Monday, February 8, 2021

SINO - INDIA STRATEGIC POSTURE : The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide

SOURCE : 

 (a ) https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/strategic-postures-china-and-india-visual-guide

(b) https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=14hB-wqVTUd1SZcqJMUSA05r42_m7brY0&hl=en&ll=29.027140338305056%2C93.96344498935822&z=10


(c) https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/india-china-postures/China%20India%20Postures%20-%20Tables.pdf

(d) https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/the-strategic-postures-of-china-and-india-a-visual-guide.659114/

(e) https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/china-firmly-opposes-pm-modis-arunachal-visit-india-hits-back.601084/page-4#post-11162171






The Strategic Postures of China and India: A Visual Guide

Policy prescriptions following from this analysis have been published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. See Frank O'Donnell and Alexander K. Bollfrass, "India is Building Nuclear Submarines and ICBMs. That’s a $14 Billion Mistake,"  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 26, 2020.
March 2020

Background

Fueled by aggressive rhetoric from both capitals, Indian and Chinese ground forces engaged in a standoff between June and August 2017. The Doklam crisis, as it became known, stimulated introspection among officials and experts in both states about the future of their relationship. Politically, both strategic communities largely concluded that the peaceful resolution of border disputes is now less likely, forecasting more rivalry than cooperation. Militarily, Indian discussions on the strength of its military position against China in their disputed ground frontier areas have converged on the view that China holds the conventional and nuclear edge over India in this domain.1

Based on our analysis of data on the location and capabilities of Indian and Chinese strategic forces and related military units, we conclude that this assessment of the balance of forces may be mistaken and a poor guide for Indian security and procurement policies. We recommend that instead of investing in new nuclear weapons platforms that our analysis suggests are not likely to be required to deter China, New Delhi should improve the survivability of its existing forces and fill the gap in global arms control leadership with an initiative on restraint and transparency.

China and India’s deliberately opaque strategic postures make objective assessments difficult. To overcome that problem, this brief introduces a new data compilation, consisting of a variety of published intelligence documents, private documents sourced from regional states, and interviews with experts based in China, India, and the United States. This data is combined with open-source force estimates to provide the most comprehensive public assessment of the location and capabilities of Chinese and Indian strategic forces. The appendix provides a link to an interactive map of Chinese and Indian nuclear and conventional air and ground forces, including descriptions of some simplifications and estimates necessary to display the forces on a map. Our analysis focuses on strategic military strike concentrations as they are postured against one other, excluding border patrol forces, as of January 2018. This makes it possible to examine the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s forces.

What does this data tell us? We assess that India has key under-appreciated conventional advantages that reduce its vulnerability to Chinese threats and attacks. India appears to have cause for greater confidence in its military position against China than is typically acknowledged in Indian debates, providing the country an opportunity for leadership in international efforts toward nuclear transparency and restraint.      

Indian strategists have not focused on this opportunity, in part because they draw pessimistic conclusions regarding China. For example, one Indian expert has observed that “India’s ground force posture and strength is not really comparable to that of China in their border regions. China has better military infrastructure, capabilities, and logistics.”2 A former commander of the Indian Army Northern and Central commands, which are tasked with defense against China, wrote during the Doklam standoff that he expected the episode to end in a barrage of Chinese missile strikes to expel Indian forces from the area and settle the dispute on Chinese terms.3

Even India’s comparative optimists, a minority, do not sound hopeful. A retired Indian Army brigadier close to internal discussions on China policy has observed that “even as conventional asymmetry prevails, it is being largely undermined by Indian strides in infrastructural build up, force modernisation and new raisings.”4

The next sections assess the nuclear forces India and China have arrayed against each other, followed by conventional forces relevant to a potential conflict.

China’s Nuclear Strike Forces and Ranges

Chinese nuclear forces comprise land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and aircraft that may emerge as nuclear bombers.5 The land- and sea-based elements are operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, which executes nuclear strike orders issued by the Central Military Commission under Xi Jinping’s chairmanship.

Sea-based missiles do not have a fixed location. However, China’s land-based missile bases can be geo-located. Including only the nuclear forces and locations most relevant to targeting India, the map below shows that the bases are concentrated in the far north, with three DF-21 bases in the country’s south.6 

In all, an estimated 104 Chinese missiles could strike all or parts of India. These include about a dozen DF-31A and six to twelve DF-31 missiles capable of reaching all Indian mainland targets. Another dozen DF-21s hold New Delhi at risk. The remaining missiles can target sections of India’s northeast and east coast.7 Moreover, as China deploys more road-mobile missiles over time, it will become easier to move further missiles from China’s interior to new survivable positions within range of India.

Figure 1: Map of China’s Nuclear Strike Range




Map Legend

Missile Type

Rocket Force Base and Location8

Color (of circle)

Approx. Missile Range (miles)

DF-31A

Base 56: Beidao/Tawanli, Gansu Province

Yellow

6,830

DF-21, DF-31

Base 56: Xining, Qinghai Province

Bright Green

1,335 (DF-21)
4,350 (DF-31)

DF-21, DF-31

Base 56: Delingha, Qinghai Province

Red

1,335 (DF-21)
4,350 (DF-31)

DF-21

Base 56: Liuqingkou, Qinghai Province

Black

1,335

DF-21

Base 56: Korla, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

White

1,335

DF-21

Base 53: Jianshui, Yunnan Province

Blue

1,335

DF-21

Base 53: Chuxiong, Yunnan Province

Dark Green

1,335

Sunday, February 7, 2021

SINO - INDIA STRATEGIC POSTURE - US Study explains India's conventional edge over China

 SOURCE :   https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/us-study-explains-india-s-conventional-edge-over-china-1687213-2020-06-09




                                                 PART  ONE OF TWO PARTS



VIDEO:  Google the URL BELOW TO OPEN U -TUBE

                                          [ https://youtu.be/ybJA-3wvrKk ]


A study conducted by Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School says that India has conventional military edge over China. The study was conducted by comparing the army and airforce assets of the two countries.




SINO- INDIA : STRATEGIC POSTURE

US Study explains India's conventional   edge over China

                                   By       
                         Ankit Kumar

Can India take China head-on in the event of a full-scale escalation or will we suffer a 1962-like setback? A US study says India holds a conventional advantage which makes 2020 nothing like 1962.

File photo of military installation on Indo-China border (Photo Credits: Reuters)

HIGHLIGHTS

  • Is India ready to face China in a head-on challenge?
  • A US study says that if the situation escalates India can hold off Chinese advances
  • It says that India holds a conventional advantage to ward off a 1962-type setback

India holds a conventional advantage to ward off a 1962-type setback in the event of a full-scale escalation with China primarily because of its Beijing-centric deployments across air, land and high-altitude platforms, according to a US study.

The research paper, published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School earlier this year, analysed comparative data of Indian and Chinese strategic assets.

The study, however, noted New Delhi's conventional advantage remains "under-appreciated" in Indian discourse.

The publication introduced a new data compilation based on "published intelligence documents, private documents sourced from regional states, interviews with experts based in China, India, and the United States".

It gave a comprehensive assessment of "the location and capabilities of Chinese and Indian strategic forces". The two authors of the study are Dr Frank O’Donnell, who is a non-resident fellow at the Stimson Center's South Asia Program and Dr Alexander K Bollfrass, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.

Conventional Forces

The research estimated that India's total available army strike forces near China’s border areas to be around 225,000 personnel against an estimated 200,00-230,000 Chinese ground forces under the Western Theater Command, and Tibet and Xinjiang military districts.

But then the study found the Chinese numbers misleading.

"Even in a war with India, a significant proportion of these forces will be unavailable, reserved either for Russian taskings or for countering insurrection in Xinjiang and Tibet," it says.

The authors observed that a majority of Chinese troops are located further from the Indian border, "posing a striking contrast with the majority of forward-deployed Indian forces with a single China defence mission".


Air Capabilities

The Chinese Air Force (PLAAF), according to the authors, also suffers from a numerical disparity to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in the border region.

China’s Western Theater Command controls all regional strike aircraft in this area, the proportion of which are needed to be reserved for "Russia-centric missions", the study said.

China, it added, hosts a total of around 101 fourth-generation fighters in this theatre, which also include Russian defence, against around 122 Indian comparables solely directed at China.

China would likely be compelled to rely more upon its rear-area air bases, which will "exacerbate its limited fuel and payload problems", the authors say.

Most PLAAF pilots are over-reliant upon ground control for tactical direction, which the study notes may turn out to be counterproductive.

According to the study, the Indian fighter pilots have a level of institutional experience in actual networked combat due to ongoing conflicts with Pakistan.

Although China has a superior missile force, it is unlikely to overcome the PLAAF disadvantage at once.

"If the PLAAF attacks just three airfields, it will require 660 ballistic missiles per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. China’s stock of 1,000-1,200 MRBMs/SRBMs (medium- and short-range ballistic missiles) will be over in less than two days when attacking just three airfields, with no other major target systems being addressed," wrote the authors, quoting a former IAF official.

The authors believe that China may permanently station large forces nearer to the border but it will give time for a counter-build-up by India.

LAC Stand-Off An Intelligence Failure

Frank O’Donnell, the lead author, told India Today TV that their assessment of the disposition of major Chinese and Indian combat forces has not changed since the publication in March.

That said, he pointed out that such a large movement by the PLA would have been picked up by Indian and US intelligence much in advance.

"What has happened in this episode is that a large Chinese military exercise near the border areas was used as a feint, with Chinese forces then being diverted toward the positions they occupy today," O’Donnell said.

He termed the current situation an outcome of "a significant intelligence failure" and suggested that "there should be a Kargil Review Committee-level public inquiry as to how this intelligence failure was permitted to occur and provide recommendations for preventing a recurrence".

Possible Solutions

Asked about the possible solution to end the stand-off, O’Donnell suggested an aggressive diplomatic strategy, similar to that New Delhi executed following the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

"China is intensely sensitive to its global image and how it is portrayed. The 2008 Mumbai playbook of regular MEA briefings of scores of foreign ambassadors regarding the nature and extent of the Chinese LAC violation, and pressuring these governments to publicly criticize China for these actions and demand that it withdraw will raise the international costs to China's reputation in continuing the occupation."

In his opinion, Russia should be a particular target of Indian diplomacy with regard to China.

"To intercede with China as its closest partner to tell it to pull back, Russia is reportedly already very distressed with the Chinese actions," O’Donnell added.

The final diplomatic option, in O’donnell’s view, is the cancellation of an invitation to China for next year’s BRICS summit, which India is hosting. "PM Modi can publicly state that at present he cannot see how he could invite China to attend if it is occupying Indian territory," says O’Donnell.

He noted that the Doklam crisis ended soon before the scheduled commencement of the 2017 BRICS summit.