Sunday, November 13, 2016

India's 'Surgical Strikes' in Kashmir: Truth or Illusion?

SOURCE:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37702790




India's 'Surgical Strikes' in Kashmir

                          : Truth or Illusion?

  • 23 October 2016
  • From the section India
 
 
 
India's army said its forces attacked on 29 September - but gave few details
 
 
India made headlines in late September after carrying out "surgical strikes" on militants across the de-facto border in disputed Kashmir.
 
 
Days earlier insurgents had attacked an army base in Indian-administered Kashmir, killing 18 soldiers. Tensions spiked as India blamed Pakistan.


Supporters of the Indian government said the army's strikes had taught Pakistan a long-awaited lesson - but Islamabad dismissed the reports as an "illusion". The BBC's M Ilyas Khan visited the border area to find out what actually happened.


CLICK TO READ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What did Indian troops do?
 
 
Despite the use of the term "surgical strikes", the Indians definitely did not airdrop commandos to hit "launching pads of militants" inside Pakistani-held territory, or conduct ground assaults deep into the Pakistan-administered side. But they did cross the Line of Control (LoC), in some cases by more than a kilometre, to hit nearby Pakistani border posts.

Police officials on the Pakistani side privately concede that such a ground assault did occur in the Madarpur-Titrinot region of Poonch sector, west of Srinagar, where a Pakistani post was destroyed and one soldier killed.

In Leepa valley to the north, locals said that the Indians crossed the LoC and set up their guns on ridges directly overlooking the village of Mundakali. A Pakistani border post located at some distance east of the village was hit. Two other posts higher up in the mountains were also hit. At least four Pakistani soldiers were injured in the attack, which lasted from 05:00am until 8:00am, locals said.


 


 
The Leepa valley. A route across the centre of the mountain-top shown was previously used by militants to cross into India, until the border was fenced.
 
 
A similar advance by the Indians in the Dudhnial area of Neelum valley further north was beaten back by the Pakistanis. At least one Pakistani soldier was injured - reports of a dead soldier could not be independently verified by the BBC.


The Pakistani army described the exchanges as nothing more than cross-border firing, albeit in a more co-ordinated fashion and all along the LoC.


Officials said two soldiers were killed in the attacks - one in Poonch, and one in Bhimber sector, further south. Defence minister Khwaja Asif later said a total of nine soldiers were injured in the assault.


Indian troops could not have hit a target and returned alive as the climb required was too steep, officials said. Nor could helicopters have been used to drop special forces given the difficult terrain and because Pakistan would have shot down the aircraft.


There is no conclusive evidence to prove either side's claims - the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.
 

Indian army's anger over Kashmir killings

Why India needs cool heads



Eyewitness: Ali Akbar, Mundakali village resident, Leepa Valley

 

 
 

I normally wake up at 4:30am. As usual I did my chores - and just then I heard small arms fire, about 100 rounds. I waited a few minutes and then I heard four bombs [mortars] land near the village. We have been in a state of war for a long time, so I knew that heavy guns meant trouble and that the village might get hit. I was standing there when four more bombs came. Then four more, after a few minutes.

The first shells had landed in the forest near the village [where a border post is located] and I saw flames and smoke rising. My wife called to me to get in. We have built a bunker in the basement with 24-inch thick walls. She said everybody was inside, and wanted me to get in too.

By now they had started targeting another one of our posts higher up on the mountaintop in front.

Then the next round of shells hit another post further back.

Small arms fire also continued. This was surprising for me. They had apparently crossed over from the LoC and had set up their guns at the top of the cliff. I could heard the bullets whizzing overhead, through the treetops, snapping twigs and leaves that were falling to the ground.

The firing continued until about 6am. After that, the heavy guns fell silent but small fire continued.

We remained in our basement until 10am. No one had had time to eat or drink that morning.

Later, we heard that the Indians had crossed the LoC and hit our posts from positions overlooking the valley. I don't understand why they didn't try to reach our post where we have the local company headquarters. They could have done it. It's walkable, and is easier for them because they occupy higher ground. Perhaps our people detected their movement and fired at them which pushed them back.

This is the first time since the war on the LoC began nearly 30 years ago that they have fired from this position.


               How did the Pakistanis Respond?



In many areas the attack came as a surprise.

Accounts of villagers gathered in Leepa suggest that Indian soldiers first opened fire in the valley at around 0500, hitting the post near Mundakali village and blowing up a mosque adjacent to it.

A soldier who was preparing for pre-dawn prayers was hit and injured, they said.


This border post in Mundakali was said to have been hit by Indian fire

An Indian post in Keran-Lawat as seen from the Pakistani side

Fire was also directed at two other posts higher up in the hills, one of which served as the forward headquarters in Leepa.

Locals say bunkers at these posts were partly destroyed and their communication system was paralysed for some time.

This meant that troops stationed down in the valley and at the brigade headquarters took a while to realise what was going on.


The soldier who was injured at the Mundakali post was given first aid by villagers, and then transported to the military-run hospital in Leepa on a motorbike. Nearly two dozen villagers helped put out the fire that had engulfed the mosque.

The Pakistanis did not take long to get their act together and fired back from the remaining bunkers, pushing the Indian guns back from the ridges overlooking the valley.

In Dudhnial in Neelum valley, the action took place further up in the mountains, away from the village. A few villagers were awakened by gunfire.

 
The bazaar in Dudhnial village

An official familiar with what happened that morning said the Indians had advanced well beyond the LoC when their movements were detected.

"The Pakistani fire sent them scurrying back to their bunkers," he said.

Down south, in Poonch, Kotli and Bhimber areas, it was more or less the same story: Indians coming forward from their positions on the LoC, taking unsuspecting Pakistani soldiers by surprise both due to the suddenness of the attack and the intensity of the fire and then pulling back once the Pakistanis had a chance to respond.

Unprepared, and having a numerical disadvantage generally, the Pakistanis made use of their firepower to the fullest, exhausting their ammunition.

Locals said that in the days following the attack, hundreds of villagers were pressed into service carrying artillery shells and other ammunition to border posts to replenish their supplies.

   
          



                   Were Any Militants Hit?

Kashmir-focused militants have had a strong presence in Pakistani-administered Kashmir for years. During the 1990s they crossed the LoC in droves to ambush troops on India's side.

Their activities became less visible after the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, but their proficiency in suicide raids and other attacks kept them relevant to Pakistan's strategy in its dispute with India, despite denials from Pakistan's military.

The militants continue to maintain safe houses in bigger cities like Muzaffarabad, located some distance from the border area.

But they now mostly set up camps near military deployments along the LoC and away from villages where there is a growing sense of fatigue among locals towards the insurgency

Since the 2003 ceasefire, Neelum has raised a generation of college boys and militants have mostly moved out of villages and closer to military camps

Despite the claims in the Indian media, the BBC could find little evidence that militants had been hit.

There were no reports of any of the camps in the Samahni area of Bhimber or in the Poonch-Kotli area having been hit. They are mostly located behind ridges that serve as a natural barrier against direct Indian fire.

In Leepa, some five or six wooden structures housing militants between the villages of Channian and Mundakali had not been targeted. A ridge that runs along the east bank of the nearby stream covers them from military positions on the LoC.

Likewise, in Neelum, most militant camps - such as the ones at Jhambar, Dosut and in the Gurez valley area further east - are located in the valleys below, at a safe distance from the LoC.

The BBC also could not confirm an Indian media report that Lashkar-e-Taiba camps in the Khairati Bagh village of Leepa valley and the western end of Dudhnial village in Neelum valley had been hit on 29 September.

However, in Dudhnial some locals who helped carry military munitions to forward posts the weekend following the Indian strikes said they had seen one or two damaged structures close to a Pakistani post near the border. They thought those structures might have been hit on the morning of 29 September.

But they were reluctant to discuss whether those structures had been occupied by militants, or whether five or six men had died there, as the Indian media had claimed.

The BBC asked the Pakistani military about militant activity in the area, but there was no immediate response.


High in the hills. Nearby, the road descends into the Leepa valley


              What is the Mood Now?



Since 29 September there has been no let up in tension in the LoC area.

Locals in Leepa told the BBC that following the attack, there had been an increased influx of militants in the valley. Are they in the area to help the army in case border skirmishes with the Indians get worse? No one is sure.

In Neelum, a top official of the district administration called a meeting and advised locals earlier this month to start digging bunkers in or near their houses in case border tensions escalate.

A local school teacher who was at the meeting said the official was told that removing militants from the area would be a simpler and less costly option to protect villages from Indian shelling.

The strategy was a confidential matter, the official responded. It would be up to the government to decide



CLICK TO READ

Disputed Kashmir profiled   [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-11693674 ]

Concern over Kashmir police's pellet guns
 [http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-36822567 ]









 
 
                    RELATED  ARTICLES
                                     ON
                   SURGICAL STRIKE
 

( a ) India and Pakistan are Rearranging the Thresholds of Conflict [ http://thewire.in/70652/india-pakistan-rearranging-thresholds/ ]

 

 (b ) Kashmir attack: India 'launches strikes against militants' [ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37504308 ]

  • 30 September 2016
  • From the section India
 
 
 

  ( c )  Kashmir attack: What's behind the deadliest militant raid in years? [ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37504308 ]

  • 19 September 2016
  • From the section Asia
 
 
 
  ( d )  Indian army’s anger over Kashmir killings [ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37404332 ]
  • 19 September 2016
  • From the section India
 
 
 
 
 ( e ) Why India needs cool heads after Kashmir attack  [ http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-37405064 ]
  • 20 September 2016
  • From the section India
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Tuesday, November 8, 2016

Is The Modi Government Entering Self-Destruction Mode?

SOURCE:
http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/11/05/is-the-modi-government-entering-self-destruction-mode/



         Is The Modi Government Entering

                   Self-Destruction Mode?

It's traversing a familiar political arc we saw most recently with UPA-2.

 
 
 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, China, September 4, 2016. REUTERS/Mark Schiefelbein/Pool
 
 
Until recently, the attacks on liberals and the opposition came with plausible deniability for the Narendra Modi government. They could be blamed on non-state Hindutva actors, such as "fringe" RSS-aligned activists or state governments, even BJP-led state governments.

So how could you blame the Modi government for a lynching in Dadri? Wasn't Dadri in Uttar Pradesh, and law and order a state subject? How could you blame Modi for the gau rakshaks? How was it Modi's fault if ABVP activists had enough clout with the HRD ministry to ruin the life of a Dalit student in Hyderabad, making him embrace death? How could you blame the Modi government if leftists in JNU were advocating azadi for Kashmir and Delhi Police arrested the wrong guys for it? How could you blame the Modi government if lawyers were beating up teachers and journalists inside a Delhi court and the Delhi Police looked away? As for the arrests of Aam Aadmi Party MLAs, the law was taking its own course.

That plausible deniability, that isolation Modi pretended from these actions, is now going away. The mask is coming off. In becoming openly authoritarian, suppressing the opposition and the liberal media, the Modi government is making a huge mistake


 
Like UPA-2, it is letting the arrogance of power come in the way of sanguine politics. It is only going to hurt itself in the process, just like UPA-2 did. The anti-democratic nature of the Modi government's actions may not be comparable in scale to the Emergency, but certainly comes from the same instinct of protecting power with suppressing voices of opposition and dissent. Ultimately, this path leads only to self-destruction, as both Indira Gandhi and UPA-2 eventually found out.
 
 
After the "surgical strikes", the Modi government was on an all-time nationalism high. Nationalism has been the defining sentiment of this government. So powerful is nationalism that it can hide everything: from cultural Hindu majoritarianism to questionable GDP data to scuttling the rural employment guarantee law for the drought affected.


Which is why the Modi government panicked when a veteran soldier committed suicide over unhappiness with the government's failed promise of one rank-one pension (OROP). The Modi government appearing to be letting down veteran soldiers immediately changed the perception it had built for itself.


With just one news break, the Modi government's claim of standing one with our soldiers, for their dignity and honour, rang hollow. The BJP was using images of soldiers in its Uttar Pradesh election campaign to tom-tom its surgical achievement of having given Pakistan a 'reply'. Suddenly, it seemed like hypocrisy. The BJP had exploited the OROP issue even in the 2014 elections, earning the support of ex-servicemen.


The surgical strike narrative suddenly turned. The Modi-led BJP discovered deshbhakti can be a double-edged sword. Nationalism's tables had turned.


Just like the UPA-2 government erred in arresting Anna Hazare and helping the Lokpal movement become much bigger, the Modi government acted in haste to have Rahul Gandhi, Manish Sisodia and Arvind Kejriwal detained. In preventing them from meeting the family of the veteran who took his own life to protest against the government's inaction on OROP, the Modi government only helped give more life to the opposition. Weak, fragmented, disunited, even scared and co-opted, the opposition needs fresh energy that only the Modi government's mistakes can give it. The slow pace of implementing OROP, leading to the ex-servicemen's suicide, and police detention of opposition leaders, was exactly such a political mistake.


At this point the Modi government needed something to deflect attention, shift the debate. As we have consistently seen, the government and its apparatchiks blame liberals for everything. The opposition is too weak, the comatose Congress party dying a slow death--it is the handful of Delhi liberals who need to be silenced. Nothing personifies Delhi liberals like NDTV, an old punching bag of the Hindu right, whose credibility makes up for the TRPs the "nationalist" editors have taken away from it.


The issue of Hindi channel NDTV India's coverage of the Pathankot operation, allegedly compromising the operation as it was taking place, has been live since January 2016 itself. But the timing of the Information and Broadcasting ministry's order asking NDTV India to go off air for 24 hours is suspect. The need to deflect attention away from the OROP suicide row could have been a factor in the timing of the decision.

Instead of debating whether the government has been negligent in looking after veterans, we are now debating whether a day's ban on NDTV India is fair. Is it political censorship or did NDTV India compromise security? The answer doesn't matter, though if you care, NDTV has argued that it broadcast only what other channels were broadcasting, and the newspapers had also published the same stories with the same level of detail. The government, the ruling party and its online warriors have been able to deflect the issue from the OROP suicide.

Discrediting NDTV and showing it up to be anti-national is an additional gain for the government. Yet, the government is in net loss. With every passing day, the Modi government is helping create an opposition where there was none. Having already co-opted the media, it is provoking the media, almost daring it, to go against the government. NDTV was already willing to bend over backwards, as we saw in its dropping of a P. Chidambaram interview. But apparently that's not enough.

Playing with the fire of nationalism is risky, and the OROP suicide was only a small trailer of that. What if there's another big terrorist attack the Modi government finds itself unable to respond to with the same level of political astuteness as it did with the "surgical" strike?

High on power, the BJP government is willing to take such risks. It is willing to do anything to try and topple Congress governments in small states and stop the Aam Aadmi Party in its tracks. Such aggression by a single-party majority government could just as well be the beginning of its self-destruction.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

Monday, November 7, 2016

It Will Take More Than Force for India to Win the Terror Endgame

SOURCE::
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/10/14/not-war-not-peace-motivating-pakistan-to-prevent-cross-border-terrorism-event-5390

It Will Take More Than Force for India to Win the Terror Endgame


                   Not War, Not Peace?
          : Motivating Pakistan to Prevent
                     Cross-Border Terrorism

      [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLDnAxhpaNI ]

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only a combination of Indian coercive and non-violent capabilities, and a willingness to bargain, can motivate Pakistan to remove the threat of violence. And just as threat of force alone will not work for India, terrorism won’t get Pakistan what it wants from India.
 
 
 
 
                   Swearing-in ceremony of Narendra Modi.
 (L-R) President Pranab Mukherjee, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif and Prime Minister of Mauritius, Navin Ramgoolam. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

 
 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent public references to Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan confirm for many Pakistanis what they have long suspected:
 that India is employing covert means to destabilise and foment violence in Pakistan. If India is pursuing covert operations to punish Pakistan, it would be a disturbing development in the nearly 70-year security competition between the two states; but it should not come as a great surprise.


The prospect of covert Indian operations and rhetoric regarding Balochistan and Kashmir widens the front that Pakistani leaders must defend. While alarming to Pakistan, these tactics reflect the Indian leaders’ attempts to find ways to motivate the Pakistani establishment to demonstrably renounce anti-India terrorism and to neutralise actors that threaten to conduct it. “It’s a Rubik’s cube – dealing with Pakistan,” a former Indian national security adviser told us in late 2014. “You keep fiddling with squares. As you move one set, others are affected or become problems.”


Since the terrorist attacks in New Delhi and Jammu in late 2001 and early 2002, in Mumbai in November 2008 and, most recently, on the Pathankot air base, Indians have increasingly concluded that eschewing forceful responses does not work. As one retired senior Indian military officer lamented to us in 2014: “How do you prove deterrence if you don’t use force at any time?” Modi won the 2014 election in part because he displayed his resolve to use force to fight threats against India.
Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear forces make Indian conventional military operations against Pakistan exceedingly risky. Indian leaders are trying to find alternatives that could simultaneously satisfy domestic demands to punish Pakistan, deter Pakistan from escalating conflict in reaction to Indian punitive actions and bring conflict to a close in ways that do not leave India worse off – in terms of casualties, costs and overall power. Pakistani officials and strategists, too, should have a keen interest in understanding these alternatives.


Our focus on possible Indian options for changing Pakistan’s behaviour regarding terrorism does not ignore Pakistan’s legitimate interest in motivating India to redress the grievances of Kashmiri Muslims and create conditions in and around Kashmir that are acceptable to Kashmir, Pakistan and India. The best solution would be for both states to eschew violence against each other and to take reciprocal, verifiable steps to demonstrate to each other that they are doing so. Indeed, Pakistani experts as diverse as Munir Akram and Pervez Hoodbhoy, in recent contributions to the daily Dawn, have sketched non-violent steps that Pakistan and Kashmiris, on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC), could take to increase pressure on India to pacify the situation.


Akram urged Pakistan to “launch a major diplomatic offensive in international forums and the world’s capitals to halt India’s massive human rights violations in occupied Kashmir,” and to revitalise “the legitimacy of the Kashmiri struggle” as something distinct from “terrorism”. Hoodbhoy noted that Pakistan could increase international support by highlighting the indigenisation of the Kashmir movement and “cracking down upon Kashmir-oriented militant groups still operating from its soil.” Combined, such developments would strengthen Pakistan’s position in talks with India and with outside powers.


Yet, as long as Pakistan and groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LT) do not clearly demonstrate their renunciation of cross-border violence, and India does not demonstrate that it will reciprocate by accommodating the interests of reasonable Kashmiri stakeholders in a peace process, more violence with the potential to escalate the conflict remains all too possible. This is why we have written Not War, Not Peace? – to analyse the implications of possible Indian policies and capabilities to deter and to respond to another major terrorist attack on India.

At stake is the potential for war that could escalate to nuclear devastation of Pakistan and India. This would be the most destabilising and catastrophic event in the international system since World War II.



George Perkovich and Toby DaltonNot War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border TerrorismOxford University Press, 2016
George Perkovich and Toby Dalton
Not War, Not Peace?: Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism
Oxford University Press, 2016



For a problem this profound, it is notable that no theories in the existing international relations literature, or in other states’ practices, offer guidance as to how India and Pakistan could most effectively proceed here. Unlike any other nuclear-armed antagonists, India and Pakistan directly border each other, have unresolved territorial disputes (Kashmir and Sir Creek) and have engaged in armed conflict four times, not to mention multiple other militarised crises in places such as Siachen and across the LoC in Kashmir. Furthermore, terrorism poses a threat that could instigate future conflict. Studies on deterring and defeating terrorism have not addressed situations in which the major antagonists possess nuclear weapons. Theories and case studies of nuclear deterrence and escalation management have not involved cases in which terrorists are the instigators of aggression and may not directly be under the control of state leaders.


India cannot reasonably expect that Pakistani authorities will be willing and able to destroy groups, such as LT, and simultaneously eradicate the numerous militant groups that now threaten the internal security of Pakistan more directly. “They can’t stop everybody,” a senior Indian official acknowledged to us in 2014, “but we need to know they are trying … via signals we can mutually understand.” In other words, the reasonable objective is for Pakistan to make demonstrable, persistent efforts to pacify the tactics Pakistan based actors use to pursue their political demands towards India, regarding Kashmir and other issues.


India’s primary coercive options could centre on army incursions, or more limited airborne strikes, or covert operations. India’s development of operational military and intelligence capabilities to support these options aims to deter cross-border terrorism through the threat of future punishment. Depending on which of these options India pursues, nuclear strategy and capabilities would play a reinforcing role. For example, if Indian leaders decided to unleash major ground and air operations – as envisioned in ‘Cold Start’ – they would have to anticipate possible Pakistani nuclear responses and deploy more credible nuclear forces and plans to counter Pakistan than the current Indian doctrine of ‘massive retaliation’ implies. Since these are the options most discussed in India, they require deep analysis.


To optimise the potential of any strategy, Indian policy making processes and military-diplomatic capabilities need to be improved. Meanwhile, our extensive analysis suggests that none of India’s most likely options – army-centric, air-centric, covert and nuclear – could confidently achieve the desired changes in Pakistani behaviour with acceptable risks to India. This suggests that India could channel more effort into developing capabilities and strategies to exert non-violent pressure on Pakistan to prevent cross-border terrorism.


Army-based operations, that would damage the Pakistani military enough to (theoretically) motivate leaders to curtail terrorist threats against India, would probably also reduce the capabilities of the Pakistani military and intelligence services to combat terrorist groups. This challenge could grow if Indian incursions drove more people to join anti-India militant groups in Pakistan. And the more damage India might inflict on the Pakistani military, the greater the probability that Pakistan would resort to nuclear weapons, leading to escalatory destruction that would cause much greater harm to India than the terrorist attack that instigated the conflict.


More limited, precise air strikes could entail lesser risk of escalation. However, strikes calibrated to mitigate escalation could signal to Pakistani leaders that India lacks resolve to actually force fundamental changes in Pakistani behaviour. Pakistan has the means to defend its airspace and to mobilise ground forces to widen a conflict in response to Indian air attacks.


Finding a sufficient mix of destructiveness and restraint would confront India with challenges that, for example, US and Israel have not faced when they have used aircraft and missiles to attack their adversaries. This is not to ignore the potential value of air strikes against terrorist-related targets to satisfy Indian political necessities and mobilise international pressure on Pakistan. Still, whether such gains would durably alter Pakistani behaviour is highly uncertain.


As noted above, changes to the nuclear doctrine might provide a more credible buttress to punitive conventional military operations, especially those that involve major army campaigns in Pakistan. However, that alone would be unlikely to motivate Pakistani leaders to meet India’s counter terrorism demands. Moreover, creating capabilities and options for a battlefield nuclear war would raise significant concerns about how such a war could be controlled and terminated. There is no history to draw upon here: no states have ever exchanged nuclear attacks.


Finally, covert or special forces operations might actually degrade the capability of terrorist groups to attack India and could harm Pakistani interests enough to motivate Pakistani authorities to do more to prevent cross-border terrorism against India. Of course, covert Indian operations also could invite Pakistani retaliation, which Indian policymakers acknowledge is a significant vulnerability.


In any case, covertness necessitates restraint in claiming credit for such operations. To the extent that if India’s covert activities in Pakistan became apparent to Pakistan and the wider world, India could lose reputational and political leverage over Pakistan, as many Indian commentators have pointed out in the wake of Modi’s Independence Day speech. An exceptionally experienced counsellor to several Indian prime ministers told us, “It is not in our interest to have people think we are little different from the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] … if Pakistanis assert we are just like them … the international community will say ‘they both do it’, and the pressure falls off Pakistan.”


Contrary to military options, utilising diplomatic, economic and other means of international censure in a strategy of nonviolent compellence may be a better way to motivate Pakistan. The punitive benefits of a non-violent strategy may be less direct than military action but it also comes with far lower risks of an escalating military conflict. With a clear comparative advantage over Pakistan in economic clout and soft power, India could utilise these tools to isolate Pakistan internationally in response to another major terrorist attack.


However, in order to be successful with this strategy, India would have to develop greater deftness in international coalition-building. The Indian government’s own behaviour in Kashmir, and willingness to address grievances there, would need to be positive enough to make outside powers feel they will not be accused of hypocrisy if they side with India against Pakistan.


Overall, India and Pakistan are approaching rough symmetry at three levels of competition: covert, conventional and nuclear. One of the countries may be more capable in one or more of these domains, but each has now demonstrated enough capability in all three to deny the other confidence that it can win more than it loses at any level of this violent competition. India drove Pakistani forces out of Kargil, but Pakistani conventional and nuclear capabilities prevented India from escalating the war.


India mobilised its forces massively after the 2001 attack on the parliament and Pakistan took some steps to curtail terrorist groups but the balance of power made neither of them want to fight. Despite trying to develop the ‘Cold Start’ doctrine, India did not respond militarily to the 2008 attack on Mumbai; but Pakistani authorities have hinted to us and others that damage to Pakistan’s reputation and vulnerability to Indian destabilisation efforts made Pakistan take unspecified steps that have prevented further Mumbai-like attacks since 2008.


Pakistan subsequently also tested a short-range nuclear missile with the stated intention to deter Indian army incursions that might follow another cross-border terror incident. This condition of rough balance and deterrence across the spectrum of conflict amounts to an unstable equilibrium. Any number of actions by leaders and non-officials, taken by mistake or on purpose, could destabilise it.


The basic balance in useable force creates an opportunity for leaders to take steps to stabilise and pacify the India Pakistan competition. Diplomacy and deal making cannot shift balances of power and deterrence but they can solidify them through explicit agreements that clarify expectations and standards of behaviour. Two recent examples demonstrate that bargaining can result in stable outcomes that address the core concerns of contending parties. In August 2016, the government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed a comprehensive peace agreement to end the civil war there.


This agreement followed years of secret negotiations and a series of interim steps, including mutual paying of reparations to victims of the conflict and a commitment by FARC to end its relationship with the drug trade on which it had relied for funding. In July 2015, after similarly lengthy talks, the P-5 plus Germany reached a landmark nuclear deal with Iran to address concerns that Tehran was pursuing nuclear weapons.


Such agreements – essentially, negotiated accommodations – raise the costs for any authorities that would subsequently violate them. This is all the more relevant when major outside powers have a stake in the stabilisation that has been achieved. China and US both have great interests in stability between Pakistan and India. Both could be expected to press India and Pakistan to uphold any agreements, to contribute to fact-finding if there are disputes over compliance, and to reward both states by increasing investment and urging others to do so, when the security establishments in India and Pakistan demonstrate commitment to stabilisation.


Notwithstanding some intermittent high-level diplomatic engagements with Pakistan, including Modi’s own dramatic visit to Lahore in December 2015, the Indian government has toughened its position on Kashmir. This, too, should not be surprising given the doubts voiced by Indian officials about the intentions of the Pakistani security establishment. Yet, if the Indian government persists in the belief that it can manage Kashmir as an internal matter, without Pakistan’s negotiated cooperation, New Delhi will be unable to build an international coalition that would significantly raise the cost for Pakistan of future major attacks on India.


Indeed, by acting as if there is nothing to negotiate with Pakistan, Indian leaders would encourage proponents of violence in Pakistan and discourage international players who would like to fully embrace India, but are reluctant to do so if India insists that they reject Pakistan at the same time. India has the power, the habits of mind and institutions to sustain a war of attrition with Pakistan. But India cannot achieve its ambitions to be a global power if it remains bogged down in such a war.


The analysis presented in Not War, Not Peace? shows that there are no clear solutions that India can unilaterally pursue to end the threat of violence from Pakistan. Some are more likely to be effective, at greater or lesser risk and cost, for India and Pakistan. But only a combination of Indian coercive and non-violent capabilities, paired with a willingness to bargain, can motivate Pakistan to remove the threat of violence. And just as threat of force alone will not work for India, neither will support or tolerance of anti-India terrorism enable Pakistan to get what it wants from India. Both have to demonstrate willingness to compromise through bargaining, which is only possible if both reassure each other that they are eschewing violence. It is up to Indian and Pakistani leaders and societies, with encouragement from the international community, to find a combination that will work for them.


This piece has been co-published by Herald, the monthly magazine of the Dawn group in Pakistan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Sunday, November 6, 2016

MINOR TACTICAL WARFARE Revealed : : How The Surgical Strikes Ops Unfolded

SOURCE:
http://www.rediff.com/news/column/revealed-how-the-surgical-strikes-ops-unfolded/20160930.htm

                           
                      
         MINOR  TACTICAL WARFARE 

                          Revealed
: How The Surgical Strikes Ops Unfolded
                               By
                    Nitin Gokhale


September 30, 2016


 
'A couple of hours before the H-Hour, the Kupwara division opened small arms and mortar fire on posts opposite its area of operation.'

'This was a diversionary tactic.'


'As Pakistani forces began to react to the firing, special forces teams began to slowly cross the LoC into PoK.'


Nitin Gokhale reveals how planning for the surgical strikes began hours after the Uri attack.







On Thursday morning, a long-standing taboo in the minds of India's strategic decision-makers was broken.

As news about the Indian Army's surgical strike on terrorist camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir broke around noon on Thursday, it was clear that India was no longer afraid of a possible escalation with Pakistan, its empty nuclear threat notwithstanding.


In fact, Pakistan's nuclear bluff has been called: Both armies understand nuclear escalation requires a much higher threshold.


Even the threat of first use of tactical nuclear weapons is just bluster: Both armies are professional, whatever image they may project.


After this event, at least in the public mind and thus of the politicians, the fear of nuclear escalation will recede.
The entire episode has changed the India-Pakistan dynamics on the LoC.


A decisive move by the political leadership to declare to the world the action the army took has brought in an element of unpredictability that Pakistan is not used to.


So far, Pakistan could always predict an Indian response to any terrorist attack. Condemnation, shock, presentation of dossiers would complete the Indian action.


By going beyond the rhetoric, the Narendra Modi government has injected a new element to which Pakistan is not used to.
In Islamabad, the reaction have therefore been extremely muted or confused.


While the Pakistan army has denied any surgical strike by India, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his defence minister have condemned the attack and said any such future attack will get a befitting reply!


For India, arriving at this decision was not easy.


On September 18, when Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar and army chief General Dalbir Singh were flying together back from Srinagar late that night after taking stock of the aftermath of the attack on an administrative camp near the army's Uri brigade that killed 18 soldiers ( two soldiers died later), the mood in the aircraft was somber.


India had not lost so many soldiers together in one attack in the past decade. The nation was downcast.


It seemed India had no answers to Pakistan's continuing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir.


Mid-way through the flight, Parrikar, who is about to complete two years as defence minister in November, told the army chief to give him at least three options that would involve demonstrable action against the perpetrators of the attack early the next morning.


Parrikar wanted the options in his hand before he attended the Cabinet Committee on Security meeting the next day.


The Military Operations Directorate worked through the night and presented the possibilities that existed to launch operations along and across the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir.
Armed with the options, the defence minister went for the CCS meeting.


The CCS, taking inputs from various agencies -- the Research and Analysis Wing, the Intelligence Bureau, the National Technical Research Organisation -- and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval decided to order preparations for a retaliatory strike.


The CCS, India's highest decision making body on matters of strategic affairs, was determined to go off the usual beaten track of 'we-condemn-the heinous-attack' that has been India's standard response to any terrorist attack in the past two decades.


The prime minister had already promised that the sacrifice of the 18 soldiers would not go in vain. So preparations began in right earnest.


All of India's top decision-makers on security affairs had a series of meetings between September 18 and 25 to decide on multiple steps to hurt Pakistan.


Revisiting the Indus Waters Treaty, boycotting the SAARC summit in Islamabad, describing Pakistan as the 'Ivy League of Terrorism' in the UN, was all part of the well thought out, coordinated strategy to corner Pakistan.


Even as these steps were being initiated, preparations for a punitive strike on terrorist camps located in Pakistan occupied Kashmir, not very far from the LoC, were underway.


The NTRO and R&AW were tasked to get accurate assessment of the camps and launch pads, the strength of terrorists present there along with Pakistani army regulars.


The Indian Army's Northern Command also had local intelligence through their Humint (human intelligence) about what was happening across the LoC.



 







Initial reports spoke about heightened defences in these camps. Some of the 30-odd camps that the Pakistan army maintains and nurtures along the LoC were emptied immediately after the Uri attack, fearing retaliation from the Indian Army.


After 10 days had passed without any visible action or even any overt preparation for an attack across the LoC, the guard seemed to lower perceptibly in the camps.


Pakistan was lulled into thinking India's response will be on expected lines: Every other measure but a military strike.
Little did they know that targets had been selected, assessments done and a crack force assembled to hit the camps and Pakistani army posts in an arc between Poonch and Kupwara.
On Wednesday, September 28, the CCS was presented with the plan.


The basic aim was to hit the terrorist infrastructure in PoK and send a message that India would not allow the attacks to go unpunished.


It was immediately approved.


Defence Minister Parrikar and NSA Ajit Doval were tasked by the prime minister to oversee and coordinate the operation.
The MO Operations Room (mistakenly described by many as the War Room) became an intense hub of activity between Wednesday noon and early morning on Thursday.
By noon on Wednesday, the strike teams had been staged forward from three directions.


The chosen targets were across the areas under the jurisdiction of 19 Division (in Uri), 28 Division (in Kupwara) and 25 Division (in Rajouri).


The H-Hour (the specific time at which an operation commences, or is due to commence) was half past midnight on Wednesday.
A couple of hours before the H-Hour, the Kupwara division opened small arms and mortar fire on posts opposite its area of operation.


This was a diversionary tactic. As Pakistani forces began to react to the firing, special forces teams began to slowly cross the LoC into PoK.


A couple of teams slipped out between the Beloni and Nangi Tekri battalion areas in Poonch sector south of the Pir Panjal and across the Tutmari Gali in the Nowgam sector.


By 2 am, the teams were on target.


Five launch pads and two Pakistani army posts -- which were co-located with the launch pads -- were destroyed and all occupants killed.


The Indian Army has refused to put a number to the fatal casualties among the terrorists so far. As the DGMO said in a statement, the operation is over and India has no further plans at the moment.


Clearly, its advantage India for the moment.


Now the government must keep up the pressure on all fronts -- economic, political, diplomatic -- besides retaining the option to use a military response whenever it feels Pakistan needs to be punished.


The decisiveness shown by Mr Modi and his colleagues needs to continue even in the face of grave provocations that Pakistan may unleash in coming weeks although further escalation could stretch the Pakistani army even more -- they are heavily committed on the western borders, FATA, and controlling internal insurgencies/terrorism.
 
Nitin Gokhale