Thursday, August 18, 2016

SOUNDS OF BATTLE DRUMS FROM SOUTH BLOCK

SOURCE:
http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/newsindia/vk-singh-tried-to-deny-me-promotion-via-false-charges-malafide-intent-army-chief-dalbir-singh/ar-BBvKqf7?li=AAggbRN&ocid=iehp


                                     [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gAKAERPjTaE  ]




        VK Singh tried to deny me promotion

                                    via

               false charges, malafide intent

              : Army Chief Dalbir Singh





In the first instance of a serving Army chief speaking out against a predecessor and a serving minister, General Dalbir Singh, Chief of Army Staff, has accused General (retired) V K Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, of trying to stall his promotion “with mysterious design, malafide intent and to arbitrarily punish” him for “extraneous reasons”.

 
In an affidavit submitted in his personal capacity to the Supreme Court Wednesday, General Dalbir Singh has said that in 2012 “I was sought to be victimised by the then COAS” General V K Singh “with the sole purpose of denying me promotion to the appointment of Army Commander”.

 
“False, baseless and imaginary allegations of lapses were levelled against me in the show cause notice” of May 19, 2012 and consequent imposition of an “illegal” discipline and vigilance (DV) ban, the Army chief has stated in his affidavit.
The affidavit was filed in response to a petition moved by Lt Gen (retd) Ravi Dastane who alleged favouritism in Dalbir Singh’s selection as Army Commander, making him next in line to succeed General Bikram Singh.

 
Dalbir Singh was placed under a DV ban by V K Singh between April and May 2012 for alleged “failure of command and control” after a Court of Inquiry was ordered into an operation carried out in Jorhat, Assam on the night of December 20-21, 2011 by the 3 Corps Intelligence and Surveillance Unit.

 
Dalbir Singh was then General Officer Commanding of the Dimapur-based 3 Corps. Referring to the Jorhat operation in his affidavit, he has stated “on that day, I was away on part of annual leave and rejoined duty on 26 Dec 2011”.
His promotion as GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, with effect from June 15, 2012 was cleared by General Bikram Singh who reversed the DV ban after V K Singh retired on May 31, 2012.


 
Dalbir Singh was placed under a DV ban by V K Singh between April and May 2012.© Provided by Indian Express Dalbir Singh was placed under a DV ban by V K Singh between April and May 2012.


This delayed promotion, after reserving the vacant Army Commander’s post for 15 days, was challenged by Dastane in the Supreme Court. He contended he was eligible to be Army Commander but was denied the opportunity by General Bikram Singh who favoured Dalbir Singh despite the latter being under a DV ban at the relevant time.

 
In February 2012, months before he moved against Dalbir Singh, V K Singh had lost his legal battle on the age row in Supreme Court which held that the government’s decision on his date of birth would apply to his service matters, prompting him to withdraw his petition. The court told V K Singh that he could not go back on the commitment he made to abide by the government decision to treat his date of birth as May 10, 1950 and rejected the contention of “prejudice” and “perversity” against him.

 
In his affidavit in response to Dastane’s petition, Dalbir Singh has mounted a direct attack on V K Singh: “The passing of directions for initiating administrative action against me after about one month of having already finalised the Court of Inquiry smacks of a motivated, biased, arbitrary and malicious intent to punish me which the then COAS executed apparently as planned by him.”

 
He has underlined it is now “revealed clearly that the imposition of DV ban and issue of show cause notice to me by the then COAS was illegal and premeditated”.
“Despite their being no evidence against me at the Court of Inquiry, the show cause notice was issued malafidely. no material whatsoever of attendant circumstances was provided to me. The show cause notice issued, beside suffering from vagueness, was premeditated and also against the principles of natural justice,” his affidavit states.

 
He has pointed out that V K Singh, in his order on April 23, 2012, recommended “action against some officers of the Eastern Command without recommending any action to be taken against Respondent No. 3 (Dalbir Singh)... how and on what basis he had changed his mind on 18.05.2012 is not forthcoming

 
Stating he was “victimised for extraneous reasons”, he said the “illegal imposition of DV ban” could not be made a basis for Dastane to challenge his appointment as Army Commander. “In fact, it is the answering respondent (Dalbir Singh) who is the victim and not the appellant (Dastane),” his affidavit states.
Referring to the reply filed by the Ministry of Defence in June 2014, Dalbir Singh’s affidavit states “it is now clearly established that the authorities, including the Government of India, Ministry of Defence were satisfied of gross injustice meted out to me and my honour and military reputation including my innocence...”.

 
The Ministry, in its affidavit, had not only rejected Dastane’s challenge but also censured the manner in which V K Singh had placed Dalbir Singh under the DV ban saying “the entire exercise to issue show cause notice was premeditated and as per records, the directions issued in this regard, including imposition of the DV ban and issue of show cause notice, were found to be illegal”.




















 
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OROP : OROP PANEL WON'T ADDRESS KEY ISSUES

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/orop-panel-won-t-address-key-issues-say-ex-servicemen/281874.html



    OROP  PANEL WON'T ADDRESS
                           KEY ISSUES

Chandigarh, August 17
 
The one-man Judicial Committee comprising Justice L Narasimha Reddy set up by the Central Government to look into the implementation of “one rank, one pension” (OROP) formula for the ex-servicemen and address anomalies arising thereof held its first public hearing at the Chandimandir Military Station today. Ex-servicemen contended that major points of discord were not included in the committee’s terms of reference.

A large number of retired armed forces personnel across all ranks attended the hearing to present their views and opinions before the committee, which is scheduled to submit its reports to the government in December. Justice Reddy is a former Chief Justice of the Patna High Court.

Ex-servicemen said major points of discord that did not form part of the committee’s mandate included the definition of OROP, not equalising the pension annually, not fixing pension according to the highest rate for the particular rank and instead basing it on the average rate of the rank, fixing the date of implementation and base year for calculations.

Veterans said unless these key issues were resolved, OROP would lose its real essence. It would not only deprive them of full benefits, but also lead to more disparities later on. This, they claimed, would lead to more unrest and bad blood.





















 
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Understanding Military Strategy and the Four Levels of War

SOURCE:
http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news/a39985/four-levels-of-war/




      Understanding Military Strategy

                               and

               the Four Levels of War

When "strategy" gets thrown around by politicians and the                       media, you can bet it's being misused.                                          By   

                              

In my sustained effort to help others understand the news, there is one important area that really must be addressed, both because this is an election period and because some of these words are so widely confused and conflated in modern journalistic usage they now have little to no meaning. Specifically, I am referring to what we know as the "Levels of War," and the way that terms like "tactics" and "strategy" and "campaign" (and several other related concepts) are thrown around as though they are synonyms. They are not; and how they are used, both by reporters and the candidates themselves, appears to be a reliable way to separate the wheat from the chafe.
 
But why does this matter in reporting on—or in speaking/proclaiming about—news coming from the Middle East or any other conflict zone you might want to know about?
Simply put, if a candidate mixes and matches these words in very non-specific ways, it is a pretty clear indicator that both his national security advisors and perhaps even his international relations advisors are either rank amateurs or are flatly ignored by the candidate.
 
 
So down to brass tacks: There are four levels of warfare. These are the Political, Strategic, Operational, and Tactical levels of war. I will use examples from World War II in order to level the playing field and convey these ideas in their most basic (and least confused) form. For our purposes, we will only address three in detail: the tactical level, the operational level, and the strategic level. I believe that the "Political" level is self-evident, but for clarity I will address it briefly. It is perhaps the most important, because decisions at the political level have the ability to directly or indirectly affect the other three.

Tactical Level

A simple definition, though not an ironclad one, of the tactical level of warfare might read (my words): 
"The tactical level of warfare is that level where men meet and fight from the individual level through the division. It is the realm of skirmishes, engagements, and battles. Planning at the tactical level starts at 'now' and occurs out to roughly 48 hours in the future, or at most a few weeks. The tactical level of warfare is where one sees the face of battle." 
Most weapon systems used in war operate at this level. Knives, bayonets, guns, cannons, bombs, and torpedoes—the actual tools of personal destruction are mostly tactical. (Nuclear weapons, obviously, transcend this area.) Some information systems operate at this level as well. Speed at this echelon is sometimes measured in yards per day, but usually in miles per hour. Tactical combat for infantry on foot rarely moves faster than 2.5 m.p.h., but even jets moving to conduct an individual bombing raid rarely move faster than a few hundred miles per hour. This is the popular conception of war. This is war at the level of Saving Private Ryan. This is fighting by privates and sergeants, lieutenants, captains, and colonels. The battles on the beaches of Normandy in 1944 were tactical.

 
Operational Level

The operational level is somewhat more difficult to define and understand. Operational level planning occurs with the intent of setting missions and objectives that will bend the enemy to your will in an entire theater of operations. Think of this as the blueprint that helps you build a house from a bunch of bricks. Each brick is a tactical engagement. You put them together to make a wall, and then a house. Operational level plans are known as "campaigns," and by design each consists of a series of battles and engagements (ie. the 'tactical level') designed to win some larger objective. The operational level of warfare is the realm of generals. Plans begin with the intent that they will start a few days or weeks in the future and may stretch out to cover months of time and thousands of square miles. This level of war deals with the movements of entire corps, armies and army groups, or whole fleets at sea. Again, referring back to June 1944, the overall plan for invading the beaches and the entire province beyond the beaches, Operation Overlord, was an operational level plan.

Strategic Level

Thirdly, there is the strategic level of warfare. Over time there have been various definitions and subsets of this overarching term. There has been "Grand Strategy" and "National Strategy" and "Military Strategy," all of which address slightly different aspects of the same general concept. This level concerns the planning and conduct of the war at the highest levels. Strategic plans aim for objectives that lead directly to, or at least significantly toward, peace. In other words, these plans seek to answer the question, "How will we win this war?" It is easier to understand strategic concepts not by assigning a force level as a definition, but by understanding the level at which decisions occur. Within the U.S. Army, strategic level decisions occur at the highest level headquarters in the field, most often in conjunction and with the approval of the National Command Authority. This is the echelon that approves changes in force structure.

 
Strategic decisions also determine the allocation of portions of national resources. Decisions about production of material and allocations of raw material and personnel occur at this level. Strategy plans lay out what the lower level campaign objectives should be, allocate forces, and choose the "theaters" in which campaigns occur. The decision that the primary invasion of Occupied Europe in 1944 would take place at Normandy (as opposed to southern France, on the coast of Germany, or up from Italy and around or through the Alps) was a strategic-level decision. The decision to defeat Germany first, and then Japan, might also be considered strategic in nature. Decisions regarding the allocation of resources available to the nation ("Do we build 10,000 tanks and 2,000 planes and 100 ships, or should we devote our industrial base to making 3,000 ships and 1,000 tanks and 500 planes?") are strategic in that they indirectly determine the course and direction of the lower levels of warfare. You cannot fight a land war without land forces, and you cannot win at sea without ships. But you can never have all the things that the different services want, so choices have to be made, and these decisions, by their nature, are strategic.

Most Popular

Political Level

Finally, as I mentioned, there is the political level of warfare. In our society, the civilian government retains control over decisions to go to war, whom to fight, and with whom to ally.

  Decisions at this level involve the interrelationships between allies, decisions regarding the factors of production, the national will, and societal issues. And it is here that another profession holds great sway, one that operates in the realm of influencing civilians. Here, one of the most critical tools—"weapon" in all but name—is the power which is held by the press, by reporters.
 
Obviously, all four levels are interrelated. There was no way to avoid that in the 20th Century, and probably less so in the 21st.

 A political decision may directly result in a tactical engagement and even have bearing upon the conduct of that engagement. For example, and to return to our Normandy example, it was a political decision made at the War Department that resulted in a new rule that pulled sole surviving siblings out of combat zones. (Yes, Saving Private Ryan is at least partially based upon a true story.)

A political decision about something like Rules of Engagement or a desire not to seem too militaristic—such as the idea not to send U.S. armored vehicles to Somalia early on—can also have an effect on the nature of these fights. The reverse may also occur; for example, tactical events in South Vietnam pushed President Nixon towards a political decision to conduct bombing operations over Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam. Cross level influence is even more common between adjoining levels, but, in general, these distinctions remain valid as mental constructs with which we may subdivide war for the purpose of discussion, decipher the news, and deconstruct the candidates' statements. The lines between these divisions may blur along the boundaries; this is to be expected.

 The separation between tactical and strategic warfare might become confused because these lines depend upon numerous factors, such as forces in theater and the geographic scale of the theater itself. Yet for our purposes, these divisions serve as an adequate starting point.
 
Now, for some examples of how terms like "Strategy" can be misused.
 
Donald Trump is often cited by journalists for having an ISIS "Strategy." But what you see, when you look at any of his actual statements, is not a "Strategy" linking Ends, Ways, and Means, but instead a grocery list of things that he thinks should be done. Most of it is quite tactical in nature. A grocery list of military buzzwords does not a strategy make.

 Journalists should know better, because words mean things.
 
Jeb Bush is even more egregious in that he himself uses the word "Strategy" over and over again, without apparently any actual idea about what the term might mean. Here you see him decrying the current President for a "lack of strategy" without ever actually explaining what he means, either in his critique or in his use of the term. Straight from Fox and Friends:
"What I would do is to do what I proposed two months ago at the Reagan Library, which is to defeat ISIS, and to defeat Assad, to bring stability because it's in our national security interest to do it…We don't have a strategy right now. This president is incrementally getting us into a quagmire without having a strategy to defeat ISIS."
We could go on, but now at least you have some ammo of your own to help you knock down the easy targets.
 
 

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STRATEGY : List of Military Strategies and Concepts

SOURCE:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_strategies_and_concepts










      List of Military Strategies and Concepts
Main article: Military strategy
 
 
 
 
               CLICK  THE  LETTERING IN
 
                         INK BLUE
 
      TO OPEN FURTHER REFERENCES ON
 
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Part of a series about
 
War
This article is a list of military strategies and concepts that are commonly recognized and referenced. Military strategies are methods of arranging and maneuvering large bodies of military forces during armed conflicts.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

 [hide] 
 

Offensive strategies[edit]

  • Air superiority – Essential to a successful air campaign. It is achieved by 1) mastery of the air, 2) attacking the means of production, 3) maintain battle ourselves, 4) prevent the enemy from battle
  • Attrition warfare – A strategy of wearing down the enemy to the point of collapse through continuous loss of personnel and material. Used to defeat enemies with low resources and high morale.
  • Bait and bleed – to induce rival states to engage in a protracted war of attrition against each other "so that they bleed each other white", similar to the concept of divide and conquer
  • Battle of annihilation – The goal of destroying the enemy military in a single planned pivotal battle
  • Bellum se ipsum alet – A strategy of feeding and supporting an army with the potentials of occupied territories
  • Blitzkrieg – An attack that uses concentrated force and rapid speed to break through enemy lines, named after the German World War II strategy meaning Lightning War
  • Blockade / Siege / Investment – An attempt to cut off food, supplies, war material or communications from a particular area by force, usually taking place by sea
  • Clear and hold – A counter-insurgency strategy
  • Coercion – Compelling the enemy to involuntarily behave in a certain way by targeting the leadership, national communications, or political-economic centers
  • Command of the sea – The naval equivalent of air superiority
  • Counter-offensive – A strategic offensive taking place after the enemy's front line troops and reserves have been exhausted, and before the enemy has had the opportunity to assume new defensive positions. Tactic is usually implemented through surging at the enemy after their attack.
  • Counterforce – A strategy used in nuclear warfare of targeting military infrastructure (as opposed to civilian targets)
  • Countervalue – The opposite of counterforce; targeting of enemy cities and civilian populations. Used to distract the enemy.
  • Decapitation – Achieving strategic paralysis by targeting political leadership, command and control, strategic weapons, and critical economic nodes
  • Deception – A strategy that seeks to deceive, trick, or fool the enemy and create a false perception in a way that can be leveraged for a military advantage
  • Denial – A strategy that seeks to destroy the enemy's ability to wage war
  • Distraction – An attack by some of the force on one or two flanks, drawing up to a strong frontal attack by the rest of the force
  • Encirclement – Both a strategy and tactic designed to isolate and surround enemy forces
  • Ends, Ways, Means, Risk – Strategy is much like a three legged stool of ends, ways, means balanced on a plane of varying degree of risk
  • Enkulette – A strategy used often in the jungle that aims at attacking the enemy from behind.
  • Exhaustion – A strategy that seeks to erode the will or resources of a country
  • Feint – To draw attention to another point of the battle where little or nothing is going on
  • Flanking maneuver – Involves attacking the opponent from the side, or rear
  • Guerrilla tactics – Involves ambushes on enemy troops. Usually used by insurgency.
  • Heavy force – A counterinsurgency strategy that seeks to destroy an insurgency with overwhelming force while it is still in a manageable state
  • Human wave attack – An unprotected frontal attack where the attacker tries to move as many combatants as possible into engaging close range combat with the defender
  • Incentive – A strategy that uses incentives to gain cooperation
  • Indirect approach – Dislocation is the aim of strategy. Direct attacks almost never work, one must first upset the enemy's equilibrium, fix weakness and attack strength, Seven rules of strategy: 1) adjust your ends to your means, 2) keep your object always in mind, 3) choose the line of the least expectation, 4) exploit the line of least resistance, 5) take the line of operations which offers the most alternatives, 6) ensure both plans and dispositions are flexible, 7) do not throw your weight into an opponent while he is on guard, 8) do not renew an attack along the same lines if an attack has failed
  • Interior lines – Placing ones forces in between the enemy forces and attacking each in turn in order to allow ones forces to have better communications and allows one to mass all of ones forces against a part of the enemies
  • Limited war – A war in which the survival of a nation is not at stake
  • Penetration – A direct attack through enemy lines, then an attack on the rear once through
  • Periclean strategy – The two basic principles of the "Periclean Grand Strategy" were the rejection of appeasement (in accordance with which he urged the Athenians not to revoke the Megarian Decree) and the avoidance of overextension
  • Persisting strategy – A strategy that seeks to destroy the means by which the enemy sustains itself
  • Pincer ambush – A "U"-shaped attack with the sides concealed and the middle held back until the enemy advances, at which point the concealed sides ambush them
  • Pincer maneuver – Allowing the enemy to attack the center, sometimes in a charge, then attacking the flanks of the charge
  • Punishment – A strategy that seeks to push a society beyond its economic and physiological breaking point
  • Rapid Decisive Operations – Compelling the adversary to undertake certain actions or denying the adversary the ability to coerce or attack others.
  • Raiding – Attacking with the purpose of removing the enemy's supply or provisions
  • Refusing the flank – Putting the minimal number of troops required to hold out against the enemy's attack while the rest of the military launches a counterattack through the enemy's flank
  • Separation of insurgents – A counterinsurgency strategy should first seek to separate the enemy from the population, then deny the enemy reentry, and finally execute long enough to deny the insurgent access
  • Scorpion attack – A pincer attack that is supplemented by an air strike
  • Shape, Clear, Hold, Build – The counterinsurgency theory that states the process of winning and insurgency is shape, clear, hold, build
  • Siege – Continuous attack by bombardment on a fortified position, usually by artillery
  • Shock and awe – A military doctrine using overwhelming power to try and achieve rapid dominance over the enemy
  • Swarming – Military swarming involves the use of a decentralized force against an opponent, in a manner that emphasizes mobility, communication, unit autonomy and coordination/synchronization.
  • Theater strategy – Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power
  • Total war – War in which a nation's survival is at stake
  • Troop surge – deploying a large number of troops into theatre in order to overcome resistance
  • Turning maneuver – An attack that penetrates the enemy's flank, then curls into its rear to cut it off from home
  • Win without fighting – Sun Tzu argued that a brilliant general was one that could win without fighting

Defensive strategies[edit]

Strategic concepts[edit]

  • Center of gravity (military) – The hub of all power and movement on which everything depends, the point at which all energies should be directed
  • Decisive point – A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack
  • DIME(FIL) – The elements of national power diplomacy, information, military, and economics, often included are financial, intelligence, and law enforcement see MIDLIFE
  • Expediency – War is a matter of expedients – von Moltke
  • Fog, friction, chance – War is characterized by fog, friction, and chance
  • Golden Bridge – To leave an opponent an opportunity to withdraw in order to not force them to act out of desperation – Sun Tzu
  • Iron Calculus of War – Resistance = Means x Will – Clausewitz
  • MIDLIFE – The elements of national power diplomacy, information, military, and economics, often included are financial, intelligence, and law enforcement, see DIME(FIL)
  • Moral ascendancy – Moral force is the trump card for any military event because as events change the human elements of war remain unchanged – Du Piq
  • OODA loop – Decision-making occurs in a recurring cycle of observe-orient-decide-act. An entity (whether an individual or an organization) that can process this cycle quickly, observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby "get inside" the opponent's decision cycle and gain the advantage – Boyd
  • Paradoxical nature – The nature of strategy is a paradoxical and does not follow a linear pattern – Luttwak
  • Positive ends – The possibility of taking advantage of a new security environment to create conditions for long-term peace – Wass de Czege
  • Primary Trinity – (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war's element of subordination to rational policy – Clausewitz
  • Principles of war:
    • Objective (Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective)
    • Offensive (Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative)
    • Mass (Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time)
    • Economy of Force (Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts)
    • Maneuver (place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power)
    • Unity of Command (For every Objective, ensure Unity of effort under one responsible commander)
    • Security (Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage)
    • Surprise (Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared)
    • Simplicity (Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding) – US Army FM 3.0
  • Systems approach – Nation-states operate like biological organisms composed of discrete systems. These systems included: leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and the military – Warden
  • Tipping point – The point at which "the momentum for change becomes unstoppable." – Gladwell
  • VUCA – Volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity characterize the strategic environment – U.S. Army War College
  • Weinberger-Powell Doctrine – A list of questions have to be answered affirmatively before military action is taken by the United States:
    • Is a vital national security interest threatened?
    • Do we have a clear attainable objective?
    • Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
    • Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
    • Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
    • Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
    • Is the action supported by the American people?
    • Do we have genuine broad international support?

See also[edit]

References[edit]

Notes

External links[edit]

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