PART ONE : DOKLAM & HIMALAYAN IMPASSE : HOW CHINA WOULD FIGHT AN INDIAN BORDER CONFLICT

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/himalayan-impasse-how-china-would-fight-an-indian-border-conflict/

                           PART ONE 

Himalayan Impasse: How China Would                 Fight an Indian Border Conflict

                                 By

                     Kevin McCauley

 FOR PART ONE  CLICK   Here   
 FOR PART TWO CLICK   Here   
FOR PART THREE CLICK    Here

September 20, 2017

At the end of August, Chinese and Indian troops both pulled back from the Doklam region  in Bhutan after weeks of tense posturing. The face off began in June when Chinese construction crews accompanied by soldiers began building a road. The area is sensitive to Indian national interests not only because of its ally Bhutan, but also due to area’s proximity to a narrow corridor connecting eastern India with the rest of the country. Beijing repeatedly ratcheted up the messaging to India, including the release of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs legal justification of China’s territorial claims against India (China Daily, August 3, 2017). If the two sides decide to face off again,  forces on both sides will need to contend with the difficult mountain terrain and complex weather conditions.

 To prepare for such a contingency, both India and China have invested significantly in units capable of mountain and high-altitude warfare. An examination of the Chinese Military’s doctrine and training of such units provides important insights into how such a conflict would be conducted.

Mountain and High Altitude Campaigns

Mountain and high altitude operations would be conducted in the complex terrain found in many regions of China, in particular border regions, as well as Taiwan where mountain and urban on island operations could occur. Special terrain and their meteorological conditions have significant impact on informationized military operations. 

PLA border defense and counterattack campaigns would include mountain and high altitude mountain specialized warfare.

Environmental Characteristics

Mountains account for approximately 33 percent of China’s total area, and a high percentage of the border regions. Mountainous regions normally contain few roads and other infrastructure, little population, and limited resources. Mountain ranges twist and turn making line of sight complex. Erosion, steep slopes, lush vegetation in some areas, floods during rainy seasons, and rivers restrict mobility. Limited roads and paths generally follow valleys and ridgelines, or through passes and other choke points. [1]

Impact on Military Operations

Mountainous terrain creates difficulties for command and coordination, as well as mobility and maneuver. These regions are advantageous for defensive actions where relatively small forces can hold key passes and valleys against superior forces, using natural obstacles to support an in-depth defensive system. The terrain often provides the defense with shelter and concealment. The restrictive terrain limits offensive force deployments along restricted mobility corridors, splitting offensive formations along independent directions. The terrain generally favors employment of light and airmobile forces, although small heavy groups can operate along roads, in flat terrain in some valleys or plateaus, or provide support to lighter forces. The narrow mobility corridors make envelopments and flank attacks difficult, as well as reducing operational tempo in general. The mountainous terrain can conceal force concentration and movements. Mountain combat rely on non-linear (非线性) operations with a focus on rapid penetration, flank attacks, envelopments, ambushes, air assault and special operations insertions. Non-contact (非接触) operations with joint fire strikes and information attacks are critical to a successful campaign. [2]

Mountainous areas often have low population densities featuring high socio-cultural complexities, limiting the ability to rely on local supplies and support. [3] The difficult terrain and weather conditions increases the requirements for logistics, equipment and operational support. Consumption rates for materiel, oil, and medical support are higher than in general terrain. Lack of local maintenance support combined with severe mountain terrain and weather conditions increase maintenance and repair requirements. Ethnic and religious factors increase the importance of political and psychological operations to ensure the support of the local population. Forces also require high levels of communications to support dispersed units, engineering for mobility and protection, reconnaissance and meteorological support for situational awareness and targeting. [4]

The annual recruitment, demobilization and training cycle could influence the timing of operations. The impact would be greatest on the ground forces relying on higher percentages of two-year recruits than the other services. This problem could be circumvented by retaining troops in anticipation of combat, although this could provide indication and warning of possible operations.

The 2006 Science of Campaigns (SoC) places great emphasis on conducting a penetration and breakthrough of the enemy’s first line defense. This PLA study does emphasize employing pincer attacks, envelopments, and insertion of airborne and special operations forces (SOF) into the enemy rear area when possible to support frontal attacks. The 2013 Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns provides updated PLA thinking on campaigns. An informationized military would experience greater offensive advantages than in the past in conducting sudden, concealed indirect attacks with dispersed forces to disrupt the cohesion of the enemy’s defensive system. Informationized reconnaissance, communications, navigation and positioning systems can support concealed assembly, deployment, maneuver and attack. The modernized force could better conduct three-dimensional maneuver and multi-directional feints to confuse and stress the defender, seize key terrain, and achieve a deep attack against the enemy. The PLA also believes that informationized logistics and equipment support can overcome many of the difficulties posed by the complex environment. [5]

Mountain and High Altitude Training

Ground Force

PLA campaign publications on mountain and high altitude warfare define the significant impact on offensive and defensive operations, supporting operational planning, training and equipment requirements for combat in this complex terrain. PLA units in the Western Theater Command (WTC) train at mountain and high-altitude combat, particularly the 52nd and 53rd Mountain Infantry Brigades, and the 54th Mechanized Infantry Brigade located in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, as well as a Mechanized Infantry Division garrisoned in Hotan. This training acclimates troops to the high-altitude mountain and meteorological conditions (Xinhua, July 3; China Brief, January 13). The 76th and 77th Group Armies train in high altitude mountain terrain over 4000 meters, as do motor transport units in the region providing heavy equipment transport and logistics support. Army training includes joint operations with Air Force and Rocket Force units (PLA Daily, February 19, 2017; MOD, May 17, 2017; PLA Daily, September 19, 2016; People’s Daily, August 19, 2015; PLA Daily, August 24, 2017).

Air Force

The WTC Air Force is undergoing restructuring to adapt to the new joint command structure and operational requirements. The Air Force command is concentrating on forming an Air Force operational system of systems (作战体系 – an integrated force grouping), as well as improving combat readiness. Air Force elements including aircraft, surface-to-air missile, radar units, and communications train in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. Training includes joint operations with Army units, long-range mobility, ground attack and air defense, emergency operations, and operating under complex meteorological conditions (PLA Daily, October 31, 2017; MOD, September 9, 2016). Imagery analysis has shown increased Air Force aircraft deployments and facility improvements over the past few years, as well as recent increases in aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), at regional air bases which could better support operations against India. UAVs include the CH-4 recon/strike UAV deployed at Xigaze. (Offiziere.ch,December 30, 2015; Offiziere.ch, January 11, 2016; Offiziere.ch, August 4).

Rocket Force

While the Rocket Force command likely resides with the Central Military Commission, Rocket Force personnel are deployed to theater commands to support operational planning and coordination. The Rocket Force conducts training at night and dispatches foreign reconnaissance satellite warnings supporting concealed deployment of missile brigades to launch sites. The Rocket Force also trains in various climatic conditions as well as mountain terrain. Rocket Force brigades designated to support a WTC operational plan against India would have pre-surveyed launch positions prepared to support the joint fire plan (Global Times, April 12, 2016; PLA Daily, August 12, 2017; PLA Daily, August 23, 2015). [6]

Specialized Light Equipment

The editor of the journal Ordnance Knowledge (兵器知识) has stated that the PLA is developing lightweight equipment to better conduct mountain operations (China Daily, July 17). Army units in the Tibet region are equipped with some specialized light mobile equipment, including armed 8X8 all-terrain armed vehicles and the PCL-09 122mm truck-mounted howitzer (MOD, January 4, 2017; MOD, May 23, 2017). China has also developed a new light tank to replace old Type 62 light tanks that had been deployed to many units in the southern mountain regions. The new 35-ton tank is equipped with a 105mm main gun and has been tested on the Tibet Plateau (MOD, June 30, 2017). The Z-20 medium lift helicopter reportedly has similar capabilities to the U.S. Black Hawk and is capable of operating at high altitudes (China Daily, January 3, 2014).

Command and Forces

The theater Army would form a command post within the theater command for the operation with ground force units forming the primary component supported by the other services (PLA Daily, May 19, 2016; Global Times, February 3, 2016; Global Times, May 13, 2016). Campaign forces will likely employ a combination of centralized command (集中指挥) on the main attack axis and decentralized command (分散指挥) on secondary axes. Command staffs conduct detailed terrain, climatic and mobility analysis that can impact operations to develop the operational plan. [7] The figure below shows the theater joint command relationships. [8]

A mountain campaign typically is conducted by an Army commanded campaign formation (战役军团) either consisting of or supported by Air Force, Rocket Force, and other services. The figure below shows a notional border campaign operational system of systems composed of the theater command and joint campaign formations. The theater receives support from the Strategic Support Force for strategic intelligence and information warfare support, and Joint Logistics Support Force, as well as the theater Joint Logistics Support Center. Subordinate joint or combined arms tactical formations could be formed to conduct independent actions along separate attack axes. These larger task forces in turn would form various specialized tactical groups. [9]

Operations

Recent PLA publications emphasize paralysis of the enemy defensive system over destruction. Enhanced capabilities to conduct deep attack via firepower and vertical envelopments improve offensive capabilities and decrease the reliance on costly frontal attacks. Precision strikes are emphasized to support ground operations and increase operational tempo by destroying enemy fortified positions. Ground-based precision artillery and missiles can overcome the loss of aviation fire support caused by weather conditions. The fire plan will include a layered assault and interdiction throughout the enemy’s depth. Artillery and Army Aviation strike forward and shallow depth positions, while longer range rocket, Air Force aviation, and Rocket Force missiles strike in-depth targets. [10] SOF also play a key role providing intelligence, strike guidance and damage assessments, as well as attacking key targets other forces cannot easily strike. Recent PLA publications also stress that restricted terrain can isolate defenders and degrade reconnaissance, allowing the offensive force to employ navigation and positioning systems and terrain masking to surprise, penetrate and encircle enemy positions. [11]

Defensive operations establish multi-zone, in-depth defensive positions with interlocking fire that control lines of communications and key terrain. Ambushes are set, and an active defensive posture maintained. A strong tactical and campaign reserve is formed to implement counterattacks and transition to offensive operations. Materiel is prepositioned to overcome enemy interdiction and resupply problems caused by weather and terrain. [12]

High Altitude Plateau Campaigns

High altitude plateau is a very special geographical and climatic environment characterized by average elevations above 4000 meters and reaching over 7000 meters. This battlefield environment is found in the Qinghai-Tibet plateau and would affect operations during a Sino-Indian conflict. [13]

Environmental Characteristics

The high altitude environment is characterized by bad weather and snow, thin air, severe cold, oxygen deficiency, high-intensity ultraviolet radiation, and generally poor living conditions. The terrain is complex with steep mountains, and weak infrastructure including few and poor quality roads and airports leading to significant mobility and resupply problems. Most areas have little vegetation limiting camouflage capabilities. The region contains mostly minority populations creating sensitive ethnic and religious issues. [14]

Impact on Military Operations

The impact of mountain terrain on combat is similar, but much more severe in high-altitude cold mountain terrain. There is a significantly adverse effect on personnel with increased non-combat attrition, as well as reduction in the performance of weapons and equipment. These factors greatly reduce combat effectiveness of the force, which will continue to decline over the course of the operation due to environmental factors in addition to combat. Personnel acclimatized to the high-altitude will still experience a physical and mental decline, with susceptibility to various medical conditions. Vehicles experience reduced power, increased fuel consumption, and high maintenance and repair requirements. Weapons exhibit greater failure rates, ammunition experiences higher numbers of dud rounds, and long-range missiles experience problems with course deviation. [15]

The climate limits the time frame to conduct combat actions, as well as being unpredictable. The snow season lasts for six months; and the rainy season experiences flash floods, deep water levels in rivers, and muddy roads inhibiting mobility. The climate and terrain limit force size and campaign scale. Armored vehicles, large-caliber artillery and other heavy equipment will experience limited mobility. Weather conditions would limit air operations to June through September. The 1962 Sino-Indian War was fought in October and November without air support. The high-altitude reduces aviation performance and lift capabilities, although the thin air increases the range of projectiles and shrapnel. [16]

Operations

Operations in high altitude terrain will be similar to those in mountain terrain, although forces will be smaller, and logistics, equipment and operational support requirements greater. Firepower requirements will increase greatly, with additional fire support included within the campaign formation and joint forces in support. Greater reliance on ground-based precision fire support is emphasized to overcome terrain and the decline in combat capabilities of other forces, as well as the potential loss of aviation fire support. Psychological operations are important to bolster the morale of troops, weaken the enemy’s will to resist, and retain support of the ethnic population. [17]

The terrain and climatic conditions greatly favor the defense, as in mountain warfare. The defense will initially remain relatively passive in in-depth fortified positions protected by obstacles. The defense will concentrate on tenaciously holding their positions, and concentrate on large-scale attrition of enemy forces. Small scale spoiling attacks and ambushes can be conducted to thwart enemy operations and maintain a more active defense. Stockpiles and reserves of supplies should be strategically positioned to meet combat requirements. The Air Force and Rocket Force will strike key enemy objectives in-depth and conduct battlefield interdiction to disrupt offensive operations, and support the transition to offensive operations. [18]

Conclusion

Mountain and high altitude warfare present specialized problems for military operations. The complex terrain will restrict force employment and deployment, creating difficulties for mobility and maneuver. The conditions generally favor the defense, although recent PLA doctrinal writings express a belief that high tech weapons and equipment can mitigate some of the specialized problems and enhance offensive capabilities. These newer publications emphasize greater use of precision strikes to overcome terrain and enemy defenses to support ground operations and increase operational tempo. The PLA considers air and information superiority to be critical factors for successful operations. However, aviation support is significantly restricted by altitude and weather conditions. High altitude terrain will stress personnel and equipment, increasing non-combat losses, as well as maintenance and repair requirements. Psychological operations are important targeting friendly and enemy troops, as well as civilians.

Despite the difficulty of operations in mountainous or high altitude conditions, the PLA has specialized forces and equipment for such combat. PLA units train in terrain and weather conditions similar to potential conflict areas in preparation for operational missions. Campaign and tactical doctrine provide guidance for specialized training and operational planning for contingencies is these terrain conditions.

PLA mountain and high altitude combat doctrine provides insight into operations during a potential Sino-Indian border conflict. Forces would be relatively small because of the restricted terrain, and would be limited to troops that routinely train and are acclimated to the special conditions. Joint precision strikes would constitute an important component of the operation to overcome the complex terrain, destroy the cohesion of the enemy’s in-depth defensive system, and support and increase the operational tempo of ground force combat. Insertions of airmobile and special operations forces into the enemy rear area would support frontal ground force combat, seize or destroy key targets, support the joint fire strike, and interdict enemy forces. Ground-based precision strikes could compensate for reduced aviation support. Information attacks, electronic and psychological warfare would be important components in achieving information superiority critical for a successful operation.

Kevin McCauley has served as senior intelligence officer for the Soviet Union, Russia, China and Taiwan during 31 years in the U.S. government. His publications include “Russian Influence Campaigns against the West: From the Cold War to Putin,” and “PLA System of Systems Operations: Enabling Joint Operations.” Mr. McCauley writes primarily on PLA and Taiwan military affairs, and is an Adjunct, RAND Corporation.

ADTIONAL READING

https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/System-of-Systems-Enabling-Joint-Operations.pdf?x87069

https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/System-of-Systems-Enabling-Joint-Operations.pdf?x87069

Notes

1. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), pp. 219-220; Science of Campaigns(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 31
2. In Tibet population centers are primarily in the Lhasa, Xigaze and Nyingchi area. The PLA has likely prepositioned materiel in areas of operations.
3. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 220; Science of Campaigns(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 406
4. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 220; Science of Campaigns(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), pp. 416-421
5. Theater Joint Operations Command (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016), p. 340
6. Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 409; Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 221; Military Terms (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011), pp. 176-177
7. Theater Joint Operations Command (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2016), p. 340
8. Science of Joint Tactics (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2014), p. 119; Science of Campaigns (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 404
9. Rocket Force participation would include but not necessarily be limited to the 56th Base headquartered in Xining. Operational requirements and targets would determine the types of missiles required to support the operations. Missiles that could carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead present a warning problem to the two nuclear states, risking escalation.
10. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), pp. 221-222; Science of Campaigns(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), pp. 413 and 423-424
11. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), pp. 222-224
12. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 224
13. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 224
14. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 224
15. Science of Army Campaigns Under High-Tech Conditions, (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2003), pp. 303-323; Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), pp. 224-225
16. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), p. 226
17. Lectures on the Science of Army Campaigns (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2013), pp. 227-229

SOURCE:
https://scroll.in/article/870499/the-military-owes-its-loyalty-to-the-constitution-of-india-not-to-the-party-in-power?utm_source=Takshashila+Weekly+Dispatch&utm_campaign=f1537130a4-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_03_14&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_726cf26482-f1537130a4-238208225

Indian Military must remind Politicians that it’s Loyal to the Constitution – not the Party in Power

By

                       Prakash Menon

Several recent events have contributed to speculation that the military’s apolitical nature is being compromised.

For several years now, a spate of events linked to India’s armed forces, including statements from the highest rungs of military leadership, have cast a shadow on their apolitical character. 

This is distressing even if it is a case of misplaced interpretation, factual ignorance or the shenanigans of individuals on social media. The military’s apolitical nature is a cornerstone of India’s democratic foundation; diluting it could be disastrous. But what are the beliefs that symbolise the nature and character of the “apoliticalism” of the Indian armed forces?

Its unending deployment for internal security in Jammu and Kashmir and the North East has resulted in the military becoming a permanent and key representative of the state’s coercive power in a politically charged atmosphere. Inevitably, most of the military’s actions are politically sensitive and it often finds itself in the midst of political controversies. This is bound to continue as long as the military is deployed in support of civilian authority. But the moot point is that such controversies must be dealt with by the military and civilian authorities acting in unison. What has regrettably become frequent is the military’s stance being in opposition to a state government’s with the central government supporting the military. The military thus becomes an object of Centre-state politics.

The “human shield” incident in Kashmir last April is illustrative. An unacceptable military act was justified in the name of operational expediency and institutionally portrayed as an act of heroism. The military’s stance was supported by the Centre but decried by the state government. The Army was mired in a political controversy and its act was both praised and supported by political parties. It seemed that the Army was taking sides in a domestic political battle and was, therefore, moving away from its apolitical character.

In recent times, the use of the armed forces for spreading yoga mats, spoiling the Yamuna riverbed, constructing railway footbridges and cleaning garbage from mountain tops is exceptionable. The government needs to handle the military with greater care, delicacy and respect. The military also needs to tell the government, behind closed doors, that it cannot be employed for the benefit of a political party or of a religious organisation it supports.

The military’s deliberate leveraging of its operations on the Line of Control for domestic electoral purposes suggests that the armed forces serve the political party in power, like in China. Such a portrayal has given rise to speculation that the military’s apolitical nature is being increasingly compromised.

The Army Chief’s recent comments about a political party, the All India United Democratic Front in Assam, suggested that the Army was taking sides in what is essentially a political battle between the ruling party and the opposition. Some commentators have argued that there is nothing wrong in the Army supporting the central government, which it serves, especially when it comes to matters of security. True, the Army is an executive arm of the government but it owes its loyalty to the Constitution of India and not to the party in power. Indeed, saying that the military is apolitical means that it does not take part in any political argument and even if it wishes to express its views about the impact of political manoeuvring on security, it should convey them behind closed doors. The basis of being apolitical rests on avoiding as far as possible the messy and murky world of domestic politics. Yet, recent incidents and statements put the military under the arc lights for all the wrong reasons.

Former Chief of Army Staff and union minister General VK Singh participates in #Rashtroday event of RSS at Meerut in RSS uniform

      General Vijay Kumar Singh, Minister of State – Ministry of External Affairs,                                                        Government of India in RSS Uniform             

                    The Ex-Indian Army Chief Crossed Democratic Line of Control

Away from the limelight

Another important sphere of civil-military interaction is external security. Here again, statements of military leaders about foreign countries have significant impact on foreign relations. It is not unusual to convey signals to other countries through the statements of military chiefs. But such statements are crafted and approved at appropriate levels and reflect the government’s view. It would, therefore, not be incorrect to assume that recent statements of the Army Chief about Pakistan and China reflect the government’s viewpoint. If it were not so, the pronouncements would have been denied or contradicted. Since the statement that China and Pakistan are orchestrating immigration from Bangladesh has come from the Army Chief, we must assume it is true. But does such an accusation have to be levelled by the Army Chief, especially when no other arm of the government has brought it to the public’s notice? Clearly, there is a need to exercise greater discretion while commenting on foreign countries as it affects the sphere of political relations, driven primarily from outside the military arena.

Words are the primary weapon of politicians, not of the military. Although the military may also use words as a weapon, the power of the word in a democracy is better exercised by civilian authorities. The military need not seek the limelight. Instead, it should carry out its duties quietly, contain its views and disagreements on politically sensitive subjects to closed door sessions and let its actions speak for themselves. When it has to express its views, preferably through an official spokesman, the military should be guided by the tenet that one of the greatest values it brings to India’s democracy is not taking sides in the domestic political discourse. It is thus that the military will maintain the distinction of being an apolitical force.

Lt Gen Prakash Menon (retired) is Director of Strategic Studies at the Takshashila Institution and former military adviser to the National Security Council Secretariat.

IESM : PROTEST MOVEMENT BY DEFENCE VETERANS, UPDATE AND WAY AHEAD

SOURCE:
IESM

PROTEST MOVEMENT BY DEFENCE 

VETERANS, UPDATE AND WAY AHEAD

Dear Veterans,

1.       Second Hearing in HSC against the NGT Order to 

lift Dharanas from Jantar Mantar has been fixed for 05 

Mar 2018.  Senior Advocate Prashant Bhushan is 

representing the case.  We are hopeful of some positive 

order from HSC.

2.       Third Hearing of our OROP Case in HSC has been 

tentatively fixed for 1^st week of Apr 2018.  We have 

made Prayers for the Implementation of Actual OROP and 

other related issues as under:-

· Declaring the letter dated 07.11.2015 bearing reference 12(1)/2014/D(Pen/Pol)-Part-II illegal, unconstitutional, and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution;

· Declaring  the Notification dated 14.12.2015 bearing reference No. 12(01)/2014-D(Pen/Pol)-Part-II issued by Respondent No. 1 illegal, unconstitutional, and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution;

· Declaring  the letter of Respondent No. 1 to the Chief of Army Staff, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of Air Staff dated 03.02.2016 bearing reference 12(1)/2014/D(Pen/Policy)-Part-II illegal, unconstitutional, and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution;

·Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that the pension of past pensioners be automatically and contemporaneously enhanced, whenever there is any future increase or enhancement in the rates of pension;

·Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that errors in tables prepared by the Central Government indicating One Rank One Pension computation, wherein there are numerous instances of ex-servicemen who retired with senior rank and longer length of service being shown to be eligible for lesser pension that ex-servicemen who retired with junior rank, be corrected to ensure One Rank One Pension;

· Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that fixation of pension must be on the basis of financial year 2014-2015 and not calendar year 2013;

·Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing payment of revised pension with effect from 01.04.2014 instead of 01.07.2014;

· Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that Havildars who retired as Hon. Naib Subedar be given the pension of Naib Subedar;

· Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that all soldiers who have been conferred an Honourary superior rank, whether before or after retirement, be given the pension relatable to such superior rank;

                                                                  

·Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that all ex-servicemen of the defence services be given benefit of full per-commissioning service period for pension calculation, regardless of their date of retirement;

· Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that veterans who have retired as Major after 13 years of service be granted the pension of Lt. Colonel;

·Direction in the nature of mandamus to the Union of India directing that veterans who retired prior to 2004 as Lt. Colonel be given pension of Colonel;

· Pass any other or future order(s) as this Hon’ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

· 7^th CPC  pensions need to be worked out afresh by multiplying the factor of 2.57 to    the Actual pensions as on 31 Dec 2015   and not the pensions of base year 2013.

· 33 years  rule  having been cancelled,  the pensions of Defence Personnel need to be  reworked afresh based on the rank and engagement period.

3.       Meeting of Defence Veterans alongwith the serving 

senior officers chaired by Dr. Subhash Ramrao Bhamre 

Raksha Rajya Mantri (Minister of State for Defence) held 

on 16 Feb 2018 which was well attended.  All 

Organisations gave out their issues.  I attended the 

meeting on behalf of IESM, and raised the following 

issues.

 (a)   Implementation of Actual One Rank One 

Pension (OROP).

(b)    Pensions of Defence Widows should be same as 

the ESM Pensions.

(c)    Pensions of Defence Reservists be enhanced to 

equivalent to pension of Sepoy.

(d)    Ensuring Second Career for the early Defence 

Retirees till the age of 60 years through the Act of 

Parliament.

(e)    Improvements in Medical care Scheme ECHS.  

The medical procedures which have been 

introduced in the Country be on ECHS Procedure 

list within, six months of their being operational in 

India.

(f)     Dire need to have Veterans Hospitals on the 

line of other Democracies.

(g)    Need to enhance ECHS Budget to efficiently 

manage Super Specialty Care for the Defence 

Personnel and their dependents.

(h)    Need to have Covenant Act of Defence Forces 

on the lines of UK & other countries.

(j)    Need to expedite construction of Martyrs 

Memorial at India Gate.  Long delays have already 

been caused.

(k)    Need to enhance rates of Disability Pension for 

Defence Personnel.

4.       We are planing to hold a Maha Rally at Delhi in mid March or a week later to resume Relay Hunger Strike across the Country.  Date and time will be communicated shortly.  All ESM are requested to take part in  Mahar Rally at Delhi  and resume Relay Hunger Strike  with intensity at various locations in the Country.

5.       State Conveners and representatives at various locations are requested to hold Meetings, Seminars, Rallies regularly in the Country.  Feedback may please be forwarded to IESM HQ at 543 Sector 23, Gurgaon -122017 (Haryana).

6.       ESM residing in NCR are requested to come to  Jantar Mantar regularly, atleast once a week to strengthen the  Protest Movement.  The Govt continues to deny our due Justice.  Not only we are being denied our dues, we are continuously being Downgraded, Degraded, ill-treated and mistreated. Legal option which has already been exercised, will take lot of time therefore we need to continue our Protest Movement with strength and intensity.

7.       Governing Body Members responsible for various states are requested to constitute committees as under:-

(a) Block Level          -        3 members.

(b) District                -        5-7 members

(c)  Big Cities             -        5-7 members.

(d) State Level          -        9-11 members.

8.       Details of members of the Committee be forwarded to IESM HQ for formalization.  Membership Drive be carried out as an ongoing campaign on war footing.

9.       On 10^th March 2018, we will be completing 1000^th Day of our continuous Agitation at Jantar Mantar and at other locations across the Country.  All Members of the Defence Family residing in NCR and areas close by Delhi are requested to visit Jantar Mantar from 1230PM to 4PM to commemorate 1000^th Day of Protest Movement.  ESM at other locations are requested to assemble at their respective locations, schedule to be decided by local conveners and committees to commemorate 1000^th Day to strengthen, our resolve to get “Justice to Jawan”.

10.     Another important issue is health Care of ESM and members of their families.  We are in touch with the ECHS HQ for update and their assistance to resolve our problems and issues.  Requests, where Empanelled Hospitals deny admission in emergency situation are being attended to on priority.  We request that any such difficulty be brought to our Notice.  Col RP Chaturvedi, Mob No 9891279035 and email: rpchaturvedi@gmail.com ,is our Head ECHS.  We have also  asked the Govt to issue  instructions for all new  medical  procedures be brought on the ECHS  list within six months of their being operational in India.  Efforts are being made to improve the availability of medicines at ECHS Clinics.

11.     We are also keeping close liaison with Veterans Directorate at Delhi Cantt.  We have brought to their notice issues concerning ESM & their dependents.  Copies of our letters to MoD & PMO are regularly being sent to the three Chiefs for their info and action.  We will continue to raise issues with Govt through requests, representations, meetings etc.

12.     We will shortly be starting our Scheme of “Measures for the benefit of Armed Forces Veterans, War widows, their dependents and Veer Naries”.  Soldiers have given supreme, sacrifice for mother land but their families have not got the recognition by the Government which they deserved for the sacrifice given by their husbands.  IESM has been recognized in corporate sector as one of the pioneer organization which is spearheading welfare measures for veterans,  veernaries,  their families and citizen of India.  Corporate houses have started contributing funds reserved as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to IESM for the purpose. Recently, one corporate  has contributed Rs 25 lakhs and to start with IESM  has allotted another  Rs 25 lakhs to make corpus  fund of Rs 50 lakhs for the  purpose.  We hope this fund will increase every year.  We plan to given scholarships to the children of veernaries, veterans and their dependents at School, College and professional level.  We plan to given financial help to veernaries who wish to start their own cottage industry and financial help to old age homes/orphanages out of this fund.  The scheme will be upgraded as we go along.  Detailed SOP is being issued separately.

13.     Lastly, friends, we do need resources to continue our Agitation, May I request all numbers of the Defence Fraternity to contribute voluntarily for the cause.  Efforts be also made to approach corporates, organizations, individuals for their contribution for the cause.  

Yours Sincerely,

                                                                 Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM (Retd)

 Advisor United Front of Ex Servicemen & Chairman IESM  

                                                                                                                                         Mobile: 9312404269, Tel: 0124 4110570

Email: satbirsm@gmail.com