Sunday, February 3, 2019

Operation Lal Dora: India’s aborted military intervention in Mauritius

SOURCE:
https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/13056/1/Brewster,%20D.%20Operation%20Lal%20Dora%202013.pdf


Operation Lal Dora: India’s aborted military intervention in Mauritius

Mauritius forms an anchor to India’s strategic role in the Indian Ocean. India has long had a special economic, political and security relationship with Mauritius, which a US diplomatic report has characterised as Mauritius’ “willing subordination” to India. 1 A key turning point in the relationship occurred in 1983, when, in Operation Lal Dora, India came to the point of a full scale military intervention in the island state to ensure that it stayed in India’s strategic orbit.


This article will discuss a 1983 political crisis in Mauritius which threatened to overturn a Hindu-led government and led to plans for an Indian intervention in the island. When Indian military leaders hesitated over a military operation, Indira Gandhi instead relied on her security services to achieve India’s objectives. An understanding of this previously undisclosed operation casts light on India’s thinking about its role in the region, its military decision-making processes, and on what could be seen as a long-standing alignment of interests between India and the United States in the Indian Ocean. These issues are particularly relevant as the United States now looks to further develop its strategic partnership with India as part of its ‘Pivot to Asia’

Strategic rivalry in the Indian Ocean during the Cold War

The southwest Indian Ocean of the late 1970s and early 1980s was a scene of superpower competition, rivalry and intrigue. The Indian Ocean had become a new frontier of the Cold  War as the Soviet Union and the United States expanded their naval capabilities in the region and jostled for influence over the small and politically weak Indian Ocean island states. The great distances across the Indian Ocean meant that access to local port facilities and air bases became a major focus of competition between the two superpowers. At the same time, apartheid South Africa actively destabilised states that it considered hostile. This strategic competition led to considerable instability in the region. Several of Indian Ocean island states including Seychelles, Comoros and Madagascar suffered coups involving foreign powers or mercenaries. As the Mauritius Times commented in 1978,”Mauritius is the only important island left in the Indian Ocean that is not in the pocket of any superpower…It would be sheer folly to dismiss the likelihood of a coup in Mauritius.”2



For much of the Cold War, the growing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union was the cause of considerable dismay for New Delhi. India saw itself as destined to become the leading power in the Indian Ocean, but it did not have the military capability to challenge the regional presence of either the United States or a “friendly” Soviet Union. The ideology of nonalignment to which India officially subscribed held that the ‘intrusion’ of great powers (particularly Western powers) into any part of the developing world was inherently illegitimate and the primary (if not only) source of insecurity among developing states. From the early 1970s, India had strongly opposed the US military presence in the Indian Ocean as a threat to regional stability. The “intrusion” of a US naval task force led by the USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in the closing days of the 1971 Bangladesh war was long remembered in India as an outrageous and impermissible exercise in gunboat diplomacy. New Delhi also strongly resented the US base on Diego Garcia which gave the  United States the capability to dominate the entire Indian Ocean and to potentially intervene in South Asia.



Although India had a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union, it was also concerned about Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean region, particularly after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1980. While New Delhi refrained from publicly condemning the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and continued in its anti-US rhetoric, there were increasingly instances where New Delhi and Washington had similar interests in the region. From the early 1980s, the Reagan administration also increasingly saw India as a status quo power that could act as a security provider to the region. 3

Political instability in Mauritius

Mauritius, the island state located some 900 km east of Madagascar, is in many ways the “Little India” of the Indian Ocean. It was colonized by the Dutch, the French and then the British. With no indigenous population, the Europeans imported slaves from Africa and indentured labour from India to work the sugar cane plantations. Between 1834 and 1920, some 420,000 Indian workers migrated to Mauritius, many of them Bhojpuri speakers from the Indian state of Bihar. Today some 70% of Mauritius’ population is of Indian descent with the remainder is mostly French Creole speakers of African descent and a very small white French community. Although the whites no longer hold the reins political power, the key Franco-Mauritian families or “Grand Blancs” as they are called, still exert considerable economic influence.


Since gaining independence from Britain in 1968, Mauritius has managed to maintain a democratic system, but the road has sometimes been rocky. Its early years were dominated by Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, leader of the Mauritian Labour Party, who shepherded Mauritius through independence and then governed for the next 14 years. Ramgoolam was pragmatic and a moderate social democrat and, although of Indian descent, he sought to maintain a balance between the various ethnic and religious groups that make up Mauritius. He also balanced Mauritius’ international relationships, although generally taking a pro-Western line. This included a mild, if largely symbolic, opposition to the US presence at Diego Garcia.

Even before the independence of Mauritius, India saw itself as having a special relationship with the island. Early Mauritian political leaders of all persuasions took inspiration from India’s struggle for independence and the Indian community clung tenaciously to the idea of Mother India. After the departure of the Royal Navy from the region, India effectively assumed responsibility for Mauritius’ security under a 1974 defence agreement. In effect, this agreement signified Mauritius swapping one security guarantor for another. Under the agreement India transferred patrol boats and a helicopter to Mauritius and the Indian Navy effectively took responsibility for the Mauritian Coast Guard. Indira Gandhi considered Mauritius to be one of India’s most dependable international partners and a potential safe haven for her and her family.4 


New Delhi had supported Seewoosagur Ramgoolam since independence. But by the early 1980s he was barely hanging on to power and it was clear that he would lose the forthcoming election to the main opposition party, the Mouvement Militant Mauricien (MMM). Ramgoolam was deeply unpopular as compared with the MMM, which had a young leadership and often identified with radical third world movements. The MMM was nominally led by Anerood Jugnauth, a London-trained lawyer of Indian descent, but its “ideological leader”, was a firebrand socialist of French descent, Paul Berenger. With political change likely, the politically active Indian Mission in Port Louis facilitated several meetings in New Delhi between Indira Gandhi, Jugnauth and Berenger in 1980 and 1981. Mrs Gandhi faced the reality of the forthcoming transfer of power and swung her support behind the MMM. Gandhi also hoped to see the new government take a stronger stand against the US presence at Diego Garcia.5


But many still had misgivings about the MMM’s radical policies, and Berenger’s leftist views in particular. Berenger called for close ties with Libya and the Soviet Union and socialist leaning African states. Much attention was also focused on the MMM’s links with Libya whose leader, Muammar Gaddafi, was widely seen as representing both Arab radicalism and as a fellow traveler of the Soviet Union. Among other things Libya was financing the conversion of Mauritian Hindus to Islam.


In June 1982, Ramgoolam decisively lost a general election to the MMM, after which Jugnauth became Prime Minister, with Berenger as Finance Minister. Days later, Indira Gandhi made a triumphant visit to the island, showcasing India’s special relationship with   Mauritius and its approval of the new government. Among other things, Mrs Gandhi approved a double tax treaty that has since allowed Mauritius to position itself as an offshore financial centre and the primary route for foreign investment into India.However ideological and personality differences among Mauritius’ new leaders surfaced within months. There was considerable personal friction between Jugnauth and Berenger, and major disagreements over Berenger’s imposition of economic austerity measures mandated by the IMF. There was also disquiet over Berenger’s attempts to promote French Creole as Mauritius’ national language. For Berenger and other young socialists, creolisation was an important social engineering exercise to transcend what they saw as non-indigenous languages and cultures and create a single homogeneous Mauritian culture.8

The Creole language issue became a proxy for the communal tensions that surfaced under the new government. Some non-Hindu leaders feared that the delicate communal balance in Mauritius that Ramgoolam had nurtured since independence would be upset by Jugnauth and that Mauritius would come to be dominated by a majority Hindu culture. Hindu leaders were frustrated that they had less economic and political power than the Franco-Mauritians despite their majority numbers and feared that Berenger’s role in the new government could signal a return of the “Grand Blancs” to power. Some believed that Berenger intended to exclude high caste Hindus from power and even establish military rule. As one analyst commented on Berenger’s policy of creolisation: “The stake was high: no less than the reversal of the whole ethnic political balance which had structured the regime of independence.”9


By early 1983 Jugnauth had become increasingly concerned about the possibility of Berenger leading a coup against him with the help of Libya and the Soviet Union. The Indian Mission in Port Louis kept a close watch on developments. According to one of Jugnauth’s advisors, after the 1982 election both the United States and the Indians were feeding false intelligence to Jugnauth about Berenger’s socialist links.10 In February 1983, Jugnauth met with Mrs Gandhi in New Delhi, where he requested military assistance in the event of a coup by Berenger. According to an advisor to Jugnauth who was accompanying him, Mrs Gandhi assured him of Indian support, telling him that, “Within five hours a contingent of my air force will be in Mauritius.”11


 The power struggle came to a head in mid March 1983. On Mauritian Independence Day, while Jugnauth was in New Delhi attending a Non Aligned Movement summit, Berenger arranged for the Mauritian National Anthem to be broadcast over Mauritian television in Creole, referring to Creole as the new national language.12 On Jugnauth’s return to Mauritius, Berenger proposed constitutional changes that would strip power from the prime minister. The MMM government disintegrated and Jugnauth was left with a small number of mostly Hindu followers.


 The collapse of the government heightened communal and ideological tensions throughout Mauritius. Jugnauth feared for his safety after he was jostled by Berenger supporters. Local media reported the formation of a “workers’ militia” led by Berenger. Jugnauth spoke of the dangers of “growing fascism,” labelling Berenger a “racist”and comparing him to  Stalin.13 Hindu leaders exploited Hindu communal fears about Berenger, while Berenger supporters saw Hindu leaders such as Harish Boodhoo as being in league with New Delhi.14


New Delhi’s concerns 


New Delhi was extremely concerned about these developments. It was worried about the welfare of the Indian ethnic population in Mauritius under a Berenger government that may favour the Creole and Muslim minorities and potentially provoke a refugee exodus by Hindus.15 Over the previous decades, there had been considerable official discrimination against the Indian minority communities throughout the Indian Ocean region – at the hands of whites in South Africa, black Africans in East Africa and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. In 1972, the entire Indian community had been expelled from Uganda by Idi Amin. In mid 1983, rising communal tensions between Sinhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka would explode into pogroms and civil war. Official discrimination against Indians also existed elsewhere in the world, even where Indian community represented a majority or near majority of the population. In Guyana, the majority Indian ethnic community had been excluded from power since independence. In Fiji, constitutional restrictions had been introduced to prevent the majority Indian ethnic community from exercising political control. While India had previously left its diasporic communities to their own fates, by the early 1980s the protection of Indian ethnic communities outside of India had become a factor in New Delhi’s calculations.16


Of probably greater significance were New Delhi’s concerns about the drift of Mauritius out of India’s sphere of influence and the possible loss of Mauritius as the only unquestioning supporter of India’s foreign policy in the Indian Ocean. In particular, New Delhi was concerned about Mauritius’ links with Libya and the Soviet Union, which had been funding the MMM prior to the 1982 election. 17 After the election, Mikhail Orlov, the Soviet Ambassador to the Seychelles, had met secretly with Berenger to offer Soviet assistance in reorganising Mauritian internal security services and they later offered to supply patrol boats to the Mauritius Coast Guard. 18 Jugnauth ruffled feathers in New Delhi by making his first official overseas visit to Libya rather than India. Jugnauth also visited Moscow where he was told that Soviet assistance would be conditioned economic assistance on Mauritius moving towards a socialist system.19 


There were even greater concerns about a government led by Berenger. His French ancestry and his attempts to undermine the power of Hindu communal groups would not have helped create the view that he would be a reliable supporter of India. Although New Delhi saw many benefits from its relationship with the Soviet Union, including its role as a supplier of defence equipment and its strategic role in balancing against China, India remained jealous of its relationships in the region and would have seen a drift of Mauritius into the Soviet orbit, particularly under white leadership, in negative terms. Mrs Gandhi may well have seen the crisis as an opportunity to consolidate India’s political role in Mauritius. This was part of a broader strategy then being followed by New Delhi in asserting and expanding its influence throughout the Indian Ocean region, from Sri Lanka, to Maldives, the Seychelles, Southern Africa and even the Antarctic.20 


The United States also supported the status-quoist Jugnauth against the socialist Berenger. The US was particularly worried that a Berenger government might allow the Soviet Navy access to Port Louis and would also aggressively prosecute Mauritius’ claims over Diego Garcia. General Vernon Walters, the legendary Deputy Director of the CIA, took a close interest in Mauritius, cultivating personal links with Harish Boodhoo and other Hindu leaders.21 While the US was working to undermine Berenger during this period, it is not clear whether the US and India actively coordinated their activities in Mauritius. However, Mauritius’ later move towards a broadly pro-Western foreign policy under a new Jugnauthled government (which will be discussed below) certainly suggests that there may have been considerable US involvement in the crisis


Plans for Indian military intervention: Operation Lal Dora 


As the Mauritian political crisis deepened in mid-March 1983, Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Army and Navy to prepare to intervene against a possible coup against the Jugnauth government. Despite Mrs Gandhi’s earlier promise to Jugnauth, Mauritius was well beyond the airlift capabilities of the Indian air force. Instead, the intervention plan, named Operation Lal Dora 22, involved the landing in Port Louis of two battalions from the 54th Infantry Division, the Indian Army’s designated rapid reaction unit based in Hyderabad.


 The plan unfolded in a way that was typical of the lack of coordination between the Indian Army and Navy at that time. An advance battalion of 54th Division troops arrived unexpectedly at the Indian Naval dockyard in Mumbai after a 30 hour journey from Hyderabad with orders to board Western fleet ships. Remarkably, the Navy’s Western Command in Mumbai, which had commenced planning for the operation, had not been informed of the Army movement and many crew were on shore leave. The troops initially attempted to virtually force their way onto INS Mysore, which was the largest warship berthed alongside, but were stopped by the Operations team of the Western Naval Command and staff of the Western Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral K K Mukherjee.23 After negotiations between the Army and Navy, the troops were sent to camp at the sprawling Colaba Army base to await orders while some of the Army’s equipment was loaded on the INS Mysore, and fuel, victuals and medical supplies were ordered for the amphibious task force.


Indian Naval officers then set to planning the naval operation. Having studied the recent UK operation in the Falklands less than a year previously, they believed that the Navy could transport the troops from its main western naval base in Mumbai to Mauritius with two days preparation, followed by around five days sailing time. The Navy then had no specialised amphibious lift capability in the Western Fleet, but the troops were to be transported on warships. The naval task force was to include:


                     • one or two modern Rajput class guided missile                              destroyers (INS Rajput and/or INS Rana),                                       carrying KA-28 Helix helicopters;

                    • three or four Leander class destroyers carrying                            Alouette helicopters, as well as MK42C Sea Kings                         for slithering operations;

                     • a Deepak class naval tanker, carrying one                                     helicopter;


                      • one or two modern Rajput class guided missile                              destroyers (INS Rajput and/or INS Rana),                                          carrying KA-28 Helix helicopters;

                     • three or four Leander class destroyers carrying                             Alouette helicopters, as well as MK42C  Sea Kings                          for slithering operations;

                     • a Deepak class naval tanker, carrying one                                     helicopter;

                     • a survey and training ship.24

Notably, the naval task force would have no fixed-wing air support. India’s sole aircraft carrier at that time, INS Vikrant, was then in the process of being refitted for new Sea Harrier aircraft and was not available. Despite the crucial role that fixed wing aircraft had played in the Falklands campaign, the lack of air support was apparently of little concern to the Indian Navy given that Mauritius had no air force.


Disagreements in the War Room


While preparations were being made in Mumbai, senior military and intelligence officers met with Mrs Gandhi in the War Room in South Block to discuss the operation. Present at the meeting was Mrs Gandhi’s National Security Advisor, R N Kao, a former head of RAW. The Navy was represented by Admiral O S Dawson, Chief of Naval Staff. The Army was represented by Lieutenant General S K Sinha, who was then Vice Chief of Army. (The Chief of Army, General Krishna Rao, was then on tour in Vietnam and Sinha was preparing to take over from Rao several months later). Dawson was known to be close to Mrs Gandhi and her family since his younger days when he was ADC to the Indian President and would receive Mrs Gandhi’s children at the President’s pool. But Sinha had a more difficult relationship with her.25 


It became apparent that the Indian Army and Navy had quite different views about the operation. There were considerable disagreements between Army and Navy over command and control of the amphibious task force. The naval task force was to be commanded by Vice Admiral Nayyar. Admiral Dawson argued that the Navy should be in overall command of operation, while General Sinha argued for overall command. Mrs Gandhi suggested that Navy would be force commander at sea but the Army would assume command of the task force once the landings took place (an arrangement which Navy was not at all happy with).26


Other than the question of command, the Navy was confident of its ability to execute the operation, even at a distance of some 4,600 km from its fleet base in Mumbai. The Indian Navy believed that it had the capability to conduct operations at long distance, and had become confident in its capabilities to refuel and replenish at sea. The Navy was also familiar with Port Louis, having accumulated intelligence reports and photographs etc from numerous ship visits over the years and from the Indian naval officers stationed there. The Navy was not overly concerned about landing the troops. It was believed that troops could be properly briefed at sea for alongside landings and disembarkation. The Navy did not believe that troops would need to be landed on beaches, but expected that troops could be landed at Port Louis docks without opposition, or at worst a semi-opposed landing at the docks. The Mauritian Coast Guard (commanded by an Indian naval officer) could also provide assistance if necessary. Nayyar however requested Rules of Engagement in the event of US intervention, no doubt remembering the Navy’s experience in 1971 when it had been given no Rules of Engagement in relation to the USS Enterprise.


However, General Sinha told Mrs Gandhi that he did not have confidence in the planned operation.27 Apart from the question of command, Sinha had major concerns about the army’s ability to conduct an amphibious operation of this nature and about the possibility of US intervention. Sinha believed that his troops were inadequately trained for amphibious operations. The Army’s previous experience at an opposed amphibious landing had been disastrous. In the closing days of the 1971 Bangladesh War, in Operation Beaver, a force of Gurkhas had been landed near Cox’s Bazaar in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in an attempt to cut off an escape route of retreating Pakistani troops into Burma. The amphibious force had not been able to find the correct landing beach and several Gurkhas drowned when they were ordered to disembark with full equipment into deep water. The badly planned operation was widely regarded as a fiasco. Sinha, a Gurkha himself, was no doubt deeply aware of this. Sinha was also very concerned about the possibility of US intervention in the operation. The USS Enterprise was still fresh in the minds of Indian military leadership, as was the presence of US forces at Diego Garcia. Some have called a preoccupation among some Indian military strategists with US intervention the “Enterprise Syndrome.”

There is reason to believe that Sinha may have been sufficiently concerned about the possibility of US intervention to take the initiative of personally consulting with US representatives about Washington’s views on the Mauritian political crisis. (In this regard, it is worth noting that the Indian armed forces are notoriously kept compartmentalized from both intelligence analysis and political decision-making in New Delhi.) According to B.Raman, a former head of the counter-terrorism division of RAW, the Indian intelligence   services later became aware that a “senior” Army officer leaked Jugnauth’s request for assistance and the details of the War Room meeting to the US Embassy in Delhi, which later “affected his chances of rising to the top.”28 Two months later, against longstanding tradition, Mrs Gandhi controversially ordered that Sinha be passed over in his expected promotion to Army Chief and he took early retirement from the Army. (Sinha then joined the opposition BJP party and subsequently served as Ambassador to Nepal and Governor of Kashmir.) If Raman is to be believed, Sinha was passed over because of leaks over the Mauritius operation, and not because of his opposition to an assault on Sikh militants in the Golden Temple in Amritsar, which was widely thought to be the reason.29


With the military commanders unable to agree on execution of the operation, Mrs Gandhi decided against the operation and Operation Lal Dora was put on hold. Equipment was unloaded and troops were returned to barracks. The most obvious reason was the Army’s distinct lack of enthusiasm for the operation. However, Mrs Gandhi was shrewd. It is also possible that she merely intended Indian preparations for the operation to act as a signal to relevant Mauritian leaders of India’s determination to support Jugnauth. 30  Word was spread in Port Louis that the Indian Navy was “surrounding” Mauritius.31

Political intervention and the 1983 elections


According to one account, in place of Operation Lal Dora, upon the suggestion of R N Kao, Mrs Gandhi decided to send N F Suntook, then head of RAW, to Port Louis to deal with the crisis at a political level.32 Suntook was due to retire at the end of March 1983 and he was  requested to delay his retirement by a couple of weeks. Suntook’s mission to Mauritius was never publicly disclosed. Indeed, his abrupt disappearance a few days prior to his scheduled retirement provoked somewhat bizarre accusations in the Indian media that he had defected to Washington.33


In Mauritius, Suntook was assisted by Prem Singh, the Indian High Commissioner, who was well known for his highly partisan support for Jugnauth.34 Singh was later accused of having played a virtual pro-consul role in Mauritian politics.35 Suntook and Singh worked with Harish Boodhoo and other Hindu and Muslim leaders to persuade them to swing their support behind Jugnauth, and it is likely that financial incentives were offered.36 Berenger claims that he knew nothing of Suntook’s role.37 The efforts of Jugnauth and his Indian backers to build a new Hindu coalition around Jugnauth were successful. On the day after Suntook returned to Delhi in April, Jugnauth announced the establishment of a new party called the Militant Socialist Movement (MSM), which merged Boodhoo’s Parti Socialiste Mauricien with Hindu elements from the MMM. This new party, along with other opposition groups, had the numbers to form a new government in Parliament.


New elections were called for August 1983, which Jugnauth would win convincingly. The election campaign was divided on highly communalist basis and included threats of violence. Boodhoo claimed that a Libyan hit squad was in Mauritius to conduct assassinations.38 There was a purported assassination attempt on Boodhoo on the eve of the election, although some insiders have claimed that the incident had been organised by  Boodhoo himself.39 It is highly likely that the MSM received significant financial support from India during the campaign.40


The Aftermath


The events of 1983 consolidated India’s already extensive influence in Mauritius. Since that time all major political leaders have publicly acknowledged India’s special role in Mauritius’ security. After the 1983 election, Jugnauth requested the appointment of Major General J N Taimini, the Indian Army’s chief liaison officer with RAW, as the Mauritian National Security Advisor. Tamini occupied that post for more than a decade, to be followed since that time by other Indian appointees with connections to RAW.  

Mauritius also took a distinctly pro-Western turn in foreign policy. The new Deputy Prime Minister Gaetan Duval, who represented the old guard of pro-Western leaders, took charge of foreign policy, stating that Mauritius considered itself “a staunch ally of the West.”41 Jugnauth refused to receive the Soviet Ambassador, Nicolai Pankov, who was thereupon recalled to Moscow. The Libyan diplomatic mission was expelled after refusing to cease its non-diplomatic activities in providing financial assistance to the Muslim community. Jugnauth backpedalled on Berenger’s previous strident stance on Diego Garcia, reportedly stating that “we have to accept the base is there.”42 Mauritius continued its formal claim to sovereignty over Diego Garcia, but dropped demands for closure of the base and any appeal to the International Court of Justice. Jugnauth also lifted the embargo on the supply of labour to the US base that had been imposed by his previous government. Relations with  South Africa also improved. Duval was known to be particularly close to South Africa and was a frequent visitor there. Jugnauth stated that Mauritius would be “realistic” in its relations with Pretoria even though it was opposed to apartheid.43 Pretoria was allowed to open a diplomatic presence in the form of a trade office.


The Mauritian crisis also presaged India playing a much more active role throughout the Indian Ocean, particularly after Rajiv Gandhi assumed office in 1984. As Admiral RH Tahiliani (who in 1984 took over from Admiral Dawson as Chief of Naval Staff) commented: “We must take the responsibility that size imposes on us, without having any hegemonistic aspirations. Coming to the help of a small neighbour is a responsibility, but we have no intention of spreading our sphere of influence.”44 In 1986, the Indian Navy secretly intervened used one of its frigates, the INS Vindhyagiri, in the Seychelles to head off one of several attempted coups (Operation Flowers Are Blooming).45 In July 1987, Rajiv Gandhi sent peacekeeping forces in the Sri Lanka in an attempt to enforce a negotiated solution to civil war (Operation Pawan). In November 1988, following a request by the Maldivian President, India flew a battalion of paratroops to the Maldives, making a daring landing at Malé airport to avert an attempted coup by Tamil mercenaries (Operation Cactus). India’s unprecedented level of activity in the Indian Ocean only ended after the humiliating withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka in 1990. Rajiv Gandhi was subsequently assassinated by Tamil extremists in May 1991 in retribution for his role in the operation. India found that foreign interventions can sometimes carry a significant cost. 


Lessons from Operation Lal Dora

In some ways the story of Operation Lal Dora is merely an interesting footnote to the Cold War – when jostling between the West and the Soviet bloc in the Indian Ocean threatened India’s role in the region. However, the story also has broader significance in a number of respects and particularly in light of Washington’s hopes that India will take a broader security role in the Indian Ocean.  

First, the events of 1983 were a turning point in the close security relationship between India and Mauritius, which continues and has in fact strengthened since then. India has effectively become Mauritius’ security guarantor and Mauritius has “willingly subordinated” itself to India in strategic matters. Mauritius now provides an anchor for India’s growing sphere of influence in the southwest Indian Ocean.46


Second, Operation Lal Dora demonstrated the willingness of India during the 1980s to conduct foreign military interventions. In some respects, India was much more of a “normal” state – in terms of its willingness to project military power - than the nonaligned rhetoric of the times would suggest.


 Third, these events demonstrate how Indian and US interests were often aligned, even in the depths of the Cold War - again, despite New Delhi’s rhetoric. India’s interests in maintaining its influence in Mauritius transcended its relationship with the Soviet Union. There seems to have been an interesting, if limited, commonality of interests between India and the United States over Mauritius. New Delhi appears to have considered that its  primary long-term interest in Mauritius lay in supporting the Jugnauth government with the intention of maintaining the dominant position of the Hindu community in Mauritian politics. US interests appear to have been served by supporting a relatively conservative Jugnauth government which could be persuaded to reject Soviet and Libyan influence and adopt a more Western-oriented foreign policy. It is unclear whether or not this was the outcome of a specific understanding between New Delhi and Washington. An implicit alignment of Indian and US strategic interests in the Indian Ocean would be seen in several other instances during the 1980s, predating the public development of strategic links during the 1990s.


Fourth, the story of Operation Lal Dora illustrates the lack of jointedness, failures in operational coordination and lack of communication between services that have long plagued the Indian armed forces. The operation involved little or no joint planning and issues of command remained unresolved. Some steps have been taken to address these problems, including the establishment of the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in 2002, although there are questions about its effectiveness. Despite calls for many years, there is still no Chief of Defence Staff as a single point advisor to the government. Coordination between India’s armed forces is still seen by many to be woefully inadequate compared with other major powers. A lack of coordination in joint operations could have a significant impact on India’s credibility as a major power. This is likely to be a major issue for India in coming years as demands for it to conduct combined force operations grows.


Finally, the story sheds light on India’s military capabilities. Although the Navy was confident in its abilities to successfully conduct the operation, it had to make do without proper amphibious capabilities. Troops were to be transported aboard warships and the fleet logistics train was extremely thin. No fixed wing air cover was available. In contrast, the Army had little confidence in its abilities to conduct the operation. There have been considerable attempts to address these weaknesses. Over the last decade or so the Navy has further developed its amphibious capabilities through the acquisition of the amphibious dock ship, INS Jalashwa and other landing craft. The Indian Navy is in the process of procuring up to four large multi-role support vessels and is establishing an amphibious warfare school at Kakinada on India’s east coast. In 2011, it was announced that the 54th Infantry Division (which was to play a role in Operation Lal Dora) had been designated as a Reorganised Amphibious Formation. The Navy, which demonstrated its amphibious capabilities in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives as part of the 2004 Tsunami relief efforts, is eager to learn from the experience of the United States and others in amphibious operations through bilateral exercises. As India stretches its sea legs in the Indian Ocean and beyond into the Pacific, the need for these capabilities is only likely to grow. 

 



NOTES:-


 1 Report from US Embassy Port Louis to US Secretary of State, “Mauritius Denies Plan To Cede Agalega Islands To India, But Issue Shows Mauritian Subordination”, 15 December 2006, published in The Hindu, 2 April 2011.


 2 The Mauritius Times, 23 June 1978, quoted in P.K.S.Namboodiri, JP Anand and Sreedhar, Intervention in the Indian Ocean, (Delhi: ABC Publishing, 1982), p.260.


3 Which included US approval for India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987 and the Maldives in 1988.


 4 During the Indian General Elections in 1977, Indira Gandhi reportedly kept an aircraft on standby at Sarsawa Air Force Base ready to fly her to Mauritius in case her life was endangered. Dilip Bobb, ‘Blunting the Edge,’India Today, 1 September 1980, p.85.


 5 Ajay Dubey, Government and Politics in Mauritius (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1997), p.147. 


6 Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Interview with co-author, 12 May 2012. 


7 Some have claimed that Indian Congress Party leaders had a personal interest in the treaty and the ability to move Indian money offshore. The treaty has recently become a matter of controversy with claims that Mauritius is being used by wealthy Indians to avoid tax and launder money of questionable origin. Attempts by the Indian government to close down the “round tripping” of Indian money is now the subject of tensions with Mauritius.


 8 Kevin Shillington, Jugnauth: Prime Minister of Mauritius (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.114.


 9 Jean Houbert, “Mauritius: Politics and Pluralism at the Periphery” Annuaire des Pays de l’Ocean Indien, Vol 9 (1982/83), pp.225-65.

 10 Satteeanund Peerthum. Co-author interview, 9 May 2012. 

11 S.Peerthum, “L’ingérence néocolonialiste,” in L’Express, “Portrait d’une nation”, 12 March 1998, p.56. 

12 Patrick Eisenlohr, Creole Island or Little India? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), p.59. 

13 Malenn D. Oodiah, Mouvement Militant Mauricien: 20 ans d’histoire (1969-1989) (Port Louis, s.n.: 1989), p.146; Times of India, 17 May 1983. 


14 Oodiah, Mouvement Militant Mauricien, p.146. 


15 Selig Harrison, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, p.263.


 16 Most obviously in India’s 1987 intervention in Sri Lanka, but also in India’s response to political developments in Fiji.

 17 Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Interview with co-author, 12 May 2012. At the same time, the CIA had been supporting the Rangaloom government. This came to light in July 1981, when a White House official mistakenly leaked to the press that the United States was seeking to counter Libyan influence in Mauritania. When the Mauritanian government publicly demanded an explanation, the US State Department was left to deny its involvement in Mauritania by explaining that in fact it was supporting the Mauritian government against Libyan influence. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987, (London: Simon & Schuster, 1987), p.159. 


18 Peerthum, “L’ingérence néocolonialiste”, p.56 and Interview with co-author, 9 May 2012. 


19 Sir Anerood Jugnauth, Interview with co-author, 12 May 2012.

 20 India was staging Antarctic expeditions through Mauritius and in March 1983, an Indian Antarctic team was in Port Louis.

 21 Boodhoo met with Walters both in Mauritius and Washington D.C.

 22 Lal Dora means “red thread” in Hindi. It is commonly used in the Hindu puja ritual and other Hindu rituals and invokes the blessings of the Hindu gods. 

23 Confidential interviews with former senior Indian naval officers. 

24 INS Mysore, an ageing Fiji class cruiser built in 1939 and acquired from the Royal Navy in 1957, was deemed non-operational by planners. 


25 Among other things, Sinha’s father, M K Sinha, had been a political opponent of Mrs Gandhi. 


26 The British experience of commanding the Falklands operations in 1982 is often held up as a model of command of amphibious operations conducted far from home. The overall command of the Falklands operation was held by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse who operated from task force headquarters at Northwood, England. Command of all forces within the operational zone around the Falklands Islands initially fell to Rear Admiral John Woodward. As landing operations started at San Carlos, Commodore Michael Clapp, Commander, Amphibious Warfare Forces, took command of landing forces and reported directly to Admiral Fieldhouse at Northwood. Once established on shore, all land operations fell under the command of the Commander, Land Forces who also reported directly to Admiral Fieldhouse at Northwood. 

27 Lt General S K Sinha. Interview with co-author, February 2012. 

28 B.Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory Lane (New Delhi: Lancer, 2007), p. 120. Although Raman does not name Sinha, there is little doubt as to who he is referring. 

29 Shortly after these events, Mrs Gandhi requested Sinha to begin planning an assault against Sikh militants in the Golden Temple in Amritsar - which was subsequently implemented in the highly controversial Operation Bluestar in 1984. However, Sinha strongly advised Mrs Gandhi against such a course of action, fearing (correctly) for its impact on Army morale.


 30 A tactic that Mrs Gandhi was to use the following year in ordering planning for a full scale military intervention in Sri Lanka – to be called Operation Buster .


 31 Prem Singh. Interview with co-author, May 2012. 


32 Raman, The Kaoboys of R&AW, p. 119. 


33 The Indian Home Minister, P.C.Sethi, was forced to deny these allegations in parliament. V.Balachandran, “The day media turned a patriot into a traitor,” Sunday Guardian, 19 September 2010.

 34 According, to Kishan S. Rana, who was a later Indian High Commissioner to Mauritius. Kishan S. Rana, “Island Diplomacy”, Indian Express, 7 June 2003; and Kishan S. Rana, The 21st Century Ambassador: Plenipotentiary to Chief Executive (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p.74. 


35 Selig Harrison, “India, U.S. and Superpower rivalry” in Selig Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean, p.262. Singh was recalled in 1986 following allegations of interference in Mauritian politics. 


36 Peerthum, “L’ingérence néocolonialiste”. 


37 Paul Berenger. Interview with co-author, May 2012. 


38 Colin Legum, Africa contemporary record: annual survey and documents: Volume 13, (New York: Africana Publishing, 1983), Page B231 


39 Oodiah, Mouvement Militant Mauricien, p.153. 


40 Confidential interviews with Mauritian political identities, May 2012. 


41 Legum, Africa contemporary record, p. B221. 


42 Times of India, 17 May 1983. 


43 “Mauritius: a change in direction?” The South African Institute of International Affairs, Brief Report No.53, December 1983.


44 Quoted in Raju G.C.Thomas, “The Sources of Indian Naval Expansion,” in Robert H.Bruce, The Modern Indian Navy and the Indian Ocean: Developments and Implications (Perth: Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies, 1989), pp.95-108. 

45 David Brewster and Ranjit Rai, “Flowers Are Blooming: the story of the India Navy’s secret operation in the Seychelles,” The Naval Review (2011), pp.58-62. 

46 See David Brewster, “An Indian sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean?” Security Challenges, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring 2010), pp. 1-20













Wednesday, January 30, 2019

Afghanistan: Trump’s Gift to the Taliban

SOURCE:
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-caves-in-to-the-taliban-by-brahma-chellaney-2019-01






Afghanistan: Trump’s Gift to the Taliban

                                      

The just-announced "agreement in principle" between the US and the Taliban should be called what it is: a Faustian bargain that will lead to still more violence in the region, and perhaps in the West. By abandoning Afghanistan, the Trump administration is repeating one of the worst foreign-policy mistakes of the past few decades.



     After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States invaded Afghanistan and removed the Taliban from power, thereby eliminating a key nexus of international terrorism. But now, a war-weary US, with a president seeking to cut and run, has reached a tentative deal largely on the Taliban’s terms. The extremist militia that once harbored al-Qaeda and now carries out the world’s deadliest terrorist attacks has secured not just the promise of a US military exit within 18 months, but also a pathway to power in Kabul.


History is repeating itself. The US is once again abandoning war-ravaged Afghanistan, just as it did three decades ago following a successful covert operation by the CIA to force the Soviets out of the country. The US, desperate to end its longest-ever war, appears to have forgotten a key lesson of that earlier abandonment: it turned Afghanistan into a citadel of transnational terrorism, leading to civil war and eventually bloodshed in the West.

The accord reached between the Taliban and the US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, reads like a wholesale capitulation on the part of the Trump administration. In 2014, the US signed a security pact with the Afghan government that granted the Americans access to nine military bases at least until 2024. But the US has now agreed to withdraw all of its forces in exchange for a mere promise from a terrorist militia that it will deny other terrorist networks a foothold on Afghan territory. Never mind that the Islamic State is already operational in Afghanistan and poses a challenge to the Taliban itself.


Though the agreement has been dubbed a “peace” deal, it will almost certainly lead to even more Islamist violence, not least against Afghanistan’s women. The Taliban are determined to re-impose the medieval practices they enforced during their harsh rule from 1996 to 2001. Whatever gains Afghanistan has made in terms of women’s and civil rights may soon be reversed.
Make no mistake: the Taliban are brutal and indiscriminate in their use of violence, and they refuse even to recognize the country’s legitimate government, which will make fleshing out the new “framework” accord exceedingly difficult. A number of key issues must be spelled out unambiguously, including when the ceasefire between the Taliban and US-backed Afghan forces will take effect. And even then, it is highly doubtful that the Taliban will agree to a power-sharing arrangement with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s government.
In fact, having been emboldened by a series of US concessions over the past six years, the Taliban have escalated their terrorist attacks and made significant battlefield gains against Afghan forces. So, if anything, they will see the new agreement as an implicit validation of their impending victory. They know that time is on their side, and that most Americans favor a US exit. That means they will probably play hardball when negotiating the details of a final deal.
In addition to representing a major victory for the Taliban, the accord is also a win for Pakistan, which harbors the militia’s leadership and provides cross-border sanctuaries for its fighters. Just last year, Trump cut US security assistance to Pakistan, tweeting, “   [ PAKISTAN] they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help.”

It is worth remembering that when Trump took office, he promised to reverse the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan by “winning again.” But just two years later, he has apparently decided that it is the extremists who will be winning again.

Far from breaking with former US President Barack Obama’s failed approach, as he promised, Trump has now fulfilled his predecessor’s quest for a deal with the Taliban. Having also recently announced a military drawdown in Syria, Trump has made it clear that the US will readily throw its Kurdish and Afghan allies under the bus in order to extricate itself from foreign entanglements of its own making.

To be sure, America’s Faustian bargain with the Taliban has been in the making for years, which explains why the group is conspicuously absent from the US Department of State’s annual list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, despite having killed more civilians in the past year alone than any other outfit. To facilitate talks with the Taliban, Obama allowed the militia to establish a de facto diplomatic mission in Qatar’s capital, Doha, in 2013. And a year later, he traded five senior Taliban leaders for a US Army sergeant (who was later charged with desertion)
Moreover, to lay the groundwork for a deal, the US war planners have long refrained from targeting the Taliban’s command-and-control base in Pakistan, thereby effectively undercutting its own military mission in Afghanistan. As the top US military commander in Afghanistan admitted in 2017, “It is very difficult to succeed on the battlefield when your enemy enjoys external support and safe haven.” [ read  PAKISTAN ]
The US has come full circle. The Taliban, like al-Qaeda, evolved from the violent jihadist groups that the CIA trained in Pakistan to wage war against the Soviets in the 1980s. After suffering the worst terrorist attack in modern world history, the US turned against the Taliban, driving their leaders out of Afghanistan.
But now, in search of a face-saving exit from the Afghan quagmire, America is implicitly preparing to hand the country back to the same thuggish group that it removed from power 17 years ago. Sadly, once American troops leave Afghan soil, the ability of the US to influence events there, or to prevent a new terrorist attack on the US homeland, will be severely limited.





Thursday, January 17, 2019

IN THE ERA OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE, BRING BACK PIGEONS

SOURCE:
https://www.army.mil/e2/-images/2009/11/04/55067/army.mil-55067-2009-11-04-141132.jpg



    IN THE ERA OF      ELECTRONIC  WARFARE,

BRING BACK PIGEONS



JANUARY 16, 2019







On April 16, 1919, the troop transport Ohioan docked at Hoboken, New Jersey. Among the various disembarking members of the American Expeditionary Forces was a small detachment of 21 men of the U.S. Army Signal Corp’s Pigeon Service Company No. 1. Pier-side newspaper reporters flocked around the officer in charge, Capt. John L. Carney, to ask about the exploits of the distinguished hero pigeons the Army chose to bring home. Foremost among the latter was an English-bred black check hen named Cher Ami. As Carney told the story, it was Cher Ami who on October 4, 1918 braved shot and shell to deliver a message from the besieged men of a composite force surrounded in the Charlevaux Ravine of the Argonne Forest, forever known as  “The Lost Battalion.” Cher Ami arrived at her loft with the intact message from the force’s commander, Maj. Charles W. Whittlesey, albeit minus a right leg and with a wound clear across the chest cutting through the breast bone. Cher Ami survived her injuries and Whittlesey’s message provided the exact position of his force back to the regimental and divisional headquarters, information which contributed to the eventual relief of the men.
Cher Ami’s story remains legendary to this day, a testament to the bravery of animals in war. The story, although the records are uncertain if Cher Ami or another pigeon delivered Whittlesey’s message, often obscures the purposes underlying the use of homing pigeons by the U.S. Army. From 1917 to 1957, the Signal Corps maintained pigeon breeding and training facilities, and birds saw service in World War II and Korea. When the pigeon service disbanded in 1957, the Army contended that advances in electronic communications rendered the peacetime maintenance of pigeon breeding and training facilities unnecessary. The remaining pigeons were sold at auction, with a select few being donated to zoos around the nation. Today the use of homing pigeons is viewed as novelty, a quirky vignette of the early 20th century battlefield.
Over 60 years later, the military homing pigeon warrants reexamination. The electromagnetic spectrum’s influence extends throughout the systems and operations of the battlespace into the fabric of civil society. Offensive and defensive operations in the cyber space realm, combined with kinetic strikes on air, land, sea, or space-based infrastructure, could potentially disable or severely damage entire communication or power grids. Adversaries with electronic warfare dominance would then be positioned to control the battlespace and restrict the options presented to American or allied commanders. Reflecting on electronic warfare’s potential, some communications between the front lines of the battlefield and rear echelon command and control elements may need to rest on the legs or back of a feathered messenger when a human runner or more visible vehicle or aircraft may prove too vulnerable to interception or destruction.
In an era where military innovation may conjure up thoughts about futuristic weapons and high-dollar research, development, and acquisition, perhaps consider an innovation redux: the homing pigeon. A brief examination of the American military experience with homing pigeons offers insights into both the utility of the birds and their advantages in the modern electronic warfare battlespace.
Pigeon Primer
Homing pigeons are relatives of the rock dove, Columba livia, which frequently conduct seize and hold or tactical air strikes on urban residents and residences worldwide. Homing pigeons, however, are more akin to race horses, carefully bred and nursed to maximize speed, endurance, and navigational prowess. As with race horses, loft owners do not shy from spending $1,000s to 100s of $1,000s for champion pigeons in hopes of breeding future generations of race success. The exact science is unclear, but theories postulate as to how the pigeons navigate, returning to their home lofts either through visual, magnetorepton, or olfactory means. The distances flown by homing pigeons can vary from 10s to over a 1,000 miles over unfamiliar terrain or open water, at speeds from 60 to over 90 miles per hour. A pigeon can sustain grievous injury in flight and continue on its journey home, as was the case with Cher Ami and other military pigeons in both world wars.
The use of pigeons for military purposes extends back centuries, but World War I introduced widespread battlefield use of the birds by both the Central and Entente powers Previously, pigeons saw use in the 1800s primarily in journalism, with military use only rekindled in the Franco-Prussian War during the Siege of Paris. Following American entry into World War I, French and British officials championed the value of homing pigeons after the experiences at Verdun and the Somme. In trench warfare, where artillery bombardments turned carefully laid telephone lines into confetti, pigeons proved the only reliable means of communication between the front trenches and the artillery and command elements in the rear. Neither bombardment, dust, smoke, poison gas, or fog grounded the feathered messengers. For the British at the Somme, pigeon liaison was “always . . . able to operate regularly. In many cases it was the only one which was able to resist the weather and the means of destruction of the enemy.” Thereafter, the Army Signal Corps wasted little time in establishing a pigeon service in July 1917, utilizing Allied experience with a proven technology to address communication issues. Work continued to refine and improve wired and wireless communication systems for the battlefield, but off-the-shelf pigeon technology ensured the men of the American Expeditionary Forces would not be caught ill-prepared in a communication blackout when electronic means or runners fell to enemy fire.
Pigeons demonstrated reliability as messengers and the ability for usage with a variety of forces. In World War I, the Signal Corps reported an overall message delivery rate of 95 percent.  In 1944, the Army reported pigeon-delivered tactical message rates at 99 percent. After success with combat operations in Europe in World War I, the U.S. military employed pigeons in the Pacific, Europe, and North Africa in the second war. Messages evolved from small pieces of rice paper to sections of map grids to eventual exposed photographic film. In World War I, pigeons served in the Tank Corps, Air Service, and with naval aviation. In World War II, pigeons served everywhere with everyone. They took part in Operation Overlord with paratroopers in the 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions, and were carried up the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc with the Rangers in special containers. Other birds parachuted into Burma with members of the Office of Strategic Services, carrying messages behind enemy lines, while others found a home inside the confines of Sherman tanks. Thousands of birds found work aboard the heavy bombers of the Army Air Forces in raids over Europe. In the Italian campaign, pigeons proved invaluable in transmitting messages over rugged terrain to coordinate fire missions for aircraft or artillery. Much as pigeons can adapt and thrive in practically every environ on the planet, the same held true for military employment of the birds.
Beginning in 1917 and continuing with World War II, the Army’s pigeon force drew from the civilian racing pigeon community. In 1917, the American Expeditionary Forces’ Pigeon Service tapped two founding members of the American Racing Pigeon Union — John L. Carney and David C. Buscall — to receive direct commissions as first lieutenants to build up the pigeon force from scratch. Both men, coincidentally current or former non-commissioned officers in the Army and Marine Corps, respectively, brought with them the highly specialized knowledge and background required to acquire, train, breed, and distribute pigeons to forces in the field. Through their civilian contacts, the men acquired via purchase or donation large numbers of quality racing pigeons and helped recruit the non-commissioned officers necessary to staff and train pigeon handlers in Northern France. The necessity to build and field pigeons for the American Expeditionary Forces further demonstrated how the specialized nature of pigeon work put a premium on civilian pigeon knowledge within the ranks.
Postwar, the Army continued the pattern of working closely with civilian organizations, such as the American Racing Pigeon Union, in recruiting men from the pigeon racing community. When the Army needed to rapidly expand the pigeon force in World War II, the civilian community responded with donations of tens of thousands of birds and even World War I “retread” volunteers for the officer and enlisted ranks to tend and train the pigeons. Never a large or overly expensive force, Army “pigeoneers” ensured communication continuity for the fighting men at the front, albeit always as a secondary or emergency method of transmission. Regardless of its size or lack of panache, the men of the Pigeon Service represent a solid example of a civil-military partnership able to respond to a wartime necessity in an orderly, efficient fashion.
Pigeons Presently?
For the contemporary challenges of cyberwarfare and electronic warfare, Army Futures Command should examine the record of the Army’s disbanded Pigeon Service. From the experience of the two world wars, the pigeon effort took off through partnership with civilian organizations. Akin to the Cyber Direct Commissioning Program, by recruiting and providing advanced grade to pigeon specialists for their civilian training, the Army staffed the officer and non-commissioned ranks with knowledge and skills essential for rapid expansion at minimum cost in training and the associated infrastructure therein. Furthermore, the connections of these citizen-soldiers further provided entre into acquiring quality homing pigeon stock from the civilian community for the Army with minimal delay. The ability to then “surge” a pigeon force became possible, in part to the small peacetime Pigeon Service then in existence.
In the arena of technology, pigeons are decidedly mundane messengers yet proven and reliable. The use of off-the-shelf technology at a time of need in 1917 served the Army faithfully for half a century. A similar acquisition success is found in the Army’s “Big Five” acquisition. Col. David C. Trybula concludes that by incorporating mature or maturing technologies into the systems, the results proved “extraordinary and perhaps revolutionary” when compared to the systems being replaced. While not arguing that homing pigeon technology can replace the advanced communications technologies of today, there are advantages to contemplate in the electronic warfare environment.
As the fighting in the Donbass region of Ukraine and in Syria have demonstrated, electromagnetic security can be a matter of life and death, of light and darkness. Through electronic warfare methods, Russian-backed separatist forces have caused an array of difficulties for Ukrainian forces. In the current fighting in Syria, American forces have likewise come face to face with Russian electronic warfare technologies and tactics, an electronic warfare battlefield-turned-proving ground for future conflicts. Monitoring, jamming, or infiltrating electronic-based systems to enable or deny kinetic effects places a premium on protecting signal communication.
Pigeons are certainly no substitute for drones, but they provide a low-visibility option to relay information. Considering the storage capacity of microSD memory cards, a pigeon’s organic characteristics provide front line forces a relatively clandestine mean to transport gigabytes of video, voice, or still imagery and documentation over considerable distance with zero electromagnetic emissions or obvious detectability to radar. These decidedly low-technology options prove difficult to detect and track. Pigeons cannot talk under interrogation, although they are not entirely immune to being held under suspicion of espionage. Within an urban environment, a pigeon has even greater potential to blend into the local avian population, further compounding detection. The latter presumably factored into the use of pigeons to clandestinely smuggle drugs, defeating even the most sophisticated of walls.
Furthermore, pigeons provide an asymmetric tool available for hybrid warfare purposes. The low-cost, low-technology use of pigeons to transport information or potentially small amounts of chemical agents — or even coded cyber weapons — makes them a quick and easy asset to distribute among a civilian population for wider military purposes. During World War II, the British Confidential Pigeon Service of MI14(d) dropped baskets of homing pigeons behind enemy lines for espionage purposes, gathering invaluable military intelligence in the process from a wide array of French, Dutch, and Belgian civilians. Even as a one-way means of communication, the pigeon proved an invaluable military asset.
The ideas herein are not claimed to be unique or refined. Military pigeon forces are all but extinct, but yet the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and French Ground Army maintain small pigeon forces in the event that electronic warfare should disrupt or disable military communications. As for the American military, the only traces of its pigeon force can be found in artifacts or photographs in museums around the country. The use of military homing pigeons in the 21st century in similar or more creative ways is limited only by initiative and imagination — a statement true for most any battlefield innovation and the disrupting potential of electronic warfare.

Dr. Frank Blazich is a curator of modern military history at the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History. This article does not represent the views of his employer.





Tuesday, January 15, 2019

Syria’s Kurds: The new frontline in confronting Iran and Turkey

SOURCE:





  Syria’s Kurds
The new frontline in confronting Iran andTurkey
                                  By 
                   James M. Dorsey




US President Donald J. Trump’s threat to devastate Turkey’s economy if Turkish troops attack Syrian Kurds allied with the United States in the wake of the announced withdrawal of American forces potentially serves his broader goal of letting regional forces fight for common goals like countering Iranian influence in Syria.


Mr. Trump’s threat coupled with a call on Turkey to create a 26-kilometre buffer zone to protect Turkey from a perceived Kurdish threat was designed to pre-empt a Turkish strike against the People’s Protection Units (YPG) that Ankara asserts is part of the outlawed Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), a Turkish group that has waged a low-intensity war in predominantly Kurdish south-eastern Turkey for more than three decades.


Like Turkey, the United States and Europe have designated the PKK as a terrorist organization.`


Turkey has been marshalling forces for an attack on the YPG since Mr. Trump’s announced withdrawal of US forces. It would be the third offensive against Syrian Kurds in recent years.


In a sign of strained relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkish media with close ties to the government have been reporting long before the October 2 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul that Saudi Arabia is funding the YPG. There is no independent confirmation of the Turkish allegations.


Yeni Safak reported in 2017, days after the Gulf crisis erupted pitting a Saudi-UAE-Egyptian alliance against Qatar, which is supported by Turkey, that US, Saudi, Emirati and Egyptian officials had met with the PKK as well as the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which Turkey says is the Syrian political wing of the PKK, to discuss the future of Syrian oil once the Islamic State had been defeated.


Turkey’s semi-official Anadolu Agency reported last May that Saudi and YPG officials had met to discuss cooperation. Saudi Arabia promised to pay Kurdish fighters that joined an Arab-backed force US$ 200 a month, Anadolu said. Saudi Arabia allegedly sent aid to the YPG on trucks that travelled through Iraq to enter Syria.


In August last year, Saudi Arabia announced that it had transferred US$ 100 million to the United States that was earmarked for agriculture, education, roadworks, rubble removal and water service in areas of north-eastern Syria that are controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces of which the YPG is a significant part.


Saudi Arabia said the payment, announced on the day that US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrived in the kingdom, was intended to fund stabilization of areas liberated from control by the Islamic State.


“The delivery of $100 million is considered as the latest move by Saudi Arabia in support of the partnership between the U.S. and YPG. Using the fight against Daesh as a pretext, the U.S. has been cooperating with the YPG in Syria and providing arms support to the group. After Daesh was cleared from the region with the help of the U.S., the YPG tightened its grip on Syrian soil taking advantage of the power vacuum in the war-torn country,” Daily Sabah said referring to the Islamic State by one of its Arabic acronyms.



Saudi Arabia has refrained from including the YPG and the PKK on its extensive list of terrorist organizations even though then foreign minister Adel al-Jubeir described in 2017 the Turkish organization as a “terror group.”


This week’s Trump threat and his earlier vow to stand by the Kurds despite the troop withdrawal gives Saudi Arabia and other Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt political cover to support the Kurds as a force against Iran’s presence in Syria.


It also allows the kingdom and the UAE to attempt to thwart Turkish attempts to increase its regional influence. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt have insisted that Turkey must withdraw its troops from Qatar as one of the conditions for the lifting of the 18-month old diplomatic and economic boycott of the Gulf state.


The UAE, determined to squash any expression of political Islam, has long led the autocratic Arab charge against Turkey because of its opposition to the 2013 military coup in Egypt that toppled Mohammed Morsi, a Muslim Brother and the country’s first and only democratically elected president; Turkey’s close relations with Iran and Turkish support for Qatar and Islamist forces in Libya.

Saudi Arabia the UAE and Egypt support General Khalifa Haftar, who commands anti-Islamist forces in eastern Libya while Turkey alongside Qatar and Sudan supports the Islamists.


Libyan and Saudi media reported that authorities had repeatedly intercepted Turkish arms shipments destined for Islamists, including one this month and another last month. Turkey has denied the allegations.


“Simply put, as Qatar has become the go-to financier of the Muslim Brotherhood and its more radical offshoot groups around the globe, Turkey has become their armorer,” said Turkey scholar Michael Rubin.


Ironically, the fact that various Arab states, including the UAE and Bahrain, recently reopened their embassies in Damascus with tacit Saudi approval after having supported forces aligned against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad for much of the civil war, like Mr. Trump’s threat to devastate the Turkish economy, makes Gulf support for the Kurds more feasible.


Seemingly left in the cold by the US president’s announced withdrawal of American forces, the YPG has sought to forge relations with the Assad regime. In response, Syria has massed troops near the town of Manbij, expected to be the flashpoint of a Turkish offensive.

Commenting on last year’s two-month long Turkish campaign that removed Kurdish forces from the Syrian town of Afrin and Turkish efforts since to stabilize the region, Gulf scholar Giorgio Cafiero noted that “for the UAE, Afrin represents a frontline in the struggle against Turkish expansionism with respect to the Arab world.”


The same could be said from a Saudi and UAE perspective for Manbij not only with regard to Turkey but also Iran’s presence in Syria. Frontlines and tactics may be shifting, US and Gulf geopolitical goals have not.


Dr. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute for Fan Culture, and co-host of the New Books in Middle Eastern Studies podcast. James is the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog, a book with the same title and a co-authored volume, Comparative Political Transitions between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and North Africa as well as Shifting Sands, Essays on Sports and Politics in the Middle East and North Africa and just published China and the Middle East: Venturing into the Maelstrom







MR MODI & THE BEAR ; The famous 'bear hug' of PM Narendra Modi

SOURCE:




The famous 'bear hug' of PM Narendra Modi


  



CLICK / GOOGLE TO VIEW THE FAMOUS 'MODI HUGS'



https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/photos/the-famous-bear-hug-of-pm-narendra-modi/ss-BBDMJCt?fullscreen=true#image=1