Saturday, December 9, 2017

INDIAN HISTORY MUSLIM PERIOD ; India Should Be Grateful to Alauddin Khilji for Thwarting the Mongol Invasions (r)

SOURCE:
https://thewire.in/203518/india-grateful-alauddin-khilji-thwarting-mongol-invasions/


India Should Be Grateful to Alauddin Khilji for Thwarting the Mongol Invasions


                               BY 

               


9 Sep 2017










Depiction of the Mongol siege of Baghdad, 1258. credit: Wikimedia


For the past month, Rajasthan has been convulsed by a controversy over the Bollywood movie, Padmavati, based on Padmavat – a prose-poem written by Malik Muhammad Jayasi in 1540 CE which uses Alauddin Khilji’s conquest of Chittor in 1303 CE and his supposed obsession with Rani Padmini of Chittor as a backdrop for its ficitional tale.
None of the politicians and activists accusing the film maker of denigrating the honour of the Rajput queen of Chittor, Padmini, and glorifying the “Muslim conqueror Khilji” has even seen the film yet.
Much of the controversy is fuelled by ill-feeling towards Khilji, based on the fact that he was an oppressive ruler to his subjects, who were mostly Hindu. So the possibility of romance – or even unrequited love – between a Muslim “villain” and a Hindu queen being depicted on screen, even as a fantasy, as has been rumoured, infuriates Hindu right-wing groups.

What is not well-known, however, is that Khilji, for all his faults, saved India from a fate much worse than even his own oppressive rule – that of the murderous Mongols, who tried to invade the Indian subcontinent six times during his reign as the sultan of Delhi, and failed miserably, thanks to his brilliance as a general, the quality, discipline, and bravery of his army and its commanders, and their superior military tactics.

A portrait of Allauddin Khilji, made in the 17th century. Credit: Wikimedia
What the Mongol invaders inflicted on Persia, the Caliphate of Baghdad, Russia, and elsewhere is well documented – genocide, the destruction of infrastructure, and the destruction of native culture, literature, and religious institutions. Their habit of leaving conquered countries as wastelands that would not spring back for at least a hundred years, and their tendency to rule even the regions they settled in, such as Russia, in an exploitative and backward way, are well-known to historians and laypersons alike.
Against this backdrop, one can safely argue that Alauddin Khilji, for all his faults, actually saved the syncretic culture of the Indian subcontinent of that time – which included Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist, and Jain subcultures – from enormous destruction, even if preserving the culture of India may not have been what motivated his resistance to the Mongols.
Indeed, Khilji is a classic study in the layered and complex nature of historical figures whom it is impossible to portray in the black-and-white terms that modern politics seems to demand.

 Khilji is rightly viewed negatively for his cruelty and brutality; but he should also, in fairness, be seen as the saviour of Hindustan that he unwittingly ended up being, by repelling the formidable and ruthless Mongol hordes.

The Mongols, scourge of God
The Mongols were largely illiterate, so much of their history was written by the people of the territories they conquered, such as the Islamic lands of the near east, and of China and Russia. Much of what we know about them is based on the writings of scholars such as Rashid al-Din and other Islamic scholars who lived in the time of the Mongols.
The Mongol dynasty was founded in 1206 CE, when a council of Mongol tribesmen elected the warrior Temujin as their leader and conferred upon him, at the age of 44, the title of Genghis – meaning “Mighty” – Khan. In the Indian subcontinent, he is known as Changez Khan. Radiating outwards from Mongolia, the Mongols, first under Genghis and, after his death in 1227 CE, under his sons and grandsons, embarked upon a plan of global conquest that resulted in the largest land empire in history – conquering China, Russia, Central Asia, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and eastern Europe (parts of Hungary and Poland), and left a trail of death and destruction behind them.
The map below shows the extent of the Mongol empire in 1294 CE, which is just two years before Alauddin Khilji ascended the throne of Delhi.







The extent of the Mongol empire, circa 1294











Upon Genghis Khan’s death, the Mongol empire was partitioned into four parts. Eventually, these became the [a] Yuan dynasty in China, famous for Genghis’s grandson Kublai Khan; [b]  the Golden Horde in Russia, which was founded by Genghis’s grandson Batu Khan; the [c ] Chaghatai Khanate of Central Asia, headquartered around Uzbekistan, founded by Genghis’s son Chaghatai Khan; and the [d ]Ilkhanate of western Asia, founded by Genghis’s grandson Hulagu Khan. The Mongols were the dominant military power in the world from the rise of Genghis Khan until at least the middle of the 14th century. With the exception of a few minor defeats involving small forces in battle, such as the 

 Battle of Ayn Jalut, click/google  url to read further [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Ain_Jalut ]    no military could defend itself against their onslaught.

The Mongols, being nomads, usually did not settle in the lands they conquered. Their goals were simple: exact tributes and treasure from the kingdoms they had conquered, and take from them the latest technology they possessed, in addition to the most beautiful women for their harem and the most able-bodied men for their military. They would demand all this from any nation before actually attacking them. If the ruler accepted their suzerainty and paid the stiff tribute demanded, the Mongols would leave his kingdom unharmed. If he refused, they would raze that kingdom to the ground and leave behind a wasteland. As Curtin describes it,

 “The Mongols destroyed every living thing; even the cats and dogs in the city were killed by them.”

The Mongols themselves had no unique religious identity, and the Mongol nation was a fairly secular multi-ethnic meritocracy from the time of Genghis Khan. Hence, religion was not a strong motivating factor in their attacks. As an example, Hulagu was a mixture of the traditional Mongol religion of Tengrism and Buddhism, and his wife was Nestorian Christian.

Hulagu Khan. Credit: Wikimedia
The Mongols did not just invade and conquer; they exterminated civilisations. To give just an idea, during Genghis’s invasion of the Persian Empire, these were the number of people put to death in some of the cities overcome by the Mongols in 1222 CE: Urgench, 1 million; Merv, 700,000; Nishapur, 1.7 million; Rey, 500,000 (an estimate based on the order that every male should be killed in a city of approximately a million people); and Herat, 1.6 million. That’s nearly 6 million people just from these cities, at a time when the world population is estimated at 400 million. In other words,

 the Mongols are said to have killed 1.5% of the world population in a single campaign.

When Hulagu Khan – known in the Indian subcontinent as ‘Halaku’ – sacked Baghdad in 1258, he is believed to have killed several hundred thousand people. His own estimate of the death toll was 200,000. He single-handedly ended what is known as the Islamic Golden Age. Ibn Iftikhar, quoting Islamic scholars, writes, 

“the Mongols stormed the country and killed everyone they were able to find, including men, women, children, old, young, sick, and healthy. People would try to hide inside wells, gardens, and they even fled towards the hills and mountains. However, the Mongols would continue on, finding even people on the rooftops of their homes and inside the mosques. The streets ran blood ‘like rainwater in a valley.’
He also reports, “The Mongols destroyed mosques, palaces, grand buildings, hospitals, and libraries. The Mongols raided the House of Wisdom itself. The Tigris river ran black from the ink of the books that were thrown into the river, mixed with the blood of the slain.” The destruction the Mongols wreaked on the Muslim world was so great – it came close to wiping out Islamic civilisation – that most Muslims of the time viewed it as a form of divine retribution for the sins they had committed.
The Golden Horde under Batu Khan invaded Russia in 1238-1240 CE with the same brutality as in the other cases described above. Entire populations of towns like Ryazan and Kiev were massacred. But what is even more interesting about the Russian invasion is the effect of Mongol rule on a country in which they actually settled and ruled for 250 years. As Cicek explains,
“Soviet historians argued that the Mongol invasion greatly delayed Russia’s economic development. Tribute payments and the destruction of commercial centers delayed the growth of a money economy. The town economies based on handicrafts were completely destroyed, throwing Russia back by several centuries. The economy of Europe, however, flourished in this period, preparing the necessary ground for the industrial revolution. The Mongols also prevented the agricultural development of Russia, which further worsened the commercial position of Russia, especially in comparison to the West. Russia not only lost the vital trade route of the Dvina River but also lost some of its territories in the west to Lithuania, Sweden, and the Teutonic Knights. To summarize, the net effect of the Tatar yoke on the Russian economy, according to Soviet historians, was overwhelmingly negative. The Mongols gave nothing but destruction and looting to the Russian people.”
The sacking of Suzdal by Batu Khan. Credit: Wikimedia


 What they did was plunge Russia into its ‘Dark Age.’ Another destructive legacy of the Mongols in their 250-year rule of Russia was the institution of serfdom.

         Khilji’s repulsion of the Mongol                                   
                     invasions of India

Alauddin Khilji was born in Delhi in 1266 CE, lived his entire life in the Indian subcontinent, and ruled as sultan of Delhi from 1296 CE – 1316 CE. By any definition, he would have to be called an Indian monarch, not a foreign invader. As a ruler, he would prove himself to be one of India’s greatest warrior kings and one of the world’s great military geniuses.

Historical details about the Khiljis are obtained from fundamental sources such as Ferishta, who lived during the time of the sultan of Bijapur, Ibrahim Adil Shah II, and Ziauddin Barani, who lived at the time of Mohammad Bin Tughlaq and Firuz Shah Tughlaq. These accounts are well-summarised in the works of eminent contemporary historians such as K.S. Lal, Satish Chandra, and Peter Jackson.

Khilji greatly expanded the empire that he inherited from his uncle, Sultan Jalaluddin Khilji, after killing him. Many of his conquests were of kingdoms ruled by Hindu kings, including Chittor, Devgiri, Warangal (from where he acquired the famous Kohinoor diamond), Gujarat, Ranthambore, and the Hoysala and Pandya kingdoms. He was able to do all this not because these other kingdoms were weak, but because he was a great soldier and general with a well-trained and disciplined army, using superior Turkic cavalry and infantry tactics, and had built a solid economic base which provided him with the resources to finance these campaigns.

During Khilji’s rule, the Mongols of the Chaghatai Khanate under Duwa Khan repeatedly tried to invade the Indian subcontinent. The attacks that occurred during the reign of Alauddin Khilji were not the first time that the Mongols had invaded India. But, as Lal puts it, “All these were minor invasions as compared with those that occurred in the time of Alauddin; and it was the good fortune of India that the most tremendous assaults were delivered to this country when a strong monarch like Alauddin was the ruler.”

Khilji, by his military brilliance, managed to defeat the Mongols not once, but five times, and avoided defeat a sixth time even when taken by surprise, as the Mongols attacked with massive forces.
The first invasion attempt was carried out in 1298 CE, and involved 100,000 horsemen. Alauddin sent an army commanded by his brother Ulugh Khan and the general Zafar Khan, and this army comprehensively defeated the Mongols, with the capture of 20,000 prisoners, who were put to death.
In 1299 CE, the Mongols invaded again, this time in Sindh, and occupied the fort of Sivastan. Alauddin despatched  Zafar Khan to defeat them and recapture the fort, which he did, even without the need for siege machines.
The Battle of Kili
This humiliating defeat prompted Duwa Khan to attempt another full-scale assault on India in 1299 CE, and he sent his son, Qutlugh Khwaja, with 200,000 soldiers, determined to finish off the Delhi Sultanate once and for all. The Mongol army came fully equipped for this assault on Delhi and for a long campaign, with sufficient food provisions. Alauddin’s own advisors were panic-stricken and advised him not to confront the dreaded Mongols who had come in such force.
It should be mentioned here that Alauddin’s predecessor, Jalaluddin, had averted war with the Mongols in a previous attack by agreeing to humiliating demands from them. But Alauddin was determined to fight to the end. As Lal describes it, he told his advisor,
“How could he hold the sovereignty of Delhi if he shuddered to encounter the invaders? What would his contemporaries and those adversaries who had marched two thousand kos to fight him say when he ‘hid behind a camel’s back’? And what verdict would posterity pronounce on him? How could he dare show his countenance to anybody, or even enter the royal harem, if he was guilty of cowardice, and endeavoured to repel the Mongols with diplomacy and negotiations? … ‘Come what may, I am bent upon marching tomorrow into the plain of Kili, where I propose joining in battle with Qutlugh Khwaja.’”
Alauddin met Qutlugh Khwaja at Kili, and the day was won by the bravery and martyrdom of his general Zafar Khan. (That the Mongols retreated because of Zafar Khan’s actions is the only explanation postulated by Barani, and quoted by Lal and Chandra; however, Jackson doubts this explanation and says the real reason the Mongols withdrew was that Qutlugh Khwaja was mortally wounded in the battle, a fact confirmed by other sources.) The defeated Mongols went back to their country without stopping once on the way.
After Chittor, a surprise challenge
However, Duwa Khan was not satisfied. In 1303 CE, he again sent a huge force of 120,000 horsemen to attack Delhi, under General Taraghai. This was, unfortunately for Alauddin, immediately after his long battle with and victory over the kingdom of Chittor. That Alauddin was busy with his attack on Chittor was known to Taraghai, and was one of the key factors in his planning. Alauddin was taken completely by surprise. His army was greatly depleted and had suffered great losses in equipment in the battle for Chittor. He tried to get reinforcements from other parts of the empire, but the Mongols had blocked all the roads to Delhi.

Yet Alauddin did not lose heart, and fought a gallant defensive battle. Lal explains it thus:
“Sultan Alauddin gathered together whatever forces he had in the capital, and arrayed his forces in the plains of Siri. As it was impossible to fight the Mongols in an open engagement with so small an army, Alauddin decided to exhaust the patience of the besiegers by strengthening his defence lines. On the east of Siri lay the river Jamuna, and on the south-west was the old citadel of Delhi, although by the time of Taraghai’s invasion it had not been repaired. In the south lay the dense jungle of Old Delhi. The only vulnerable side, therefore, was the north, where the Mongols had pitched their camp.”
Alauddin dug trenches and built ramparts and created a strong defensive position that made it impossible for Taraghai to defeat him. After two months of trying hard to break Alauddin’s defences, Taraghai lost patience and returned home. This was clearly brilliant generalship under extremely adverse circumstances which would have meant certain defeat for anyone who was not as resolute and as resourceful.
This close shave made Alauddin realize the need for stronger defence of the capital, and he took various measures, such as constructing a wall, repairing forts, and the like. As a result, Delhi was never again at risk of conquest by the Mongols.
In 1305 CE, seeking to avenge their previous defeats, the Mongols invaded again, under the leadership of Taraghai, Ali Beg, and Tartaq, with a force of 50,000 horsemen. Taraghai was killed in a preliminary clash even before arriving in Delhi, but Ali Beg and Tartaq pushed on. Knowing Delhi to be strongly defended, they started plundering the countryside of Avadh.  Alauddin sent a force of 30,000 to 40,000 horsemen with the general Malik Nayak to meet the Mongols and inflicted a crushing defeat on them on December 30, 1305. Twenty thousand horses belonging to the enemy were captured, and most of the soldiers were slaughtered. 8000 prisoners of war were brought to Delhi, including the two generals, who were subsequently beheaded.
The last attempt to invade the Delhi Sultanate was made by Duwa in 1306 CE, just before his death, when he sent the generals Kubak and Iqbalmand with an army of 50,000 to 60,000 horsemen. Kubak advanced in the direction of the Ravi river, and Iqbalmand advanced in the direction of Nagor. Alauddin dispatched his favorite general, Malik Kafur, to deal with the Mongols. Kafur defeated Kubak in a battle on the Ravi and captured him alive. He then intercepted the second force at Nagor and defeated that as well. Only 3000 or 4000 soldiers remained of the Mongol invasion force.
Thus, Alauddin Khilji achieved what no other ruler in the world, east or west, had achieved. He repeatedly repulsed and defeated large-scale invasions by the Mongols, who had been an unstoppable force wherever they had gone — Russia, China, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Europe. He was able to repel forces of up to 200,000 Mongol horsemen. In comparison, the force that Hulagu took with him to Baghdad and used to completely destroy the Caliphate had only 150,000 horsemen.
The Mongols had not become weak and feeble since the sack of Baghdad in 1258 – this was not the reason for Alauddin’s success. As an illustration, his uncle who preceded Alauddin as Sultan of Delhi preferred to “make a settlement, giving the Mongols very favourable terms”, to use Lal’s words. Alauddin’s own advisors advised him in 1299 CE to submit rather than fight the feared Mongols; but Alauddin Khilji proved superior to his formidable Mongol foes.

The Alai Darwaza in delhi, commissioned by Alauddin Khilji. Credit: Wikimedia
Khilji’s legacy to the Indian subcontinent
From the knowledge of how other countries fared under the Mongols, it is fair to say that had the Mongols conquered India, India would have likely been set back at least two or three hundred years in its development. A large part of the knowledge and culture that had been accumulated in India over millenia might well have been destroyed. Every library, school, temple, mosque and even home would have likely been burnt to the ground. As the Russian experience shows, even if the Mongols had settled down in the Indian subcontinent (an unlikely proposition, given the hot Indian weather), the consequences for India would probably not have been savoury.
So the Mongols were not like any other invader. If Khilji had lost to the Mongols, the outcome would not have been as benign as when Ibrahim Lodi lost to Babur. In that case, one ‘foreign’ ruler who had recently made India his home was replaced by another, but the Indian subcontinent itself did not suffer greatly. If the Mongols had won against Khilji, they would probably have wiped a large percentage of India’s cultural heritage off the map of the world. 

If we have ancient traditions in India that survive to this day, a large part of the credit for that has to go to Alauddin Khilji, one of history’s greatest warrior-kings.

 By all accounts, Alauddin Khilji was not a benevolent king to his subjects. But he also was a brave soldier and a brilliant general who saved the Indian subcontinent from certain destruction. Of course, Khilji did not resist the Mongols to save Indian culture and civilisation; he did what he did to save himself. But that is true of every ruler who defends their kingdom against a foreigner, whether that be Shivaji, Rana Pratap, or Laxmibai of Jhansi.

These days, it is becoming increasing common to paint one-dimensional portraits of people: “Hindu hero,” “Islamic tyrant,” “Islamic hero,” etc. But the problem with such stereotypes is that people are not monolithic — they are complex and layered.

 The man you hate as a Muslim bigot may also be the reason you are a Hindu today.

 Was Alauddin Khilji a bigot?
The story of Alauddin Khilji shows us that we need to understand history in its entirety. Just as most Indians are unaware of Alauddin Khilji’s role in stopping many Mongol invasions, even the image of Khilji as someone who persecuted Hindus is based on an incomplete understanding of history.
To be sure, Khilji was an extremely cruel, suspicious and vindictive man, and meted out barbaric punishments to those who antagonised him. But his cruelty was impartial, and made no distinction between Hindus and Muslims.
Historians are generally agreed that while Alauddin Khilji was a cruel despot, he was not a bigot. He was a pragmatist.
One statement that has been widely circulated in recent times as proof of Alauddin’s bigotry comes from Ziauddin Barani, who mentions (Kulke and Rothermund) that Alauddin asked wise men to 

 “supply some rules and regulations for grinding down the Hindus, and for depriving them of that wealth and property which fosters rebellion. The Hindu was to be so reduced as to be left unable to keep a horse to ride on, to carry arms, to wear fine clothes, or to enjoy any of the luxuries of life.”
The first thing one needs to understand about this statement is the source. As Peter Jackson explains, Barani himself was an extreme bigot, writing in his Tarikh-i-Firuz-Shah that Hindus should be looted and enslaved and the Brahmins, in particular, should be massacred en masse. Some of what Barani writes about Alauddin, therefore, reflects his own prejudice more than Alauddin’s. In fact, there are many places where he disapproves of Alauddin as having been too soft on Hindus.
The next thing to understand is that the main revenue of the state came from agriculture, and most of the farmers were Hindus. Alauddin needed to finance his expensive military campaigns, and for this, he levied heavy taxes on the farmers — and hence the Hindus. This was rightly viewed as oppression; but the motivation for the oppression was fiscal, not religious.
An additional motivation for Alauddin in impoverishing the farmers was that there was a constant threat of rebellion against him. This threat arose both from the wealthy farmers as well as from the Muslim nobility. Alauddin acted with equal brutality in suppressing both threats. A poor farmer was not a threat.
Other instances of brutality that Alauddin engaged in were during his conquests. It just happened that many of his conquests were of Hindu rajas and, as Lal explains it, “It is true that during the process of conquest, atrocities were committed, but in times of war suffering is inevitable. With the establishment of peace and order, no organised persecution of Hindus was possible.”
That religion and religious doctrine were anyway secondary to administrative policy for Alauddin are clear from an exchange that Barani notes between Alauddin and the cleric Qazi Mughis, in which Alauddin says:
To prevent rebellions in which thousands perish, I issue such orders as I conceive to be for the good of the state, and the benefit of the people. Men are heedless, disrespectful, and disobey my commands. I am then compelled to be severe and bring them to obedience. I do not know whether this is according to the sharia, or against the sharia; whatever I think for the good of the state or suitable for the emergency, that I decree.
Even the much-reviled religious tax, the jaziyah, was levied rather inconsistently, as Chandra points out: “Jaziyah as a separate tax affected only a small section in the towns. As such, it could hardly be considered a device for forcing conversion to Islam.”
In conclusion, it seems clear from various historical sources that the rule of Alauddin Khilji was not characterized by bigotry. And it would not have been practical, in any case, to indulge in large-scale discrimination against the Hindu majority — not only for Alauddin, but for any sultan, for the rulers were in the minority. As Barani says, Iltutmish, one of Alauddin’s predecessors, once explained to his clergy that Muslims were as scarce in India as “salt in a dish of food,” and hence he could not afford to be too harsh with the Hindus.


 Seshadri Kumar is an R&D Chemical Engineer with a BTech from IIT Bombay and an MS and a PhD from the University of Utah, U.S. He writes regularly on political, social, economic, and cultural affairs at www. leftbrainwave.com.
The author would like to thank the following people for reading drafts of this article and offering valuable suggestions that have greatly improved it: Ajoy Ashirwad, Anirban Mitra, Prof. Harbans Mukhia, Prof. Partho Sarathi Ray, Ramdas Menon, and Sandhya Srinivasan. The author would also like to thank all those who participated in discussing an earlier and much shorter version of this article that he had posted on Facebook — those discussions have helped sharpen the focus and improve this expanded version
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KILLING MACHINE “Slaughterbots” Kill “As much death as you want”

SOURCE:
 https://thebulletin.org/%E2%80%9C-much-death-you-want%E2%80%9D-uc-berkeleys-stuart-russell-%E2%80%9Cslaughterbots%E2%80%9D11328


              THIS WAS TO HAPPEN - THE BIBLE 





                     [MAKE IN INDIA]

                    KILLING  MACHINE


                      “Slaughterbots”


   “Kill As much death as you want”

    : UC Berkeley's Stuart Russell on

                  “Slaughterbots”


                                                                      By
  

                   Lucien Crowder
                                       [  https://youtu.be/9CO6M2HsoIA ]
5 DECEMBER 2017



Not many films advocating arms control will get hundreds of thousands of hits on YouTube. But not every film advocating arms control comes with a title such as “Slaughterbots.”
At 7 minutes and 47 seconds, “Slaughterbots” is fast-moving, hyper-realistic, anxiety-laden, and deeply creepy. If you’ve never heard of swarming drones before, this is just the short film to turn you against them forever. If you never dreamed that those toy-like drones from off the shelf at the big-box store could be converted—with a bit of artificial intelligence and a touch of shaped explosive—into face-recognizing assassins with a mission to terminate you—well, dream it.

The set-up is simple enough. The CEO of something called StratoEnergetics takes to a stage and demonstrates to a live audience his company’s newest product: a tiny drone equipped with face recognition technology, evasive capabilities, and a deadly explosive charge. The drone, after showing off some tricks, blasts open the skull of a luckless mannequin. Things get much weirder from there.

The prime mover behind the film is Stuart Russell, a professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley. Here, Russell checks in with the Bulletin to explain how the film was made, how little stands between us and the drone apocalypse, and what the prospects are for banning autonomous weapons before they get truly out of hand.

LUCIEN CROWDER: The slaughterbot video was really well done. It's quite disturbing, as it was evidently intended to be. I won't be showing it to my 10-year-old son. How was that video put together?

STUART RUSSELL: It started with a thought that I had. We were failing to communicate our perception of the risks [of autonomous weapons] both to the general public and the media and also to the people in power who make decisions—the military, State Department, diplomats, and so on. So I thought if we made a video, it would be very clear what we were talking about.

So just to give you one example of the level of misunderstanding, I went to a meeting with a very senior Defense Department official. He told us with a straight face that he had consulted with his experts, and there was no risk of autonomous weapons taking over the world, like Skynet [the runaway artificial intelligence from the Terminator  movies
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1340138/videoplayer/vi1249751321?ref_=tt_ov_vi       [google to open ]

 If he really had no clue what we were talking about, then probably no one else did either, and so we thought a video would make it very clear. What we were trying to show was the property of autonomous weapons [to] turn into weapons of mass destruction automatically because you can launch as many as you want.

So I wrote a one-page treatment of how I thought a short video would go. I happened to meet some people who were capable of producing the movie, and we exchanged a few ideas. Eventually they produced a script, and reiterated the script—I would say not much of my original treatment remained. The idea for the CEO presentation came entirely from the production company. So then once we had roughly agreed on how a script might look, we got funding from the Future of Life Institute, and then we did the production.


CROWDER: Well, it came out great. As you're aware, it can be very, very hard to communicate risk to the public in a way that really makes an impression, and I think this succeeded in a way that very few things do. Where did the name “slaughterbots” come from? That's catchy.

RUSSELL: We were casting around because we kept calling them, for want of a better word, “drones”—even though we know that a drone is a remotely piloted vehicle and it upsets the American [government and military] terribly when we use the word “drones” to refer to autonomous weapons. The Americans, I guess for good reason, do not want their remotely piloted drones to be caught up in this whole treaty discussion at all. We just thought and thought and thought, and we came up with dozens of different ideas for what they might be called [once] they're already in common use. I think “slaughterbots” came from the production team, but it was one of 10 or 15 names that we came up with.
CROWDER: Well, I think you chose the right one. The slaughterbot shown in the opening scene, the one that recognized and killed the mannequin—how was that done? I imagine that it was a remote-control drone and not an AI-enabled device—is that right?
RUSSELL: It's completely computer-generated.
CROWDER: There was no physical flying vehicle at all? Well, it was quite realistic.
RUSSELL: No, they did a great job. Even the one that sits in [the CEO’s] hand, it's all computer-generated.
CROWDER: My goodness. Now, you say in the coda to the video that the dystopia it describes is still preventable. What part of the slaughterbot technology package isn't available yet? I imagine it would be the AI, because the rest of it seems relatively simple.
RUSSELL: Well, the AI is basically available as well. All the bits [one would need to] do, we know how to do. It's probably easier than building a self-driving car chip, partly because [slaughterbots have] a much lower performance requirement. A slaughterbot only has to be 90 percent reliable, or even 50 percent would be fine. So the technology is already essentially feasible. I think it would still take a good engineering effort to produce something like what you see in the movie, but it doesn't require research breakthroughs. People who say "Oh, all this is decades in the future" either don't know what they're talking about or are deliberately saying things they don't believe to be true.
I think at the moment it would take a good team of PhD students and post docs to put together all the bits of the software and make it work in a practical way. But if I wanted to do a one-off—a quadcopter that could fly into a building, find a particular person based on visual face recognition, and give them a rose or something like that—I think we could do that in a few months. And if you wanted to produce [something] high-quality, miniaturized, mass-produced, and weaponized, [you] would also probably want to have evasive maneuvers and the ability for many of them to attack an individual at once if necessary, and that kind of thing. So it would be more work, but—if you think about a wartime crash project like the Manhattan Project—I would guess [it would take] less than two years.

CROWDER: Well, that's not very encouraging to hear.
RUSSELL: It's not very encouraging. [But it doesn’t make sense to argue that a treaty on autonomous weapons] is completely pointless—that all you would achieve with the treaty is [to] put the weapons in the hands of the bad guys and not the good guys.

We have a chemical weapons treaty. Chemical weapons are extremely low-tech. You can go on the web and find the recipe for pretty much every chemical weapon ever made, and it's not complicated to make them—but the fact that we have the Chemical Weapons Convention means that nobody is mass-producing chemical weapons. And if a country is making small amounts and using them, like Syria did, the international community comes down on them extremely hard. I think the chemical weapons treaty has been successful [even though] it is not hard for bad guys to make chemical weapons. The whole point is you keep large quantities off the market, and that has a huge impact. The same would be true with these kinds of weapons.
CROWDER: It seems to me it would be reasonably straightforward to enforce a ban against autonomous weapons in the hands of national militaries, but regulating against slaughterbots in civilian hands would be a different issue—but I guess you just answered that?
RUSSELL: As time goes by, it will become easier for non-state actors to make autonomous weapons, at least in small quantities. But if you're making small quantities, you may as well pilot them yourself. There is no real reason to make them autonomous. For the time being, human pilots are going to be more effective, and if you're only doing a few dozen, you may as well have human pilots. So it's only when you want to scale up, and go to tens of thousands, that you can't use human pilots and you have to make them autonomous.
CROWDER: I see. Now wouldn't one approach for lethal autonomous weapons in private hands be to include safeguards in commercially available drones? I saw a reference to this in a report on autonomous weapons by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The report suggested that you could include hardware features that limited the devices’ functions, or software that allowed the devices to be de-activated. Do you think that sort of thing would be effective?
RUSSELL: Well, all computer security measures can be defeated, but it is still useful to have them. Geo-coding, so [a device] can't go outside the country where you bought it, for example, would be good. Because you certainly want to prevent them from being used to start wars. And the kill switch is something that the Federal Aviation Administration is talking about requiring. I don't know if they have actually done it yet, but they're talking about requiring it for all drones above a certain size in the US. As with the Chemical Weapons Convention, you would want industry cooperation, so [companies] would be required to verify the bona fides of customers, and they would be required to report orders above a certain quantity, and so on.
CROWDER: They would be required to verify the identities of customers?
RUSSELL: [Yes, as with] chemical companies—if someone orders 500 tons of some chemical that is a precursor of a chemical weapon, they can't just ship it to them. They have to find out who they are.
CROWDER: That makes sense.
RUSSELL: So in some sense, [industry is a] party to the [Chemical Weapons Convention], and that was very important in its success. That wasn't true for the Biological Weapons Convention—in fact, a big weakness was a lack of verification and a lack of requirements for industry cooperation.
CROWDER: I see. Now, the CEO in the video says that these devices can evade pretty much any countermeasure and can't be stopped. But military history, it seems to me, is pretty much a story of measures and countermeasures and further countermeasures, and weapons eventually becoming obsolete. Do you agree with what the CEO said, or were you having him engage in a bit of salesmanship?
RUSSELL: Well, of course, he would say that—wouldn't he? But to my knowledge, there aren't any effective countermeasures. There is a laser weapon the Navy is using that can shoot down one fixed-wing drone at a time. It seems that it has to be a fairly large fixed-wing drone, and [the laser] has to focus energy on it for quite a while to do enough damage to bring it down. But I suspect that would not be effective against very large swarms. People talk about electromagnetic pulse weapons [as countermeasures], but I think you can harden devices against that. And then we get into stuff that is classified, and I don't know anything about that. I know that [the Defense Department] has been trying for more than a decade to come up with effective defenses and I'm not aware of any.
CROWDER: Now, is it implausible for me to think that if you were talking about two militaries, they could simply deploy drone swarms against each other—sort of like miniature air forces—and they could fight it out in the air?
RUSSELL: As a form of anti-swarm defense?
CROWDER: Yes, more or less. The same way that fighter planes go after bombers.
RUSSELL: Yeah, I mean that's a possibility, but it means you kind of have to have them prepositioned pretty much everywhere that someone might attack.
CROWDER: Right.
RUSSELL: It [also] doesn't fill me with confidence [when] some people say "Oh, yeah, we will just have personal anti-swarm defenses that we will carry around with us."
CROWDER: I don't particularly want to have to do that myself.
RUSSELL: No.
CROWDER: Now, in the coda to the video, you mention that artificial intelligence has enormous potential to benefit humanity, even in defense. I wonder if you were referring to the idea, which some people propose, that robotic soldiers might behave better in battle than humans do—more ethically, so to speak—because they lack emotions. Or were you talking about something else?
RUSSELL: No, I'm not talking about that. I'm talking about the fact that [artificial intelligence] can help with surveillance [and] analysis of intelligence data… . It can help with logistical planning, tactics, strategy, and defensive weaponry [that] even current antimissile defense systems use. I mean, they are simple forms of AI, but they're pretty effective. The [Defense Department] has been using AI already, in many of these areas, for a long time.
Some people mistake our goal as [banning] AI in the military, or even [banning] AI, and we're not saying any of those things. We're just saying [that] once you turn over the decision to kill to the machine… . Just like Google can serve a billion customers without having a billion employees—how does it do that? Well, the software has a loop in it that says “for i = 1 to 1 billion, do.” And if you need more hardware, you just buy more hardware. It's the same with death. Once you turn over the ability to kill to the machine, you can have as much death as you want.
CROWDER: That's a vivid way of putting it. Last month, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons held its first talks on autonomous weapons via a group of governmental experts. My impression is that basically they agreed to keep talking about it, though members of the Non-Aligned Movement came out in favor of a ban on autonomous weapons. Is that roughly accurate?
RUSSELL: Yes, I think that's right. Some people are disappointed. I think it depends on how optimistic you were in the first place. I think some people were worried that various nations might just throw a spanner in the works and prevent the talks from moving ahead at all. The way that the [Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons] works, you kind of require a consensus from everyone in order to move ahead. So the fact that everyone agreed to continue the talks next year is a small victory, and certainly the Non-Aligned statement was pretty positive. In the normal scheme of how things move in the diplomatic process, I think we could say that progress was satisfactory. One would hope that over time, it will just become more and more the norm of international dialogue that countries will support a ban, or something resembling a ban. France and Germany actually tried to get agreement on what they called a political declaration—not a treaty, but a kind of statement of principle that people can sign up to, saying essentially that there has to be meaningful human control over lethal attacks. I don't think that they got much momentum with that, but again, their goal was to avoid scaring off some of the countries that were not necessarily in favor of a treaty, so that things can keep moving forward.
CROWDER: Could you name the countries that are the prime suspects for throwing a spanner in the works?
RUSSELL: I think you would have to say, at the moment, Russia—based on some of the things they were saying. You got the sense that they didn't really want this process moving forward, that they wanted the right to develop whatever weapons they felt like developing. Of course, they don't always just say it like that. [They say], well, “we want to make sure that a treaty doesn't infringe on peaceful uses of AI, which could be very beneficial to humanity.” Which of course is kind of nonsense. We have a Biological Weapons Treaty, but that hasn't stopped us from doing research on biology for the benefit of humanity. Experts [on artificial intelligence] do not feel that a treaty would be a threat to their own research.
CROWDER: All right, then, let me ask one final question. How do you see the prospects for a treaty banning autonomous weapons—or, if not a ban treaty, an effective international instrument that would improve security?
RUSSELL: I would say that, if I was a betting person, I think the odds of having a ban in place within the next decade are less than 50/50. I could see something weaker than that, which could amount to sort of an informal moratorium, where nations could adopt something similar to what the US already has in Directive 3000.09 [a Defense Department policy statement declaring that “Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force”]. There are [also] confidence-building measures, like notifying each other of new weapon systems, and that kind of stuff. There's a whole continuum of measures that you can have. I think that we may see some of that, and it may be enough to give us time to work toward a treaty. A treaty may not be a total ban. It may be a partial ban—for example, a ban on antipersonnel weapons. But it might allow for autonomy in submarine warfare or aerial combat, where the weapon-of-mass-destruction characteristic doesn't apply so much.

                     SAMPLES OF 

                “Slaughterbots”


StratoEnergetics introduces new Slaughterbot autonomous weapon

Looking like an iPhone rollout or creepy TED Talk, this sci-fi PSA from the group Stop Autonomous Weapons looks at a possible near future of autonomous drones trained to kill a specific human target.
They even set up a creepy StratoEnergetics manufacturer website:
It's created by Stop Autonomous Weapons, a group dedicated to bringing pressure to update the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to explicity include autonomous weapons:
Representatives from more than 70 states are expected to attend the first meeting of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems on 13-17 November 2017, as well as participants from UN agencies such as UNIDIR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.
This is not the first time that nations have discussed this topic at the CCW. In 2014-2016, the CCW held three informal meetings of experts, each approximately one week long, to discuss lethal autonomous weapons systems. At their last meeting in April 2016, states agreed for the first time on recommendations for future action, proposing the establishment of an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to move deliberations to the next level. At the CCW’s Fifth Review Conference last December, states established the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous weapons systems and scheduled for it to meet twice in 2017.
Visit autonomousweapons.org to learn more about efforts to ban these weapons.
























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