SOURCE:
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/line-of-actual-control-where-it-is-located-and-where-india-and-china-differ-6436436/

Line of Actual Control: Where it is located, and where India and China differ

Written by Sushant Singh | New Delhi | Updated: June 18, 2020 8:42:11 am

India-China LAC explained: As tensions continue between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a look at what the line means on the ground and the disagreements over it.

As tensions continue between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a look at what the line means on the ground and the disagreements over it:

What is the Line of Actual Control?

The LAC is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory. India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km. It is divided into three sectors: the eastern sector which spans Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the middle sector in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and the western sector in Ladakh.

What is the disagreement?

The alignment of the LAC in the eastern sector is along the 1914 McMahon Line, and there are minor disputes about the positions on the ground as per the principle of the high Himalayan watershed. This pertains to India’s international boundary as well, but for certain areas such as Longju and Asaphila. The line in the middle sector is the least controversial but for the precise alignment to be followed in the Barahoti plains.

The major disagreements are in the western sector where the LAC emerged from two letters written by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to PM Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959, after he had first mentioned such a ‘line’ in 1956. In his letter, Zhou said the LAC consisted of “the so-called McMahon Line in the east and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west”. Shivshankar Menon has explained in his book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy that the LAC was “described only in general terms on maps not to scale” by the Chinese.

After the 1962 War, the Chinese claimed they had withdrawn to 20 km behind the LAC of November 1959. Zhou clarified the LAC again after the war in another letter to Nehru: “To put it concretely, in the eastern sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon Line, and in the western and middle sectors it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has consistently been pointed out by China”. During the Doklam crisis in 2017, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged India to abide by the “1959 LAC”.

What was India’s response to China’s designation of the LAC?

India rejected the concept of LAC in both 1959 and 1962. Even during the war, Nehru was unequivocal: “There is no sense or meaning in the Chinese offer to withdraw twenty kilometres from what they call ‘line of actual control’. What is this ‘line of control’? Is this the line they have created by aggression since the beginning of September?”

India’s objection, as described by Menon, was that the Chinese line “was a disconnected series of points on a map that could be joined up in many ways; the line should omit gains from aggression in 1962 and therefore should be based on the actual position on September 8, 1962 before the Chinese attack; and the vagueness of the Chinese definition left it open for China to continue its creeping attempt to change facts on the ground by military force”.

When did India accept the LAC?

Shyam Saran has disclosed in his book How India Sees the World that the LAC was discussed during Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 1991 visit to India, where PM P V Narasimha Rao and Li reached an understanding to maintain peace and tranquillity at the LAC. India formally accepted the concept of the LAC when Rao paid a return visit to Beijing in 1993 and the two sides signed the Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity at the LAC. The reference to the LAC was unqualified to make it clear that it was not referring to the LAC of 1959 or 1962 but to the LAC at the time when the agreement was signed. To reconcile the differences about some areas, the two countries agreed that the Joint Working Group on the border issue would take up the task of clarifying the alignment of the LAC.

Why did India change its stance on the Line of Actual Control?

As per Menon, it was needed because Indian and Chinese patrols were coming in more frequent contact during the mid-1980s, after the government formed a China Study Group in 1976 which revised the patrolling limits, rules of engagement and pattern of Indian presence along the border.

In the backdrop of the Sumdorongchu standoff, when PM Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing in 1988, Menon notes that the two sides agreed to negotiate a border settlement, and pending that, they would maintain peace and tranquillity along the border.

Have India and China exchanged their maps of the LAC?

Only for the middle sector. Maps were “shared” for the western sector but never formally exchanged, and the process of clarifying the LAC has effectively stalled since 2002. As an aside, there is no publicly available map depicting India’s version of the LAC.

During his visit to China in May 2015, PM Narendra Modi’s proposal to clarify the LAC was rejected by the Chinese. Deputy Director General of the Asian Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, Huang Xilian later told Indian journalists that “We tried to clarify some years ago but it encountered some difficulties, which led to even complex situation. That is why whatever we do we should make it more conducive to peace and tranquillity for making things easier and not to make them complicated.”

Is the LAC also the claim line for both countries?

Not for India. India’s claim line is the line seen in the official boundary marked on the maps as released by the Survey of India, including both Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan. In China’s case, it corresponds mostly to its claim line, but in the eastern sector, it claims entire Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet. However, the claim lines come into question when a discussion on the final international boundaries takes place, and not when the conversation is about a working border, say the LAC.

 An Army convoy moves along a Srinagar-Leh highway leading to Ladakh, at Gagingir in Ganderbal district. (Express Photo: Shuaib Masoodi)

But why are these claim lines controversial in Ladakh?

Independent India was transferred the treaties from the British, and while the Shimla Agreement on the McMahon Line was signed by British India, Aksai Chin in Ladakh province of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was not part of British India, although it was a part of the British Empire. Thus, the eastern boundary was well defined in 1914 but in the west in Ladakh, it was not.

A G Noorani writes in India-China Boundary Problem 1846-1947 that Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s Ministry of States published two White Papers on Indian states. The first, in July 1948, had two maps: one had no boundary shown in the western sector, only a partial colour wash; the second one extended the colour wash in yellow to the entire state of J&K, but mentioned “boundary undefined”. The second White Paper was published in February 1950 after India became a Republic, where the map again had boundaries which were undefined.

In July 1954, Nehru issued a directive that “all our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern and North Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. The new maps should also be sent to our embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public generally and be used in our schools, colleges, etc”. This map, as is officially used till date, formed the basis of dealings with China, eventually leading to the 1962 War.

How is the LAC different from the Line of Control with Pakistan?

The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the UN after the Kashmir War. It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by DGMOs of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement. The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground

PLA ; AKSAICHIN REGION - India-China Faceoff: Precise Details Of Galwan Valley Brawl

SOURCE:
Collected from Media & Social Media

India-China Faceoff: Precise Details Of                         Galwan Valley Brawl 

                                        https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y7YNo1YyOFQ

                   

Most Authentic Account by an ex Fire and Fury Corps Cdr.

THE BACK STORY

The Galwan river is a tributary to the Shyok river. It flows in from East and then takes a sharp left turn (aligned with the flow of the river) on account of geological features, to go ahead and meet with the Shyok river. From the point where it turns left is considered to be Indian territory. The LAC passes along the ridge line of the bank of the river, which dips into the bend and moves approximately along the ridge line of the opposite bank. The corner of the bend of the river, known as point 14. This is the point to which Indian patrols go and return.

Early May, a Chinese tent was spotted on a triangular bank, at point 14. This is deemed to be in Indian territory. Not just that Chinese troops patrolled down along the bank towards Shyok. Indian patrol went up from Shyok and confronted them. The Chinese claim now was ALL of the Galwan valley was theirs.

Subsequently, the Chinese dismantled the tent and the camp and fell back. However, they'd keep up intrusions into the Indian part of Galwan, and also pitched tents higher up on the bank. This was right at the corner of the bend. India protested this cos it was on our slope.

THE TRIGGERING EVENT

Post the Lt Gen level meeting on the 6th of June, it was agreed that the two armies would disengage and move back. Indians to Shyok river and the Chinese to point 1, which is further upstream Galwan river.

The Chinese had put up tent/s on a ledge on the ridge above the point. The reason they might have moved the tent/s from the river bed to above was, not only did it give a better vantage point, with the glacial melt the rivers tend to be in spate around now (and this continues till August).

So as to ensure that the Chinese had complied, a patrol was sent to inspect. This patrol essentially consisted of about 12 members. Some accounts suggest that the patrol was being led by Major and the rest soldiers and NCOs. There's one report which says that the Chinese had brought up an earthmover along Galwan river towards construction, upto the point. The tents hadn't been dismantled.

THE FACE-OFF

As per protocols, the patrol had gone in unarmed, possibly carrying only sticks. Once they reached the spot, and on finding the tents still there, they asked the Chinese to comply with the disengagement plan. From most reports, they were waylaid up and held hostage by the Chinese. It can be safe to assume that the Chinese were armed with guns, else it wouldn't be possible to 'detain' the Indian patrol.

The report of this hostage situation reached the base and, as per reports, the CO rushed with another platoon, with back up forces following up. The ledge on which the Chinese were situated is a tough and treacherous trek from the Indian side. Here, it seems, they insisted that the CO come with only a small team and negotiate. There were alleged threats to throw the captive Indian soldiers over the ledge.

THE ATTACK

Col Babu went up the ledge to negotiate. After the negotiation, they seemed to agree to the withdrawal, when they suddenly leapt at Col Babu and the two soldiers who were with him. They had spiked mallets and heavy handheld weapons. They hit and bludgeoned them to death on the spot. Not just that they chase at the rest of the second party who had gone up with the intent to kill. As they were only armed with a staff they tried to retreat and escape, but were chased and either slipped and fell down the ledge, or were thrown or were chased and beaten to death. Remember, the Chinese were at least 3:1 against the Indians and were armed with killer weapons.

THE REINFORCEMENTS & THE MELEE

On seeing this unfold, the main body of Indian troops now rushed to support their comrades. But they could, at best move up in a single file. They resorted to stone-pelting and this happened both ways. There were about 200 odd Indian soldiers.

There was a larger Chinese force which was waiting at the base of the slope, on the Chinese side. They rushed up. Now there were nearly 3-400 odd Chinese to take on the Indians who were scampering up to confront.

Essentially a pell-mell resulted. It's tough to say, being so removed, what exactly transpired or who did what in this situation. There have been some reports of shots being fired (as also bullet wounds), but that hasn't been substantiated.

Remember all this was happening in diminishing light, with the night gaining rapidly. Given the terrain, as the Sun gets hidden by the jagged peaks, darkness falls fast and suddenly. This contributes to more deaths and accidents.

THE LANDSLIDE

The greatest revenge, it seems, was taken by Karma. While accounts differ (Vineet says that it was a Chinese JCB which was ill operated which caused it) the fact of the matter was, there were too many Chinese troops (some say upwards of 300) up on the ledge. They preferred being on the ledge instead of storming on the river bed cos, being on the ledge would give them an unfair advantage over Indian troops who were coming in single file. However, this turned out to be their doom (goes to prove how unfamiliar they are with the terrain). A portion of the ledge gave way under the weight and resulted in a landslide. If you inspect the pictures, you will find that there are a number of landslides along the slopes. This landslide resulted in the maximum number of casualties for the Chinese.

The soldiers who were being kept hostage and their exact fate haven't been outed, yet. There were some reports that at least some of the hostages were freed. Some possibly also were victims of the landslide.

Given the fact that it was night, a rescue was difficult. Most fell into the river below. This resulted in hypothermia as also a lot of injuries.

WAS IT PRE-MEDITATED?

There's no doubt about the fact that this was premeditated. The place of the ambush was carefully chosen. The troops were prepared and in all probability weren't regular Border troops but more hardened troops. They initiated the violence with a clear intent to kill. The weapons they had on were designed for fatal damage. They laid and initiated the ambush. It was their own overzealousness which resulted in a much higher casualty rate for them.

THE GREY AREA CHINA WILL CLAIM

China will claim that it was in its own land cos it was on the ledge at the very edge of the LAC. But the ledge is clearly on the Indian side. The facts of the matter can only be ascertained by fresh satellite images and they must have. Irrespective of whatever China claims, India should mount a diplomatic offensive against China. India will not get a better chance to do so.

CAN ONE DECLARE WAR ON THE BASIS OF THIS?

Highly unlikely. Why? Cos it has transpired in a very grey area. However, one can start exploiting grey areas to India's advantage and go and park parallel to the Chinese camps at Finger 7. Essentially build-up counter …

As received..... Sir my Coursmate unit is 3 Fd Regt.

They had One of the Chinese CO in their custody . On return of our 10 soldiers who were with Chinese their CO was released .

This is the fact

Gnrs of 3 Med got hold of a Chinese CO and it’s what compelled them release our men.

The Gunners of 3 amongst others were called to assist 16 Bihar in the incident of physical face-off. The 2ic along with the brave hearts drove down to assist. In the ensuing mellee the Sikhs definitely killed seven Chinks and got their Chinki Col Alive. Two of own succumbed to injuries while the 2ic and one small own group was overwhelmed. The Chinki Col held by these Sikhs was the fulcrum of all negotiations

: 3 Field Regiment Sikh troops were part of that nasty battle. They fought like Tigers and in bargain lost two JCO. Officiating CO was in injured, two Major got injured along with many JCO NCO. Officiating CO along with JCO presumely PoW or missing. Must have come back yesterday after GOC level negotiation. We must spread the valour of Gunner in the groups known to us. Jai Hind.

Also from another gp....and...quite reasonable👇🏻👇🏻😇

This is being spoken of in other groups too, I can assure you. We must refrain from falling into the “main gunner tu infantry wallah” narrative. Sarhad par ladnewala, marnewala har veer tha hindustani sipahi.

Of course, for the brave Khalsas of 3 Fd, I say this:

"Deh siva bar mohe eh-hey,

subh karman te kabhu na taro.

Na daro arr seo jab jaye Laroon,

nischey kar apni jit karo.

Arr Sikh hoon apne he mann ko,

eh laalach hou gun tau ucharo.

Jab aav ki audh nidan bane,

att he rann me tabh joojh maro.

Nischaykar aapni jeet karoon!

Bole sao nihal, Sat Sri Akaal!"

For the record...

2 x JCOs from 3 Med

Hav Palani from 81 Fd

Lost their lives valiantly🙏🙏🙏

Understanding the Military Build-up on the China–India Border

SOURCE 

https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/06/china-india-border?fbclid=IwAR3Wr0-U3bYNgs9aLj5gZJPrK9c8_8Tkl69Ky_9W7aj_Uen7ynuB0OQ3JSM

                  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-MQRFQYtJAI&feature=youtu.be

   

Understanding the Military Build-up on the                      China–India Border

                              

                              By

        

Henry Boyd & Meia Nouwens 

Fatal clashes on the China–India border have aroused fresh speculation about the extent of a military build-up in the western Himalayas. Henry Boyd and Meia Nouwens assess satellite imagery to explain what has been happening there since early May.

Unverified videos began circulating on social media from 5 May, showing scuffles between Indian and Chinese personnel along India’s disputed western border with China. Though subsequent open-source reporting has been prolific, official information from either side has not, and details have remained vague and often conflicting.

Open-source satellite imagery suggests that the most alarming claims, that 10,000 troops from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have crossed the nominal Line of Actual Control (LAC) and are occupying undisputed Indian territory, appear to have been unsubstantiated. However, there is credible evidence to suggest that both China and India have significantly reinforced their positions on their respective sides of the de-facto border, leading to a series of military-to-military talks aimed at resolving the current situation. The fatal clashes that took place during this de-escalation process in mid-June underline the tense nature of the situation and the continuing challenges to its successful resolution.

What has been happening?

The lack of official comment about on-the-ground developments from both sides, combined with the mountainous terrain of the region and wide geographic spread of the various points of recent activity, make it difficult to build an accurate picture of the situation on the ground.

The most recent confrontations have taken place in four main points along the LAC: Pangong Lake, the Galwan River valley, the Hotsprings/Gogra area along the Ladakh border, and near Naku La in Sikkim. While they seemed to have been resolved through bilateral dialogue over the past few weeks, the situation along the northern banks of Pangong Lake in Ladakh, where the confrontations started, remains tense.

Chinese and Indian claims overlap significantly in this part of the LAC, but neither side officially acknowledges the extent of their overlapping claims along Pangong Lake. India colloquially describes the disputed area as ‘Fingers’ in reference to eight successive outcroppings of land into the lake, and asserts that the LAC starts at Finger 8, while the Chinese claim that it starts at Finger 2, which India dominates. At the beginning of the year, India’s most advanced post was located at Finger 3, while China’s was at Finger 8. Both sides regularly patrolled the area between Fingers 4 and 8 in support of their claims, but neither had occupied it permanently.

On 5 and 6 May, Indian media reported that Indian and Chinese troops had clashed, injuring soldiers from both sides. Further ‘intrusions’ by both sides have taken place since then, notably on 21 and 22 May, but these have reportedly been small reconnaissance operations and not involved any occupation of territory.

In a rare show of high-level military dialogue, the commanders of India’s XIV Corps and China’s Southern Xinjiang Military District met on 6 June in eastern Ladakh. And mid- and lower-level military officials met inconclusively on 10 June ahead of a possible second round of high-level commander talks. As a result, Indian and Chinese troops have reportedly ‘disengaged on the ground at multiple locations in Eastern Ladakh’, with both sides agreeing to pull back their troops from the LAC in the areas of the Galwan valley, Patrolling Point 15 and Hot Springs in eastern Ladakh by 2–2.5km. The dispute along the northern shore of Pangong Lake, however, was not mentioned in read-outs of the 6 June talks, suggesting that friction between the two sides has not been resolved and that here the additional troop build-up remains in place. Following the news of fatalities in the latest clash in the Galwan valley, bilateral talks have been upgraded to foreign minister level.

What are China’s actual military resources in the area?

The PLA Army has three border-defence companies (边防连) based close to the areas in question in Aksai Chin. Two are drawn from the 362nd Border Regiment (32160部队) and are located at Fort Khurnak (库尔那克堡) on the north bank of Pangong Lake and at Spanggur Lake (斯潘古尔) to the south. The third is located at the Kongka Pass (空喀山口) near the Indian post at Gogra/Hot Springs, and belongs to the 363rd Border Regiment (69316部队). There is also a patrol boat squadron (山顶上的国门舰队) on Pangong Lake itself. At establishment, these units would amount to around 500–600 personnel. Under the circumstances, it is probable that additional forces – drawn from one or both of their parent Border Defence Regiments’ operational reserves – have also been deployed to the area, raising the total PLA border forces in the area to 1,000–1,500 personnel.

In addition to the border forces, the PLA Army has mobilised additional conventional combat forces, most likely from the 6th Mechanised Division. This formation is based far to the northwest, on the southern boundary of the Taklamakan Desert, but constitutes the Southern Xinjiang Military District’s primary operational reserve. In the Doklam confrontation of 2017, PLA Army force dispositions seemed to follow a similar pattern, with border forces on the frontline, but with regular manoeuvre formations deployed further back as a reserve.

By the end of May, companies of main battle tanks and batteries of towed artillery had been deployed at existing Chinese positions north and east of Gogra. This combination of heavy armour and towed artillery is now quite rare in the PLA Army following its latest reorganisation – but is consistent with the known equipment holdings of the 6th Mechanised Division, as well as the three other divisions in the Xinjiang Military District.

In the Galwan River sector, a very small Chinese deployment at Patrolling Point 14 (PP14) had been withdrawn by the end of May, with the main PLA camp then established 3km further back in territory China already occupied. There is little indication that this detachment is equipped with armour or artillery, and the planned Chinese road along the valley remains unfinished, complicating the PLA’s ability to maintain a more substantial presence in this area for now. During de-escalation activities near PP14 on the night of 15 June, however, a confrontation occurred between Indian and Chinese troops. Although no shots were reportedly fired, a physical fight eventually resulted in multiple fatalities on both sides, with the harsh climactic conditions and freezing temperatures gravely exacerbating the troops’ injuries.

The situation along the northern banks of Pangong Lake is different and at present seems to be the most challenging barrier to a successful conclusion of the de-escalation talks. From early May, China has placed more forces into the disputed area between Finger 4 and Finger 8. According to Indian sources, these additional troops have blocked the path from Finger 2 to Finger 8, with one source claiming that the Chinese have ‘dug up a moat-like construction with troop build-up to prevent India from patrolling further’ between Fingers 3 and 4. This apparent attempt to solidify Chinese control over the disputed area now seems to be the key point of contention between the two sides. 

Overall, these deployments correlate with reporting in the Indian media that, by late May, China had between 1,200 and 1,500 personnel in the immediate vicinity of the LAC, with around 5,000 more diverted to the region in support.

In response to the initial clashes, India has reinforced the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and rotational army units in its forward positions along the LAC with additional army personnel from the 3rd Infantry Division. Elements of the division’s 81st Mountain Brigade and 114th Infantry Brigade have reportedly been brought forward from their regular cantonments in the valley between Durbuk and Tangtse, with additional units being brought into theatre to replace these mobilised forces as an operational reserve.

Are things different this time?

This round of confrontations takes place within a larger and increasingly tense geopolitical context between the US and China, and China and the wider Indo-Pacific region. However, incidents like this aren’t a novel development (see Churmur in 2014 and Doklam in 2017). While the wider geopolitical context might heighten threat perceptions, this episode in the ongoing disputes is not more likely to result in an outright kinetic war.

The current clashes should be seen as a continuation of a trend of incidents that occur each spring, when snow in this mountainous region thaws and opportunistic gains can be made on either side of the disputed border. The Indian government estimates that between 2016 and 2018 there were 1,025 transgressions by the PLA along the LAC. In 2016, there were 273 transgressions, rising to 426 in 2017 and decreasing again in 2018 to 326. The Chinese government doesn’t publish similar details of perceived transgressions into territory it claims as its own.

The spark leading to such incidents also doesn’t seem vastly different. In Churmur in 2014 and Doklam in 2017, tensions rose as the result of perceived transgressions beyond the territorial status quo and the construction of new, or the reinforcement of existing, connectivity infrastructure. Raised threat perceptions due to infrastructure development along the border area seem to have been at least one reason for last month’s confrontations.

The fatalities following the 16 June incident demonstrate just how high tensions are running between the two sides. Ongoing military and diplomatic talks are a positive de-escalatory move, but won’t be a permanent one. They are unlikely to lead to any lasting clarification over where exactly the boundaries of Indian or Chinese claims along the LAC lie. Since the 2017 Doklam standoff, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping have held annual informal summits to defuse tensions. The current clashes may raise question marks about the utility of such high-level engagements. Some observers maintain that such summits provide much-needed opportunities for high-level dialogue during times of crisis, while others argue that they have failed to achieve a tangible outcome. Until then, expect more border confrontations each spring.

This article was updated on 19 June 2020 to add labels and annotations to the satellite imagery.