Wednesday, August 1, 2018

BALOCHISTAN : Pakistan’s Countdown to Dissolution:

SOURCE:
https://www.diplomaticsquare.com/pakistans-countdown-to-dissolution/




 Pakistan’s Countdown 

                            to 

               Dissolution:(R)

                                    By
                    Bibi Mahdim Baluch*












Senior US Foreign and Defence Intelligence analysts have forecast the total collapse of Pakistan by 2025. 

It now appears that the developing ground realities across its main provinces are supportive of just such a prediction. The appeal to a common religious framework is backfiring as all and sundry now face a ruthless onslaught by Punjab’s armed forces and their sponsored Islamist proxies. As a consequence, the historically disparate federal fault lines are becoming fully exposed and are upon the brink of dissolution paving the way for a series of new states in one of the most geo-politically strategic parts of the world.
Pakistan’s hegemons have never relinquished absolute authoritarian control over the other provinces from their main centres of power in the Punjab. As such the terms Pakistan and Punjab have become interchangeable denoting the same oligarchy, whose elitist rulers function primarily from Islamabad and Rawalpindi. They have been the guardians of its constitutional framework from inception and have across successive generations perpetuated one of the most thriving kleptocracies in the modern world.
The highly dysfunctional governance structures of the Pakistani state are mired by rampant corruption, nepotism and quasi-feudal systems of patronage riddled with debilitating bureaucratic mismanagement, making any form of effective long term fiscal planning untenable. These in conjunction with a major energy crisis, a defence budget standing at a staggering 10% of GDP and declining life indicators across all major sectors including literacy, health and employment have given rise to very bleak future prospects for the majority of its inhabitants. These conditions exist in the midst of a highly pernicious decades long propagation of the dictum ‘Islam as Nationality and Islam as State’ which resounds aloud daily in almost every school and Islamic madrassa across Pakistan. The result being that its military has become progressively infiltrated by Islamists, many of whom have merely disrobed in order to don military attire and inherit one of the largest collections of nuclear weapons in the world.
The extent of infiltration is all pervasive. Lashkar a Taiba, a designated terrorist organisation who conducted the 2008 bombings in Mumbai, were carefully engineered by ISI operatives using satellite phones inside Pakistan. Their combatants have been operating a lucrative Islamist factory for decades on the outskirts of Rawalpindi, enjoying full Pakistani military patronage well away from any drone attacks. In fact, General Musharraf once described Lashkar e Taiba as a reserve force of the Pakistani army. Unbelievably they are not the only proxy to be courted with such favours. In September 2014 just after the Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri announced that a new Al Qaeda franchise had been created in the Indian sub-continent, the group led an attack on Pakistan’s naval base in Karachi. The purpose of the attack had been to hijack a Chinese built Pakistani Frigate armed with cruise missiles capable of firing several hundred kilometres against ships at sea. They had wanted to take it out into the Indian Ocean, move up to an American naval vessel and open fire. It was then discovered that the terrorists who had plotted this attack were in fact members of the Pakistani navy and had been able to mount the vessel because they possessed the correct protocol.  To make matters worse at least half of Karachi is now in the hands of the TTP – the Pakistani Taliban and their intricate network of local police informants, many of whom are situated within close vicinity of the Chinese Nuclear submarines stationed at Karachi naval base.
The volatility of the situation cannot be underestimated. Pakistan is now purported to possess the 4th largest nuclear stockpile in the world according to its eminent former Ambassador Hussain Haqqani, having overtaken both the United Kingdom and France. The contentious issue is the unregulated fissile material that Pakistan’s 4 Chinese built nuclear reactors produce. The plutonium waste generated can easily become weapons material. The crux of the matter is that the joint civil and military caretaking of nuclear sights and their command and control systems can no longer be deemed secure in light of the level of Islamisation of the Pakistani armed forces, civil institutions and general populace. A state which selects ISI Director Generals such as Nadeem Taj whose finger  prints were all over the Mumbai bombing and whom would routinely warn the Pakistani Taliban before any drone strike so that they could clear the area in advance as recalled by the former CIA analyst and presidential adviser Bruce Riedel can no longer be relied upon in the war on terror. In addition,as he went on to reveal, one can be certain that when the audacity of its rulers reaches such a level that a CIA Director whom visits Islamabad in good health,upon returning to the United States meets his eventual death with symptomatic signs indicative of poisoning, major alarms bells are set off. This cannot bode well for Pakistan. No doubt the US decisions to make huge military aid cuts and impose sanctions on Pakistani firms involved in nuclear trade were premised upon a host of such dire precedents. Civilised powers are well aware that Pakistan is an Islamist time bomb with a firm commitment to trans-national jihad.
Matters have become all the more urgent as a plethora of Islamists are training under the protection of a media blackout in Balochistan hidden well away from the outside world. They will certainly be taking advantage of the high speed rail, road and maritime routes courtesy of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor for transportation of weapons, narcotics and the nuclear materials much coveted by Iran.  The rail link connecting Quetta to Gwadar Free Trade Zone will provide the Taliban and ISIS with safe passage to a deep sea port and a modern industrial sector of high level technology including advanced satellite communications systems. With Chinese ascendency in the Pakistani political sphere and their de facto control of the straits of Hormuz via CPEC, cover has been granted to these Islamists from a most unlikely quarter.
Significantly Pakistan’s order of Chinese Nuclear Attack Submarines due to be completed by 2023 and 2027, is uncomfortably close to the 2025 predicted date of collapse. The firing of its first submarine launched cruise missiles in January 2017 from an undisclosed location in the Indian Ocean and the launch of the menacingly named nuclear capable Babur 3 missile, a sea based variant of the Babur 2 land based missile should have set off major warning signals in New Delhi and Washington. Gwadar may well become the central pivot that brings down this Machiavellian edifice.
As ethnic and sectarian tensions assume gargantuan proportions and popular uprisings become larger and more frequent across the country, conditions ripen for its final dissolution. Its first territorial loss occurred in 1971 when East Pakistan broke away.The Punjab based hegemons of West Pakistan were unwilling to concede to the democratic mandate granting the majority Bangladeshi population of East Pakistan the right to form the government for the entire federation. General Yahya’s decision to brutalise the East Pakistan uprising in 1970 and the systematic campaign of genocide and rape orchestrated by the Pakistani Army and supported by their Islamist Militias from Jamaat e Islami led to Indian intervention and the establishment of the independent People’s Republic of Bangladesh.
The very same methods have been employed in Balochistan. The long standing Baloch resentment to their illegal occupation by Pakistan on March 27th 1947 is reaching its climax as the resistance movement spreads nationwide. Pakistan has unleashed a horrifying ethnic cleansing programme tantamount to a genocide in Balochistan in which it is estimated that over 30,000 innocent civilians including men, women and children have been subject to state sponsored Enforced Disappearances with a further 10,000 falling prey to a merciless ‘Kill and Dump’ policy. In the latest escalation, in a spate of abductions of hundreds of Baloch women whom have been held in internment camps regulated by the army, harrowing reports of mass rape and torture are coming to light.
Whilst the media blackout in Balochistan has enabled the Pakistani army to contain knowledge of such happenings, reports of such abuses are now also surfacing with greater regularity across Sindh where opposition is also being mobilised against the government. Everyday life is becoming unbearable for significant portions of Sindh’s population whom must contend with atrocious levels of poverty, worse than parts of Sub-Saharan Africa in some places. Sindhi’s know full well that a state in which literacy is declining yearly whilst over half of children under 5 are born stunted, there can be little hope of any meaningful future. Pakistan is a state wherein monetary investment in nuclear warfare and Islamist proxies far exceeds spending on much needed health, education and employment.With the estimated population projection of 300 million by 2050 and severe water shortages, things can only get worse.
Balochistan has the weakest infrastructure of all the states despite a phenomenal wealth of natural resource revenues including gas, gold and a host of other minerals. It also has the highest gender, education and literacy disparities. Female literacy is 18 percent compared to 45 percent nationally and almost 2.5 million children are out of school. In the seven decades since occupation, resource revenues have been siphoned off by state officials and agencies at an alarming rate. Billions of dollars are unaccounted for and the province is unable to provide its residents with access to some of the most basic facilities. To make matters worse, CPEC which has been advertised as much promised development has resulted in the mass forced migration of Baloch natives from their ancestral lands in order to pave the routes for its mega-projects, most of which mainly benefit the Punjab. In fact, CPEC is responsible for having internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Baloch natives.
For Pakistani officials, the problem of Balochistan’s widespread illiteracy and poverty is nearly always blamed entirely upon the feudal system despite Islamabad being fully aware that in the Makuran region and other major cities, tribalism is barely perceptible. In actuality it is these areas which have the higher concentrations of literate Baloch that have been the main target of Pakistan’s kill and dump policy. It is such places that are witnessing the continued culling of the Baloch intelligentsia and educationists whose co-educational schools, holistic curriculum and expansive book fairs have been seen to pose the greatest threat to the state backed Islamist narrative.More Baloch secular nationalists and educationists have been killed than Taliban leaders and operatives in Pakistan as the state has been at war not with terrorism but rather any form of enlightenment activity, especially emanating from Baloch soil in keeping with long held Baloch secular values. Consequently, the army is now busy hastily building madrassas at every street corner and converting what few schools there were into Islamist barracks so as to inculcate Baloch youth into jihadi ideology, the cornerstone of Pakistani identity.
In contrast it has made every effort to support the most corrupt elements of the feudal orders in the Baloch tribal territories as part of its long standing divide and rule policy. Herein lies the root cause of the malice which fuels inter-tribal rivalries and fighting.During these decades of Pakistani occupation there has been little elevation or transformation of the tribal-feudal structures in Balochistan or indeed any semblance of proper democratic parliamentary governance with its vital attendant mechanisms of an independent judiciary, fully functioning civil service and target orientated bureaucracy.
This is clearly visible in Pakistani state machinations and manipulations concerning the Marri tribe. It is common knowledge that Punjab’s only interest in Balochistan is its resources and what happens to its people is of no concern. Just the oilfields located in the Marri areas would have contributed to the eradication of poverty across Balochistan and instituted substantive health, education and housing projects. However, there is little sign of resource revenues or implementation of long term state fiscal planning. In reality the Marri and the majority of Baloch endure appalling levels of poverty.
Pakistan has instead concentrated its efforts upon creating and sustaining inter-tribal divisions. In the issue of the Marri succession, the imposition of their stooge Jangyz Marri was a staged performance negating all democratic precedent. One can hardly expect a puppet to act beyond his puppet master’s moral compass and it is a demoralizingly poor ethical framework that Pakistan prescribes to as evidenced by the orders for the abduction, torture and rape of Marri women sanctioned directly from ISI headquarters in Punjab.
In order to negate their efforts, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marrihas been deemed the last Nawab of the Marri tribe until such time after independence a tribal committee with joint leadership of its constituents, such as the Gazeni, Bijarani and Loharani, can, if indeed they wish to do so, put forth representatives to partake in a transparent and accountable voting procedure for selection of a new overseer.The democratically elected government must make sure that every single Marri is given an exact equal amount of resource revenue allocations thereby preventing any single Marri becoming subservient to another, a much favoured method of Pakistan’s Punjabi oligarchs aimed at breeding further internal strife.
The 21st century is the time of governmental systems rooted firmly in representative parliaments managed by highly qualified civil servants and guided by some utilitarianism, holding firm to the overarching principle that the greatest good of the greatest number should be the objective of all policy decisions. Regular elections, the rule of law and transparent fiscal planning are the major hallmarks of modern civilised states. One is hard pressed to find any such mechanisms in Pakistan.
If Balochistan and Sindh were already under the radar, with the rise of Manzoor Pashteen, Pakistan’s descent into chaos has gained momentum. The Pashtun nation whom have been subject to some decades long Talibanisation stratagem aimed at cementing national cohesion under a Pan Islamist umbrella, now presents the Pakistani army and state apparatus with its most disconcerting challenge.The implications of the growing Pashtun Tahafuz or protection movement now gripping formidable portions of the Pashtun population shows all the signs of developing into a major nationalist movement. It is no secret that dissension amongst the Pashtuns, cited to number between 30-40 percent of the Pakistani Army is growing as many are refusing to open fire upon their fellow Pashtuns during military encounters across their tribal belt.
The fact is that across Balochistan, Sindh and the Pashtun areas enforced disappearances and extra-judicial kill and dump has now become common practice. The Pakistani state  armed forces are conducting this in such an organised fashion that many people are forced to refrain from reporting missing loved ones lest they too become victims of abductions, sexual harassment or kill and dump and also because the very case files of the missing persons also end up missing. There is now a head on collision course between Pakistan’s oligarchs operating mainly from the Punjab and the revived nationalist sentiments gaining ascendancy across all the provinces all at once.In a show of desperation recently, Pakistani bombardments of Baloch villages which is now routine occurrence were aimed at forcing Baloch natives to take part in upcoming elections in order to bolster international accountability. 

Logical deduction warrants that as a tidal wave of popular uprisings grows across civil society in Balochistan, Sindh and the Pashtun heartlands, in due course accompanied by mass civil disobedience and cross country strikes, the federal structure will certainly collapse and external intervention will be required to delineate a new set of states along correct boundary lines as well as the institution of new democratic governments. Whether or not 2025 becomes the exact year of this fated collapse, let us be under no illusions that the hegemony in Punjab is now standing upon a precipice.
Preparations for the break-up of Pakistan must now be given due attention by regional and world powers.

*The writer is a Baloch activist, an education consultant based outside Pakistan. Diplomatic Square profusely thanks Bibi Mahdim Baloch for this contribution.
 The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of Diplomatic Square or its editorial team.





OROP : “Haq, Ki Awaj”

SOURCE:
IESM



                OROP  :  “Haq, Ki Awaj”





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Dear Friends,
1.             Video on SC Hearing on 27th Jul2018, Govt misleading the Nation on OROP recorded by NDTV India on 27th Jul 2018 but covered very small portion at 9 PM is enclosed for information and wide circulation please.
2.             We will file a strong rejoinder to Govt assertion on OROP in SC within two weeks.
3.             We will continue our struggle to get Respect, Justice and Status to Soldiers.
4.             You are aware that other deprived Sections of Society Jawan, Kisan & Dalit have joined together to raise “Haq, Ki Awaj” a peaceful Andolan across the Country with effect from 09 Aug 2018.  People for write-up regarding People for Responsible Government is enclosed herewith.  Though we will execute our individual movements, we will support each other.
5.             Other deprived Sections ie Youth, Women and labourers have also shown interest to join “Haq Ki Awaj”.
6.         You are also aware that SC has allowed Protests at Jantar Mantar and Boat Club.  Delhi Police is framing the guidelines.
7.         Another important issue is use of Power of Votes to ensure Defence Personnel are taken seriously.  Supreme Court in its judgement has stated that serving defence personnel are allowed to become voters at the place of Posting.  ESM at various cantonments and Military Station are requested to meet local commanders and Station Commanders to inform them about the contents of SC Judgement for action please.
8.         We will continue our struggle at Jantar Mantar and at other loications across the Country.  All ESM and volunteers of our families are requested to join and intensify the struggle till our Mission of Restoration of respect; Justice and Status is accomplished.  Implementation of actual OROP being our fist objective.  All are requested to visit Jantar Mantar regularly as was done when we started the Protest Movement on 15 June 2015
With regards,  
                              
Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM (Retd)                      
 Advisor United Front of Ex Servicemen & Chairman Indian Ex-Servicemen Movement (IESM)                                                                                  Mobile: 9312404269, 01244110570                                                            

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Friday, July 27, 2018

7 CPC : RELATIONSHIP DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IOR & MULTIPLICATION FACTOR

SOURCE:
https://www.facebook.com/sivasankar.vidyasagar?hc_ref=ARRu1qkfKQxzM8_U4mwg5flTN4rgSBsmKX4sCVhXEF_s2tw95hD1mE9MPaED16tl10s&fref=nf




      DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IOR  &                        MULTIPLICATION FACTOR   
                 Sivasankar Vidyasagar





July 14 ,2018



Dear sir,

The multiplication factor was increased from 2.57 to 2.67 for Brigadiers, but we are getting pension as multiplied by 2.57. We thought the anamoly would be rectified when the the pension tables are issued. Please clarify.
With regards
Brig K M Rao (Retd)
Member TESWA


Dear Brig 

1. The Index of Rationalisation ( IOR) for Brigadiers has been enhanced to 2.67 and not multiplication factor which remains same at 2.57. 

2. Permit me to explain  a  difference 
between IOR and Multiplication Factor.

3. Multiplication Factor. It is nothing but ratio between Minimum pay in 7th CPC and Minimum pay in 6th CPC. The minimum pay of Central Govt Civilian Employee is Rs 7,000 in 6th CPC which has been enhanced to Rs 18,000 in 7th CPC. The ratio is Rs 18000 / 7000 = 2.57. Therefore the pay of all those pensioners in Dec 2015 is multiplied by 2.57 to arrive at pay in Jan 2016. So are the pension of all Pre - 2016 pensioners. For Brig with 32 years' service the pension in Dec 2015 was Rs 37,280. In Jan 2016 it goes by 2.57 times i.e. 37280 x 2.57 = Rs 95,810 pm.

4. Index of Rationalisation (IOR). This is term used to show the degree of responsibility of serving soldiers. The responsibility of Lt and Brig is not same. Therefore higher is the rank, higher is IOR. For Brigadiers it was initially fixed at 2.57 whereas for DIG in CAPFs it was 2.67. This anomaly was brought to the notice of Ministry of Defence by the three Service HQs. The same was later rectified by enhancing IOR of Brig to 2.67. (IOR of Lt Cols and Cols has also been enhanced to 2.67 but IOR for Brigadier who shoulder more responsibility than Colonel has been kept at 2.67. Had it been for IAS they would have got it enhanced to 2.70). IOR is more relevant to serving soldiers. The Defence Pay Matrix is constructed using two terms i.e. one is IOR and another is Entry Pay. The first cell in the Defence Pay Matrix is arrived by simple formula which is IOR x Entry Pay. For Brigadiers Entry pay is Rs 52,290. Vide SAI 2/S/2008, the Pay in Pay Band for Brigadier in Jan 2006 is Rs 43,390 and Grade pay is Rs 8900. Therefore the sum of Pay in Pay Band + Grade comes to Rs 43390 + 8900 = Rs 52,290. Therefore 7th CPC fixed Entry Pay of Brigadier at Rs 52,290. With IOR being 2.67 the first cell in Def Pay Matrix is IOR x Entry Pay = 2.67 x 52290 = Rs 1,39,614 rounded off to Rs 1,39,600. The next lower cell in Def Pay Matrix with increment of 3% is Rs 139600 x 1.03 = Rs 143800 pm. In this manner the pay scale in Def Pay Matrix for Brig has been worked out for 16 years with maximum being Rs 2,17,600 pm + DR.

5. Relationship Between IOR and Multiplication Factor. IOR as explained above is more relevant for serving soldiers and not for Pre – 2016 pensioners. The minimum pay of serving Brigadier in Jan 2016 is arrived by taking his Pay in Pay Band + Grade pay in Dec 2015. Then to go from 6th CPC to 7th CPC it is multiplied by Multiplication Factor of 2.57 ( i.e. 18000 / 7000).

Let us take an example to understand how pay of serving Brigadier is fixed as on Jan 2016.Let us assume his Pay in Pay Band in Dec 2015 is Rs 51,100 and Grade Pay is Rs 8900. The sum is Rs 51100 +8900 = Rs 60,000. To get his pay in 7th CPC multiply this with Multiplication Factor of 2.57 as explained. The pay in Jan 2016 before Def Pay Matrix is Rs 60000 x 2.57 = Rs 1,54,200. But this cannot be less than what is given in the Def Pay Matrix ( Entry pay of Rs 52290 x 2.67 of IOR). The figure in Def Pay Matrix closest is Rs 1,57,100. Therefore the matrix pay of Brigadier as in Jan 2016 is Rs 1,57,100. To get the Last Drawn Emoluments (LDE) add MSP of Rs 15,500. The LDE is Rs 157100 + 15500 = Rs 1, 72,600.If this Brigadier retires in Jan 2016 then his pension is 0.50 x LDE = Rs 0.50 x 172600 = Rs 86,300 + DR.
From this long explanation you can make out is : Multiplication Factor and IOR are both used in fixing pay of Serving soldiers. IOR has no effect on Pre – 2016 Pensioners. Their pension is Pension in Dec 2015 x 2.57 only.

6. When will IOR Benefit Pre – 2016 Brigadiers? As explained, the IOR has no effect on pension of Pre – 2016 Brigadiers till Jun 2019. When OROP – 2018 is implemented w.e.f. Jul 2019, then Average Pension of Brigadiers retired in calendar year 2018 is taken in fixing pension of Pre – 2016 Brigadiers. Since Post – 2016 Brigadiers are benefited by IOR of 2.67 and their pensions have gone up since Jan 2016 all Pre – 2016 Brigadiers will get the benefit of IOR of 2.67 only w.e.f. Jul 2019.

7. Sir, I hope I have cleared the doubt about IOR and Multiplication Factor.Though these two have different meanings, yet for Post – 2016 serving soldiers, IOR and Multiplication factors have been used in fixing pay as in Jan 2016. Now I am sure you know what is IOR and what is Multiplication Factor.
Warm regards,

Brig CS Vidyasagar (Rtd)












































ON WAR ; The Best Phrases of "THE ART of WAR"

SOURCE:
https://www.facebook.com/groups/237127499808464/permalink/955878351266705/











The Best Phrases of "THE ART of WAR"
                               of 
                        TZUN TZU
                              BY   
                     Daniel Moreno

                                 [  https://youtu.be/31j43R77tOc   ]






Sun Tzu - The Art of War ~ Short Documentary(History Channel)


                   [ https://youtu.be/maOFYVR8B40 ]




The Art of War - Sun Tzu - An Animated                           Book Summary



                      [  https://youtu.be/qBduuL-DZ24  ]




   THE COMPLETE "ART OF WAR "



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http://www.anzishaprize.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Tzu-Sun_-von-Clausewitz-General-Carl_-Machiavelli-Niccolo_-Jomini-Baron-de-The-Complete-Art-of-War-Start-Publishing-LLC-2013.pdf


              The Complete Art of War 

[A]    The Art of War   BySun zu translated by Lionel Giles              
              
 [B]   On War                   By Carl von Clausewitz translated by Colonel J.J. Graham                                                   

[C]    The Art of War     By Niccolò Machiavelli 


[D]    The Art of War     By Baron De Jomini translated by G.H. Mendell, and W.P. Craighill




THE ART OF WAR is the best and most famous treaty of strategy in the world, which has become a book of worship in the world of economy and business. It proposes valid principles both in the world of military strategy and in the world of business or politics. Despite its age (2500 years) is a terribly modern book that will help to reflect on any type of problem and to pose the necessary strategies to attack it,

Now the tactics of combat are taking to another field, that of the businesses. Many officials of the Asian armies had to return to the civil life and chose to form their own companies. Without studies in business, they had to resort to what they knew, the administration of military units, directing their companies as armies, applying the knowledge mainly learned in the Art of War.


His purpose was to deliver wisdom to the future generals so that they could obtain victory by defeating the enemy in the easiest way possible, so it is based on rather psychological tactics, since its fundamental principle is that "every war is a deception".


From this single idea it is clear the importance of marketing to position a product before selling it. The product must be sold before manufacturing, knowing the needs of potential customers, "get the victory before entering battle." Therefore the market is a battlefield, where information is key before fighting, knowing the strengths and weaknesses of the opponent or as Sun Zu said: "know yourself and know your enemy."


The book describes military tactics and recommendations for victory, not only in battle, but in a long-term contest. In the early nineteenth century, many economists saw Sun Tzu as a business guru, since the military tactics he describes are also applicable to the economic and commercial world and, by extension, to most aspects of life. This book inspired great historical figures such as Napoleon, Machiavelli, Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, Montgomery, Marchall, etc.

I am going to present a well synthesized summary that I found on the internet. Many key phrases of the modern manuals of business management are practically literal quotations from the work of Sun Tzu (changing, for example, army by company, or armament by resources) Sun Tzu's collection of essays does not exceed 100 pages, distributed in 13 chapters, with a very condensed exposition. In a few pages he presents suggestions on: philosophies, strategies, tactics, organizational recommendations on war, among others.

Then I leave a brief summary with the best sentences of each chapter:


Seen as the best strategy book of all time, written dating from the fourth century before our era, and applied its wisdom to this day, mainly in the corporate world, but its application goes beyond the militia and business, can be used in daily life, of course, knowing how to interpret the concept.



★CHAPTER 1: About the evaluation

War is of vital importance to the State; it is the domain of life or death, the road to survival or the loss of the Empire: it is forced to handle it well. Not reflect seriously on everything that concerns you is to give proof of a guilty indifference in regard to the conservation or loss of what is most dear to us;  and this should not happen between us.

The art of war is based on deception. Therefore, when it is capable of attacking, it must appear incapacitated; when the troops move, appear inactive. If he is close to the enemy, he must make him believe that he is far away; if it is far away, pretend that it is close.

Hit the enemy when it is messy. Prepare against him when he is safe everywhere. Avoid during a time when it is stronger. If your opponent has a choleric temper, try to irritate him. If he is arrogant, try to encourage their selfishness.

If the enemy troops are well prepared after a reorganization, try to disarrange them. If they are united, sowing dissension among their ranks. Attack the enemy when he is not ready, and appear when he does not wait for you. These are the keys to victory for the strategist.



★CHAPTER 2: On the initiation of actions

If you are besieging a town, you will exhaust your strength. If you keep your army for a long time in the campaign, your supplies will be exhausted.

I have heard of military operations that have been clumsy and sudden, but I have never seen any expert in the art of war maintain the campaign for long.

Be as quick as the thunder that resounds before you have been able to cover your ears, fast as the lightning that shines before you have been able to blink.

An intelligent general fights to deprive the enemy of their food. Each serving of food taken from the enemy equals twenty that you supply to yourself.

If you use the enemy to defeat the enemy, you will be powerful wherever you go.

The most important thing in a military operation is victory and not persistence. The latter is not beneficial. An army is like fire: if you do not turn it off, it will consume itself.




★CHAPTER 3: On the propositions of victory and defeat

It is better to keep an enemy intact than to destroy it.

Those who succeed in rendering the armies of others helpless without fighting are the best masters of the Art of War.

Never attack by anger and in a hurry. It is advisable to take time in planning and coordinating the plan.
A true master of martial arts defeats other enemy forces without battle, conquers other cities without besieging them and destroys other armies without spending much time.

Complete victory occurs when the army does not fight, the city is not besieged, the destruction does not last for a long time, and in each case the enemy is defeated by the use of strategy.

If you know others and you know yourself, not in a hundred battles you will be in danger; If you do not know others, but you know yourself, you will lose a battle and gain another; If you do not know others or know yourself, you will be in danger in every battle.




★CHÁRTER 4: About the measure in the disposition of the means

Invincibility is in oneself, vulnerability in the adversary.

Invincibility is a question of defense, vulnerability, a matter of attack. While you have not observed vulnerabilities in the battle order of the adversaries, hide your own attack formation, and prepare to be invincible, in order to preserve yourself. When opponents have vulnerable battle orders, it's time to go out and attack them.


The defense is for times of scarcity, the attack for times of abundance.

In situations of defense, you silence the voices and erase the traces, hidden as ghosts and spirits underground, invisible to everyone. In situations of attack, your movement is fast and your shout, swift as thunder and lightning, for which you can not prepare, even if they come from heaven.

Everyone praises victory in battle, but what is truly desirable is to be able to see the world of the subtle and realize the world of the occult, to the point of being able to achieve victory where there is no form.
If you are able to see the subtle and to real


When you are able to see the subtle, it is easy to win.

A victorious army wins first and starts the battle later; A defeated army fights first and tries to gain victory later.



★CHAPTER 5: On the firmness

The experts are able to defeat the enemy by creating a favorable perception in them, thus obtaining victory without the need to exercise their strength.

Disorder comes from order, cowardice arises from courage, weakness arises from force.

If you want to pretend disorder to convince your adversaries and distract them, you must first organize the order, because only then can you create an artificial disorder. If you want to feign cowardice to know the strategy of the adversaries, first you have to be extremely brave, because only then can you act as timid in an artificial way. If you want to feign weakness to induce arrogance in your enemies, you must first be extremely strong because only then can you pretend to be weak.

When an army has the force of impetus, even the shy one becomes brave, when he loses the force of impetus, even the brave one becomes timid. Nothing is fixed in the laws of war: these are developed on the basis of impetus.

It moves the enemies with the prospect of triumph, so that they fall into the ambush.



★CHAPTER 6: About the full and the empty

The good warriors make the adversaries come to them, and in no way do they allow themselves to be attracted outside their strength.

If you make the adversaries come to you to fight, their strength will always be empty. If you do not go out to fight, your strength will always be full. This is the art of emptying others and filling yourself.

Appears in critical places and attacks where they least expect it, causing them to come to the rescue.
Be extremely subtle, discreet, to the point of having no form. Be completely mysterious and confidential, to the point of being silent. In this way you can direct the fate of your opponents.

It arrives like the wind, move like the lightning, and the adversaries can not defeat you.

When the adversaries arrive to attack you, do not fight with them, but you establish a strategic change to confuse them and fill them with uncertainty.

Make the adversaries see what is ordinary for you as extraordinary; make them see as ordinary what is extraordinary for you.

If you make the adversaries not know the place and date of the battle, you can always win.

Do something for or against opponents to get their attention, so that you can attract them to discover their habits of attack and defense behavior.

Everyone knows the form by which he was the winner, but nobody knows the way by which he secured victory.

An army does not have constant formation, just as water does not have a constant form: genius is the ability to obtain victory by changing and adapting according to the enemy.



★CHAPTER 7: On direct and indirect confrontation

The difficulty of armed struggle is to close long distances and turn problems into advantages.
If you ignore the plans of your rivals, you can not make precise alliances.

Only when you know every detail of the terrain condition can you maneuver and war.

A military force is established by strategy in the sense that you distract the enemy so that he can not know what your real situation is and can not impose his supremacy.

When a military force moves quickly it is like the wind; when it goes slowly it is like the forest; It is voracious as fire and motionless as mountains. It is fast as the wind in the sense that it arrives without warning and disappears like lightning. It's like a forest because it has an order. It is voracious as the fire that devastates a plain without leaving behind a blade of grass. It is immobile like a mountain when it is quartered. It is as difficult to know as the darkness; its movement is like thunder that resounds.

The first one who makes the movement is the "guest", the last one is the "host". The "guest" has it difficult, the "host has it easy".

Do not chase the enemies when they pretend a retreat, nor attack expert troops.



★CHAPTER 8: About the nine changes

There are routes that you should not use, armies that are not to be attacked, cities that should not be surrounded, lands over which you should not fight, and civil rulers' orders that should not be obeyed.

Generals who know the possible variables to take advantage of the terrain know how to handle the armed forces.

The considerations of the intelligent person always include objectively analyzing the benefit and harm. When you consider the benefit, your action expands; When you consider the damage, your problems can be solved.

Tires the enemies keeping them busy and not letting them breathe.

Good generals: they commit themselves to death, but they do not cling to the hope of survival; they act according to the events, in a rational and realistic way, without being carried away by emotions or being subject to being confused. When they see a good opportunity, they are like tigers, other wise they close their doors. Their action and their non-action are matters of strategy, and they can not be pleased or angry.



★CHAPTER 9: About the distribution of means

Military maneuvers are the result of plans and strategies in the most advantageous way to win. They determine the mobility and effectiveness of the troops.

When you fight on a mountain, it attacks from the top down and not the other way around.

An army prefers a high ground and avoids low ground, appreciates light and detests darkness.

If the emissaries of the enemy utter humble words while he increases his war preparations, this means that he will advance. When high-sounding words are pronounced and advanced ostentatiously, it is a sign that the enemy is going to retreat. If your emissaries come with humble words, send spies to observe the enemy and you will see that your preparations for war are increasing.

If the enemy sees an advantage but does not take advantage of it, he is tired.

If there are murmurs, lack of discipline and the soldiers talk a lot to each other, it means that the loyalty of the troops has been lost. Murmurs describe the expression of true feelings; lack of discipline indicates problems with superiors. When the command has lost the loyalty of the troops, the soldiers speak frankly to each other about the problems with their superiors.

The emissaries who come with a conciliatory attitude indicate that the enemy wants a truce.

If the enemy troops face you with ardor, but they delay the moment of entering into combat without leaving the land, you must observe them carefully. They are preparing a surprise attack.

The enemy who acts in isolation, who lacks strategy and takes lightly his adversaries, will inevitably end up being defeated.

If your plan does not contain a strategy of withdrawal or after the attack, but you rely exclusively on the strength of your soldiers, and take your opponents lightly without assessing their condition, you will surely fall prisoner.


When the orders are given clearly, simply and consistently to the troops, they accept them. When the orders are confusing, contradictory and changing, the troops do not accept them or understand them. When the orders are reasonable, fair, simple, clear and consistent, there is a reciprocal satisfaction between the leader and the group.




★CHAPTER 10: About the topology

In order to defeat the enemy, the entire military command must have only one intention and all military forces must cooperate.

When the laws of war signal a sure victory it is clearly appropriate to engage in battle, even if the government has given orders not to attack. If the laws of war do not indicate a certain victory, it is appropriate not to enter into battle, even if the government has given the order to attack.

Those who know martial arts do not waste time when they make their movements, nor do they exhaust themselves when they attack. Because of this it is said that when you know yourself and know others, victory is not a danger; When you know heaven and earth, victory is inexhaustible.



★CHAPTER 11: On the nine kinds of land

The speed of action is the essential factor of the condition of military force, taking advantage of the mistakes of the adversaries, moving along roads that do not wait and attacking when they are not on guard.

In an invasion, as a rule, the more invaders enter the territory of others, the stronger they become, to the point that the native government can no longer expel them.

May the movements of your troops and the preparation of your plans be unfathomable.

Prohibit auguries to avoid doubts

A skillfully prepared military operation must be like a speeding snake that counterattacks with its tail when someone attacks it by the head, it strikes back with its head when someone attacks it by the tail and it counterattacks with head and tail, when someone attacks it by the middle .

It is up to the general to be quiet, reserved, fair and methodical.

Change your actions and revise your plans, so that no one can recognize them.

You can win when no one can understand at any time what your intentions are.

The main deception that is valued in military operations is not directed only to enemies, but begins with the troops themselves, to make them follow you without knowing where they are going.

Use your soldiers only in combat, without communicating your strategy. Let them know the benefits that await them, but do not tell them about the potential damages. If the true is said, your plan will fail. If the soldiers begin to worry, they will become hesitant and fearful.

The task of a military operation is to pretend to accommodate the enemy's intentions. If you concentrate totally on this one, you can kill your general even if you are miles away. This is called expertly meet the target.


★CHAPTER 12: On the art of attacking by fire

It is not enough to know how to attack others with fire, it is necessary to know how to prevent others from attacking you.

A government should not mobilize an army out of anger, and military leaders should not provoke war over anger.

Act when it is beneficial; otherwise, give up. Anger can turn into joy, and anger can become pleasure, but a destroyed people can  not be reborn, and death can not become life. Consequently, an enlightened government pays attention to all this, and a good military command takes it into account. This is the way to keep the nation safe and keep its army intact.



★CHAPTER 13: On concord and discord

Information can not be obtained from ghosts or spirits, nor can it be taken by analogy, nor discovered by calculations. It must be obtained from people; people who know the situation of the adversary.

If spies are not treated well, they can become renegades and work for the enemy.

You can not get the truth from the spies without subtlety.

Each issue requires prior knowledge.

Whenever you are going to attack and fight, you must first know the talents of the enemy's servers, and thus you can face them according to their abilities.

A brilliant ruler or a wise general who can use the most intelligent for espionage, can be sure of victory.

Espionage is essential for military operations, and armies depend on it to carry out their actions. It will not be advantageous for the army to act without knowing the enemy's situation, and knowing the enemy's situation is not possible without espionage.




FURTHER READING





The Art of War





The Art of War
Bamboo book - closed - UCR.jpg
Author(trad.) Sun Tzu
CountryChina
LanguageChinese
SubjectMilitary strategy and tactics
Publication date
5th century BC
TextThe Art of War at Wikisource
The Art of War
Traditional Chinese孫子兵法
Simplified Chinese孙子兵法
Literal meaning"Master Sun's Military Methods"
The Art of War is an ancient Chinese military treatise dating from the Spring and Autumn period. The work, which is attributed to the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu ("Master Sun", also spelled Sunzi), is composed of 13 chapters. Each one is devoted to a distinct aspect of warfare and how that applies to military strategy and tactics. For almost 1,500 years it was the lead text in an anthology that would be formalised as the Seven Military Classics by Emperor Shenzong of Song in 1080. The Art of War remains the most influential strategy text in East Asian warfare.[1] It has a profound influence on both Eastern and Western military thinking, business tactics, legal strategy and beyond.
The book was first translated and published into French in 1772 (re-published in 1782) by the French Jesuit Jean Joseph Marie Amiot and a partial translation into English was attempted by British officer Everard Ferguson Calthrop in 1905 under the title The Book of War. The first annotated English translation was completed and published by Lionel Giles in 1910.[2] Numerous military and political leaders such as the Chinese communist revolutionary Mao Zedong, Japanese daimyo Takeda Shingen, and American military general Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr. have drawn inspiration from the book.

History[edit]

Text and commentaries[edit]

The Art of War is traditionally attributed to a military general from the late 6th century BC known as "Master Sun" (Sunzi or Sun Tzu), though its earliest parts probably date to at least 100 years later.[3] Sima Qian's 1st century BC work Records of the Grand Historian (Shiji), the first of China's 24 dynastic histories, records an early Chinese tradition stating that a text on military matters was written by a "Sun Wu" from the State of Qi, and that this text had been read and studied by King Helü of Wu (r. 514–495 BC).[4] This text was traditionally identified with the received Master Sun's Art of War. The conventional view—which is still widely held in China—was that Sun Wu was a military theorist from the end of the Spring and Autumn period (776–471 BC) who fled his home state of Qi to the southeastern kingdom of Wu, where he is said to have impressed the king with his ability to train even dainty palace ladies in warfare and to have made Wu's armies powerful enough to challenge their western rivals in the state of Chu.[5]
The prominent strategist, poet, and warlord Cao Cao in the early 3rd century AD authored the earliest known commentary to the Art of War.[4] Cao's preface makes clear that he edited the text and removed certain passages, but the extent of his changes were unclear historically.[4] The Art of War appears throughout the bibliographical catalogs of the Chinese dynastic histories, but listings of its divisions and size varied widely.[4] In the early 20th century, the Chinese writer and reformer Liang Qichao theorized that the text was actually written in the 4th century BC by Sunzi's purported descendant Sun Bin, as a number of historical sources mention a military treatise he wrote.[4]

Authorship[edit]

Around the 12th century, some scholars began to doubt the historical existence of Sunzi, primarily on the grounds that he is not mentioned in the historical classic The Commentary of Zuo (Zuo zhuan 左傳), which mentions most of the notable figures from the Spring and Autumn period.[4] The name "Sun Wu" (孫武) does not appear in any text prior to the Records of the Grand Historian,[6] and has been suspected to be a made-up descriptive cognomen meaning "the fugitive warrior": the surname "Sun" is glossed as the related term "fugitive" (xùn ), while "Wu" is the ancient Chinese virtue of "martial, valiant" ( ), which corresponds to Sunzi's role as the hero's doppelgänger in the story of Wu Zixu.[7] Unlike Sun Wu, Sun Bin appears to have been an actual person who was a genuine authority on military matters, and may have been the inspiration for the creation of the historical figure "Sunzi" through a form of euhemerism.[7]

Yinqueshan tomb discovery[edit]

In 1972, the Yinqueshan Han slips were discovered in two Han dynasty (206 BC – AD 220) tombs near the city of Linyi in Shandong Province.[8] Among the many bamboo slip writings contained in the tombs, which had been sealed around 134 and 118 BC, respectively were two separate texts, one attributed to "Sunzi", corresponding to the received text, and another attributed to Sun Bin, which explains and expands upon the earlier The Art of War by Sunzi.[9] The Sun Bin text's material overlaps with much of the "Sunzi" text, and the two may be "a single, continuously developing intellectual tradition united under the Sun name".[10] This discovery showed that much of the historical confusion was due to the fact that there were two texts that could have been referred to as "Master Sun's Art of War", not one.[9] The content of the earlier text is about one-third of the chapters of the modern The Art of War, and their text matches very closely.[8] It is now generally accepted that the earlier The Art of War was completed sometime between 500 and 450 BC.[9]

The 13 chapters[edit]

The Art of War is divided into 13 chapters (or piān); the collection is referred to as being one zhuàn ("whole" or alternatively "chronicle").
The Art of War chapter names in translations by Giles, Wing, Sawyer, and Chow-Hou
ChapterLionel Giles (1910)R.L. Wing (1988)Ralph D. Sawyer (1996)Chow-Hou Wee (2003)
ILaying PlansThe CalculationsInitial EstimationsDetail Assessment and Planning
(Chinese: 始計)
IIWaging WarThe ChallengeWaging WarWaging War
(Chinese: 作戰)
IIIAttack by StratagemThe Plan of AttackPlanning OffensivesStrategic Attack
(Chinese: 謀攻)
IVTactical DispositionsPositioningMilitary DispositionDisposition of the Army
(Chinese: 軍形)
VUse of EnergyDirectingStrategic Military PowerForces
(Chinese: 兵勢)
VIWeak Points and StrongIllusion and RealityVacuity and SubstanceWeaknesses and Strengths
(Chinese: 虛實)
VIIManeuvering an ArmyEngaging The ForceMilitary CombatMilitary Maneuvers
(Chinese: 軍爭)
VIIIVariation of TacticsThe Nine VariationsNine ChangesVariations and Adaptability
(Chinese: 九變)
IXThe Army on the MarchMoving The ForceManeuvering the ArmyMovement and Development of Troops
(Chinese: 行軍)
XClassification of TerrainSituational PositioningConfigurations of TerrainTerrain
(Chinese: 地形)
XIThe Nine SituationsThe Nine SituationsNine TerrainsThe Nine Battlegrounds
(Chinese: 九地)
XIIAttack by FireThe Fiery AttackIncendiary AttacksAttacking with Fire
(Chinese: 火攻)
XIIIUse of SpiesThe Use of IntelligenceEmploying SpiesIntelligence and Espionage
(Chinese: 用間)

Chapter summary[edit]


The beginning of The Art of War in a classical bamboo book from the reign of the Qianlong Emperor
  1. Detail Assessment and Planning (Chinese: 始計) explores the five fundamental factors (the Way, seasons, terrain, leadership, and management) and seven elements that determine the outcomes of military engagements. By thinking, assessing and comparing these points, a commander can calculate his chances of victory. Habitual deviation from these calculations will ensure failure via improper action. The text stresses that war is a very grave matter for the state and must not be commenced without due consideration.
  2. Waging War (Chinese: 作戰) explains how to understand the economy of warfare and how success requires winning decisive engagements quickly. This section advises that successful military campaigns require limiting the cost of competition and conflict.
  3. Strategic Attack (Chinese: 謀攻) defines the source of strength as unity, not size, and discusses the five factors that are needed to succeed in any war. In order of importance, these critical factors are: Attack, Strategy, Alliances, Army and Cities.
  4. Disposition of the Army (Chinese: 軍形) explains the importance of defending existing positions until a commander is capable of advancing from those positions in safety. It teaches commanders the importance of recognizing strategic opportunities, and teaches not to create opportunities for the enemy.
  5. Forces (Chinese: 兵勢) explains the use of creativity and timing in building an army's momentum.
  6. Weaknesses and Strengths (Chinese: 虛實) explains how an army's opportunities come from the openings in the environment caused by the relative weakness of the enemy and how to respond to changes in the fluid battlefield over a given area.
  7. Military Maneuvers (Chinese: 軍爭) explains the dangers of direct conflict and how to win those confrontations when they are forced upon the commander.
  8. Variations and Adaptability (Chinese: 九變) focuses on the need for flexibility in an army's responses. It explains how to respond to shifting circumstances successfully.
  9. Movement and Development of Troops (Chinese: 行軍) describes the different situations in which an army finds itself as it moves through new enemy territories, and how to respond to these situations. Much of this section focuses on evaluating the intentions of others.
  10. Terrain (Chinese: 地形) looks at the three general areas of resistance (distance, dangers and barriers) and the six types of ground positions that arise from them. Each of these six field positions offers certain advantages and disadvantages.
  11. The Nine Battlegrounds (Chinese: 九地) describes the nine common situations (or stages) in a campaign, from scattering to deadly, and the specific focus that a commander will need in order to successfully navigate them.
  12. Attacking with Fire (Chinese: 火攻) explains the general use of weapons and the specific use of the environment as a weapon. This section examines the five targets for attack, the five types of environmental attack and the appropriate responses to such attacks.
  13. Intelligence and Espionage (Chinese: 用間) focuses on the importance of developing good information sources, and specifies the five types of intelligence sources and how to best manage each of them.

Quotations[edit]

Chinese[edit]

Verses from the book occur in modern daily Chinese idioms and phrases, such as the last verse of Chapter 3:
故曰:知彼知己,百戰不殆;不知彼而知己,一勝一負;不知彼,不知己,每戰必殆。
So it is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be put at risk even in a hundred battles.
If you only know yourself, but not your opponent, you may win or may lose.
If you know neither yourself nor your enemy, you will always endanger yourself.
This has been more tersely interpreted and condensed into the Chinese modern proverb:
知己知彼,百戰不殆。 (Zhī jǐ zhī bǐ, bǎi zhàn bù dài.)
If you know both yourself and your enemy, you can win numerous (literally, "a hundred") battles without jeopardy.

English[edit]

Common examples can also be found in English use, such as verse 18 in Chapter 1:
兵者,詭道也。故能而示之不能,用而示之不用,近而示之遠,遠而示之近。
All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
This has been abbreviated to its most basic form and condensed into the English modern proverb:
All warfare is based on deception.

Cultural impact[edit]

Military and intelligence applications[edit]

Across East AsiaThe Art of War was part of the syllabus for potential candidates of military service examinations.
During the Sengoku period, the Japanese daimyō named Takeda Shingen (1521–1573) is said to have become almost invincible in all battles without relying on guns, because he studied The Art of War.[11] The book even gave him the inspiration for his famous battle standard "Fūrinkazan" (Wind, Forest, Fire and Mountain), meaning fast as the wind, silent as a forest, ferocious as fire and immovable as a mountain.
The translator Samuel B. Griffith offers a chapter on "Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung" where The Art of War is cited as influencing Mao's On Guerrilla WarfareOn the Protracted War and Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War, and includes Mao's quote: "We must not belittle the saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military expert of ancient China, 'Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a thousand battles without disaster."[11]
During the Vietnam War, some Vietcong officers extensively studied The Art of War and reportedly could recite entire passages from memory.
General Võ Nguyên Giáp successfully implemented tactics described in The Art of War during the Battle of Dien Bien Phu ending major French involvement in Indochina and leading to the accords which partitioned Vietnam into North and South. General Võ, later the main PVA military commander in the Vietnam War, was an avid student and practitioner of Sun Tzu's ideas.[12] America's defeat there, more than any other event, brought Sun Tzu to the attention of leaders of American military theory.[12][13][14]
Finnish Field Marshal Mannerheim and general Aksel Airo were avid readers of Art of War. They both read it in French; Airo kept the French translation of the book on his bedside table in his quarters.[citation needed]
The Department of the Army in the United States, through its Command and General Staff College, lists The Art of War as one example of a book that may be kept at a military unit's library.[15]
The Art of War is listed on the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program (formerly known as the Commandant's Reading List). It is recommended reading for all United States Military Intelligence personnel.[16]
According to some authors, the strategy of deception from The Art of War was studied and widely used by the KGB: "I will force the enemy to take our strength for weakness, and our weakness for strength, and thus will turn his strength into weakness".[17] The book is widely cited by KGB officers in charge of disinformation operations in Vladimir Volkoff's novel Le Montage.

Application outside the military[edit]

The Art of War has been applied to many fields well outside of the military. Much of the text is about how to fight wars without actually having to do battle: It gives tips on how to outsmart one's opponent so that physical battle is not necessary. As such, it has found application as a training guide for many competitive endeavors that do not involve actual combat.
The Art of War is mentioned as an influence in the earliest known Chinese collection of stories about fraud (mostly in the realm of commerce), Zhang Yingyu's The Book of Swindles (Du pian xin shu 杜騙新書, ca. 1617), which dates to the late Ming dynasty.[18]
Many business books have applied the lessons taken from the book to office politics and corporate business strategy.[19][20][21] Many Japanese companies make the book required reading for their key executives.[22] The book is also popular among Western business circles citing its utilitarian value regarding management practices. Many entrepreneurs and corporate executives have turned to it for inspiration and advice on how to succeed in competitive business situations. The book has also been applied to the field of education.[23]
The Art of War has been the subject of legal books[24] and legal articles on the trial process, including negotiation tactics and trial strategy.[25][26][27][28]
The Art of War has also been applied in the world of sports. National Football League coach Bill Belichick is known to have read the book and used its lessons to gain insights in preparing for games.[29] Australian cricket as well as Brazilian association football coaches Luiz Felipe Scolari and Carlos Alberto Parreira are known to have embraced the text. Scolari made the Brazilian World Cup squad of 2002 study the ancient work during their successful campaign.[30]
The Art of War is often quoted while developing tactics and/or strategy in Electronic Sports. Particularly, one of the fundamental books about e-sports, "Play To Win" by Massachusetts Institute of Technology graduate David Sirlin, is actually just an analysis about possible applications of the ideas from The Art of War in modern Electronic Sports.
The Art of War was released in 2014 as an e-book companion alongside the Art of War DLC for Europa Universalis IV, a PC strategy game by Paradox Development Studios, with a foreword by Thomas Johansson.

Notable translations[edit]


Running Press miniature editionof the 1994 Ralph D. Sawyer translation, printed in 2003
The book has been translated into Assamese by Utpal Datta and published by Asom Sahitya Sabha.
The book was translated into Manchu as ᠴᠣᠣᡥᠠᡳ
ᠪᠠᡳᡨᠠ
ᠪᡝ
ᡤᡳᠰᡠᡵᡝᠩᡤᡝ
 Wylie: Tchauhai paita be gisurengge,[31][32] Möllendorff: Coohai baita de gisurengge, Discourse on the art of War.[33]
The first Manchu translations of Chinese works were the Liu-t'ao 六韜, Su-shu 素書, and San-lueh 三略 – all Chinese military texts dedicated to the arts of war due to the Manchu interests in the topic, like Sun-Tzu's work The Art of War.[34][35] The military related texts which were translated into Manchu from Chinese were translated by Dahai.[36] Manchu translations of Chinese texts included the Ming penal code and military texts were performed by Dahai.[37] These translations were requested of Dahai by Nurhaci.[38] The military text Wu-tzu was translated into Manchu along with Sun-Tzu's work The Art of War.[39] Chinese history, Chinese law, and Chinese military theory classical texts were translated into Manchu during the rule of Hong Taiji in Mukden with Manchus placing significance upon military and governance related Chinese texts.[40] A Manchu translation was made of the military themed Chinese novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms.[41][42] Chinese literature, military theory and legal texts were translated into Manchu by Dahai and Erdeni.[43] The translations were ordered in 1629.[44][45] The translation of the military texts San-lüeh, Su-shu, and the Ta Ming hui-tien (the Ming law) done by Dahai was ordered by Nurhaci.[46] While it was mainly administrative and ethical guidance which made up most of San-lüeh and Su Shu, military science was indeed found in the Liu-t'ao and Chinese military manuals were eagerly translated by the Manchus and the Manchus were also attracted to the military content in Romance of the Three Kingdoms which is why it was translated.[47]

Another Manchu translation was made by Aisin Gioro Qiying.[48]




Citations


  1. Jump up^ Smith (1999), p. 216.
  2. Jump up^ Giles, Lionel The Art of War by Sun Tzu – Special Edition. Special Edition Books. 2007. p. 62.
  3. Jump up^ Lewis (1999), p. 604.
  4. Jump up to:a b c d e f Gawlikowski & Loewe (1993), p. 447.
  5. Jump up^ Mair (2007), pp. 12–13.
  6. Jump up^ Mair (2007), p. 9.
  7. Jump up to:a b Mair (2007), p. 10.
  8. Jump up to:a b Gawlikowski & Loewe (1993), p. 448.
  9. Jump up to:a b c Gawlikowski & Loewe (1993), p. 449.
  10. Jump up^ Mark Edward Lewis (2005), quoted in Mair (2007), p. 18.
  11. Jump up to:a b Griffith, Samuel B. The Illustrated Art of War. 2005. Oxford University Press. pp. 17, 141–43.
  12. Jump up to:a b McCready, Douglas. Learning from Sun Tzu, Military Review, May–June 2003."Archived copy". Archived from the originalon 2011-10-11. Retrieved 2009-12-19.
  13. Jump up^ Interview with Dr. William Duiker, Conversation with Sonshi
  14. Jump up^ Forbes, Andrew ; Henley, David (2012). The Illustrated Art of War: Sun Tzu. Chiang Mai: Cognoscenti Books. ASIN B00B91XX8U
  15. Jump up^ Army, U. S. (1985). Military History and Professional Development. U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute. 85-CSI-21 85.
  16. Jump up^ Marine Corps Professional Reading Program
  17. Jump up^ Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present, and Future. 1994. ISBN 0-374-52738-5, chapter Who was behind perestroika?
  18. Jump up^ https://cup.columbia.edu/search-results?keyword=book+of+swindles
  19. Jump up^ Michaelson, Gerald. "Sun Tzu: The Art of War for Managers; 50 Strategic Rules." Avon, MA: Adams Media, 2001
  20. Jump up^ McNeilly, Mark. "Sun Tzu and the Art of Business : Six Strategic Principles for Managers. New York:Oxford University Press, 1996.
  21. Jump up^ Krause, Donald G. "The Art of War for Executives: Ancient Knowledge for Today's Business Professional." New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1995.
  22. Jump up^ Kammerer, Peter. "The Art of Negotiation." South China Morning Post (April 21, 2006) p. 15
  23. Jump up^ Jeffrey, D (2010). "A Teacher Diary Study to Apply Ancient Art of War Strategies to Professional Development". The International Journal of Learning. 7 (3): 21–36.
  24. Jump up^ Barnhizer, David. The Warrior Lawyer: Powerful Strategies for Winning Legal Battles Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Bridge Street Books, 1997.
  25. Jump up^ Balch, Christopher D., "The Art of War and the Art of Trial Advocacy: Is There Common Ground?" (1991), 42 Mercer L. Rev. 861–73
  26. Jump up^ Beirne, Martin D. and Scott D. Marrs, The Art of War and Public Relations: Strategies for Successful Litigation [1]
  27. Jump up^ Pribetic, Antonin I., "The Trial Warrior: Applying Sun Tzu's The Art of War to Trial Advocacy" April 21, 2007, [2]
  28. Jump up^ Solomon, Samuel H., "The Art of War: Pursuing Electronic Evidence as Your Corporate Opportunity" [3]
  29. Jump up^ "Put crafty Belichick's patriot games down to the fine art of war"The Sydney Morning Herald. 2005-02-04.
  30. Jump up^ Winter, Henry (June 29, 2006). "Mind games reach new high as Scolari studies art of war"Irish Independent.
  31. Jump up^ Shou-p'ing Wu Ko (1855). Translation (by A. Wylie) of the Ts'ing wan k'e mung, a Chinese grammar of the Manchu Tartar language (by Woo Kĭh Show-ping, revised and ed. by Ching Ming-yuen Pei-ho) with intr. notes on Manchu literature. p. 39.
  32. Jump up^ http://library.umac.mo/ebooks/b31043252.pdf
  33. Jump up^ Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. North China Branch, Shanghai (1890). Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Kelly & Walsh. pp. 40–.
  34. Jump up^ Early China. Society for the Study of Early China. 1975. p. 53.
  35. Jump up^ Durrant, Stephen (1977). “Manchu Translations of Chou Dynasty Texts”. Early China 3. [Cambridge University Press, Society for the Study of Early China]: 52–54. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23351361.
  36. Jump up^ Sin-wai Chan (2009). A Chronology of Translation in China and the West: From the Legendary Period to 2004. Chinese University Press. pp. 60–61. ISBN 978-962-996-355-2.
  37. Jump up^ Peter C Perdue (30 June 2009). China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia. Harvard University Press. pp. 122–. ISBN 978-0-674-04202-5.
  38. Jump up^ Frederic Wakeman Jr. (1985). The Great Enterprise: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-century China. University of California Press. pp. 44–. ISBN 978-0-520-04804-1.
  39. Jump up^ Early China. Society for the Study of Early China. 1977. p. 53.
  40. Jump up^ Claudine Salmon (13 November 2013). Literary Migrations: Traditional Chinese Fiction in Asia (17th-20th Centuries). Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 94–. ISBN 978-981-4414-32-6.
  41. Jump up^ Cultural Hybridity in Manchu Bannermen Tales (zidishu). ProQuest. 2007. pp. 25–. ISBN 978-0-549-44084-0.
  42. Jump up^ West, Andrew"The Textual History of Sanguo Yanyi: The Manchu Translation". Retrieved 11 October 2016.
  43. Jump up^ Arthur W. Hummel (1991). Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period: 1644–1912. SMC publ. p. vi. ISBN 978-957-638-066-2.
  44. Jump up^ Shou-p'ing Wu Ko (1855). Translation (by A. Wylie) of the Ts'ing wan k'e mung, a Chinese grammar of the Manchu Tartar language (by Woo Kĭh Show-ping, revised and ed. by Ching Ming-yuen Pei-ho) with intr. notes on Manchu literature. pp. xxxvi–.
  45. Jump up^ Translation of the Ts'ing wan k'e mung, a Chinese Grammar of the Manchu Tartar Language; with introductory notes on Manchu Literature: (translated by A. Wylie.). Mission Press. 1855. pp. xxxvi–.
  46. Jump up^ http://www.dartmouth.edu/~qing/WEB/DAHAI.html
  47. Jump up^ Durrant, Stephen. 1979. “Sino-manchu Translations at the Mukden Court”. Journal of the American Oriental Society 99 (4). American Oriental Society: 653–61. doi:10.2307/601450https://www.jstor.org/stable/601450?seq=2 pp. 654–56.
  48. Jump up^ Soldierly Methods: Vade Mecum for an Iconoclastic Translation of Sun Zi bingfa (Art of War). p. 82






SEE ALSO



Concepts

Books







Sources

  • Gawlikowski, Krzysztof; Loewe, Michael (1993). "Sun tzu ping fa 孫子兵法". In Loewe, Michael. Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide. Berkeley: Society for the Study of Early China; Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley. pp. 446–55. ISBN 1-55729-043-1.
  • Graff, David A. (2002). Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300-900. Warfare and History. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415239559.
  • Griffith, Samuel (2005). Sun Tzu: The Illustrated Art of War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 019518999X.
  • Lewis, Mark Edward (1999). "Warring States Political History". In Loewe, MichaelShaughnessy, EdwardThe Cambridge History of Ancient China. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 587–650. ISBN 0-521-47030-7.
  • Mair, Victor H. (2007). The Art of War: Sun Zi's Military Methods. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0-231-13382-1.
  • Smith, Kidder (1999). "The Military Texts: The Sunzi". In de Bary, Wm. TheodoreSources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times to 1600, Volume 1 (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 213–24. ISBN 978-0-231-10938-3.
  • Вєдєнєєв, Д. В.; Гавриленко, О. А.; Кубіцький, С. О. (2017). Остроухова, В. В., ed. Еволюція воєнного мистецтва: у 2 ч.

External links