Friday, November 18, 2016

PANGS OF DEMONETISATION : RANT OF FILTHY BANDICOOTS

SOURCE: 


                                                   BASED  ON

http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2016/11/14/we-need-to-stop-holding-up-the-army-as-the-sole-repository-of-al/



                   RANT OF  FILTHY
ANTI - NATIONALISTS COMMIES 
                                AND
                FIFTH  COLUMNIST                                                                                                                                        BLACK  MONEY HOLDERS 



              RANT OF THE MORONS                                                                

     We Need To Stop Holding Up The Army
                                    As
    The Sole Repository Of All Nationalism

           A nation is not just a territory
                that needs defending.

                  14  NOVEMBER 2016





 
 
Baba Ramdev, right, seated next to retired former Indian Army chief General V.K. Singh during a protest in New Delhi in 2012. (AP Photo/Rajesh Kumar Singh)
 
 
 
Stay hungry, stay patriotic. That's what Baba Ramdev wants ordinary Indians to be. Why? Because members of the army, who are protecting our borders, routinely go without food for days, especially when they are on active duty. Such is his logic.

"During war, our soldiers fight without eating food for seven to eight days. So, can't we do the same for our nation?" one of India's most successful yoga-guru-turned-entrepreneurs said to the media yesterday.

 "Many people are showing their opposition to the prime minister but nothing is bigger than the nation," he added.

As a defence of the government's move of currency demonetisation to curb corruption and black money, Ramdev's statement may warm the cockles of his devotees, especially those who believe nothing is bigger than the prime minister (to them, also known as the nation), but the comment is shockingly pernicious on several levels.
 
As the promoter of Patanjali, an FMCG enterprise which has already recorded a ₹5,000 crore turnover in F16, it is despicable of Ramdev to undermine the pain of hunger, that too in a country which ranks below some of its neighbours — China, Nepal and Bangladesh — in the
 
 
 
We don't need to look up statistics to register the endemic poverty that afflicts India's heartland. But we do need to appreciate the bleak irony of asking millions of hungry people to put nationalist sentiments before their right to have three square meals a day.
 
 
 
Hindustan Times via Getty Images
People stand in long queues to exchange their old currency at the Bank of Baroda in Pahar Ganj, New Delhi, on November 13, 2016. (Photo by Arvind Yadav/Hindustan Times )

 
 
Wasn't it Swami Vivekananda, often appropriated by card-carrying Hindutva activists to serve their own interests, who pointed out the futility of preaching religion to those left with an empty stomach? And so, by what right could a nation expect undying patriotism from those it has failed to guarantee two square meals a day?

Worse still, due to the acute cash crunch unleashed by the sudden revocation of old currency, even people with means to buy food have been reduced to looting stores,
 babies have died to lack of healthcare, senior citizens have collapsed in queues to get their money changed. The prime minister, who Ramdev wants the rest of the country to put before their lives, has mocked the plight of the people and then quickly followed it up with public histrionics. The worst elitism, especially among privileged Indians, is on shameless display on social media these days.

                             FIRING THE RIFLE
 FROM THE SHOULDER OF POOR
                                   TO
 HIDE THE BLACK HOARDED FILTH

 
 
VASUNDHRA]
 
 
 
 
: Demonetisation Has Brought Out The Worst Form Of Elitism Among India's Privileged Classes
 
 
THE   BANDICOOTS SHOULD KNOW THAT IF A SOLDIER COMMITS A MISTAKE IN WAR IT IS NOT THAT HE  LOSES HIS LIFE BUT THE NATION ALSO SLIDES INTO A PERPETUAL  SLAVERY OF HUMILATION   WHERE AS IF A BANDICOOT FALLS IN THE RAT TRAP  HE LOSES ONLY HIS HOARDED  LOOTED  WORTHLESS PAPER -Vasundhra
 
 
RANT OF A BANDICOOT
 
 
For Ramdev to drag the army into this unfolding crisis, as the exemplar of nationalism, is not only insidious (as an attempt to cover up for the ruling government's spectacular mess), but also disrespectful to the vast majority of Indians who are not part of the defence establishment.


The service rendered by the armed forces to the nation is, without a doubt, fraught with risk and hardship, demanding deeper reserves of courage and fortitude than, say, a school teacher's or a bus driver's. And yet, in a sense, the job of defending the country against enemies and keeping it safe from internal incursions is also a job like any other — with benefits and a salary.

To weigh it against other professions or to rate it on a scale of relative importance is unwarranted, unless one believes different kinds of work merit different levels of respect, according to a perceived hierarchy of dignity in labour. That would amount to claiming that some citizens are less important to the nation than others.


 
Women come out the State Bank of India, Nuh branch, with new Rs 2000 rupee note, on November 13, 2016 in Gurgaon, India. (Photo by Parveen Kumar/Hindustan Times via Getty Images)
 
 
TRUTH   IS
 
SEGMENT OF SOCIETY MENTIONED BELOW HAVE WATCHED HELPLESSELY THEIR FRUITS BEING LOOTED BY THESE BANDICOOTS  &  NOW ARE EMPLOYING GHOST WRITERS TO DEFEND THEIR LOOT (Vasundhra)
 
 
 
Why must the contribution to society by a scientist who develops a life-saving vaccine or by a doctor who cures hundreds of suffering patients or by an economist whose policy has a tangible effect in improving the conditions of millions be regarded as any less noble or patriotic than those guarding our borders?

A great musician may soothe many a troubled mind, a writer may give hope to those who have turned away from life, an educator may enable hundreds of young minds to look beyond their immediate circumstances and to dream big.

As far as critical services go, what about those who dispose of our daily refuse, without whom we would be drowning in our own garbage? And, most pertinent under the circumstances, what about the bankers, who are tirelessly working weekdays and weekends, trying to serve a nation desperately seeking cash?

By valorising the services of the army to the exclusion of others, Ramdev's ends up shaming the ordinary, salaried, tax-paying citizens of India, part of whose hard-earned incomes, ironically, go into funding the defence budget. In doing so, he too, along with the supporters of the ruling government, harks back to a relic from the past: to a moment in history when the military was the be-all and end-all of a nation's sovereignty as opposed to the sum total of many ancillary parts that create a complex, modern economy.



 
People in queue to change their 500 and 1000 currency notes in Allahabad. (Photo by Prabhat Kumar Verma/Pacific Press/LightRocket via Getty Images)
 
 
 
The appropriation of the army to advance political interests has only been gaining momentum since the surgical strikes along the Line of Control (LoC), after the terrorist attack on military headquarters in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, who has been described as "one of the nine jewels" of his cabinet by PM Modi, has brazenly politicised the counter-attacks waged by India's security forces in the LoC. Among the many explosive comments he made after the operations, he attributed the core ideology of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) as the driving force behind the counter-strike. He also believes that true Indians must be unquestioningly loyal to the government's decisions and never doubt the official version of any event.

     BRATHEREN  bandicoot   YOU  ARE DITTO ON THE BULL(Uncastrated adult male )  "INDIAN  BANDICOOTS  MUST BELIEVE  & SUPPORT 'ALLAHAS'  VOICE BEING  EMANATED FROM  RAWALPINDI WHOSE  CURRENCY PRINTING PRESSES  AT KARACHI & PESHAWAR ARE MINTING INDIAN  CURRENCY TO BE DEPLOYED FOR THE LIBERATION (enslavement) OF BANDICOOTS IN INDIA"                                                                                         Vasundhra
 
 
 
EK  JAICHAND  KI  PUKAR 
 एक  जयचंद  की  पुकार 
 
 
Why must the contribution to society by a scientist who develops a life-saving vaccine or by a doctor who cures hundreds of suffering patients or by an economist whose policy has a tangible effect in improving the conditions of millions be regarded as any less noble or patriotic than those guarding our borders?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Wednesday, November 16, 2016

IMMORTAL STORY OF RUPEE रूपपहिया कि अमर कहानी

SOURCE:
http://www.msn.com/en-in/money/topstories/interesting-facts-about-the-rupee/ss-BBiBxxY?li=AAggbRN&ocid=iehp&parent-title=indias-cash-crunch-starts-to-choke-the-food-supply-chain&parent-ns=ar&parent-content-id=AAklZ1s&fullscreen=true#image=BBiBxxY|6



                                
                    IMMORTAL STORY OF RUPEE
                रूपपहिया  कि  अमर  कहानी




The basic unit of money in Sri Lanka Rupee equal to 100 cents

The basic unit of money in Seychelles, Rupee equal to 100 cents

The basic unit of money in Nepal, Rupee equal to 100 paisa

The basic unit of money in Mauritius, Rupee equal to 100 cents

The basic unit of money in Pakistan, Rupee equal to 100 paisa

The basic unit of money in India, Rupee equal to 100 paisa









In November 1994, printing of Re 1 note was stopped mainly due to higher cost and for freeing capacity to print currency notes of higher denomination.

After a gap of over 20 years, Re 1 note has been released in the country.

 Let's get to know our currency better.

 Here are some of the most amazing, lesser-known facts about the Indian rupee:



1) First Paper Currency


The process of issuing paper currency started in the 18th century. Private banks like Bank of Hindustan, Bank of Bengal, the Bank of Bombay, and the Bank of Madras were among the first to print paper money. 
It was only after the Paper Currency Act of 1861 that the government of India was given the monopoly to print currency.
(Image: One of the first Indian bank one rupee note printed in 1917)







3/25 SLIDES© RBI site

2) The highest denomination note ever printed by the RBI was the Rs 10,000 note in 1938 and again in 1954. These notes were demonetized in 1946 and again in 1978






4/25 SLIDES© RBI

3) The RBI can issue banknotes in the denominations of 5000 and 10,000, or any other denomination that the Central Government may specify. But, there can't be banknotes in denominations higher than 10,000 as per the current provisions of the RBI Act, 1934.





5/25 SLIDES© REX Features

4) What's the rupee made of?


Not paper! Your currency is composed of cotton and cotton rag.







6/25 SLIDES© Samuel Bourne/Spencer Arnold/Hulton Archive/Getty Images

5) Commemorative coins in India have been issued on various occasions.

The first 75 rupee coin was issued in 2010 to celebrate 75 years of Reserve Bank of India.

In 2011, 150 rupee coins were issued to commemorate the 150th birth anniversary of Rabindranath Tagore.  

The first 1000 rupee coin [ यह  मोदी से कैसे बच गया ] was announced in 2012, issued to commemorate the 1000 years of Brihadeeswarar temple in Thanjavur, Tamil Nadu.









7/25 SLIDES© AP Photo/Bikas Das

6) Coins can be issued up to the denomination of Rs. 1000 as per Coinage Act, 2011.








8/25 SLIDES© AP Photo/Ajit Solanki

7) 15 languages appear in the language panel of banknotes in addition to Hindi prominently displayed in the centre of the note and English on the reverse of the banknote.







9/25 SLIDES© AP Photo

8) Rupee symbol


In 2010, rupee got a new symbol ₹, designed by D.Udaya Kumar.

The symbol was derived from Devanagari letter "र" (ra) and is a combination of the Latin letter 'R' and Devanagari letter 'र'. The parallel line in the symbol is drawn to make it look like the tricolor of the Indian national flag.









10/25 SLIDES  

9) For the visually impaired


There is an identification mark (different geometrical shapes) on the left hand side of each note in the form of raised print (intaglio) - a diamond for Rs 1000, circle for Rs 500, triangle for Rs 100, square for Rs 50, rectangle for Rs 20 and none for Rs 10 - to help the visually impaired identify the denomination. 









11/25 SLIDES© AP Photo/Bikas Das

10) Mystery of the vanishing rupee


In 2007, an acute shortage of coins gripped the eastern Indian city of Calcutta, which saw shopkeepers begging change from beggars and buying coins at prices above their face value.

(Image: A woman selling stacks of 100 rupee coins (USD$ 2.5) for 120 rupees (UDS$ 3), counts notes at a bus stand in Calcutta, India Friday, June 15, 2007)









12/25 SLIDES  

11) When Re 1 coin was worth Rs 5


One reason cited for this acute shortage in Calcutta was: coins being melted down and smuggled to Bangladesh where they were turned into razor blades, ornaments, fountain pen nibs, metal idols.

The one rupee coin was actually worth Rs 35, for every single rupee coin was being melted into 5-7 blades, as per new reports.









13/25 SLIDES© Sanjit Das/Bloomberg

12) Cardboard tokens as coins


To counter the coin shortage in the East, workers in tea gardens in states bordering Bangladesh, were encouraged by the owners to accept brown-coloured cardboard tokens instead of the metallic coins.

The cardboard tokens were made of the same size as the coins they meant to represent, with similar values marked on them. 








14/25 SLIDES© AP Photo

13) Rupee vs dollar in 1947


The 'fact' that had been floating around that the rupee was equal to a US dollar in 1947 is but a myth.
At the time of independence (and till 1966), India’s currency was pegged to British pound, (and the exchange rate was Rs 13.33 to the pound). The pound itself was pegged to $4.03.
That means, the $ to INR rate would be somewhere around Rs 4.










15/25 SLIDES© Adeel Halim/Bloomberg

14) Notes are printed at four printing presses located at Nashik, Dewas, Mysore and Salboni.

Coins are minted at the four mints at Mumbai, Noida, Kolkata and Hyderabad








16/25 SLIDES© Adeel Halim/Bloomberg

15) Each mint carries its unique identifier shape/sign at the bottom of the coin (beneath the year).
 
Delhi mint - dotMumbai mint - diamond
Hyderabad mint - star
Kolkata mint - No mint mark









17/25 SLIDES© RBI

16) A rare 5-rupee note, dated January 5, 1916, issued by the Government of India in Karachi was sold for £3,100 ($5,297 U.S.) in a London auction conducted by Spink last year. (Source: Spink)

Karachi was then part of India, until 1947.








18/25 SLIDES© ANINDITO MUKHERJEE/epa/Corbi 
                   

17) During the British rule, and the first decade of independence, the rupee was divided into 16 annas. Each anna was subdivided into 4 paisas.

In 1957, decimalisation occurred and the rupee was divided into 100 naye paise (Hindi/Urdu for new paisas). After a few years, the initial "naye" was dropped.








19/25 SLIDES© RBI

18) The Rs 5-note was the first paper currency issued by RBI in January 1938. It had the portrait of King George VI.










20/25 SLIDES© REUTERS/Anindito Mukherjee 
                   

19) Initially, Pakistan used British Indian coins and notes simply over-stamped with "Pakistan".

New coins and banknotes were issued in 1948.










21/25 SLIDES© AP Photo/Biswaranjan Rout

20) The 500 rupee note was introduced in 1987 and 1000 rupee note in 2000.










22/25 SLIDES© Thom Lang/Corbis

21) A one-rupee coin and above can be used to pay/settle any amount or sum. However, a 50 paise coin cannot be used to pay/settle any amount above Rs 10.







23/25 SLIDES© SANJEEV GUPTA/epa/Corbis

22) Ever wondered how the old notes are destroyed?

According to the data obtained by RTI activist Manoranjan Roy, 11,661 crore notes lost their usable value (between 2001 and now) and were shredded to bits, to be later balled or gummed together, and be reborn as coasters, paper-weights, pen stands, key chains.

In 2010-11 alone, 1,385 crore notes worth Rs 1,78,830 crore were destroyed.







24/25 SLIDES© AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool

23) In 2013, a Mumbai-based jewelry chain launched Sachin Tendulkar gold and silver coins on the occasion of 'Akshay Tritya.' The cost of a 10-gm was Rs 34,000 (US$620) (Image above)

In 2014, Britain’s premium luxury goods brand East India Company issued an exclusive legal tender gold coin worth 12,000 pound sterling (about Rs 12 lakh) in honour of Sachin Tendulkar









25/25 SLIDES© REX/Courtesy Everett Collection

24) The tooled one rupee coin (with the portrait of King George VI, i.e., the Head on both the sides) in the 1975-cult classic 'Sholay', was bought by a Bollywood fan for Rs 26000 at an auction last year.











 

Sunday, November 13, 2016

Hatred And Subterfuge: Pakistan’s Proxy War On India

SOURCE:http://swarajyamag.com/magazine/hatred-and-subterfuge-pakistans-proxy-war-on-india




                 Hatred And Subterfuge

           : Pakistan’s Proxy War On India

                                       By

                         Syed Ata Hasnain -




  November 04, 2016



Snapshot

The Pakistan Army continues to follow the principles of irrationality and deniability as essential aspects of its military doctrine.



Through my years as a senior commander in the Indian Army, there was an annual feature which never escaped my attention. The yearly war game of my formation would invariably begin with a presentation by a new team each time on the psyche and mindset of the Pakistan Army. I considered it mandatory for all to know as much about the mind as about the weaponry or the tactics of our western adversary.


The Pakistan Army has invariably taken the initiative and risked escalation to attain what it may perceive as the national interest of Pakistan. However, its claims of advancing that interest are more than dubious in the eyes of most of the world. There is, however, much difference in the translation of what most of the world believes and what it officially puts out as its belief.

This has been the Pakistan Army’s major achievement brought about by a deep strategy of denial, subterfuge and management of perception. It has mastered all these and been helped to a great extent by the importance of the geostrategic real estate that Pakistan occupies. This real estate is in effect the confluence of five civilisations with competing interests of each of them. These civilisations are the Indian, Chinese, Central Asian, Persian and Arab.

The Pakistani strategic leadership, consciously or unconsciously, ascribes far greater significance to this aspect and attempts to wrest advantage due to it.

Any attempt to examine the mindset of the Pakistan Army and its deep set psyche has to take into account a few specifics. The partition of the subcontinent, the wars—1947-48, 1965 and 1971, the polity which allowed unbridled growth of aggressive self-aggrandisement, the dabbling in religion and the perceived sense of insecurity arising from the geographical comparison of the size of India and Pakistan. These are just some of the events and trends which shaped the strange mind of the Pakistan Army but may need examination to arrive at other characteristics which form the Pakistani national mindset too.

Perhaps the one most significant aspect which has contributed to the mindset of the “holier than thou” and “we know it all” attitude is a social one. When feudal practices persist and a social hierarchy prevails, those at the higher rungs become more authoritarian. The making of the plan for intrusion into the Kargil sector, as described by Pakistan’s Air Commodore M. Kaiser Tufail in his seminal article confirms this assumption.

The temptation in such analyses is to proceed sequentially with historical perspectives and arrive at deductions of what we find useful when related to the current situation. I am consciously reversing the approach by first stating what my observations are on the psyche and mindset of the Pakistan Army and then drawing a historical connect to those aspects which need it.




Pakistani army soldiers adjust a tank (A MAJEED/AFP/Getty Images)
Pakistani army soldiers adjust a tank (A MAJEED/AFP/Getty Images)

In a nation where the Army has contrived to create a legitimacy for its control over major aspects of governance and which is not even answerable to the highest judicial authority, a certain sense of disdain develops for all others. It is tremendously morale-boosting for the uniformed community; decisions can be taken without having to bear the responsibility for them; there cannot be a headier empowerment than that. So the Pakistan Army’s leadership continues to thrive with a dominant mood of antipathy towards India and the Indian Army. It means that all issues concerning defense and foreign affairs are its domain as the political leadership, intelligentsia, academics and diplomats cannot truly understand military threats. This is the old and the currently prevalent mindset which prevents the leadership from deep thinking on implications of its decisions.


Two classic examples need to be quoted. First there was Kargil, where Pervez Musharraf kept the other services and the government of the day outside the ambit of planning and even basic information, as described earlier. His disdain for the Indian civilian leadership made him take an unethical decision of not saluting India’s Prime Minister in 1999 during a visit to Lahore. He followed that by initiating a conflict in the Kargil theatre. However, he had not thought through his strategy which would lead to conflict termination and the contingency planning was terribly weak.
This happened in 1971 and 1965 too. In 1971, Yahya Khan should have anticipated the potential intervention by India if a humanitarian crisis was created in former East Pakistan. Yet he went ahead and acceded to the genocidal elimination of intellectuals and imposing the wrath of the Army on the hapless citizens in the rural areas, forcing them to flee across the border. In 1965, Ayub Khan’s terrible hurry to instigate a conflict before India’s refurbished Army came into shape got the better of Pakistan.

What makes the Pakistani Generals the world’s finest conflict initiators and the worst terminators? When you belong to a service which is so dominant and can take credit for success while ascribing failure to others, decision making becomes easier. Yet, it leads to a brasher mindset. To conclude that the Pakistan Army has learnt something from its errant ways would be a mistake. It continues to follow the principles of irrationality and deniability as essential aspects of its military doctrine. The decision to strike at Pathankot air base with sponsored terrorists in order to upset the gains of the initiatives in India-Pakistan relations is reflective of this.

The Pakistan Army’s major force multipliers over the last 30 years or so have been two agencies, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), and India-focused terror groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Together they form the “deep state”, the diffused leadership which runs Pakistan’s anti-India campaign. The ISI gained its experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 90s as the lead intelligence agency while simultaneously pursuing a low-key proxy war in India’s Punjab in the 1980s.

In 1989, as conditions presented themselves, the Pakistan Army was confident of making a successful switch from Punjab to Jammu & Kashmir. The risk of escalation was huge and the nuclear parameters of either side were still ill-defined. Yet Pakistan took the risk and its intent was partially achieved; the risk-taking business is part of the Pakistan Army’s “caution be damned” attitude.


While we may brush aside the failure of the Pakistan Army in 1965 and 1971, its ability to conceive a hybrid strategy for retribution against India as a nation and the Indian Army in particular, and then pursue it for close to 40 years is in itself a reason to bring about a mindset.

In all these 40 years, it has never been chided internationally, thus emboldening it even further. The understanding and recognition that the core centre of radical Islam lies in the Af-Pak region has never been denied by the international community, but the Indian intent of having Pakistan declared a rogue state sponsoring transnational terror too, has never been given the seriousness it deserved. This supposed moral victory has given the Pakistan Army the confidence and the perception that the world rarely sees threats in unison. It can, therefore, continue to target India through its hybrid variety of proxy war without fear.

Where did the idea of proxy war come from and how did it take shape?

To understand this, it is necessary to go back to 1972 and the Shimla Agreement. The devious Pakistani mind was on display and so was the trusting Indian attitude. Ninety-three thousand prisoners of war were handed over without an attempt to seek a permanent solution to our border problems. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto guided Pakistan’s destiny for close to six years. It was the period in which the Pakistan Army was licking its wounds. In the interim came India’s Pokhran nuclear test, forcing the decision on Pakistan to also seek the bomb. In 1977, Zia-ul-Haq struck, unseated Bhutto and assumed power.


Zia then conceived his diabolical plan for seeking retribution. The plan was twofold. The first was all about neutralising India’s conventional superiority through acquisition of nuclear weapons capability. This was earnestly and illegally pursued through the 1980s and 1990s. The second was to seek opportunities or create them to exploit India’s apparent fault lines.


The history of the Af-Pak region through the 1980s is all about the experience that Pakistan Army’s senior and middle leadership gained in Afghanistan leading the transnational mujahideen and acting as the US and Saudi Arabia’s frontline state. They also ran a side show in India’s Punjab. It is this that apparently convinced the Pakistan Army leadership that religion/faith were powerful tools of motivation which created fervour and passion and could be exploited for strategic gains.

The 1980s also saw the advent of the Saudi clergy into Pakistan making a beeline for the seminaries set up in the refugee camps; the radical ideology of the Salafis found unresisted advocacy here. It was the beginning of the radicalisation of the Pakistan Army and the use of faith as a strategic weapon, something Pakistan continues to reflect in its larger thinking.

The opportunity did not need to be created. It came faster than anticipated and right where the Pakistani military leadership wanted it; in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir. The runaway success in Afghanistan in forcing the Soviet withdrawal came to be associated with the last nail in the coffin of the Cold War. Pakistan became the favoured partner of the US-Saudi combine.

Pakistani army soldiers in a search operation at the Bacha Khan university (A MAJEED/AFP/Getty Images)
Pakistani army soldiers in a search operation at the Bacha Khan university (A MAJEED/AFP/Getty Images)

It was heady, and the taste of success with the hybrid form of warfare in Afghanistan gave the generals the confidence to try the same against the Indian Army, then stuck in the quagmire of Sri Lanka. It’s a measure of the confidence of the Pakistani military leadership that it did not flinch when the opportunity was sensed in spite of the fact that Zia-ul-Haq, the chief advocate and strategist, died at the threshold in August 1988. Weaker leaderships may have succumbed, but General Mirza Afzal Beg, a mohajir cavalry officer along with Lt Gen Hamid Gul, a Punjabi, again from the cavalry, and experienced in conduct of covert operations as Director General, ISI, took the required decisions.

Institutionally, both ISI and ISPR have been the Pakistan Army’s mainstay in the execution of its strategy against India. The ISI has done the dirty work of getting the jihadi elements on board, as well as recruiting, financing and launching them, while the ISPR has managed the perception, information and strategic communication game. The leadership continues to believe in the infallibility of its strategy despite the Kargil setback and the near-war situations which emerged in 2001-02 and later in 2008.


On both occasions, the threshold of India’s tolerance for proxy war was crossed, but it did not progress into a full showdown. India’s advocacy of seeking all options is likely to have given the Pakistan Army a mistaken perception that it (India) was far too obsessed with its economic progress for it to risk a confrontation which would probably set it back by many percentage points in the economy charts.


In many ways, the ISPR, the lesser known of the two sword arms of the Pakistan Army, has been far more effective in its ventures and contributed greatly to the Pakistani strategy. Denial is its responsibility, besides the whole gamut of psychological operations. But it has been the joint effort of the two in bringing the struggle in Kashmir to the streets. Retrieving a tactical or operational situation involving terrorists, intrusions, infiltration or incidents of the Hazratbal and Charar-e-Sharif variety, is never a major challenge for the Indian Army as has been proven many times. However, the Pakistan Army has done its research well on the effects of an Intifada movement, the like of which was seen in 2008-10 and is continuing even now in 2016 after it was triggered by the death of Burhan Wani.


Recovery from such a situation needs a transformational change as was attempted in 2011. In a private discussion with the Indian defence attaché in 2011, Shuja Pasha, the high-profile ISI chief is believed to have referred to the 2011 initiatives of the Indian Army. He reportedly admitted that the Pakistan establishment watched with wonderment how the Indian Army deftly switched the situation around with a change of strategy in the approach to the people.


The Pakistanis know it and have read our weaknesses too. They are aware of the civil-military divide, the media obsession, the inability to focus on the Kashmiri alienation and the woeful quality of the information game. Can it all be defeated this time? Perhaps, the Indian government’s ownership of the surgical strikes may have surprised them. If anything, some pragmatism about the limits of Pakistan’s interference in Kashmir and elsewhere in India may have dawned on the Pakistan Army.
That India can choose to execute non-escalatory actions and be brazen enough to not even produce evidence to the world is a noticeable departure from the past. Having tasted success and got the passionate support of the public behind it, the Indian government’s actions could be also perceived by the Pakistan Army as no longer predictable and may therefore impose some caution.


However, it is also entirely believable that irrationality continues to rule the Pakistan Army’s mindset. A self-belief that tactical nuclear weapons are the guarantee against India’s proactive strategy may continue to prevail and that could be the reason for brazenness.


The Pakistan Army’s belief in the strength of its relationship with China is also a major factor in promoting its errant ways. The coming of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has enhanced the mutuality of that relationship. As the US-India strategic partnership emerges, the China-Pakistan equation will only strengthen, adding further weight to the mindset that the Pakistan Army can get away with some irrational acts to keep the pot boiling in Kashmir and elsewhere in India.
Finally, has anything changed due to the surgical strikes? It would be unfair to deduce that these have had no effect. At the same time, to state that they have changed the mindset of the Pakistani military leadership and forced it to retract from its avowed policy of interference in Jammu & Kashmir would also be incorrect. What they have definitely achieved is the conveyance of a strategic message that India’s political leadership can and will take decisions and take them early enough; and that it is quite capable of playing a diplomatic game to isolate Pakistan. The combining of options is a lesson being slowly realised. However, India would do well to take precautions against a possible unpredictable and irrational act which will cause much dismay, emotive public response and pressure, and leave it with even lesser options than what it had after Uri.


You are reading 1 of 7 free articles for this week. Only Swarajya subscribers have unlimited access to all our articles.
Click here to subscribe for as little as Rs 299Already have an account? Log in