention has been paid to South Asia — a neighboring region where the deal’s implications are similarly complex, albeit with stakes that are not as high. Energy-starved Pakistan will have a golden opportunity to conclude a long-discussed natural gas pipeline deal with Iran. Islamabad will need to weigh the energy security benefits of a gas accord with the geopolitical risks of angering Saudi Arabia — a key Pakistani ally and staunch opponent of the deal. Earlier this year, Pakistan’s parliament boldly rejected Riyadh’s request for the Pakistani military to help the Saudis fight the Houthi rebels in Yemen, whom the Saudis believe to be supported by Iran. This was a rare case of Pakistan snubbing its Saudi ally, and such refusals are not a new precedent that Islamabad wishes to set. At any rate, given that the nuclear deal may sharpen tensions between Tehran and Riyadh, Pakistan may find it increasingly difficult to resist getting dragged into a widening Saudi-Iranian proxy war.

 India, meanwhile, will be in a position to increase its oil imports from Iran. Iran was a top oil supplier for New Delhi before the Indians scaled back in deference to the U.S. sanctions regime. Also in the cards is an undersea gas pipeline that could deliver more than 30 million cubic meters of gas per day — an achievement that would bring energy but also some environmental relief, given India’s heavy reliance on dirty coal. At the same time, however, as the Brookings Institution’s Tanvi Madan recently noted, India could suffer if the deal destabilizes the Middle East: More than 7 million Indian nationals are based in the Middle East (mainly in the Arab Gulf), sending back billions of dollars in remittances. Pakistanis also have a sizable presence there, with nearly three quarters of their remittances coming from the region.

And then there is Afghanistan. Here, the U.S.–Iran deal’s implications are less complicated and largely positive. Afghanistan could be one of the deal’s biggest beneficiaries, and for two major reasons.
First and foremost, Afghanistan’s economy stands to benefit in a big way.

In the coming months, New Delhi will likely begin developing the Iranian port in Chabahar, located on Iran’s southern coast. India wants to develop this strategic warm-water port to establish access to markets in Afghanistan and Central Asia — access that it does not have via Pakistan, which refuses to grant transit rights to India. More broadly, Chabahar would provide an important trade link for products from the Middle East and Europe destined for Afghanistan and Central Asia. And it would serve as a gateway to the Middle East and Europe for exports coming from Afghanistan and Central Asia.

New Delhi has envisioned this project for years, but sanctions on Iran had put plans on hold. After Washington and Tehran signed a provisional nuclear accord in April, New Delhi and Tehran concluded an MOU laying out preliminary steps for the port — including an Indian pledge to commit about $85 million to construct container and multi-purpose terminals. Now that a formal U.S.–Iran deal is in place and the relevant sanctions will presumably be removed, India is poised to initiate Chabahar’s full-fledged development.

The benefits for Kabul are clear. The port — in addition to facilitating more commerce with key trade partner India — will help open up new markets for Afghanistan in the Middle East and Europe, and present opportunities to diversify its list of trade partners. Presently, Kabul’s import and export partners are largely restricted to countries in South and Central Asia. In effect, the Chabahar project represents a potential economic bonanza for an economically troubled nation. According to Afghan officials, a fully operational port could generate trade volumes for Afghanistan totaling billions of dollars. That is no small sum, given that Afghanistan’s total trade volume has been barely $9 billion annually in recent years.

The timing could not be better. According to the World Bank, economic growth in Afghanistan was just 2 percent in 2014 — down from an average of 9 percent between 2003 and 2012. This is no surprise. The withdrawal of international combat forces has led to a contraction of the war economy in Afghanistan. Additionally, donor fatigue — fueled by Afghanistan’s deep corruption and troubled aid delivery systems, among other things — portends cuts in foreign aid. As of several weeks ago, the UN had received less than a third of the $405 million it requested from the international community to address humanitarian challenges in Afghanistan. Making matters even worse is that Afghanistan has recently suffered a significant decline in the value of its currency.
The second reason why the nuclear deal could be a boon for Kabul is the possibility of stepped-up U.S.–Iran cooperation in Afghanistan.

Such an outcome is far from assured, given the poisoned relations between the two nations over the last few decades, and caution is certainly in order. And yet the potential rewards are high. Better bilateral relations overall could significantly reduce the likelihood that Tehran will once again try to undercut the United States in Afghanistan, as it has done in the past by providing arms to the Taliban on several occasions. Already, with the nuclear accord now in place, Iran has less reason to fear that the United States may one day use Afghanistan as a staging ground for attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, and therefore less reason to provide tactical support to the Taliban. This all bodes well for Afghanistan’s stability.
U.S. and Iranian interests in Afghanistan, which include combating the Taliban and promoting greater stability, are largely convergent. And it’s easy to understand why. Shia Iran has no desire for the Sunni Taliban to return to power — and it won’t soon forget the Taliban’s 1998 attack on Tehran’s consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif, which killed nine Iranian diplomats and prompted Iran to mobilize 200,000 troops on its border with Afghanistan.

Tehran wants a more stable Afghanistan because instability intensifies narcotics production, which fuels Iran’s drug problems. Iran has one of the world’s highest drug use rates and is afflicted by a major heroin epidemic. Additionally, destabilization could increase already-heavy refugee inflows. Only Pakistan hosts more Afghan refugees than Iran. Furthermore, a deteriorating security environment, coupled with an increasingly fractured Afghan Taliban, could increase the influence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. Even now, pro-Islamic State militants are battling — and defeating — Taliban fighters in Nangarhar province.

It’s important to recall that in the wake of 9/11, Tehran and Washington cooperated closely on Afghanistan. At the Bonn conference in 2001, it was Iran that broke a stalemate over the composition of Afghanistan’s first post-Taliban government. Several years later, according to journalist Barbara Slavin, Iran gave maps to Washington that revealed Taliban positions in Afghanistan and offered to train 20,000 Afghan troops as part of an American project to rebuild Afghanistan’s army. Of course, the two have competed in Afghanistan as well — and this goes beyond Iran’s past efforts to provide arms to the Taliban. In 2010, for example, Tehran reportedly sent bags of cash to President Hamid Karzai’s chief of staff as part of an effort to drive a wedge between Afghans and Americans. This should all be seen in the context of broader U.S.–Iran competition worldwide, which according to the Wall Street Journal has included Iran hiring Afghan Shias to fight in Syria on the side of President Bashar al-Assad.


We should not assume that the U.S.–Iran deal will magically lead to broader reconciliation; the relationship is burdened by too much lingering hostility and mistrust to expect such an outcome anytime soon. Still, it is possible that the two countries will now find ways to cooperate, or at least coordinate, in Afghanistan in areas that are mutually beneficial.


One possible area of cooperation is Afghanistan’s reconciliation process. Iran could join the United States in playing a behind-the-scenes role to encourage a fledgling peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Another is some form of quiet coordination to address the Islamic State’s rising influence in Afghanistan. Two other possibilities, because they would involve working together more overtly, are admittedly less likely. Yet they shouldn’t be ruled out, given how consequential they could be for Afghanistan. One is counter-narcotics. In an era when opium harvests in Afghanistan have reached record-high levels, Iran and the United States could consider a new joint effort to slow down the drug trade. The other is coordinated development assistance projects. While Washington’s great largesse toward Kabul is well known, Tehran has quietly contributed as well — from $540 million pledged at a donor conference in 2002 to more recent funding of schools and media institutions.

Greater U.S.–Iran cooperation in Afghanistan will undoubtedly face obstacles that go beyond the troubled bilateral relationship. Some Afghans resent Iran’s presence in the country, regarding it as excessive meddling. Even some members of the Shia minority are wary of Iran, accusing Tehran of radicalizing their communities. Additionally, it is unclear if Tehran can establish the highly cordial relations with the present government that it enjoyed with the previous Hamid Karzai-led administration. Furthermore, the scaled-down U.S. presence in Afghanistan could constrain coordinated U.S.–Iran efforts in the country. Nonetheless, the U.S.–Iran deal opens up several potential new avenues for cooperation that could work in Afghanistan’s favor.

Even if the United States and Iran do increase their cooperation in Afghanistan, this won’t be a silver bullet for the conflict-ridden country. Many of Afghanistan’s core challenges — from corruption to insurgency — can only be solved with strong leadership and effective policies that must emanate from within. Additionally, some of the U.S.–Iran accord’s potentially deleterious consequences — particularly intensified Sunni–Shia tensions — could play out directly in Afghanistan, and to its detriment.

 

Overall, however, the deal could bring very tangible economic and diplomatic benefits to Afghanistan. This is refreshingly good news for a country going through some particularly difficult times of late.
 
Michael Kugelman is the senior associate for South Asia at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. He can be reached at michael.kugelman@wilsoncenter.org and on

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ISIS INDIA :Islamic State Seeks to Provoke 'End of the World' Triggering a War in India

SOURCE:
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/07/28/ami-isil-document-pakistan-threatens-india/30674099/



  Islamic State Recruitment Document Seeks
                                        To
             Provoke 'End of the World'
                 Triggering a War in India
                                        By 
Sara A. Carter, American Media Institute


July 28, 2015

A video grab released by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) on July 11, 2015, shows Hafiz Saeed, the Islamic State leader of the Khorasan State, at an undisclosed location along the Pakistani-Afghan border.(Photo: TTP/EPA)

The document was reviewed by three U.S. intelligence officials, who said they believe the document is authentic based on its unique markings and the fact that language used to describe leaders, the writing style and religious wording match other documents from the Islamic State, also known as ISIL and ISIS. They asked to remain anonymous because they are not authorized to discuss the matter publicly.


The undated document, titled “A Brief History of the Islamic State Caliphate (ISC), The Caliphate According to the Prophet,” seeks to unite dozens of factions of the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban into a single army of terror.  It includes a never-before-seen history of the Islamic State, details chilling future battle plans, urges al-Qaeda to join the group and says the Islamic State's leader should be recognized as the sole ruler of the world’s 1 billion Muslims under a religious empire called a “caliphate.”

“Accept the fact that this caliphate will survive and prosper until it takes over the entire world and beheads every last person that rebels against Allah," it proclaims. "This is the bitter truth, swallow it.”


Retired Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who also reviewed the document, said it “represents the Islamic State’s campaign plan and is something, as an intelligence officer, I would not only want to capture, but fully exploit. It lays out their intent, their goals and objectives, a red flag to which we must pay attention.”


Alistair Baskey, deputy spokesman for the White House’s National Security Council, told AMI, “we are aware of the presence of ISIL-affiliated militants in Afghanistan, and we are monitoring closely to see whether their emergence will have a meaningful impact on the threat environment in the region.”


The Taliban is another radical Islamic group that ruled Afghanistan until ousted during the U.S. invasion in 2001. It continues fighting the current Afghan government and also trying to thwart the Islamic State's expansion into Afghanistan.


The document warns that “preparations” for an attack in India are underway and predicts that an attack will provoke an apocalyptic confrontation with America: “Even if the U.S tries to attack with all its allies, which undoubtedly it will, the ummah will be united, resulting in the final battle.” The word “ummah” refers to the entire global community of Muslims.


Striking in India would magnify the Islamic State’s stature and threaten the stability of the region, said Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow with the Brookings Institution who served more than 30 years in the CIA. “Attacking in India is the Holy Grail of South Asian jihadists.”


Pakistan Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry said the Islamic State threat in Pakistan was discussed with White House, State Department and Pentagon officials in June. He told reporters at the Pakistani Embassy in June that successful allied military operations have scattered the Pakistani Taliban.


Chaudhry denied there is an Islamic State presence in Pakistan. It could be “a potential threat for the whole world, for our region too, for our country too,” he said. “We believe that all countries need to cooperate, and Pakistan, yes.”


Unlike al-Qaeda, which has targeted terror attacks on the United States and other western nations, the document said Islamic State leaders believe that’s the wrong strategic goal. “Instead of wasting energy in a direct confrontation with the U.S., we should focus on an armed uprising in the Arab world for the establishment of the caliphate,” the document said.


So far, the U.S. strategy has been limited to fighting the militant group in Iraq and Syria, ordering limited airstrikes and deploying trainers to strengthen Iraqi security forces.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State has recruited tens of thousands of fighters and sympathizers from around the world.


The failure to target the radical Islamic ideas behind the group has given its fighters the opportunity to spread, Flynn said. “If I were in their shoes, I would say,'We are winning, we are achieving our objectives,'” Flynn said. “They have demonstrated an incredible level of resiliency and they will not be defeated by military means alone.”
 

NUCLEAR : Southern Asia's Nuclear Powers

SOURCE:
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/southern-asias-nuclear-powers/p36215?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief--link18-20150728&sp_mid=49195507&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1

Southern Asia's Nuclear Powers

Author: Eleanor Albert, Online Writer/Editor
March 6, 2015

Indian Defence

                Southern Asia's Nuclear Powers

Author: Eleanor Albert, Online Writer/Editor
March 6, 2015

Introduction

Southern Asia is home to three nuclear powers—China, India, and Pakistan—that continue to expand and modernize their arms programs. Motivated by the need to address perceived security threats, each is seeking to expand ballistic missile and cruise missile-based nuclear delivery systems. Such nuclear competition is dangerous given mounting mistrust and a dearth of diplomatic measures in place to reduce risk of confrontation. Pakistan’s chronic political instability, spotty nonproliferation record, and ongoing threats posed by militant forces have focused special concern on the safety of its nuclear materials.

What are China's nuclear capabilities?

China is seeking to soon achieve a nuclear triad (land, air, and sea-based nuclear delivery capabilities). Analysts estimate that China’s inventory is close to two hundred and fifty warheads. This includes short, intermediate, and long-range ballistic missiles. Some experts say China has as many as sixty long-range missiles with ranges between 4,350-9,320 miles. China's Central Military Commission oversees the country's nuclear weapons under the management (PDF) of the Second Artillery Force of the People’s Liberation Army.



Beijing first pursued atomic weapons after the Korean War (1950–1953) and conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. The U.S. nuclear threat during the 1950s Taiwan Crisis incentivized China's strategic nuclear program. Since China’s economic boom, Beijing has sought to modernize its nuclear forces to improve survivable second-strike capabilities, which would prevent the destruction of its entire arsenal in the event of a first-strike attack, securing the means for nuclear retaliation. Though historically driven by both U.S. and Soviet capabilities, the recent modernization of China's nuclear forces is primarily motivated (PDF) by existing and developing U.S. capabilities.

In addition to increasing the size of its arsenal, China is also altering the composition of its nuclear forces to build up more mobile systems. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 2014 annual report (PDF) said that China’s nuclear forces would grow considerably over the next five years, with the introduction of road-mobile nuclear missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. Meanwhile, some experts stress that the pace of growth is slow. Chinese missile accuracy has also significantly improved (PDF), according to a U.S. Department of Defense report.



China is investing in space and counter-space programs ($11 billion in 2013), in part to counter advanced U.S. missile defense systems. Beijing's 2007 anti-satellite missile test sparked concern among officials and analysts in Washington; those worries resurfaced in 2014 when President Xi Jinping's called on China's air force "to speed up air and space integration", and when Beijing launched its third anti-missile test in July 2014.

 

What is China's nuclear doctrine?

 

 

Beijing says its national defense policy is purely defensive in nature. Since its first nuclear test, China declared a no first use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, meaning that in the event of a conflict or crisis, it will not resort to the first use of nuclear weapons. In a 2010 national defense white paper, China’s leadership said it adheres to a "self-defensive nuclear strategy, and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country."


Yet some experts believe that Beijing’s nuclear doctrine may be shifting. After the release of China’s 2013 defense white paper, James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank, voiced alarm about the omission of Beijing's NFU pledge. However, others say that China’s modernizing nuclear forces do not necessarily indicate a policy change, but rather a "broadening" of nuclear options. In April 2013, major general Yao Yunzhu, director of the Center on China-America Defense Relations at the Beijing-based Chinese Academy of Military Science, dismissed allegations of a possible change in Beijing's nuclear policy, saying "there is no sign that China is going to change a policy it has wisely adopted and persistently upheld for half a century."



Although originally a strong critic of the international nuclear order, Beijing has since joined international bodies as a nonproliferation advocate. China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1998, acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004. Beijing signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 but has not yet ratified it.

"In the foreseeable future, the Asian reliance on nuclear weapons will increase."—Ashley J. Tellis, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

 

What are India's nuclear capabilities?

 

India possesses a developed strategic nuclear program and currently fields nuclear-capable aircraft and ballistic missiles controlled by a civilian command structure, the Nuclear Command Authority. Delhi has an estimated stockpile of 90 to 110 warheads and is expanding its military nuclear capabilities. In 2011, Delhi spent approximately $4.9 billion (PDF) on nuclear weapons, up from $4.1 billion the previous year, according to Global Zero, a nongovernmental disarmament movement. Delhi has invested in a ballistic missile defense system, longer-range ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, MIRVs (PDF), and ground-, air-, and sea-launched cruise missiles, among other systems.


Experts point to China's 1964 explosion as the impetus for the launch of India's strategic nuclear program. Delhi's first nuclear fission device was tested in 1974 and was termed by the government a "peaceful nuclear explosion." India's test drew protest internationally and was condemned as a violation of the NPT, which had entered into force in 1970. The test spurred the creation of the NSG to prevent the misuse of technology from civilian nuclear energy cooperation for the development of weapons. Delhi then waited until May 1998 to conduct five nuclear explosions.


The United States and India negotiated a landmark civil nuclear deal beginning in 2005, which was later signed into U.S. law in 2008. Washington saw the deal as a practical way to overcome barriers to cooperation and also because it believed "it would be better to have India inside the international nonproliferation tent than outside," says CFR's Alyssa Ayres. Other nuclear energy powers also boost India's civilian program: Tokyo pledged to negotiate a nuclear energy pact, a deal with Australia allows the export of uranium to India, and Russia has assisted India for years on the construction of reactors, with new deals in the works between the two countries.


While India remains outside the NPT and the CTBT, its civilian nuclear facilities are now under IAEA safeguards and India has signed and ratified the IAEA Additional Protocol. The U.S.-India deal has provided India with incentive to harmonize its export control regimes to meet the standards of various international nonproliferation guidelines, including the NSG, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

 

What is India's nuclear doctrine?

Delhi, like Beijing, pledges a NFU policy, as articulated in India's 2003 nuclear doctrine. The doctrine emphasizes that its nuclear program is intended to establish a robust but credible minimum deterrent. Moreover, the doctrine explicitly states that India's response to an external nuclear attack on its territory or armed forces anywhere would be "massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage."


Security and political objectives motivate India's strategic nuclear program. Delhi places considerable political value in its program as a means to improve its status: "India's civilian leaders have seen the bomb as a political rather than military instrument," says Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Washington-based Stimson Center. Historical tensions and high levels of distrust among its neighbors also pushed India to develop nuclear weapons to strengthen national security.


India views Chinese nuclear expansion as a security threat, experts say, and as a result Delhi seeks capabilities to counter Beijing, including in the arena of space exploration. India's reading of Chinese nuclear activity is further colored by China's role in providing Pakistan with nuclear material and technology. Since coming to power in May 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has upheld his pledge that his ruling party will adhere to India's NFU arms policy.

 

 

 

What are Pakistan's nuclear capabilities?

 

Experts estimate that Pakistan has 100 to 120 warheads and two types of delivery vehicles (PDF): aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD), a secretariat of the National Command Authority, is the primary overseer of Pakistan's nuclear policy and arsenal, and its head is a three-star general from the Pakistan Army, which experts say suggests that the body is a de facto military structure. Despite Pakistan's economic struggles, obtaining and modernizing nuclear weapons has long been political and strategic tool to deter India's conventional power, especially after the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Today, Pakistan has, by some measures, the fastest growing nuclear program in the world, according to a 2014 Council Special Report by George Mason University's Gregory Koblentz. Pakistan has nearly tripled the number of warheads it had a decade ago. In comparison India's arsenal has increased by slightly more than 50 percent, and China's has grown marginally in that same period of time. Koblentz says that by 2020, Pakistan could have enough fissile material stockpiled to produce as many as two hundred nuclear weapons.


Analysts say Pakistan is now bolstering its arsenal with tactical, short-range missiles with the ability to carry nuclear warheads. Islamabad first tested the Haft, a short-range ballistic missile, in April 2011 and the Ra'ad, a short-range air launched cruise missile, in August 2007. Pakistani officials and regional experts cite what they call India's limited war doctrine (PDF) (also known as the Cold Start doctrine) as the driving force behind Pakistan's tactical battlefield missiles. The doctrine, whose existence Delhi denies, purportedly speeds up India's ability to mobilize conventional forces.


In 1965, Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto famously said that if India acquired a bomb, then "we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own." The end of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War and the creation of Bangladesh precipitated the launch of Islamabad's nuclear bomb program; India's 1974 nuclear test only added more urgency.


In 1976, Bhutto put Abdul Qadeer Khan, a scientist who had worked at a nuclear research lab in the Netherlands, in control of Pakistan's uranium enrichment programs. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan expedited the militarization of its nuclear program with technology transfers from China and purchases of individual components and material from international suppliers. Following India's May 1998 nuclear tests, Pakistan responded with six explosions of its own a few weeks later.


Experts cite the nuclear tests as one of the driving forces behind the 1999 Kargil War, an armed conflict between India and Pakistan in the Kargil district of Kashmir that some say cast doubts about the effectiveness of strategic deterrence.


Khan confessed in 2004 that the multinational network he had developed to boost Pakistan’s program also sold sophisticated nuclear technology and material on the black market. Buyers included Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Pakistan’s leadership fiercely rejects any knowledge of Khan's operations, but there is debate over the extent of Khan's autonomy as well as reservations about whether his network has been disbanded.


Though detained and placed under virtual house arrest for five years, Khan was freed in 2009 when a high court ruled that he had not been involved in the sale of nuclear secrets. Khan is an international pariah but remains a national hero at home. Doubts in Washington about Pakistan's willingness or ability to curb proliferation contributed to the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal. Questions remain over whether Islamabad will play a role in the transfer nuclear capabilities to other countries, like Saudi Arabia.

"Nuclear competition in Southern Asia represents a classic conundrum of international relations: enormously high stakes, conflicting and entrenched interests, and at least in the near term, few realistic avenues for mitigating threats."—CFR's Daniel S. Markey

 

What is Pakistan's nuclear doctrine?

 

Pakistan is without an official nuclear doctrine, though national security authorities cite "restraint" and "responsibility" as pillars (PDF) of Islamabad's nuclear program. A report (PDF) by the U.S.-funded non-partisan Congressional Research Service says the Pakistani nuclear program's objectives include deterring "external aggression, counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation, and stabilizing strategic deterrence in South Asia." The Stimson Center’s Krepon adds, "Pakistan is a disadvantaged state that tries to compensate for weaknesses with a serious reliance on nuclear weapons." Pakistan's security establishment steadfastly backs its strategic nuclear program.


The adversarial nature of the Indo-Pakistani relationship is a central driver for Pakistani nuclear development. As the smaller state, Pakistan sees nuclear weapons as a means to offset India's military and economic advantages. In a collection of papers published by the California-based Naval Postgraduate College in June 2014, retired Brigadier General Naeem Salik, former director of arms control and disarmament affairs in Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, wrote that "Pakistan's security managers sought to achieve twin objectives (PDF) of deterring the threat of actual use of nuclear weapons by India while at the same time using its nuclear capability as an equalizer against India's conventional military."

 

What is the future of Southern Asia's nuclear competition?

Southern Asia's nuclear competition is seen by experts as fundamentally unstable (PDF). Koblentz has identified the region as the "most at risk of a breakdown in strategic stability due to an explosive mixture of unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals."


Domestic pressures add to the growing list of concerns about the region, especially in Pakistan, a country whose stability is challenged by militant groups. Despite repeated claims (PDF) by Pakistan that its nuclear facilities are secure, fears persist that a regional terrorist attack will escalate violence, prompting nuclear exchange, or that Pakistani-based or affiliated militants will acquire nuclear weapons. Experts warn of intensified nuclear risks, especially in an age in which non-state actors can develop cybersecurity (PDF) capabilities to exploit nuclear security.


There is no sign of nuclear modernization abating in China, India, or Pakistan. Expert Ashley J. Tellis writes that "in the foreseeable future, the Asian reliance (PDF) on nuclear weapons will increase." Meanwhile, nuclear powers have limited tools at their disposal to influence nuclear expansion in Asia, particularly since India and Pakistan are outside the NPT. Nuclear risk reduction measures are few and far between across the region.


"Nuclear competition in Southern Asia represents a classic conundrum of international relations: enormously high stakes, conflicting and entrenched interests, and at least in the near term, few realistic avenues for mitigating threats, much less addressing them in a more permanent way," says CFR's Daniel S. Markey.


This Backgrounder is part of a CFR project on the New Geopolitics of China, India, and Pakistan, supported in part by a generous grant from the MacArthur Foundation.

Additional Resources

Expert Ashley J. Tellis explores the nuclear capabilities in China, India, and Pakistan in his February 2015 testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists' Nuclear Notebook presents an interactive guide to the size of the world's nuclear arsenals over time.

This Stimson Center book investigates (PDF) the brewing dynamics and challenges to deterrence stability and escalation control in Southern Asia.

 

 

Retired USAF Lieutenant General Frank G. Klotz analyzes China's nuclear weapons program and the prospects for multilateral arms control in a Strategic Studies Quarterly article.

George Perkovich’s 2001 book India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation provides a comprehensive overview of India's pursuit of nuclear weapons.

 

Feroz Khan's 2012 book Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb chronicles the history of Pakistan's integrated strategic nuclear program.

 

 

More on this topic from CFR

• The Real Challenge in the Pacific Author: Michael Swaine
• Assessing U.S. Asia Policy

• China's Rise Affects Japanese Domestic Politics, Sheila Smith Writes in New Book

•   View more from Asia and Pacific, Defense and Security

 

MARITIME : MALDIVES TO SELL ISLAND TO CHINA FOR NAVAL BASE

SOURCE:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/24/maldives-law-selling-foreigners-islands-stokes-delhis-fears-rising-chinese-role

CHINA HIDDEN STRATEGY WITH PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE
MALDIVES TO SELL ISLAND TO CHINA FOR NAVAL BASE
IS INDIA SLEEPING

China might buy islands in Maldives for new Naval base in Indian Ocean 

Alarm bells are ringing in South Block after the Maldives Parliament on Wednesday amended the nation’s Constitution to allow foreign ownership of land.

 

 Friday 24 July 2015

 

• 
  

Alarm bells are ringing in South Block after the Maldives Parliament on Wednesday amended the nation’s Constitution to allow foreign ownership of land. While there has been no formal word on the issue, The Indian Express has learnt that officials are “concerned” that the amendments will enable China to buy islands and build strategic assets in the Indian Ocean nation.

 

India’s relationship with the current government in Maldives has not been at its best after the arrest and imprisonment of former president Mohammad Nasheed. Four months ago, Prime Minister Narendra Modi put off his Maldives visit following Nasheed’s detention.

 

The latest move comes after Indian firm GMR was ousted from the airport development project, with Chinese firms gaining a foothold in the nation. The amendments, which were passed by the 85-member Majlis, will allow foreigners who invest more than US$1bn to purchase land within the project site — at least 70 per cent of the area of the completed project must be reclaimed land. The Constitution previously prohibited foreign ownership of any part of Maldivian territory, but allowed leasing of land for up to 99 years. The amendments submitted on behalf of the Abdulla Yameen government by the ruling Progressive Party of Maldives (PPM) was passed with 70 votes in favour and 14 against, with one MP absent.

 

Significantly, 10 MPs of the main Opposition — ex-president Nasheed’s Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) — and nine MPs of the Jumhooree Party (JP) also voted in favour of the proposed changes. The PPM and its coalition partner Maldives Development Alliance (MDA) control 48 seats in the House. Other Opposition MPs, however, expressed concern over “possible Chinese military expansion” in the Maldives. What has alarmed New Delhi, however, is the speed with which the amendments were passed. The Bill was submitted on Monday, debated and sent to a review committee at an extraordinary sitting on Tuesday night, and put to vote on Wednesday. The Bill was sent to the 11-member committee at around 12:30am – the panel reportedly approved the amendments at around 1:30am.

 

“The parliamentary panel reviewed and approved the Bill within just one hour… that raises alarm bells,” sources said. The legislative process in Maldives includes three main stages and usually takes weeks or months. But under the new rules, a Bill can be debated and passed into law on the same day. The Maldives government maintained that the new law was necessary to attract large-scale foreign investments and to launch “mega projects”, which Yameen said would “transform” the economy and reduce the reliance on tourism. The Bill is the second amendment proposed to the Maldives Constitution since it was ratified in 2008.

 

In June, MPs had passed the first amendment to set new age limits of 30-65 years for the presidency. New Delhi sees the latest development in the context of Maldives President Abdulla Yameen’s declared foreign policy shift to the East since last year. Chinese President Xi Jingping was the first head of state to visit the Maldives after Yameen assumed power. During the visit, the Maldives agreed to become a partner in China’s maritime silk route, a trade route from China’s Fujian province to the Mediterranean Sea via South Asia and East Africa.

 

China is also providing grants and loans to the Maldives to build a bridge between the capital and the airport. Chinese companies are involved in work on the airport, too, and have been handed islands for developing resorts. In January, the MDP had alleged the government was planning to award parts of south central Laamu Atoll to China for a military base. The Chinese embassy dismissed the allegations as “completely false.”