SOURCE:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/china/2015/china-150731-sputnik01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1484%2eka0ao00b2h%2e1d2w

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cv.htm

Confirmed: China Building New Aircraft Carrier... Possibly Nuclear Powered

In-Depth Coverage
 

 31.Jul .2015



China has confirmed that it is building a unique aircraft carrier, and that it may even be nuclear-powered.


On Thursday, huanqiu.com, the Chinese-language version of local Global Times, published an internal document of the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. The report states that the company's "priority missions" are to build nuclear submarines and an aircraft carrier. It also mentions that progress on these projects has been steady.


"The priority missions of building the aircraft carrier and nuclear-submarines have been carried out smoothly and with outstanding results," the document states, according to a translation provided by Taiwanese media outlets.


The Taiwanese reports go on to say that the document suggests that China's first homegrown aircraft carrier may be nuclear-powered.


Similarly, in January 2014 media reports in China quoted Liaoning party Chief Wang Min as saying that work on China's second aircraft carrier had begun in the city of Dalian, and Beijing is ultimately expected to build four aircraft carriers. These reports, however, were quickly removed by China's censors.


The US Department of Defense assessing Chinese military power noted that, "China continues to pursue an indigenous aircraft carrier program and could build multiple aircraft carriers over the next 15 years."


The Pentagon report goes on to mention that China's home-based carriers "would be capable of improved endurance and of carrying and launching more varied types of aircraft, including electronic warfare, early warning, and anti-submarine, thus increasing the potential striking power of a PLA Navy 'carrier battle group' in safeguarding China's interests in areas outside its immediate periphery," media reports.


Assuming it remains online, the Global Times' publication of the internal CSIC document is therefore the closest confirmation that China is currently building a homegrown aircraft carrier.

Further Reading

Resources Chinese Naval Aircraft Carriers: Discussions

Aircraft Carrier Project

CV Aircraft Carrier CV References Russian Kuznetsov-class Carriers Russian Kiev-class Carriers USS Nimitz Replica Yanliang Test Base CV Phase 1 CV Phase 1 - Schematics CV Phase 1 - Pictures

Liaoning ex-Varyag Liaoning ex-Varyag - Pictures Liaoning ex-Varyag - Schematics CV Phase 2 - New Construction CV Phase 2 - Specifications CV Phase 2 - Schematics World Wide Aircraft Carriers

The Chinese colloquial abbreviation for aircraft carrier, hangmu, is also used extensively to describe flagship enterprises and other great achievements. China's navy will develop a new generation of warships and aircraft to give it much longer-range capabilities, its commander-in-chief said in comments published Thursday April 16 2009. Admiral Wu Shengli told the state-run China Daily newspaper the Chinese navy wanted to develop hardware such as large combat warships, stealth submarines with abilities to travel further and supersonic cruise aircraft. More accurate long-range missiles, deep-sea torpedoes and a general upgrade of information technology were also in the pipeline, according to Wu. "The navy will establish a maritime defense system that corresponds with the need to protect China's maritime security and economic development," Wu said. The English-language China Daily, which the government uses to deliver messages to a foreign audience, printed his comments on its front page and said it had obtained a rare interview with such a high-ranking military figure. It quoted other Chinese military figures as saying that Wu's reference to building large warships referred to highly-publicized plans to build an aircraft carrier, but also other unspecified vessels.


Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie was quoted in state media in March 2009 saying China no longer wanted to be the only major global power without an aircraft carrier. China will not remain the world's only major nation without an aircraft carrier indefinitely, state press 23 March 2009 cited the nation's defense minister as telling his Japanese counterpart. Liang Guanglie made the remarks to visiting Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada on Friday, the Oriental Morning Post said, in discussions that took place after a recent spike in tension in the South China Sea. "Among the big nations only China does not have an aircraft carrier. China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," the paper quoted Liang as saying, citing Japanese official sources. "China's navy is currently rather weak, we need to develop an aircraft carrier." Liang's comment is the highest-level recent confirmation that China aims to acquire an aircraft carrier, a sophisticated piece of military hardware that can be used to project power far beyond a nation's shores.


On 23 December 2008 Xinhua, China's official news agency, reported that China's Ministry of National Defense had stated that aircraft carriers are "a reflection of a nation's comprehensive power" and were needed to meet the demands of a country's navy. The Chinese government would seriously consider "relevant issues" with "factors in every aspects" on building its first ever aircraft carrier, said spokesman Huang Xueping when responding to a question at a press conference on whether it was a good opportunity at present to build China's aircraft carrier. "China has a long coastline and the sacred duty of China's armed forces is to safeguard the country's marine safety and sovereignty over coastal areas and territorial seas," he said.


In November 2008 the Director of the Ministry of National Defense, Foreign Affairs Office, Major General Qian Lihua, said that "having an aircraft carrier is the dream of any great military power," and "the question is not whether you have an aircraft carrier, but what you do with your aircraft carrier."


The question of China's plans to build aircraft carriers are important for several reasons. Many other countries have aircraft carriers, and little thought is given to Brazil's aircraft carrier, or Argentina's aircraft carrier, when it had one. Unlike other major maritime powers, Japan does not have aircraft carriers, and the Japanese government has regarded this class of ships as being an "offensive" weapon precluded by Japan's peace constitution. Should China acquire aircraft carriers, Japan might reconsider this position, and this might mark the start of a larger reconsideration of Japan's military posture. The United States has twice as many aircraft carriers as the rest of humanity combined, each of which is larger than other country's carriers. China's acquisition of aircraft carriers might be seen as a step towards challenging American preeminence on the high seas. At a minimum, it would mark the acquisition of a power projection capability that would move further afield than the Taiwan scenario, and into the South China Sea and beyond.


China, following the Cold War, continued to have very little in the way of credible power-projection capabilities, though China could project military forces superior to those that Southeast Asian countries could deploy to the South China Sea. The PLA Navy had studied the acquisition of an aircraft carrier beginning in the mid-1980s, followed by persistant reports that China has planned to launch a 40,000 ton class aircraft carrier by 2010, though these reports remained unsubstantiated and appeared to based on woefully inadequate analysis and information.

 
While some in the Navy had lobbied for a carrier for many years, their proposals were continually overruled by the Central Military Commission. This decision could have been motivated by a desire not to be seen to be adding a major new capability to China's maritime forces, with consequent adverse regional reaction. From a purely military perspective, a Chinese aircraft carrier would be expensive to operate, and carrier would be vulnerable to attack by aircraft, fast surface vessels and submarines. An aircraft carrier could enhance China's ability to lay claim to the islands and coral atolls of the South China Sea, an area potentially rich in oil and other resources. An aircraft carrier would make a potent political and diplomatic statement, potentially creating a major change in the strategic balance in East Asia.


In 1992, the Chinese authorities reportedly authorized a program for studying the development of an aircraft carrier. Chinese leaders at various levels did extensive feasibility studies on this project since then. In 1993, senior leaders of the Chinese Navy announced that China would start developing an aircraft carrier. In January 1993, Chinese political leaders decided to step up their carrier program and allocated several billion dollars for the project. At that time, it was believed that China had planned to finish the first aircraft carrier by 2000, but the plan was delayed repeatedly due to lack of carrier technology. Eventually it was decided to advance the carrier program in two stages.


During the first stage, China proceeded to buy several scrapped carriers from overseas in order to study the parts. China had previously pursued similar policies both in defense and other industries. Between 1985 and 2002, Chinese firms purchased a number of vessels, for ostensibly for a variety of purposes. These included for amusement parks, hotels, scrap metal, as well as likely analysis of design and other developmental purposes. China has a long history of aquiring technology for reverse engineering purposes. Of the vessels, the Varyag, an ex-Soviet carrier, contruction of which was never completed, and sold by Ukraine to what appeared to be a Chinese front company in 1998, has been the source of the greatest speculation. After arriving in Dalian, the hull was placed in drydock for a few months and painted in PLAN colors. Subsequently the hull was moored at a cargo warf. Minor work was reported to have been conducted on the hull, delivered without engines or any other equipment, between 2005 and 2008. However, as of August 2008, there was no visible work being done to make the hull seaworthy. Several years of highly visible construction activity, to include the installation of a propulsion plant, would be required to make this hull seaworthy.


Phase 2 centered on the domestic construction of a carrier by China. China appeared to have chosen to build a Chinese aircraft carrier, rather than purchasing one off-the-shelf. Although China's long-term goal was to acquire one or more aircraft carriers and it had an active program to develop a design, it remained unclear whether Beijing had reached a firm decision on the kind of carrier it would have, given budget constraints and naval funding priorities. Since the first reports of Chinese carrier aspirations in the 1980s and 1990s, various sources have claimed that China was building everything from purely training vessels to super-carriers similar to US Navy types.


In June 2005 Zhang Guangqin, the top official overseeing the country's burgeoning shipbuilding industry, denied that China was assembling an aircraft carrier in Shanghai. "I can say it clearly that there's no such thing at all," said Zhang, the vice-minister at the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense, at a news briefing in Beijing. "As to building aircraft carrier or not, related governmental departments will take all factors in consideration."


In October 2006 Lieutenant-General Wang Zhiyuan, Vice Chairman of the Science and Technology Committee in the PLA's General Armament Department stated: "The Chinese army will study how to manufacture aircraft carriers so that we can develop our own. aircraft carriers are indispensable if we want to protect our interests in the oceans." Russian press has reported Chinese interest in acquiring Russian Su-33 carrier-borne fighters, a variant of the Su-27 already transferred to China. In October 2006 a Russian press report suggested early-stage negotiations were underway for China to purchase up to 50 such aircraft at a cost of $2.5 billion. However, there has been no subsequent discussion of such a deal.


In March 2007 a Chinese Admiral of the PLAN was quoted as saying that the Chinese shipbuilding industry was actively conducting R&D in aircraft carrier construction and could be ready to build such a vessel by 2010.


The 2008 "Military Power of the People's Republic of China" stated "evidence in recent years increasingly suggests China's leaders may be moving forward with an aircraft carrier program. For example, beginning in early 2006 and with the release of China's Eleventh Five Year Plan, PRC-owned media reported on statements from high-level government and military officials on China's intent to build aircraft carriers - including a March 2007 statement from the then-minister of China's Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)."


As of 2008, Russia was believed to have been providing assistance for several years in the construction of three Chinese-designed aircraft carriers. Some analysts have thus predicted that China could have an operational carrier by 2015, while others have considered 2020 to be a more realistic timeframe. No confirmed work on any shipbuilding project of any size had been observed or reported as of the end of 2008.


In 2007 Liu, Wei-Wei; Qu, Xiang-Ju of the School of Aeronautics Science and Technology, Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Beijing 100083, China, published a paper "Modeling of carrier-based aircraft ski jump take-off based on tensor" in the Chinese Journal of Aeronautics [v 18 n 4 p 326-335].

The Chinese have built a land based replica of the Varyag the Wuhan Naval Research Institute at Yanliang [Janliang] Airfield, which is China's main aviation test facility. As of early 2008 a variant of the Su-27 was being flight tested at this facility.

MARITIME : Diagnosing Somalian Piracy: Symptom Or Disease?

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/30072015-diagnosing-somalian-piracy-symptom-or-disease-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29






Pirates offshore Somalia. Photo credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass communication Specialist 2nd Class Jason R. Zalasky (Released)

Diagnosing Somalian Piracy: Symptom Or Disease? – Analysis

                                          By

                                Prerna Bakshi

Thursday, July 30th, 2015

  

While history recounts the plunderous eras when pirates reigned over high seas, sabotaged trade and caused anarchy on land, Somalian piracy materialises this into the grim reality of the 21st century.


What started off in the war torn region of Somalia as a local effort by fishermen to protect their coastline, soon evolved into one of the deadliest installations of modern day maritime piracy with pirates infesting waters as far as 1000 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia into the Indian Ocean and as strategic for global trade as the Gulf of Aden.[1]


More than 30,000 vessels annually transit the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and more than 20% of global trade moves through this route.[2] With nearly 4000 crewmembers of 125 different nationalities captured by 2012, 150 ships reportedly ransomed for an estimated $US385 million, and insurance premiums increased by almost 10 fold for ships transiting this route,[3] Somalian piracy exerts its influence on world trade, international relations and global politics and has assumed a ‘pandemic’ status worldwide.


Certainly, this malady of the seas has not gone unnoticed by the international community. In 2009, the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) created the ‘Combined Task Force 151’ with naval forces of multifarious countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, NATO sent two missions in 2008 and EU launched ‘Operation Atalanta’ in 2009, to aid in the difficult issue of tackling pirate activity.[4]


However, these missions seemingly proved ineffective as Somalian piracy levels shot to an all time high in 2011, attributed to over 200 attacks, 700 hostages and 30 boats held in the year. [5] It wasn’t until late 2012 that piracy levels began to wane and were finally brought under control by 2013. This multifaceted episode triggers numerous questions. For instance, did the International community play a role in abetting Somalian Piracy? What role did it play in curbing piracy? Why did the various missions meet with initial failure? Can the era of Somalian piracy really be deemed as over?

In my paper, I attempt to address Somalian piracy with regard to these questions, and analyse whether Somalian piracy is an independent ‘disease’ or merely a symptom of the real ailment on-shore.


Lennox[6] categorises Somalian Piracy into two phases, each of which have a correlation to socio-political events in the country. It is no coincidence that the first phase of Somalian Piracy surfaced in 1991, immediately following the fall of Somalia’s government and supplant of Barre’s regime by clan-based warlords.


The second phase, from 2005 onwards, saw an escalation of piracy in terms of quantity, value and ransom demanded.


This phase correlates to the 2004-2006 famine that scorched Somalia aggravating poverty, limiting access to essential resources and stimulating further clan based conflict. It is evident that the off-shore problem of piracy has on-shore roots, however there is need to analyse the current cause-effect relationship between the two. Piracy is certainly the result of a larger problem in Somalia: of poverty, complete state failure, lack of government and inter-clan conflict.


However, piracy has evolved into and additionally functions as an aggravating factor for its on-shore problem. According to a UNSOM report, pirates and pirate financiers advance and finance other criminal activities as well and have built significant paramilitary capacities on land. They thus possess the potential, resources and motivations to destabilise the region and have effectively been doing so.[7] Hence, given the current scenario, piracy has forged a complex relationship with its roots in Somalia. It not only stems from these roots but has evolved to further cultivate them. Viewing piracy independently as a disease has always been a fallacy; it can more accurately be classified as a symptom that has dangerously metastasised. Treating Somalia’s state failure or Somalian piracy exclusively rather than mutually has limited potential in eradicating either problem.


While the relationship between piracy and civil conflict in Somalia is evident and direct, indirect factors play a substantial role in the creation of this situation. Falling under the purview of global governance, the situation in Somalia can be greatly attributed to several macro factors. In essence, it can be considered representative of neglect, exploitation and poor global governance by the international community.


In 2002, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the president of the Transitional National Government, expressed deep disappointment at the lack of support from the international community for rehabilitation in Somalia. During a press conference in Mogadishu, he said if the international community “keeps neglecting us”, Somalia could become “a safe-haven” for local terrorists who collaborate with international terrorists.[8] His concerns were certainly not unfounded as following the 9/11 attacks Somalia was viewed as a breeding ground for transnational terrorism.


Even after, the restoration of a Somali government became part of a counterterrorism strategy, rather than a way to deal with the root causes of state collapse and conflict. Policies of big players have also been criticised as having played a role in creating the conditions that led to a famine in Somalia in 2011.[9] ‘Al-Shabaab’, the clan based organisation controlling majority of Somalia, withheld aid from local populations and worked primarily towards their own economic and politic motive.


On the other hand, aid agencies were banned from providing assistance in areas where supplies or money might end up in the hands of Al-Shabaab operatives. This effectively created a vacuum where both sides neglected the people of Somalia. Although, it is well established that civil conflict has transnational repercussions, this truth was ignored by the international community for a prolonged period of time. While Wilson,[10] postulates that the stabilisation of Somalia would be the first step to overcoming piracy, Menkhaus,[11] cautions that delayed external action to revive and support failing states only compounds the difficulty of state building later; this is exactly what happened in the case of Somalia.


Neglect is not the only adverse contribution of the international community towards the situation in Somalia. Illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping are accused of provoking piracy by inducing local fishermen to protect their coastline at all costs. The United Nations estimated that illegal fishing companies from Europe and Asia rob Somali coastlines of over $300 million a year.

In addition to this stimulus, a private British company, Hart Security, provided military training to Somali fisherman in the 1990’s in an effort to create a “Fisheries Protection Agency”[12].The bulk of training was dedicated towards “how to handle weapons and board boats at high sea”[13] – the exact tactics currently used by Somali pirates.


In fact, Somali pirates are so conditioned that they portray themselves as the nation’s unofficial coast guard, fighting against illegal fishing and waste dumping by foreign corporations. Somalian pirates are also abetted by international sponsors; Somali refugees as far as Canada and the United States contribute money to the cause, in addition to financial backing from sources in Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Yemen and Al Qaeda.[14]


The political structure operational in Somalia also has its roots in foreign intervention. Wais Kassim H. Dahir[15] notes that the militarisation of Somalian government can be attributed to Soviet Union’s post cold war support. He also points out that when the cold war ended, superpowers left behind large amounts of weapons that turned Somalia into an armed camp. Subsequently, every household had more arms than food which kept the civil war going. Thus, it is once again apparent with the case of Somalia that civil conflict is both influenced by and influences the international sphere, re-emphasising the need for good global governance.


Having established the role foreign factors have played in indirectly encouraging piracy, it follows to question why their direct efforts to eradicate the same met with initial failure. One of the major reasons for the growth of piracy despite multinational counter-efforts was the purely naval nature of foreign response.


The initial strategy to tackle piracy seems to be based on the assumption that piracy was the ‘disease’ to be independently remedied and not the ‘symptom’ that it more rightly is. Causes of piracy may have started with grievance and shifted to greed, but the roots of the problem, including poverty and conflict, cannot be addressed with a naval response.[16] It is important to consider that waning pirate attacks in 2012 and 2013 could, in part, be related to the establishment of a government in Somalia.[17] However, spending on capacity-building in Somalia is still only equivalent to 1.5% of piracy’s annual cost.


The need of the hour is for nations to realise that their trade revenue interests go hand in hand with capacity building in Somalia.[18] While Somalian piracy has fallen sharply in the recent years, this may well be a suppression of the problem than its complete eradication. If Somali piracy is going to be combated using solely sea-based tactics it will require a critical mass of warships and air assets to maintain a constant presence in the region.


However, it would be wishful thinking to expect this sort of a presence to continue for any prolonged period given the cost of modern naval deployments.


The GOA is a large body of water, and warships are not a long-term cost effective method of providing commercial vessels with protection from Somali piracy. Without a two-pronged approach it is only a matter of time till the naval forces move out of Somalian waters and Somalia’s poverty and conflict find global expression through piracy or other internationally detrimental means.


The efficacy of a two-pronged approach is implicitly outlined in the UNSOM 2013 report. Among other capacity building initiatives, the report mentions the Security Council’s decision that UNSOM support the Federal Government of Somalia on governance, security sector reform, the rule of law, the disengagement of combatants, maritime security and mine action. It also states the agenda to strengthen the fisheries sector, by creating strong institutions and developing the policy and legal frameworks. In this context, extensive work is being carried out by rehabilitating feeder roads, clearing land for agriculture, and constructing water catchments in Somalia. These efforts are indicative of the dawning realisation for a more comprehensive strategy to address the complex issue.


The complete impact of recent and ongoing capacity building efforts on piracy remains unclear and difficult to determine due to its nascent nature. Conversely, the present situation in Somalia strongly suggests one hard truth. The naval forces may have successfully suppressed piracy but cannot provide a long-term solution. Hence, by no means can 2013 be regarded as the end of Somalian piracy. While the two-pronged approach will prove to be a panacea in the long run, a shift in scope to include targeting not only the perpetrators but also the enablers will help the strategy gain momentum. In addition, it is crucial to establish a sound judicial system to set the foundation of stability. Blanket amnesty, punishment and lustration are all possible ways of addressing such issues, which once dealt with will make the road ahead smoother.


Notes:

 [1] ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2009. London: IMB, 2009. Print.

 [2] Johnson, La’Nita M. “The Consequences of Somali Piracy on International Trade.” Global Tides 8.1 (2014): 5.

 [3] Do, Quy-Toan. The pirates of Somalia: ending the threat, rebuilding a nation. Washington DC: World Bank, 2013.

 [4] Blanchard, Christopher M., et al. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington: Congressional Research Service (2009).

 [5] Malm, Sarah. “European Court Chides France Over Somali Pirate Arrests.” Mail Online. N.p., 2014. Web. 10 Jan. 2015.

 [6] Lennox, Patrick. Contemporary piracy off the Horn of Africa. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008.

 [7] United Nations Assisted Mission in Somalia. Secretary-General’s Report On Piracy And Armed Robbery At Sea Off The Coast Of Somalia. New York: United Nations, 2013. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.

 [8] IRINnews.“SOMALIA: President Disappointed At Lack Of International Support.” N.p., 2002. Web. 14 Jan. 2015.

 [9]Bradbury, Mark. “How Do You Solve A Problem Like Somalia?” Newint.org. N.p., 2012. Web. 13 Jan. 2015.

 [10] Wilson, Brian. “Effectively confronting a regional threat: Somali piracy.” Conflict trends 1 (2009): 11-18.

 [11] Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without government in Somalia: spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping.” (2007).

 [12] Al Jazeera, English. “Firms Reap Somali Piracy Profits – Africa.”Al Jazeera English. 9 Sept. 2009. Web. 15 Jan 2015

 [13] ibid

 [14] Kellerman, Miles G. “Somali Piracy: Causes and Consequences.” Student Pulse 3.09 (2011).

 [15]Dahir, Wais Kassim. “Learning The Lessons: The Root Causes Of The Somali Conflict.” Somaliland Times 2002. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.

 [16] Hall, Andrea. “Piracy And The Experience Of Somali Women.” Canadian Military History. N.p., 2013. Web. 11 Jan. 2015.

 [17] ibid

 [18]Oceans Beyond Piracy. Latest Oceans Beyond Piracy Report. 2014. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.






































 

HE MISSED HIS RIDE TO TOWN ON HIS ASS

The following is an actual exchange of correspondence between a customer and the Irish Railway Company.

Gentlemen,

I have been riding your trains daily for the last two years, and the service on your line seems to be getting worse every day. I am tired of standing in the aisle all the time on a 14-mile trip. I think the transportation system is worse than that enjoyed by people 2,000 years ago.

 

Yours truly,

Patrick Finnegan

--------------------------------

Dear Mr. Finnegan, 

We received your letter with reference to the shortcomings of our service and believe you are somewhat confused in your history. The only mode of transportation 2,000 years ago was by foot.

Sincerely, 

Irish Railway Company

-----------------------------------

Gentlemen, 

I am in receipt of your letter, and I think you are the ones who are confused in your history. If you will refer to the Bible and the Book of David, 9th Chapter, you will find that Balaam rode to town on his ass. 

That.... Gentlemen, is something I have not been able to do on your train in the last two years! 

Yours truly,

Patrick Finnegan.

 

GEO POLTICS CENTRAL ASIA : Chabahar vs Gwadar Port

SOURCE:
http://defence.pk/threads/chabahar-vs-gwadar-port.328698/









                                                    Chabahar vs Gwadar Port

The Great Game redux: China and India maneuver over Arabian Sea ports, Gwadar (top) and Chabahar (below)


Both Pakistan and Iran being close neighbours have cordial and fraternal relations with each other. Both have evolved master plan to create economic, trade and transport ties with Central Asian countries, Afghanistan and beyond. The two countries have offered all sorts of facilities and generous incentives to shipping companies and other countries of the world to do business in their respective ports. For Central Asian countries, both the ports are most likely to become major link to global market.


Construction of Gwadar Port was necessitated due to the fact that Karachi Port was already heavily-loaded with serious congestion from commercial, fishing, civil and military shipping. It may be recalled that in 1971, the Indian Navy targeted the Karachi Port leading to a massive harm to the economy of Pakistan. It was felt that any future blockade by India would further devastate Karachi Port and economy of the country. In order to relieve too much reliance on the Karachi Port, another port by the name Port Qasim was established in Karachi. Now, with the establishment of Gwadar Port in the province of Balochistan the reliance on Karachi Port will be further reduced.


Port of Bandar Abbas in Iran is of strategic importance as it is situated on the Strait of Hurmuz leading to the Persian Gulf. This is problematic for Iran because of the high traffic and probably the penetrations of US Navy. To be more secure, the Iranians established Port of Chabahar for more congenial trade with other countries. They foresee that Chabahar Port as an instrument in their policy to escape international isolation. Iranian officials state that they desire to have Bandar Abbas Port remain as the port for Russian and European trade.


Chabahar Port is situated on the Makran Coast of the Sistan and Balochistan of Iran and is officially declared as a free trade and industrial zone by the Iranian government. The port has been developed by India. It is the closest and best access point to the Indian Ocean. Its location is at the most secure and closet route to Central Asia and Afghanistan market. It has proximity to the largest energy resources of the world. Its economic sectors are fishery industries and commercial. The port is well-connected to other cities of the country by road and airlines. A strategic partnership will be established between Iran, India and Russia to establish a multi-model transport link connecting Mumbai with Saint Petersburg, providing Europe and the former Soviet Union Republics of Central Asia access to Asia and vice versa. Iran and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to give Indian goods leading for Central Asia and Afghanistan, preferential treatment and tariff reduction at Chabahar Port.


The berths in Port of Chabahar include general cargo and bulk. Berth capacities range from 2,000 to 2,500 tonnes. Chabahar Shahid Beheshti Jetty has a length of 600 metres and can berth four vessels of up to 25,000 gross tonnage and 11-metre draught simultaneously. The other Shahid Kalantary Jetty has a length of 1100 metres, four metallic ready-made jetties. Adequate reserves of water and electricity efficient telecommunication network, warehouses and cold storage facilities are already available.


Gwadar Port is located on the Gulf of Oman, close to the entrance of Persian Gulf. It is a deep warm water sea port, about 460-kilometer west of Karachi and approximately 75-kilometer east of Pakistan border with Iran. The port is close to the important Strait of Hormuz, through which more than 13 million bpd of oil passes. It is strategically between the oil-rich Middle East, the economically shortest route to the oil-rich Central Asian States through land-locked Afghanistan, and heavily populated South Asia. It is at the mouth of the Gulf through which 40 per cent of world's daily oil passes. Much of it has been financed by China. At present, the project is estimated to be $1 billion or even more. In 2007, the government of Pakistan handed over the operations of port to PSA, Singapore for 25 years and gave the status of a Tax-Free Port for 40 years. The port became somewhat a little bit functional in 2008 with first ship to dock bringing 52,000 tonnes of wheat from Canada.


Gwadar Port has the capacity to handle large crude containers of up to 500,000 tonnes deadweight. It will have three containers terminal, a bulk- cargo terminal, a grain terminal and an oil terminal. It would promote economic development in the country and would provide vast employment opportunities to the Baloch people. The establishment of Free-Trade and Economic Zones and Export Processing Zone would attract foreign investment, and employment opportunities to the local people. The port will not open large avenues for the people of Mekran engaged in fishing and agriculture but will also facilitate easier transportation of date export to foreign markets. Gwadar would generate massive revenues for the Balochistan province. It would become a trade hub, once road and rail links are linked to the rest of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Pakistan has future plan for development of Gwadar to cater foreign trade of the Central Asian Republics and the Xingjian and the Sichuan provinces and the Tibetan region of China. It also proposes the construction of a rail and road network between Gwadar and Xingjian.


Gwadar Port will have to face stiff competition from Chabahar. It is still not operating vigorously as Chabahar. The supporting structures at Gwadar Port are still not existent. Two years have passed away and there is no visible economic activity in this port. Several projects such as 950-km railway and 900-km motorway to link with railway and highway of the country have so far remained only in files. The 200-km branch road which would link coastal road to the Indus Highway at Ratto-Dero is still not developed. There are no internal roads and services and water, gas, power and communication services for the new township and industrial zone. There are no warehouses and cold storages there.


India's financing and engineering assistance is not only limited to Chabahar Port but it is also actively developing a highway that leads from the Chabahar Port to Afghanistan. Chabahar Port is well-suited for linking southern ports of Afghanistan and a few Central Asian States. For Pakistan in the present condition the Southern Afghanistan is not ready to be a reliable transport corridor for Pakistan access to Central Asian states. Gwadar Port can be operated efficiently if there is no kidnapping and deadly attacks on foreigners and the government of Pakistan makes favorable concessions to Baloch people living in Gwadar and its surrounding areas.


As long as peace and tranquility prevails in the region and there is no cutthroat competition between Chabahar and Gwadar ports and India does not unduly interfere in the affairs of Balochistan by supporting the insurgency there the Gwadar Port trading activities will be accelerated. Further, the current confirmed involvement of terrorism activities by India in Swat and tribal areas and rising Indian economic and political influence in Afghanistan would exacerbate the tension in the region and would harm the normal activities of the Gwadar Port.


With the full operation of Gwadar Port, there are bright prospects for Balochistan for attaining on economic par with other provinces of Pakistan. The real value of Gwadar Port could be witnessed when Chinese trade grows with Gulf States, Middle East and European countries. Any transport or defense problems in the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hurmuz and the Suez will promote the significance of Central Asia as a strategic trade corridor. China, Iran and India are desperate in having closer ties with Afghanistan and Central Asian states. Iran's main considerations are not only boosting trade but securing its borders and avoiding American Navy in this region. Pakistan wants peace in its region and it does not want that militants spoil further its economy and it hopes for the best relations with Afghanistan and Central Asian states. According to the Iranian officials, both Chabahar and Gwadar can equally benefit from Central Asian business.



Conclusion

The countries of Central Asia will likely benefit from both Chabahar and Gwadar. Diversifying its import and export routes is a logical economic and political step. Although one should not exaggerate the economic benefits to be reaped. As for the competition between the two ports, it will not be a “winner take all” outcome but rather one port earning the greater share of trade. And the “winner” in this respect will likely be Chabahar, at least in the short term. Iran is more stable than Pakistan, it has better relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, and unlike the Gwadar route its proposed route goes through relatively stable parts of Afghanistan. As long as Iran avoids outright conflict with the United States or any sort of domestic turmoil it should come out of this competition with an advantage.


 For further readings;
Central Asia’s Seaport: Gwadar or Chabahar? — Registan.net

Chabahar Versus Gwadar | The Pakistani Spectator

Their Gwadar, Our Chabahar

Chahbahar and Gwadar







       Chabahar To Central Asia Highway

• Afghanistan is a land-locked country. Most of its international trade is done through Pakistani sea-ports.
• Therefore, India wished to connect to Afghanistan via an alternative route (through Iran).
• So, In 2003 a trilateral agreement was signed among India, Iran and Afghanistan.
• Under this agreement
  • Iran was to build a highway from Chabahar (a Port City of Iran) upto Afghanistan border.
  • India was to build a road connecting Delaram (border city of Afghanistan) to Zaranj (Capital of Nimruz province of Afghanistan)

• Delaram–Zaranj Highway, also known as Route 606.

• Length about 200km

• It connects Delaram (border city of Afghanistan) to Zaranj (Capital of Nimruz province of Afghanistan).

• India totally financed this project. (about 600 crore rupees).

• Border Roads Organization (BRO) of India, has constructed this highway.

• Construction started in 2005, and in 2009 the road was opened for public use.

• All these years, India was requesting Iran to allow them to do some port Development on this port. And now the permission is issued.

Chabahar is situated on the Makran

Central Asia’s Seaport: Gwadar or Chabahar?

                                       By

                         Christian Bleuer

                           (on 8/20/2007)

Both Iran and Pakistan have developed strategies to create strong economic and transport ties with Central Asia and beyond. Anchoring these strategies are two new seaports: Gwadar in Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran. Spreading out from these ports are existing or planned transportation infrastructure that leads into their respective country’s economic center and importantly for Central Asia, northwards. Both ports are well towards becoming fully operable and are offering generous incentives for companies and governments to do business in their ports. However, serious political, economic and logistical problems remain. For Central Asia one of these two ports, or indeed both, will likely become important links to world markets.


Tip: look way down into the bottom left-hand corner to see the ports.







The problems with Karachi and Bandar Abbas


Karachi is already overburdened with severe congestion from commercial, fishing and military shipping. And from a strategic vantage point it is quite problematic. The Indian Navy targeted the port in 1971 and any blockade in the future would devastate Pakistan since that country has an overreliance on the port of Karachi. The port of Qasim, built in the 1970s was to relive some of that burden and the port of Gwadar is expected to further reduce the reliance on Karachi.


Bandar Abbas is of enormous strategic significance to Iran as it is located on the Strait of Hormuz leading into the Persian Gulf. But that is also a problem for Iran. The area is already burdened with high traffic and of course, the U.S. Navy. Iran wishes to have another port that is more conducive to trade and further growth.


Gwadar

Gwadar, being much further away from India than Karachi, makes obvious strategic sense. But it is its commercial potential that will provide the most benefits. Gwadar is not some long-term project. Its first phase, with 75% of the costs covered by the Chinese government, is already completed. The existing docks, built by the Chinese Harbor Engineering Company, are now being operated by Port of Singapore. Port of Singapore won the contract over Dubai Ports World, the company that was forced out of America by opportunistic xenophobes in both political parties there. Phase two will be completed by 2010, adding even more capacity. Ziad Haider, a researcher at the South Asia Program at the Henry L. Stimson Center, noted that Pakistan can make the project succeed if it maintains the financial and political support of China for the project and if it makes some concessions to the Baluchis near Gwadar, who have already carried out deadly attacks on Chinese engineers. 


 
The problem with Gwadar, wrote Ammad Hassan in his thesis for the US Naval Postgraduate School, is that while the port has been built, “the supporting infrastructure of railroad link, industrial capacity, and civic structures at Gwadar is almost non-existent.” And of course, all analysts mention Pakistan’s extremely problematic relations with the ethnic Baluch in the area who, in addition to having been in a low-grade insurgency for some time, are not at all supportive of the port. And to understate another issue, southern Afghanistan is not quite ready to be a reliable transport corridor for Pakistan to access Central Asia, despite the Afghan government’s voiced support for the project. Nevertheless, the idea of further integrating Central Asian and Russian resources southward with the Asian and Middle Eastern market has others optimistic about the long-term prospects. The Asian Development Bank is somewhat cautious though, noting that initially the port will be significant only to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.


   
Chabahar

Gwadar’s competition for trade and transport will come from Chabahar, the new Indian-financed port in Iran. A port outside of the Persian Gulf makes sense from a strategic and logistical viewpoint for Iran. The port of Chabahar was part of a plan to develop transportation infrastructure in Iran’s east for many years. Initially put in hold in 1984 it was revived in 2002 with Indian help. And the financing and engineering assistance from India is not limited to the port. India, wishing to bypass Pakistan, is also cooperating on a highway system that leads from the port into Afghanistan as well as a planned railroad to Afghanistan. Iranian officials state that they wish to have Bandar Abbas remain as the port for Russian and European trade and have Chabahar become the port for trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran already has good relations with everybody along the route leading north (including the local “warlords”) into Tajikistan. And significantly, it is in Tajikistan where Iran has already been financing several transport projects including the Anzob tunnel. And luckily for the Iranians, the U.S. constructed a bridge over the Amu Darya that fits in nicely with the Chabahar to Khojent route.


Prospects for economic integration of Central Asia with the South


For energy and mineral resources to be sent south from Central Asia a much more expensive transport infrastructure will be required than what is being built at the moment. Another limitation is the lack of a business friendly environment in most Central Asian states. And consumer goods are already entering Central Asia from Russia and China. What more is there a demand for? Furthermore, many Central Asian leaders are obsessed over local issues and haven’t been overly enthusiastic about regional integration (with Uzbekistan being the worst offender).

What is a long-term prospect is Central Asia being a transport route from the ports to Xinjiang, Russia and Kazakhstan, all of them important markets. The routes to Gwadar and Chabahar cut off thousands of kilometers for certain trade routes.




Strategic Considerations


Any transportation or military problems in the Straits of Malacca, the Straits of Hormuz, the Suez or anywhere along Asia’s southern coastline will further boost the importance of Central Asia as a transport and trade corridor. Beyond Pakistan and Iran, both China and India are seeking closer relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia. The planned transport and trade routes will have the obvious effect of building solid ties. Iran’s considerations are boosting trade, having secure borders, and avoiding “encirclement” by American proxies (no matter how much a figment of the Iranian government’s imagination). As for Pakistan, the governments there has hoped for better relations with Central Asia. However, their Afghanistan policy always got in the way. Now they hope to move away from that era.


Conclusion

The countries of Central Asia will likely benefit from both Chabahar and Gwadar. Diversifying its import and export routes is a logical economic and political step. Although one should not exaggerate the economic benefits to be reaped. As for the competition between the two ports, it will not be a “winner take all” outcome but rather one port earning the greater share of trade. And the “winner” in this respect will likely be Chabahar, at least in the short term. Iran is more stable than Pakistan, it has better relations with Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, and unlike the Gwadar route its proposed route goes through relatively stable parts of Afghanistan. As long as Iran avoids outright conflict with the United States or any sort of domestic turmoil it should come out of this competition with an advantage.



Primary Sources:

Ahmed Rashid
Ammad Hassan (pdf)
Asia Times
Asia Times #2
Gwadar Corner
Jamestown Foundation
Rizwan Zeb
Iran Daily
Daily Times
Ziad Haider (pdf)































The distance between Gwadar port, Pakistan and Chabahar port, Iran is just 72 kilometers (around 38 miles). The very close proximity of these ports make both of them geographically equally important. Pakistan has always eyed Gwadar as its Ace card, because nobody thought that someday Iran would blink, acquiesce to the world’s demands, and sanctions would be eased. Just until yesterday, the only cargo coming and going from Chabahar belonged to India, the arch-rival of Pakistan.


With Iran’s ground-breaking nuclear pact with the United States has changed the game altogether. It has not only angered Saudi Arabia and Israel, it has in fact made Pakistani policy makers worried and anxious, as Iran’s return to normal relations with the world will snatch the strategic lever from Pakistan. Afghanistan’s transit trade, NATO supplies, corridor to Central Asia, and Russia’s aspirations to get trade window through warm waters can easily be accomplished through Chabahar, rather than Gwadar, which we always thought.


Chabahar has multiple advantages over Gwadar too. Chabahar is located in southeastern province of Sistan-o-Balochistan of Iran, and its not restive and lawless as our Balochistan. There is no military operation there. Indians are investing in Chabahar like crazy. They haven’t invested that much money even in any of their province at the same time in such a short span time, but they have developed a highway from Chabahar to Kandhar-Herat. India has completely bypassed Pakistan for trade with Afghanistan, central Asia and Russia. It has also got direct access to Afghanistan’s $3 trillion mineral reserves. Both Iran and Afghanistan are keen to use this corridor as much as possible, as this corridor not only bypasses Pakistan, it also bypasses Taliban stronghold areas in Afghanistan.


While India invests money in Chabahar, China is pouring money into Gwadar, though not as fastly as compared to Indians in Iran. Still there is no good road or rail infrastructure linking Gwadar to rest of Pakistan. Military operation is going on, and lawlessness is rampant. Writ of the government is also shaky. To add insult to the injuries, recent blockage of Afghan transit trade in Peshawar by political parties has sent a very wrong message to the world. When other nations are joining hands, opening windows of opportunities, we are closing the doors, threatening others.


So what we can do to keep Gwadar attractive? Firstly, we need to understand that merely speaking about Gwadar won’t get us anywhere. We need to work hard to build that port. Make it a true trade free zone, and most importantly ask China to speed up building road network and provincial and federal governments must ensure safe passage. India and Iran are planning to build a rail link from Chabahar to Hagigak region of Afghanistan. We must take lead and complete our Gwadar to Kashgar route.


What we can do to exploit our situation is to take sides with Saudi Arabia, and along with China ask them to sponsor Gwadar and other infrastructure. UAE might also jump in, as all of them feel very threatened by the Iran, and there is also Sunni-Shia dimension to this whole scenario. Our relations with Iran are just  so-so always, and we must not aggravate them, while ensuring that our interests in the region remain intact.

            Their Gwadar, Our Chabahar

Wednesday, 03 July 2013 | Rohit Bansal | in Business

(http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/business/their-gwadar--our-chabahar.html )


The economic corridor taking off from Kashgar in Xinjiang to Gwadar is a game changer as far as this region is concerned,” South China Morning Post quoted Pak prime minister Nawaz Sharif ahead of a 6-day visit to China Wednesday.


Beijing and Islamabad plan a series of SEZs, a rail link, and a pipeline running from the Arabian Sea port of Gwadar to the old Silk Road town of Kashgar in Xinjiang’s western border.
Our bid is limited to rebuilding the Chabahar Port in Iran, merely 100 km west of Gwadar. Even these baby steps are much to the discomfiture of the US lobby within our system. Last month, Union shipping secretary PK Sinha was in Chabahar, fast-tracking this long-pending $100-million investment.


The Iranian port can serve as our direct entry point to Afghanistan and Central Asia, circumventing Pakistan. Not surprisingly, Beijing recently offered Tehran a matching line of credit of 60 million euros! If there’s sloth on our part, Sharif’s port of good hope is steeped in poor economics.


Typical of Pakistan, all eggs have been stacked with a Chinese entity, the State-owned Overseas Port Holding Company. That’s after PSA International of Singapore, owned by Temasek, the island nation’s sovereign fund, walked out despite the tax breaks. Gwadar’s flawed commercials and Pakistan’s troubled business environment and endemic corruption broke their back.


Surely, Beijing’s plans are more strategic than tiny Singapore’s. A Chinese naval base in Gwadar, just 330 km from the Straits of Hormuz, the chokepoint of 20 per cent of the world’s oil, worries India’s strategic community. Yin Zhon, a Chinese rear admiral, stoked this. “It would be appropriate if we could have a relatively stable, fixed base for supplies and maintenance,” Yin said.
Naval Chief Admiral DK Joshi has steered clear so far. But what Joshi said in December, on the South China Sea, “country’s interests [are] at stake, we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that” might apply to Gwadar.


Joshi’s grand predecessor, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, has been direct. Gwadar would allow China “to take control over the world energy jugular and interdiction of Indian tankers,” Mehta has warned.

“The location provides China a means of keeping an eye on ships moving through Hormuz. In a future conflict this could aid the Pak navy,” concurs Manoj Joshi, distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.


The counter to Mehta and Joshi is that China’s ‘String of Pearls’ among ports from Port Sudan to Myanmar suffers from financial limitations. Business wise, Gwadar is a dud. China might be able to afford it as ‘place’ but not as a  ‘base.’


Beijing’s keenness to invest in sea lanes coming from the Middle East, and her hunger for energy in the western regions notwithstanding, Gwadar means more to Pakistani navy’s pursuit of depth rather than a Chinese need for favourable terms in a number of overseas ports for maintenance, repair and refueling.


Sheer costs and the perils of evoking the world’s suspicions might stop Beijing from splurging $1 billion needed for Phase II of Gwadar. (It has spent $198 million on the construction so far). Given Baluchistan’s insurgency, including attacks on Chinese employees, relative economics of the Karachi port is distinctly superior. Also, to Gwadar’s west, 1,000 km nearer the ‘action,’ China has already cozied up to Oman: developed infrastructure is for the taking at Salah Port.


Sharif and his predecessors market Gwadar as a hub for exporting LNG from Turkmenistan. This is a piped dream. The Pakistani State isn’t credible enough to deliver on long-term commercial contracts that deep investments in liquefaction entail. Even assuming that Sharif or a future regime in Islamabad won’t use the pipes to blackmail the world, infrastructure running all the way from Turkmenistan via Afghanistan’s eastern regions, and Pakistan’s own north-south, is a sitting duck for terrorists. An ocean of Australian LNG, not to mention East Africa, are an added risk to green-field processing in Pakistan.


“Gwadar holds no obvious and immediate economic benefits for Pakistan or China. China has stepped in to help Pak develop an alternative to Karachi, but more because Gwadar will always have more military significance than economic, unless Afghanistan stabilises and Gwadar can become a gateway to Central Asia. That does not seem likely in the near future,” says geo-strategist Sanjaya Baru.

That said, if fears on Gwadar can push us out of slumber, so be it. From available indications, stakes in Chabahar will be routed through Kandla and Jawaharlal Nehru ports, which operate as trusts. Kandla and JNP need their moment of truth without the accompanying domestic constraints.

Emulating ONGC Videsh on energy security, a ministerial body needs to resurrect the ‘Indian Ports Global,’ a vehicle we should have had long back, placing overseas bets via state-owned ports on the lines of PSA, DP World Dubai and Antwerp. If that happens, more than Manmohan Singh, we’ll have Nawaz Sharief and Xi Jingping to thank.


(The columnist is CEO & Co-Founder, India Strategy Group, Hammurabi & Solomon Consulting. Tweets @therohitbansal).