Sunday, September 25, 2016

SAMPLE 'Q' PAPER FOR INDIAN NETAS TO QUALIFY FOR GETTING A TICKET TO PARLIAMENT

SOURCE :https://outlook.live.com/owa/?path=/mail/inbox/rp

SAMPLE 'Q' PAPER FOR INDIAN NETAS TO QUALIFY FOR GETTING A TICKET TO PARLIAMENT

AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES EVEN BABUS SHOULD ALSO PERIOICALLY APPEAR FOR SUCH TESTS TO QUALIFY FOR THEIR PROMOTIONS & TO QUALIFY FOR NFFU

IF IN ARMED FORCES PROMOTIONS IS SUBJECT TO QUALIFYING IN VARIOUS PROMOTIONS TESTS THAN WHY NOT FOR BABUS

EVEN THE PRESEDENTIAL CANDIDATES IN USA HAS TO FACE SUCH SCRUTINY THAN WHY NOT BABUS & NETAS IN OUR COUNTRY

Presidential Debates Primer

With the U.S. Presidential elections less than two months away, the campaign is heating up. On Monday night, September 26, the first of three presidential debates will take place. Together, this series of debates will provide the opportunity for candidates, side by side, to outline their positions on an array of domestic and foreign policy issues that the incoming President will need to address. In anticipation, The Jamestown Foundation presents our Presidential Debates Primer, a curated selection of Jamestown publications focusing on some of the most crucial foreign policy and international security issues of strategic importance to the United States. This backgrounder is intended to lend deeper insight into the many topics likely to be raised on the debate stage as well as highlight the important issues that may be overlooked.

Russia, Eurasia, NATO

Russian Military Resists Proposed Budget Cuts, Prepares for Major Ground War
Pavel Felgenhauer (September 15, 2016)

NATO’s New Force Posture in the Baltic Region: Pluses and Minuses
Vladimir Socor (August 3, 2016)

Hot Issue – Lies, Damned Lies and Russian Disinformation
Paul Goble (August 13, 2014)

A Flank Strategy for Containing a Declining Russia: S. Enders Wimbush’s Prepared Remarks for Eurasian Disunion Book Launch Event
S. Enders Wimbush (September 6, 2016)

Asia-Pacific

China’s Blueprint for Sea Power
Andrew Erickson (July 6, 2016)

China’s Evolving Perspectives on Network Warfare: Lessons from the Science of Military Strategy
Joe McReynolds (April 16, 2015)

Chinese Signaling in the South China Sea
Peter Wood (April 21, 2016)

Addressing Rising Business Risk in China
Matthew Brazil (May 11, 2016)

War in Syria & Global Terrorism

Russian Intervention in Syria
Pavel K. Baev (December 17, 2015)

Syria’s Conflict: Managing Turkey’s Intervention
James Pothecary (September 16, 2016)

Latest Kerry-Lavrov Deal on Syria Destined to Unravel
Pavel K. Baev (September 12, 2016)

Islamic State’s Iraq ‘Caliphate’ on the Brink of Defeat
Wladimir van Wilgenberg (July 22, 2015)

Hot Issue – Recent Attacks Illuminate the Islamic State’s Europe Attack Network
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Nathaniel Barr (April 27, 2016)

Hot Issue – How DAESH’s Lone Wolf Guidance Increases the Group’s Threat to the United States
Michael W. S. Ryan (November 24, 2015)

A New Threat to Libya’s Stability Emerges
Nathaniel Barr, Madeleine Blackman (August 5, 2016)

Taliban Victories in Helmand Province Prove Test for Afghan Government
Abubakar Siddique (June 13, 2016)

FOREIGN JET-FIGHTER MAKERS WOO INDIA

SOURCE :https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fplQlClCuVM

FOREIGN JET-FIGHTER MAKERS WOO INDIA

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fplQlClCuVM ]

Daniel Stacey

39 COMMENTS

NEW DELHI—India is being offered blueprints to advanced combat aircraft by the world’s aerospace companies, a move unthinkable even a decade ago, as New Delhi gets ready to place another multibillion-dollar air force order.
India’s aging military jet fleet desperately needs an upgrade, which analysts say may spur it to place an order worth more than $10 billion in the next year. Hoping for an edge, and encouraged by a recent law that allows 100% foreign ownership of local defense firms, jet-fighter makers such as Lockheed Martin Corp. LMT -0.32 % , Boeing Co. BA -0.07 % and Saab SAABF -4.92 % AB are rushing in with offers to set up production lines to India.

Efforts to give India unprecedented access to jet fighter know-how illustrate the country’s rising importance to the West as China’s power increases, analysts say.

India, until a decade ago, was trying stubbornly to build its own jets, after the U.S. and Japan imposed sanctions following its nuclear tests in 1998, which broke U.S. nonproliferation laws and sparked tensions with Pakistan. U.S. companies were blocked from giving India the technology it needed.

Relations between India and the U.S. have improved since, as both share a goal to contain China’s military. India has struck deals with the U.S. to buy everything from Apache helicopters to transport planes and artillery, lifting the country to India’s second-biggest defense trading partner behind Russia."China’s rise has changed the equation,” said Pushan Das, a fellow with the Observer Research Foundation, a policy think tank based in New Delhi. Industry experts estimate India needs over 300 new combat jets in the next 15 years. It could be a while before a deal is struck. Successful bidders also face the challenge of setting up a jet-manufacturing system from scratch. Previous such attempts have failed.
A deal struck in 2012 with France’s Dassault Aviation SA AM -0.88 % to build Rafale fighters in India fell through last year following disagreements, and was replaced with a smaller plan to import 36 jets. That plan finally was approved by India’s government, and an agreement was signed on Friday.
Similarly, efforts to co-develop a next generation fighter with Russia’s Sukhoi stalled over cost disputes, while a third indigenous jet program aiming to deliver 120 light combat aircraft is behind schedule.
Those programs relied on state-run Hindustan Aeronautics to build and design jets. Defense experts say the company faces a skills shortage as its best engineers are spread thinly across projects that include retrofitting old Russian and French jet fighters and building helicopters and drones. The company didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Impatient with the delays, India relaxed foreign investment laws and defense procurement rules to kick-start a privately managed jet-fighter industry as its air force struggles to keep its aging fighter fleet in the sky, including MiG-21 jets bought in the 1960s. Since then, U.S. manufacturers Lockheed and Boeing, and Sweden’s Saab, have proposed building jets with Indian partners.
The U.S. hasn’t sold jet fighters to India before, with India’s air force preferring European and Russian manufacturers.
Lockheed also has proposed moving its F-16 production line in Fort Worth, Texas, to India, and training more than 5,000 locals. Its bid also is critical to strengthening military cooperation between the U.S. and India, said Abhay Paranjape, Lockheed’s director of business development in India.
“If you ever want to fight together, you need to train together, and to do that you need to fly the same kind of aircraft,” Mr. Paranjape said. U.S. industry officials said per-unit costs could drop by as much as 20% in India compared with the U.S., potentially driving fresh sales outside India.
Still, it could take Lockheed roughly four years to transfer the Fort Worth F-16 line, which is slated for closure soon when remaining orders for the aging jet type tail off, industry officials said.
A logistics-sharing treaty, signed last month, is the first of three agreements the U.S. wants India to sign to allow for a greater transfer of U.S. military technology, potentially strengthening Lockheed and Boeing’s bids to sell jets in India.
Boeing’s India President Pratyush Kumar said it was aiming to help India build F/A-18 fighters and develop jets in the long term.
Saab’s plan would have it build a second manufacturing plant in Sweden for its Gripen E jet type, train Indian technicians there, and then dismantle and ship the plant to India, said its Indian country head Jan Widerström. Saab hopes to gain an advantage by offering the blueprints for the Gripen’s advanced radar system, Mr. Widerström said.
Saab and its suppliers could help train 20,000 local technicians in coming years if their bid is successful, and build anywhere from 100 to 200 jets for the Indian air force and export customers in places such as Thailand and Malaysia, said Mr. Widerström.
“We’re offering to set up aerospace capability in India for the next 100 years,” he said.

—Doug Cameron contributed to this article.

Published on Sep 25, 2016

CONGRESS ATTACKS BJP FOR
BUYING ONLY 36 Rafale JETS.
New Delhi: The Congress on Saturday attacked the BJP-led central government for buying only 36 Rafale fighter jets from France instead of the 126 finalised during the UPA era, saying the situation for the Indian Air Force (IAF) was becoming "critical and volatile".

"During the UPA (United Progressive Alliance), we had planned to buy 126 aircraft to strengthen the IAF. Now that has been reduced to 36 aircraft," Congress leader AK Antony told reporters here.

"As per IAF, 126 was the minimum requirement for their urgent operational requirements," Antony said.

"Sanctioned strength of fighter jets in the IAF is 42 squadrons, and of late, the situation was becoming critical and volatile. The IAF needs more squadrons, current availability of fighter jets is 32 squadrons and by 2022 this will reduce to 25," the former Defence Minister said.

"What is the government`s plan? How will they bridge the gap with respect to China and Pakistan, who are building up their air strength?" Antony asked.

The Congress leader`s remarks come a day after India signed a 7.87 billion euros (about Rs 59,000 crore) deal with France to buy 36 Rafale fighter jets that will meet the IAF`s critical operational requirement for a multi-role combat aircraft and enhance its strategic reach, especially in Pakistan`s context.

"Today we read inspired pieces in some media, which claim the present government has saved money by hard negotiations. That`s not true," Antony said.

"The UPA government was not able to enter into a final contract. Price negotiations were going on," he added.

Citing the complaints of several leaders regarding the high price of Rafale jets, the Congress leader said, "That time I received series of complaints from many responsible quarters including former Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha about the price."

"They said, the price is `highly escalated and inflated, even cost is very high, exorbitantly high` and so on. When I got these complaints I asked the ministry that they will finalise the contract only after all complaints are thoroughly examined," Antony added.

"I said this complaint about `life cycle cost` from very senior politicians should be thoroughly examined by Finance Ministry before we sign contract"," the Congress leader argued.

"When there was a complaint about high prices we decided to inquire and wait for the final decision of Finance Ministry," he said, adding, "So you can`t compare the Rafale deal price during UPA government`s time and now. This spreading of inspired news is not correct."

Antony also said that he did not want to comment on the present price before he knew the exact details. He also requested the government to publish the details of the final contract.

India had decided to ink the deal for 126 Rafale jets in 2012. The deal was estimated to cost $10.2 billion and the plan was to acquire 18 aircraft in fly-away condition and manufacture the rest in India.

However, during Modi`s visit to France in April 2015, India conveyed that it would like to acquire 36 Rafale jets in fly-away condition as quickly as possible in view of the IAF`s critical operational necessity for the multi-role combat aircraft.

Commenting on comparing the price of the deal, the Congress leader said, "There is absolutely no basis in comparing price during UPA`s time and present price because the contract had not been finalised then."

Attacking the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government for not considering the technology transfer of the fighter jets, Antony said, "We had said we will purchase only 18 from France, off-the-shelf and the remaining 108 will be produced in India with HAL (Hindustan Aeronautics Limited)."

"So, the deal was, from abroad - 18 and Make in India - 108. That condition is gone in the present deal. `Make in India` is gone," he alleged.

"In our time there was a provision that technology transfer is a must. I understand there is no such condition in the present contract," Antony said, adding, "This will cost us very heavily."

NUKES PAKISTAN : A Normal Nuclear Pakistan

SOURCE :
http://www.stimson.org/content/normal-nuclear-pakistan-0

A Normal Nuclear Pakistan

A Normal Nuclear Pakistan

click / GOOGLE URL TO OPEN

PDF]A Normal Nuclear Pakistan - Stimson Center
http://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/NormalNuclearPakistan.pdf

The new report released today
"A Normal Nuclear Pakistan"
takes a hard look at Pakistan’s nuclear weapon related programs and its ambitions to be viewed as a normal state possessing advanced nuclear technologies. Pakistan’s military leadership in Rawalpindi has several choices at this juncture. It can choose to accept success in achieving a “strategic” deterrent against India – a nuclear force posture sufficient to prevent limited nuclear exchanges and a major conventional war. Alternatively, it can choose to continue to compete with India in the pursuit of “full spectrum” deterrence, which would entail open-ended nuclear requirements against targets both near and far from Pakistan. These choices would lead Pakistan to two starkly different nuclear futures and places in the global nuclear order.

NUKES INDO - PAK : How to Reduce South Asia's Nuclear Dangers

SOURCE:
http://thebulletin.org/how-reduce-south-asias-nuclear-dangers

Development and Disarmament Roundtable

What's This?

Experts from emerging and developing countries debate crucial, timely topics related to nuclear energy, nuclear proliferation, and economic development. Each author contributes an essay per round, for a total of nine essays for the entire Roundtable. This feature was made possible by a three-year grant from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.

How to Reduce South Asia's Nuclear Dangers

In the near term, prospects for South Asian nuclear disarmament appear dim. Assuming that nuclear weapons won't soon be eliminated from the subcontinent, what measures are available to India, Pakistan, outside nations, and international organizations that might reduce the risk of a South Asian nuclear exchange?

**************************************************************************

Round 1

13 September 2016

Three concrete steps toward South Asian nuclear stability

Jayita Sarkar

14 September 2016

Time for India and Pakistan to resolve their own crises

Rabia Akhtar

15 September 2016

US involvement is critical for South Asian arms control

Mario E. Carranza

Round 2

23 September 2016

Different kind of crisis, same need for Washington

Jayita Sarkar

**********************************************************************

Round 1

Essay 1 of 4

13 September 2016

Three Concrete Steps toward South Asian Nuclear Stability

Jayita Sarkar

India and Pakistan continuously increase their stockpiles of fissile material. Pakistan possesses battlefield nuclear weapons that it threatens to deploy against India. New Delhi is close to completing deployment of a nuclear triad. Non-state actors in South Asia pose a perpetual threat of gaining access to nuclear weapons or materials. Artillery fire along the India-Pakistan border is frequent.

For all these reasons, the nuclear situation in South Asia demands attention. But with Islamabad and New Delhi unlikely to slow their nuclear weapons development amid the long-standing antagonism and mistrust between the two sides, can anything be done to reduce nuclear risk in the region?

Yes—initiatives of three kinds stand out for their potential to enhance South Asian nuclear stability. First, New Delhi and Islamabad could undertake bilateral cooperation in nuclear security. Second, the two sides could—with international help—seek to improve the region's nuclear cyber security. And India and Pakistan could commit, in one fashion or another, to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Improving nuclear security. An ongoing concern in South Asia is that terrorist groups might gain access to nuclear materials, either to use these materials in attacks or to use them as bargaining chips against either New Delhi or Islamabad.

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative and its Nuclear Security Index, both India and Pakistan do a poor job of safeguarding nuclear materials. But in recent months, both countries have taken some promising steps. Ahead of the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit, which began in March, Islamabad ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. At the summit itself, New Delhi made commitments regarding nuclear smuggling and other issues. And in June, India committed to an important initiative known as the Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation.
Still, India and Pakistan both face risks regarding the security of the nuclear materials within their territories. Cooperative, bilateral mechanisms to tackle these challenges could be beneficial for both sides—but such cooperation is minimal today. What's needed is a framework for nuclear security cooperation that encourages the two sides to share best practices, know-how, and intelligence, and to conduct joint law enforcement drills.

Fortunately, an existing framework for nuclear confidence-building measures could be molded into a bilateral mechanism for improving nuclear security. Unfortunately, confidence-building efforts on the subcontinent are routinely interrupted by terror attacks on Indian soil. The 2008 Mumbai attacks resulted in a suspension of nuclear confidence-building measures for several years, and this year's Pathankot attack has led to an impasse in bilateral talks on a number of issues. It is essential, therefore, that India strategically delink nuclear security from terrorism. Otherwise, consistent progress on nuclear security is unlikely to be achieved.

Enhancing cyber security. The subcontinent faces an urgent need to increase its capability in cyber security. Weak cyber security infrastructure makes both countries' nuclear installations vulnerable—neither India nor Pakistan has in place the robust cyber security measures that their countries' nuclear facilities require. India produced a National Cyber Security Policy in 2013, but it merely set out a broad cyber security vision, without establishing the sort of detailed plans that cybersecurity threats require. Pakistan, meanwhile, passed a cyber security law in August, but the law has more to do with restricting the spread of extremist ideology than with protecting nuclear sites.

Admittedly, it is hard to envision Pakistan and India cooperating on cyber security amid the frequent cyber attacks that flow across the border. Moreover, neither country has the economic wherewithal to make the heavy investments that reliable cyber security infrastructures require. Staying ahead of the latest threat scenarios requires constant upgrades, so cyber security is a very expensive affair. Nonetheless, cyber security on the subcontinent could be improved if the international community, led by the United States, helped ensure that South Asian nuclear facilities are safe from, for example, a Stuxnet-style attack by hackers or terrorist groups. Just last month, India and the United States signed an agreement meant to enhance cooperation between the two countries regarding cyber security best practices and identification of cyber threats. It is the first such framework established by either country; more initiatives of this kind in both India and Pakistan could go a long way toward improving South Asian nuclear cyber security.

Rejecting nuclear tests. Since May 1998, when 11 nuclear explosions shook the subcontinent, neither India nor Pakistan has conducted a nuclear test. On the other hand, neither country has signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

In August, Pakistan made an overture to India, offering to establish a bilateral test-ban treaty that would formalize the two countries' existing voluntary moratoria on testing. This move was strategic to be sure, but also welcome. So far, India has demonstrated little interest in the proposal—even though pursuing it could help New Delhi in its bid for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Indeed, New Delhi's aspirations for membership in key export-control regimes make it essential for India to embrace a new approach to the issue of nuclear testing.

One approach for New Delhi would be to "go French." Under this scenario, New Delhi would behave regarding the CTBT as Paris once behaved regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—that is, formally declining to sign the treaty, but acting like a signatory. This approach would entail several benefits. First, it would formalize New Delhi's existing commitment not to test nuclear weapons and would help dissolve India's image as a "nuclear pariah." This might help New Delhi achieve its long-term aim of gaining membership in export-control groups including the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Second, it wouldn't create pressure within India to conduct additional nuclear tests.Agreeing to sign the CTBT likely would create such pressure, especially in view of claims that India's 1998 test of a thermonuclear device was not complete successful.
Third, adhering to the CTBT without signing it would be compatible with Pakistan's proposal for a bilateral nuclear test ban.

The Indian subcontinent is dominated by nuclear rivals with contested borders and a history of warfare. Therefore the region's security prospects can seem gloomy. But history provides reasons for hope. Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki more than 70 years ago, nuclear weapons have not been used in wartime. When China and the Soviet Union—two nuclear weapon states—engaged in conventional conflict along the Ussuri River in 1969, hostilities did not escalate into a nuclear exchange. If Russia and China, despite their long common border and their sometimes acrimonious relations, can co-exist without launching nuclear weapons, maybe India and Pakistan can do the same. Yet the potential for nuclear warfare in an area fraught with interstate disputes cannot be completely written off. Leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad have tools at their disposal that can help keep nuclear-armed missiles out of the air. Nuclear security, cyber security, and a test ban can chart the path toward a more stable future for South Asia.

Essay 2 of 4

Time for India and Pakistan

to

Resolve their Own Crises

Rabia Akhtar

14 September 2016

For nearly two decades, India and Pakistan have lived constantly under the shadow of nuclear war. In 1999, within a year of becoming nuclear-armed, the two states were embroiled in the Kargil crisis, a conventional conflict in which a limited nuclear exchange seemed a real and very threatening possibility. Each crisis since Kargil has raised a new the threat of nuclear escalation. Thus the subcontinent urgently needs a crisis management system that can prevent rapid escalation from conventional to nuclear war. It's not acceptable simply to hope that no further crises will develop. The two countries have shared a troubled past, and given their protracted conflict over Kashmir and the region's cross-border terrorism, hoping that crises won't occur is essentially dreaming the impossible.

Each nation's behavior toward the other is shaped, to some extent, by confidence-building measures that have been instituted over the years, both before and since nuclearization. But these measures do not prevent crises—nor, crucially, do they help manage them once they begin. And since crises are almost certain to erupt from time to time, the primary focus of nuclear stability efforts in South Asia should be to develop a mechanism for preventing rapid escalation, from conventional to nuclear, when crises do occur.

Too much Uncle Sam. Since nuclearization in 1998, both Pakistan and India have shaped their nuclear arsenals to suit their own strategic needs and outlooks. Each nation has developed its nuclear infrastructure and has continually modernized its nuclear assets and delivery systems. And each has flirted with the idea of limited nuclear war. Amid all this, each has learned how difficult it is to prevent escalation during a crisis.

Indeed, every time a bilateral crisis with nuclear overtones has developed, the United States has been asked to broker peace and practice crisis management. In effect, India and Pakistan have outsourced escalation control to the United States. Washington has ended up as the standard bearer for South Asian crisis stability even though it has no control over the Indian-Pakistani dynamic of deterrence. India and Pakistan's outright reliance on third-party mediation has left the South Asian nations dependent on the strategic mollycoddling of an extra-regional power.

Islamabad and New Delhi, both before crises and during them, face an absolute need for open channels of communication and dialogue. But today, the only available structures are fragile, unstable, and prone to collapse—just witness the "composite dialogue" process that was launched in 2004 but crashed in 2008 after the Mumbai attacks.

The United States, meanwhile, is not certain to remain engaged in future South Asian crises. In fact, some observers of regional escalation dynamics worry that US disengagement could prove highly dangerous—India and Pakistan have never handled crisis dynamics on their own, so what guarantees that they could? I understand this concern. But at the same time, India and Pakistan will never learn to contain nuclear dangers if Washington is always worrying about escalation on behalf of the two countries. The United States should actively encourage the two sides to develop bilateral crisis management mechanisms so that, when the next crisis requires de-escalation, Islamabad and New Delhi can reach out to each other instead of Washington.

The shared responsibility. In 1998, the year of the subcontinent's nuclearization, Pakistan proposed that India join it in an arrangement called the Strategic Restraint Regime. The regime contained three critical, interlocking elements: nuclear restraint, balanced conventional forces, and resolution of disputes. Years have passed, but the regime could still be adapted to contain bilateral crisis management as an essential element of its broader measures for nuclear risk reduction. Unfortunately, India has opposed the regime and has treated its three elements dismissively—arguing that New Delhi's military capabilities and force posture are driven by threat perceptions extending beyond Pakistan.

It's a strange argument. India's deployment of armored formations along the Pakistani border is certainly specific to Pakistan. So is New Delhi's
Cold Start offensive doctrine, which is designed for launching quick military action against Pakistan without crossing Islamabad's nuclear threshold. India may have realized by now how difficult Cold Start would be to execute, operationally speaking. But the damage is done: Cold Start has already provoked Islamabad to develop battlefield nuclear weapons.

India ought to receive in a spirit of magnanimity any proposal that Pakistan makes, whether it's the Strategic Restraint Regime or some means of developing bilateral crisis prevention and management mechanisms. But ever since India went nuclear, it has displayed a great deal of swagger. Sometimes it treats Pakistan as a sort of "nuclear Dalit" (the lowest caste in India)—not worthy of respect and equal treatment at the nuclear table. But responsibility for altering South Asia's strategic dynamic lies as much with India as with Pakistan. The two countries, together, are responsible for regional stability. As long as the two sides fail to recognize the mutuality of their threat perceptions, chances of establishing "mutually assured strategic stability" are dim.

India and Pakistan cannot ignore or wish away geography. The only way toward strategic stability—a shared responsibility, after all—is through dialogue and cooperation.

A final point. Near-term prospects for South Asian nuclear disarmament appear dim. But long-term prospects are no better, unless and until the process of global nuclear disarmament quickens at the top. That is, the recognized nuclear weapon states must start keeping their end of the bargain that underlies the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Though India and Pakistan, through hard work and a willingness to cooperate, may yet achieve nuclear stability on the subcontinent, they cannot achieve global disarmament on their own. That job must start with the largest nuclear powers.

Essay 3 of 4

15 September 2016

US involvement is Critical for South Asian Arms Control

Mario E. Carranza

South Asia's nuclearization has transformed the Indo-Pakistani conflict from a regional matter into a global issue. An exchange of 100 nuclear weapons between the two nations could kill 20 million people within a week and could also reduce global temperatures by 1.3 degrees Celsius, putting up to 2 billion additional people at risk of famine.

Realist scholars have long argued that to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in an Indo-Pakistani war, the two countries must achieve stable nuclear deterrence. Achieving this goal has come to seem increasingly difficult, if not impossible, and recent changes in India and Pakistan's nuclear doctrines and conventional strategies have made nuclear relations even more unstable. For example, the Indian Army's Cold Start doctrine involves quick conventional attacks—launched in retaliation for a terrorist attack by a Pakistan-based jihadi organization and intended not to provoke Pakistan into a first use of nuclear weapons. But Pakistan says it would respond to a Cold Start offensive with low-yield nuclear weapons.

The conventional wisdom is that India maintains a "recessed deterrence posture"—during peacetime, nuclear warheads are not mated with delivery systems and warheads themselves are not fully assembled. According to Debalina Ghoshal of the Delhi Policy Group, recessed deterrence contributes to strategic stability in Indo-Pakistani relations. But according to political scientist Vipin Narang of MIT, the belief that India keeps its nuclear weapons in a disassembled state "is largely now a myth. … [I]t seems likely that all of India's nuclear missile systems will eventually be deployed in a near-ready 'canisterized' state, which is a far cry from the prevailing perception that India maintains its nuclear force in a relatively recessed state.

" Pakistan's nuclear weapons, meanwhile, are apparently ready for use at any time, and authority to use nuclear weapons during military crises with India has reportedly been pre-delegated to Pakistani field commanders since 2000. It's too late now for true recessed deterrence in South Asia, and stable nuclear deterrence is probably impossible on the subcontinent.

The alternatives to stable deterrence are nuclear risk reduction and nuclear arms control. Unfortunately, the two countries have a poor record of implementing confidence-building and risk-reduction measures—and a robust regime for nuclear arms control faces barriers including the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of deep mutual mistrust. The February 1999 Lahore Declaration was an important breakthrough in Indo-Pakistani relations, but the Kargil "mini-war" later that year buried the "Spirit of Lahore." Can that spirit be revived in the era of Prime Ministers Modi and Sharif? Only if the two countries' leaders can overcome the powerful domestic vested interests that support indefinite maintenance of the status quo.

In 2004 India and Pakistan began a peace process known as the "composite dialogue." This process concerned eight baskets of issues, among them Kashmir, terrorism and drug trafficking, confidence building measures, and economic cooperation. The composite dialogue collapsed after the 2008 terrorist attack on Mumbai and the two countries failed to revive it in 2015. Since then, India and Pakistan have been "thinking about the unthinkable," to borrow the phrase of strategist Herman Kahn. That is, both countries have engaged in doctrinal debates on "escalation dominance." This doctrinal competition significantly increases the possibility of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear conflict.

The danger that nuclear weapons will be used in the next Indo-Pakistani war is very real, but the two countries can take meaningful steps back from the brink of Armageddon. They can establish a permanent hotline between their prime ministers and directors-general of military operations. They can begin a serious dialogue on their nuclear doctrines. They can create nuclear risk-reduction centers staffed by officials from both countries. They can agree to inform each other when missiles are moved within their territories for training purposes. And they can sign a cooperative aerial observation accord, patterned on the Open Skies Treaty negotiated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact states at the end of the Cold War.

But whether the South Asian rivals definitively step back from the brink of Armageddon depends on the prospects for sustainable normalization of bilateral relations (even without a formal settlement of the Kashmir dispute). Normalization seems a rather distant prospect today because of persistent mutual mistrust. Also, the Indian leadership apparently lacks political will to make a second "leap of trust" (a phrase associated with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's 1999 trip to Lahore) by reviving the composite dialogue with Pakistan. Therefore it is crucial that the international community—led by the United States—attempt to reduce tensions and establish nuclear arms control on the subcontinent.

Today, three obstacles block the way to establishing a meaningful Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms control regime: lack of proactive US diplomacy; the subcontinent's "perfection of insincerity" (that is, both India and Pakistan often make proposals that they know the other side won't accept); and, in both countries, domestic opposition to solving the nuclear conundrum. In India, domestic opposition can only be overcome by "an Indian Gorbachev." In Pakistan, opposition will only be overcome when the military loses control of the nuclear weapons program.

However, India and Pakistan do not live on a different planet from everyone else. They are vulnerable to external normative constraints, as shown by their compliance with the global moratorium on nuclear testing and by their adherence so far to the "non-use" norm (even if the nuclear taboo is very brittle in South Asia). If the nuclear taboo could be strengthened at the global level, India and Pakistan could be forced to take it more seriously. Specifically, if the United States (as a major norm entrepreneur) foreswore the first use of nuclear weapons, and also pursued a new, proactive policy of promoting nuclear arms control in South Asia, chances of a South Asian nuclear exchange would be reduced.

The United States should completely revise its approach to the nuclear stand-off in South Asia. It should abandon its current policy of siding with India and instead adopt a balanced approach to Indo-Pakistani relations. This would involve improving relations with Pakistan—though it would be a mistake to offer Pakistan a nuclear deal that would make it a mainstream nuclear weapon state. Rather, Washington should reactivate the nuclear nonproliferation norm in South Asia by renegotiating its nuclear deal with India, imposing constraints on India's nuclear weapons program that the Bush administration failed to negotiate.

The United States should also exert diplomatic pressure on both nations to start serious negotiations on nuclear arms control. At a minimum, both India and Pakistan would formally commit to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (after the US Senate ratifies the treaty). Meanwhile, the humanitarian initiative (a movement that essentially seeks a treaty banning nuclear weapons) could play a crucial role in bringing nuclear arms control back into the domestic political arena in both India and Pakistan. Antinuclear nongovernmental organizations, both local and international, could do likewise.

The India-Pakistan nuclear conundrum allows no quick fixes—but time to address the problem may be running out. Now is the moment for forceful US intervention that could help the South Asian rivals create a robust nuclear arms control regime and could save millions from a nuclear Armageddon.

*******************************************************************

Essay 4 of 4

23 September 2016

Different kind of crisis, same need for Washington

Jayita Sarkar

A new South Asian crisis began on September 18 when armed militants attacked an Indian military post in Indian-controlled Kashmir, killing 18 soldiers. Officials in New Delhi quickly voiced suspicion that Islamabad was involved. A war of words broke out. India weighed its strategic options, and Pakistan's defense minister said Islamabad wouldn't hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons if its security were threatened.

Unsurprisingly, both sides sought US involvement in the crisis. New Delhi asked that Islamabad be sanctioned economically for support of terror, and Islamabad sought redress of human rights violations in Indian Kashmir.

The new crisis broke out after this roundtable began publication. Nonetheless, a key issue in Round One was the appropriate level of US involvement in South Asian crises. Rabia Akhtar argued that India and Pakistan must learn to solve crises on their own—instead of relying on "the strategic mollycoddling of an extra-regional power." Mario Carranza wrote that US engagement in South Asia is critical and in fact called for more of it. My views tend to align with Carranza's. In a region where relations between two nuclear-armed adversaries, one of them a fragmented state, are complicated by violent non-state actors, stability demands that the United States continue to be involved.

Not just reacting. In many ways, the current crisis on the subcontinent is similar to previous crises. But two key differences distinguish it from previous iterations.

First, the current crisis occurs at a time of change in Washington's priorities in Asia. It appears that Washington's support for Pakistan as an ally in its "war on terror" could unravel. A bill now before the US Congress would designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism. The Pentagon announced in early August that it would withhold $300 million in military aid from Pakistan because of Islamabad's failure to act against militants who operate in Afghanistan. In the past, despite qualms about the Pakistani government, Washington has generally lent support to Islamabad because it has needed Pakistan's help as an ally, either in the Cold War or during the "war on terror."

Now Washington appears willing to break from this path and establish a new strategic axis in Asia—with the United States, India, Japan, and South Korea countering Russia, China, Pakistan, and North Korea.

Second, the actual use of nuclear weapons in a South Asian crisis appears increasingly likely. Pakistan relies heavily on the "madman theory," Richard Nixon's technique for intimidating an adversary into acquiescence by deliberately appearing irrational. Islamabad has found the madman theory useful both for warding off an Indian conventional military attack—the Pakistani defense minister's recent statement about using tactical nuclear weapons was not the first such claim from Islamabad—and for drawing concessions from the United States. Admittedly, India's large defense expenditures contribute to the tense situation. Moreover, New Delhi is no longer a "reactive power," as many experts once categorized it. In recent years India has increased its support for pro-independence groups in Pakistan's province of Balochistan—hoping to jolt Islamabad, much as Pakistan itself jolts India by supporting separatist groups in Indian Kashmir.

Still, though much is made of India's Cold Start military doctrine, New Delhi's operational capability to carry out the sort of attack envisioned in Cold Start remains unproven. And in any event, New Delhi values its international status as a "responsible power" too much to squander that reputation on a unilateral military action against Islamabad. In contrast, a fractured and diplomatically cornered Pakistani state could all too easily begin a nuclear war.

In Round One I spelled out the reasons that South Asian nuclear stability is so precarious—growing supplies of fissile materials, poor nuclear security, and more. One measure I proposed for reducing tensions was for both sides to adhere, in one form or another, to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. But given the strategic situation on the subcontinent, not to mention the present crisis, a bilateral nuclear test ban appears unlikely. Perhaps a bilateral no-first use agreement is possible instead. If so, it could put an end to the current state of affairs, in which each new subnational attack introduces the risk of a nuclear exchange. Such an agreement, however, will not materialize without effort from the international community. Leadership, naturally, must come from the United States

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Authors

Jayita Sarkar

Jayita Sarkar is a research fellow with the Security Studies Program at MIT's Center for International Studies. Her expertise is in international security, nuclear proliferation, foreign policy analysis, and South Asia. Sarkar's work has appeared in peer-reviewed journals including Cold War History, The International History Review, and Critique internationale and policy-related publications such as The National Interest and Foreign Policy. Sarkar was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. She holds a doctorate in international history and politics from Switzerland's Graduate Institute Geneva.

Rabia Akhtar

Rabia Akhtar is director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Policy Research at Pakistan's Lahore University. She is also an assistant professor at the same university and head of its Integrated Social Sciences Department. She holds a doctorate in security studies from Kansas State University and is a Fulbright alumna. Her doctoral research focused on US nonproliferation policy toward Pakistan during that country's nuclear weapons development, under US administrations from Ford to Clinton, and she is currently writing a book on the same topic.

Mario E. Carranza

Mario E. Carranza is a professor of political science in the Department of History, Political Science, and Philosophy at Texas A&M University-Kingsville. His books include the recently published India-Pakistan Nuclear Diplomacy: Constructivism and the Prospects for Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament in South Asia as well as South Asian Security and International Nuclear Order: Creating a Robust Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Arms Control Regime. His articles on nuclear proliferation in South Asia have appeared in The Nonproliferation Review, Asian Survey, International Politics, and Contemporary Security Policy. He received a doctorate in political science from the University of Chicago in 1987.