Thursday, August 18, 2016

STRATEGY : List of Military Strategies and Concepts

SOURCE:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_military_strategies_and_concepts










      List of Military Strategies and Concepts
Main article: Military strategy
 
 
 
 
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This article is a list of military strategies and concepts that are commonly recognized and referenced. Military strategies are methods of arranging and maneuvering large bodies of military forces during armed conflicts.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Contents

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Offensive strategies[edit]

  • Air superiority – Essential to a successful air campaign. It is achieved by 1) mastery of the air, 2) attacking the means of production, 3) maintain battle ourselves, 4) prevent the enemy from battle
  • Attrition warfare – A strategy of wearing down the enemy to the point of collapse through continuous loss of personnel and material. Used to defeat enemies with low resources and high morale.
  • Bait and bleed – to induce rival states to engage in a protracted war of attrition against each other "so that they bleed each other white", similar to the concept of divide and conquer
  • Battle of annihilation – The goal of destroying the enemy military in a single planned pivotal battle
  • Bellum se ipsum alet – A strategy of feeding and supporting an army with the potentials of occupied territories
  • Blitzkrieg – An attack that uses concentrated force and rapid speed to break through enemy lines, named after the German World War II strategy meaning Lightning War
  • Blockade / Siege / Investment – An attempt to cut off food, supplies, war material or communications from a particular area by force, usually taking place by sea
  • Clear and hold – A counter-insurgency strategy
  • Coercion – Compelling the enemy to involuntarily behave in a certain way by targeting the leadership, national communications, or political-economic centers
  • Command of the sea – The naval equivalent of air superiority
  • Counter-offensive – A strategic offensive taking place after the enemy's front line troops and reserves have been exhausted, and before the enemy has had the opportunity to assume new defensive positions. Tactic is usually implemented through surging at the enemy after their attack.
  • Counterforce – A strategy used in nuclear warfare of targeting military infrastructure (as opposed to civilian targets)
  • Countervalue – The opposite of counterforce; targeting of enemy cities and civilian populations. Used to distract the enemy.
  • Decapitation – Achieving strategic paralysis by targeting political leadership, command and control, strategic weapons, and critical economic nodes
  • Deception – A strategy that seeks to deceive, trick, or fool the enemy and create a false perception in a way that can be leveraged for a military advantage
  • Denial – A strategy that seeks to destroy the enemy's ability to wage war
  • Distraction – An attack by some of the force on one or two flanks, drawing up to a strong frontal attack by the rest of the force
  • Encirclement – Both a strategy and tactic designed to isolate and surround enemy forces
  • Ends, Ways, Means, Risk – Strategy is much like a three legged stool of ends, ways, means balanced on a plane of varying degree of risk
  • Enkulette – A strategy used often in the jungle that aims at attacking the enemy from behind.
  • Exhaustion – A strategy that seeks to erode the will or resources of a country
  • Feint – To draw attention to another point of the battle where little or nothing is going on
  • Flanking maneuver – Involves attacking the opponent from the side, or rear
  • Guerrilla tactics – Involves ambushes on enemy troops. Usually used by insurgency.
  • Heavy force – A counterinsurgency strategy that seeks to destroy an insurgency with overwhelming force while it is still in a manageable state
  • Human wave attack – An unprotected frontal attack where the attacker tries to move as many combatants as possible into engaging close range combat with the defender
  • Incentive – A strategy that uses incentives to gain cooperation
  • Indirect approach – Dislocation is the aim of strategy. Direct attacks almost never work, one must first upset the enemy's equilibrium, fix weakness and attack strength, Seven rules of strategy: 1) adjust your ends to your means, 2) keep your object always in mind, 3) choose the line of the least expectation, 4) exploit the line of least resistance, 5) take the line of operations which offers the most alternatives, 6) ensure both plans and dispositions are flexible, 7) do not throw your weight into an opponent while he is on guard, 8) do not renew an attack along the same lines if an attack has failed
  • Interior lines – Placing ones forces in between the enemy forces and attacking each in turn in order to allow ones forces to have better communications and allows one to mass all of ones forces against a part of the enemies
  • Limited war – A war in which the survival of a nation is not at stake
  • Penetration – A direct attack through enemy lines, then an attack on the rear once through
  • Periclean strategy – The two basic principles of the "Periclean Grand Strategy" were the rejection of appeasement (in accordance with which he urged the Athenians not to revoke the Megarian Decree) and the avoidance of overextension
  • Persisting strategy – A strategy that seeks to destroy the means by which the enemy sustains itself
  • Pincer ambush – A "U"-shaped attack with the sides concealed and the middle held back until the enemy advances, at which point the concealed sides ambush them
  • Pincer maneuver – Allowing the enemy to attack the center, sometimes in a charge, then attacking the flanks of the charge
  • Punishment – A strategy that seeks to push a society beyond its economic and physiological breaking point
  • Rapid Decisive Operations – Compelling the adversary to undertake certain actions or denying the adversary the ability to coerce or attack others.
  • Raiding – Attacking with the purpose of removing the enemy's supply or provisions
  • Refusing the flank – Putting the minimal number of troops required to hold out against the enemy's attack while the rest of the military launches a counterattack through the enemy's flank
  • Separation of insurgents – A counterinsurgency strategy should first seek to separate the enemy from the population, then deny the enemy reentry, and finally execute long enough to deny the insurgent access
  • Scorpion attack – A pincer attack that is supplemented by an air strike
  • Shape, Clear, Hold, Build – The counterinsurgency theory that states the process of winning and insurgency is shape, clear, hold, build
  • Siege – Continuous attack by bombardment on a fortified position, usually by artillery
  • Shock and awe – A military doctrine using overwhelming power to try and achieve rapid dominance over the enemy
  • Swarming – Military swarming involves the use of a decentralized force against an opponent, in a manner that emphasizes mobility, communication, unit autonomy and coordination/synchronization.
  • Theater strategy – Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power
  • Total war – War in which a nation's survival is at stake
  • Troop surge – deploying a large number of troops into theatre in order to overcome resistance
  • Turning maneuver – An attack that penetrates the enemy's flank, then curls into its rear to cut it off from home
  • Win without fightingSun Tzu argued that a brilliant general was one that could win without fighting

Defensive strategies[edit]

Strategic concepts[edit]

  • Center of gravity (military) – The hub of all power and movement on which everything depends, the point at which all energies should be directed
  • Decisive point – A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack
  • DIME(FIL) – The elements of national power diplomacy, information, military, and economics, often included are financial, intelligence, and law enforcement see MIDLIFE
  • Expediency – War is a matter of expedients – von Moltke
  • Fog, friction, chance – War is characterized by fog, friction, and chance
  • Golden Bridge – To leave an opponent an opportunity to withdraw in order to not force them to act out of desperation – Sun Tzu
  • Iron Calculus of War – Resistance = Means x Will – Clausewitz
  • MIDLIFE – The elements of national power diplomacy, information, military, and economics, often included are financial, intelligence, and law enforcement, see DIME(FIL)
  • Moral ascendancy – Moral force is the trump card for any military event because as events change the human elements of war remain unchanged – Du Piq
  • OODA loop – Decision-making occurs in a recurring cycle of observe-orient-decide-act. An entity (whether an individual or an organization) that can process this cycle quickly, observing and reacting to unfolding events more rapidly than an opponent, can thereby "get inside" the opponent's decision cycle and gain the advantage – Boyd
  • Paradoxical nature – The nature of strategy is a paradoxical and does not follow a linear pattern – Luttwak
  • Positive ends – The possibility of taking advantage of a new security environment to create conditions for long-term peace – Wass de Czege
  • Primary Trinity – (1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war's element of subordination to rational policy – Clausewitz
  • Principles of war:
    • Objective (Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective)
    • Offensive (Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative)
    • Mass (Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time)
    • Economy of Force (Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts)
    • Maneuver (place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power)
    • Unity of Command (For every Objective, ensure Unity of effort under one responsible commander)
    • Security (Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage)
    • Surprise (Strike the enemy at a time, at a place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared)
    • Simplicity (Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding) – US Army FM 3.0
  • Systems approach – Nation-states operate like biological organisms composed of discrete systems. These systems included: leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and the military – Warden
  • Tipping point – The point at which "the momentum for change becomes unstoppable." – Gladwell
  • VUCA – Volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity characterize the strategic environment – U.S. Army War College
  • Weinberger-Powell Doctrine – A list of questions have to be answered affirmatively before military action is taken by the United States:
    • Is a vital national security interest threatened?
    • Do we have a clear attainable objective?
    • Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
    • Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
    • Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
    • Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
    • Is the action supported by the American people?
    • Do we have genuine broad international support?

See also[edit]

References[edit]

Notes

External links[edit]

SARASWATI: Before the Pharaohs: Fresh Scientific Evidence Should make us Question earlier views about the Indus Valley Civilisation

SOURCE:
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/academic-interest/before-the-pharaohs-fresh-scientific-evidence-should-make-us-question-earlier-views-about-the-indus-valley-civilization/


                                         PROJECT SARASWATI

Before the Pharaohs: Fresh Scientific Evidence       Should make us Question earlier views                   the Indus Valley Civilisation

           in Academic Interest
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 6, 2016.
 
It often takes outsiders to shake things up. Indian cricket’s first match-fixing scandal, which broke in 1997, was exposed not by sports reporters but by political journalists who wrote the first big cover story on crooked players. In much the same way, a new study funded by an IIT Kharagpur grant which brought together a geologist, a palaeoscientist and physicists from four scientific institutions to work on the excavations of a now-deceased ASI archaeologist, has found that the Indus Valley Civilisation was at least 8,000 years old, and not around 5,000 years old as previously believed.


In their evidence, published in Nature – the world’s most highly-cited interdisciplinary science journal – and using the ‘optically stimulated luminescence’ method on ancient pottery shards, is correct then it substantially pushes back the beginnings of ancient Indian civilisation. It proves that it took root well before the heyday of the pharaohs of Egypt (7000-3000 BC) or the Mesopotamian civilisation (6500-3100 BC) in the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates.

The researchers have also found evidence of a pre-Harappan civilisation that existed for at least a thousand years before this, which may force a global rethink on the generally accepted timelines of so-called ‘cradles of civilisation’.


This is a quantum leap. The scientists are not just shifting a few years here and there. Their claim pushes back the mature phase of the Indus Valley Civilisation (with significant remains in Harappa and Mohenjo Daro in modern Pakistan and Dholavira in Gujarat) from its current dating of 2600-1700 BC to 8000-2000 BC and the pre-Harappan phase to 9000-8000 BC. This demands a fundamental rethink of old assumptions about Indian civilisation’s antiquity and reopens the debate on whether Aryans were the original inhabitants of the Indus Valley Civilisation.


Right from Arya Samaj founder Swami Dayanand Saraswati, to B R Ambedkar who rejected the idea of an ancient Aryan invasion as “absurd”, the Aryan question has been a lightning rod in debates over Indian identity. The Aryan invasion theory originated with William Jones, who postulated in 1786 that Sanskrit and other ancient languages were part of an Indo-European language family which must have had a common source, the subsequent identification in 1816 of a separate Dravidian language family and finally the discovery of the Indus Valley Civilisation by John Marshall in 1924.
The huge gap between the standard historical dating of 1500 BC for Rig Veda (though Bal Gangadhar Tilak used astrological evidence to argue for 4500 BC) and the much older physical remains of the Indus Valley drastically complicated the Indian story. That gap has now grown much wider and the questions it raises are even bigger.
 
[ Making a note of the distinction between LANGUAGE & SCRIPT, the script, early   Devnagri  in which VEDAs are written are neither Indo-European or Dravidian but its origin lies in Ethopian roots  where as language of vedas is early Sanskrit & it is a indigenous- Vasundhra ]
 
 
 
The standard academic view so far, accepted in textbooks, is that Aryans were immigrants to India, entering around 1500 BC. The alternative view – that they were indigenous creators of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro – has often been scorned by traditional academics because this argument is also appropriated by the Hindu right wing.

On current evidence, both theories are inadequate. The standard view itself has changed from a theory of white-skinned Aryan invaders who subjugated dark-skinned locals to a notion of slow Aryan migration and diffusion over centuries. The invader theory was essentially based on a racial reading by colonial scholars like Friedrich Max Mueller, who thought the Rig Veda used racial terms for Aryans as having beautiful noses (susipra); and depicted their enemies, dasas, as nose-less or bull-nosed (vrsasipra). Language experts later showed this was a wrong reading


[ Note: It takes 10,000(Ten thousand) years for a race to become black from white or vice versa. Even if Aryans were white in these 5000 yrs of Harappa they both, black or white would have become brown - Vasundhra ]







The standard academic view so far, accepted in textbooks, is that Aryans were immigrants to India, entering around 1500 BC. The alternative view – that they were indigenous creators of Harappa and Mohenjo Daro – has often been scorned by traditional academics because this argument is also appropriated by the Hindu right wing.

On current evidence, both theories are inadequate. The standard view itself has changed from a theory of white-skinned Aryan invaders who subjugated dark-skinned locals to a notion of slow Aryan migration and diffusion over centuries. The invader theory was essentially based on a racial reading by colonial scholars like Friedrich Max Mueller, who thought the Rig Veda used racial terms for Aryans as having beautiful noses (susipra); and depicted their enemies, dasas, as nose-less or bull-nosed (vrsasipra). Language experts later showed this was a wrong reading.


Circumstantial evidence on which the Vedic “Indra stood accused” as the destroyer of Harappa simply because the archaeologist Mortimer Wheeler found a few skeletons there in 1946 and Rig Veda talked of Indra as the destroyer of forts (purandra) was debunked long ago. In 1964, the American George F Dales found that only two Harappan skeletons showed evidence of a massacre.




Just as Galileo changed the centuries old wrong understanding of the earth as the centre of the universe, new evidence should make us question old beliefs. Thomas Trautmann, who used mathematical modelling to date the Arthashastra, has pointed out gaps in both theories. The only reason why the standard one is still considered standard is because it came first and the “burden of proof must be on the shoulders of those who are urging us to abandon the standard view”. This is just semantics. If facts show either idea could be plausible, so be it



In fact, there are a number of historical continuities such as prototype Shiva figures between Harappans and Aryans and cultural gaps are not as wide as previously thought. Even the absence of the horse, despite silly attempts to fake evidence, may not be unsurmountable. Horse-bones from Surkotda, for example, were identified as such by the late Sandor Bokonyi, one of the world’s leading archaeo-zoologists. We must step away from ideological hardlines of left and right for an objective reassessment.

Why should this matter?

Whether Indians were the world’s first civilised nation or whether Aryans were indigenous is, of course, irrelevant to modern challenges. It does nothing for those struggling with drought or mired in deep poverty. The past may be irrelevant as a guide to the present. Yet the past has always cast a shadow on Indian politics, from Jyotiba Phule who argued that adivasis were the original Indians to the Ramjanmabhoomi movement today. To the extent that myth making remains a political pastime, it matters. Relying on received wisdoms is self-defeating.

See full Times of India video chat on the new Indus Valley evidence here