Wednesday, March 23, 2022

March 22 Assessment Russian Offensive Campaign

SOURCE 

(A)  https://www.understandingwar.org/ 

 (B) https://defence-ua dot com/army_and_war/zsu_zahopili_vkraj_tsikavi_shtabni_mapi_rashistiv_na_pivdennomu_naprjami_stav_zrozumilij_fenomen_chornobajivki-6554.html. 

(C) https://mobile.twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1496876298051989504/photo/1


 Assessment

                   Russian Offensive Campaign 

 Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko 

                            March 22, 6:00 pm ET



SOURCE:  https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-22

Russian forces did not make any major advances on March 22 and Ukrainian forces conducted local counterattacks northwest of Kyiv and around Mykolayiv. Russian forces around Kyiv and other major cities are increasingly prioritizing long-range bombardment after the failure of Russian ground offensives but are unlikely to force major cities to surrender in this manner. Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations toward the northeastern Ukrainian cities of Chernihiv, Sumy, or Kharkiv in the last 24 hours. Russian forces continued to further reduce the Mariupol pocket.

Key Takeaways

  • Russian forces are likely moving to a phase of protracted bombardment of Ukrainian cities due to the failure of Russia’s initial campaign to encircle and seize Kyiv and other major cities.
  • Ukrainian forces conducted successful localized counterattacks northwest of Kyiv.
  • Russian forces in northeastern Ukraine did not conduct any offensive operations in the past 24 hours.
  • Ukrainian forces repelled several Russian assaults in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in the past 24 hours.
  • Russian forces continue to make slow but steady progress reducing the Mariupol pocket.
  • Russia may have failed to appoint an overall commander for its invasion of Ukraine, leading to Russian axes of advance competing for limited supplies and failing to synchronize their operations.

Russian forces are likely moving to a phase of protracted bombardment of Ukrainian cities due to the failure of Russia’s initial campaign to encircle and seize Kyiv and other major cities. Russian forces continue to conduct air and missile strikes against both civilian and military targets across unoccupied Ukraine in the absence of offensive ground operations.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 6:00 pm local time on March 22 that Russian aircraft conducted over 80 sorties in the past 24 hours.[2] Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby additionally stated on March 21 that Russian forces have increased their long-range bombardment against Ukrainian cities in an attempt to force them to surrender.[3] Russian forces are unlikely to force Ukrainian cities to surrender with bombardment alone.

Russian forces face continuing logistics and reinforcement issues. The Ukrainian General Staff specified for the first time on March 22 that Russian forces—particularly highlighting the 7th Air Assault Division operating around Kherson—are suffering casualties due to a poor medical supply system and lack of medicine.[4]The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated that Russian forces face growing supply issues, claiming some unspecified units have stockpiles of food and ammunition for no more than three days.[5] Russian forces continue to cobble together Adhoc units of servicemen from several units to replace combat losses.[6] Russia is expanding its methods to generate replacements, including expanding forcible conscription in Donetsk Oblast and forcing Russians with large amounts of debt to sign military contracts in return for exemption from credit obligations.[7]The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 22 that Russia is increasingly carrying out propaganda aimed at Belarusian servicemen to incentivize  Belarusian participation in the war, although ISW cannot independently verify this claim and an unnamed US senior defence official stated on March 21 that the United States has seen no indication that Belarus is preparing to enter the war.[8]

Russian forces are unlikely to successfully resolve their command and control issues in the near term. A senior US defence official stated on March 21 that Russian forces are increasingly using unsecured communications due to lacking sufficient capacity on secured networks.[9] CNN additionally quoted multiple sources on March 21 that the United States has been unable to determine if Russia has appointed an overall commander for the invasion of Ukraine.[10] These sources stated that Russian units from different military districts appear to be competing for resources and are not coordinating their operations.

We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:

  • Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);

  • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv;
    • Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast;

  • Supporting effort 2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast; and

  • Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances northward and westward.

Main effort  —    Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.

Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the   Dnipro        

Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations northwest of Kyiv on March 22 and continued to improve their defensive positions and logistical support.[11] Local Ukrainian sources reported Russian forces “entrenched” around Bucha on March 22.[12] Satellite imagery on March 21 additionally depicted fortified Russian artillery positions northwest of Irpin.[13] Ukrainian forces conducted several localized counterattacks on March 22, retaking the towns of Moshcun (northwest of Kyiv) and Makarov (directly west of Kyiv).[14]


Subordinate supporting effort—Chernihiv and Sumy axis

Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful attack toward Brovary late on March 21 but did not conduct any major offensive operations northeast of Kyiv on March 22.[15] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 22 that Russian forces deployed an additional BTG of the 90th Tank Division and other unspecified Central Military District (CMD) units to the northeastern axis of advance.[16] Russian forces did not conduct any assaults on Chernihiv or Sumy in the past 24 hours and continued to shell both cities.[17]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:

Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations around Kharkiv and paused attacks to take the city of Izyum, southeast of Kharkiv, on March 22.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia is deploying additional Naval Infantry from the Baltic and Northern fleets to Kharkiv and Izyum, in addition to attempting to restore the combat potential of previously deployed units.[19] The General Staff additionally reported that Russian engineering units are attempting to repair a railway connection from Valuyki (Belgorod Oblast, in Russia) to Kupyansk (Kharkiv Oblast) to support logistics efforts around Kharkiv.[20]

Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast:

Russian forces conducted several unsuccessful attacks in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the last 24 hours. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 22 that Russia and proxy forces concentrated their efforts on capturing Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, Popasna, and Vugledar but were unsuccessful.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff additionally stated Ukrainian forces inflicted heavy losses on a Russian attack on Marinka as of noon local time on March 22.[22]

Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast:

Russian forces continued to assault Mariupol and shell residential areas of the city in the past 24 hours.[23] Russian forces are continuing to reinforce artillery positions northeast of the city.[24] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov posted an update on claimed Chechen operations in Mariupol late on March 21.[25] Kadyrov claimed the head of the Chechen branch of Rosgvardia, Adam Delimkhanov, is personally leading Chechen fighters taking the city ”quarter by quarter,” including the Azovstal factory in eastern Mariupol, which Russian forces claimed to have captured on March 10.[26] Kadyrov said Chechen fighters provide reliable cover for their ”brothers in arms” in the conventional Russian military. Social media users have independently confirmed the presence of Chechen units around Mariupol, but have not confirmed the exact role Rosgvardia units are playing in ongoing urban fighting.



Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and advances northward and westwards:

Ukrainian forces likely conducted several local counterattacks against Russian forces around Mykolayiv and north of Kherson on March 22, and Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on March 21 that Ukrainian counterattacks around Mykolayiv pushed Russian forces out of defensive positions to unspecified “unfavourable borders.”[28]

Ukrainian forces additionally published a map on March 22 reportedly captured from Russian forces in Kherson Oblast on March 10.[29] The map reports Russia had about 10 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) from the 49th Combined Arms Army and 7th Airborne (VDV) Division operation on the Kherson axis in mid-March and supporting units from the 22nd Army Corps. Russian forces additionally reportedly had most of their command and control assets in the region stationed at the Kherson airport, which was struck by Ukrainian aircraft on March 15.

Immediate items to watch

  • Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks.
  • Russia will expand its air, missile, and artillery bombardments of Ukrainian cities.
  • Russian forces will likely continue efforts to reach Kryvyi Rih and isolate Zaporizhia.
  • Russian forces around Kyiv will continue efforts to push forward into effective artillery range of the centre of the city.
  • Russian troops will continue efforts to reduce Chernihiv and Sumy.
  • Mounting Ukrainian resistance in Russian-occupied territory would divert Russian combat power to rear area security.

 References

[1] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587.

[2] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278395061140246.

[3] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2973449/pent......

[4] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278395061140246.

[5] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277993621180390.

[6] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587.

[7] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine.

[8] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277993621180390https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2973395/seni......

[9] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2973395/seni......

[10] https://www.cnn.com/2022/03/21/politics/us-russia-top-military-commander......

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587.

[12] https://t.me/mistoinform1/487.

[13] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1506205361874903047.

[14] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1506215857671835651https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/22/russia-ukraine-war-news-... https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-makarov-russia-1690326; https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-kyiv-business-europe-58eb1948e...

[15] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108.

[16] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108.

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108.

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108.

[19] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587.

[20] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108.

[21] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277993621180390.

[22] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587.

[23] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587.

[24] https://twitter.com/Cen4infoRes/status/1506203319571787783; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1506225331413426179.

[25] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/1556.

[26] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Mariupol%20Battle%2......

[27] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/278168317829587https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108;

[28] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/277826441197108.

[29] https://defenceua dotcom/army_and_war/zsu_zahopili_vkraj_tsikavi_shtabni_mapi_rashistiv_na_pivdennomu_naprjami_stav_zrozumilij_fenomen_chornobajivki-6554.html.

 

Tags

























Tuesday, March 22, 2022

March 20 Assessment Russian Offensive Campaign

   

 SOURCE :

 (a) https://www.understandingwar.org/ 


Assessment

                   Russian Offensive Campaign 

 Mason Clark, George Barros, and Kateryna Stepanenko 

                               March 20, 4:00pm ET 



SOURCE: 

 (a) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-20

(b)https://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20March%2020_0.pdf


Russian forces did not make any major advances on March 20.

Russian forces around Kyiv are increasingly establishing defensive positions and preparing to deploy further artillery and fire control assets. Ukrainian forces repelled continuing Russian efforts to seize the city of Izyum, southeast of Kharkiv, and Russian forces did not conduct any other offensive operations in northeast Ukraine. Russian forces continue to make slow but steady progress on  Luhansk  Oblast and around  Mariupol, but did not conduct any offensive operations towards  Mykolayiv or  Kryvyi Rih. 


 Key Takeaways

  •    The Ukrainian General Staff reported for the first time that the Kremlin is preparing its population for a “long war” in Ukraine and implementing increasingly draconian mobilization measures, including deploying youth military organization members aged 17-18. 
  •      Ukrainian forces reportedly killed three Russian regimental commanders in the last 24 hours.
  •   Russia’s Wagner Group will likely facilitate the deployment of Libyan fighters to Ukraine. 
  •    Russian forces are digging into positions around Kyiv, including the first reports of the war of Russian forces deploying minefields.
  •      Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian assault on Izyum, southeast of Kharkiv, and inflicted heavy casualties. 
  •       Russian forces continued their slow advance into Mariupol but did not achieve any major territorial gains.
  •         Ukrainian forces launched further localized counterattacks around Mykolayiv. 


The Ukrainian General Staff reported for the first time that the Kremlin is preparing its population for a “long war” in Ukraine and implementing increasingly draconian mobilization measures.1 
The General Staff reported the Russian military commissariats of the Kuban, Primorsky Krai, Yaroslavl Oblast, and Ural Federal Districts are conducting covert mobilization measures but are facing widespread resistance. The General Staff reported the Russian PMC Wagner Group will facilitate the transport of Libyan fighters from LNA leader Khalifa Haftar’s forces to Ukraine. The General Staff reported universities in the DNR and LNR are conscripting students above the age of 18 and that most units in the DNR’s 1st Army Corps are comprised of the “mobilized population,” rather than trained soldiers, and face low morale and equipment shortages. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) additionally reported on March 20 that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu signed an order to prepare to admit Unarmiya (Russian Youth Army, a Kremlin-run military youth organization) personnel aged 17-18 to fight in Ukraine on March 15. 2 The GUR further reported Colonel General Gennady Zhidko, head of the Russian Military-Political Directorate, is in charge of executing the order. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 19 that Russian officials “severely reprimanded” the head of the 652nd unit of Information and Psychological Operations for his “weak efforts” and inability to create a “Kherson People's Republic."

Russian forces face mounting casualties among officers and increasingly frequent desertion and insubordination.
The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense reported on March 19 that “some [Russian] naval infantry units” (unspecified which, but likely referring to Eastern Military District units deployed to the fighting around Kyiv) have lost up to 90% of their personnel and cannot generate replacements.4 The Ukrainian General Staff reported at noon local time on March 20 that Ukrainian forces wounded the commander of the 346th Independent Spetsnaz Brigade and claimed that Ukrainian forces killed the commanders of the 331st VDV Regiment, 247th VDV Regiment, and the 6th Tank Regiment (90th Tank Division, CMD) at unspecified times and locations.5 The General Staff reported the Russian Black Sea Fleet is replacing 130 insubordinate soldiers in the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade with paratroopers from the 7th Airborne Assault Division – a measure highly likely to cause greater unit cohesion problems.6 The General Staff additionally reported that Russian forces are increasingly using ”outdated and partially defective equipment” to replace combat losses.

The Ukrainian MoD reported that forced mobilization in the DNR has demoralized Russian proxy forces, with many refusing to fight and accusing Russian leadership of forcing them into combat to find Ukrainian troop positions. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported the number of insubordinate Russian personnel who are refusing combat orders is “sharply increasing” in the Kherson and Mykolayiv oblasts on March 20.8 The Ukrainian General Staff reported the Russian military commandant office in Belgorod City is investigating 10 Russian servicemen of 138th Motor Rifle Brigade who refused to continue fighting in Kharkiv and agitated for other Russian servicemen to abandon their posts.

Ukrainian military intelligence (the GUR) reported on March 20 that another group of mercenaries connected with Yevgeny Prigozhin and the “League”/Wagner Group began arriving in Ukraine on March 20.10 
The GUR claimed this group aims to eliminate Ukraine’s top military and political leadership, including Volodymyr Zelensky, Andriy Yermak, and Denys Shmyhal. The GUR claimed Russia is turning to assassination plans due to the failure of Russian conventional operations. 

We do not report in detail on the deliberate Russian targeting of civilian infrastructure and attacks on unarmed civilians, which are war crimes, because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

 Russian forces are engaged in four primary efforts at this time:

 • Main effort—Kyiv (comprised of three subordinate supporting efforts);

 • Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv; o Supporting effort 1a—Luhansk Oblast; 

• Supporting effort 2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast; and

 • Supporting effort 3—Kherson and advances northward and westward.


 Main effort—Kyiv axis: Russian operations on the Kyiv axis are aimed at encircling the city from the northwest, west, and east.





Subordinate main effort along the west bank of the Dnipro Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations northwest of Kyiv on March 20.11 The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces continued to strengthen defensive positions in previously captured terrain.12 The General Staff additionally specified Russian forces are deploying engineering support, preparing logistics, and extending their fire control systems.13 The Ukrainian General staff has not previously mentioned a Russian focus on fire control systems. This Ukrainian assessment supports ISW’s forecast that Russian forces are likely seeking to set conditions for an expanded artillery and missile bombardment of Kyiv by moving into effective artillery range of its centre after abandoning plans to encircle or assault the city in the coming weeks.14


Subordinate supporting effort — Chernihiv and Sumy axis 

Russian forces strengthened their defensive positions northeast of Kyiv in the past 24 hours and reportedly began deploying minefields — the first Ukrainian General Staff report of Russian forces laying mines.15 Russian forces continued to shell civilian settlements across northeast Ukraine.16 Ukrainian forces additionally launched local counterattacks around Brovary on March 20. The Ukrainian General staff reported Ukrainian forces have cut off the fuel and food supplies of Russian forces near Brovary and destroyed an unspecified detachment of the Russian 6th Tank Regiment.17


Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv:

 Russian forces did not conduct any notable activity around Kharkiv in the past 24 hours.18 The Ukrainian Border Guard reported the detention of two Russian saboteurs in Kharkiv Oblast on March 20.19 The Ukrainian General Staff reported Russian forces are moving unspecified ”high-powered artillery” in Belgorod Oblast, Russia, as of noon local time on March 20.20 

Ukrainian forces in Izyum repulsed a Russian attempt to capture the city centre on March 19-20. The Ukrainian General Staff and local Kharkiv Oblast authorities reported Ukrainian forces inflicted heavy casualties on Russian forces.21 Russian forces will likely continue attempts to seize Izyum to support a broader envelopment of Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine but are unlikely to seize the city in the near term.

 Supporting Effort #1a—Luhansk Oblast: 

Russian and proxy forces made limited territorial gains north of Rubizhne on March 19-20, capturing the village of Varvarivka. 22 The Ukrainian General Staff stated at noon local time on March 20 that Russian forces continued to attempt to capture the settlements of Rubizhne, Severodonetsk, and Popasna but were unable to break through Ukrainian defenses.23


Supporting Effort #2—Mariupol and Donetsk Oblast: 


Russian forces continued their slow advance into Mariupol on March 20, though without any major territorial changes.24 Russian and proxy forces continued to shell the city, including with thermobaric munitions.25 Russian officials additionally confirmed on March 20 the that Deputy Commander of the Black Sea Fleet for military-political affairs, Captain of the 1st Rank Andrei Paly, was killed in Mariupol on an unspecified date.26 The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed DNR forces advanced 3km towards Verkhn'otorets'ke, north of Mariupol, on March 19.27


Supporting Effort #3—Kherson and advances northward and westwards:

The Ukrainian General Staff reported at midnight local time on March 19 that Ukrainian forces restored an unspecified “front line of defence along some borders” in the “southern direction” - likely referring to continuing Ukrainian counterattacks around Mykolayiv. 28 The General Staff further stated Russian forces did not conduct any offensive operations in the southern direction on March 20 and prioritized restoring combat effectiveness.29 The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Black Sea Fleet warships struck Ukrainian workshops and storage facilities in Mykolaiv with Kalibr missiles on March 20, though ISW cannot independently verify this claim.30 



Immediate items to watch 

• Russian forces will likely capture Mariupol or force the city to capitulate within the coming weeks;

• Russia will expand its air, missile, and artillery bombardments of Ukrainian cities; • Russian forces will likely continue efforts to reach Kryvyi Rih and isolate Zaporizhiya;

 • Russian forces around Kyiv will continue efforts to push forward into effective artillery range of the centre of the city;

 • Russian troops will continue efforts to reduce Chernihiv and Sumy.


References:

1 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276964097950009. 

2 https://gur.gov dot ua/content/putin-i-shochu-hotuiutsia-zadiiaty-u-viii-party-Ukraine-nepovnolitnikh-dokument.html.

 3 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781. 

4 https://www.facebook.com/MinistryofDefence.UA/posts/278997237746069. 

5 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

6 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276563694656716. 

7 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781. 

8 https://gur.gov dot ua/content/zbilshuietsia-kinkiest-okupantiv-Zaki-vidmovliaiutsia-vid-Bolshoi-unchaste-u-viini.html. 

9 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781. 

10 https://gur.gov dot ua/content/okupanty-perekydaiut-v-ukrainu-cherhovi-terorystychni-hrupy-z-metoiu-likvidatsii-kerivnytstvaukrainy.html. 

11                 BLANK

12 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781. 

13 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

14 https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-19

15 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

16 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/27641637800478. 

17 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276964097950009. 

18 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

19 https://www.facebook.com/DPSUkraine/posts/299940042244873. 

20 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

21 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781; https://tsn dot ua/ato/bezuspishna-sproba-rosiyskiokupanti-namagalasya-prorvati-oboronu-v-napryamku-na-izyum-2014372.html; https://t dot me/synegubov/2691. 

22 https://twitter.com/HAPE3AK/status/1505270702575915011. 

23 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

24 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

25 https://t.me/nm_dnr/7112; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505478077756891143; https://t.me/svarschiki/5171; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505434580765093891 . 

26 https://www.mk dot ru/politics/2022/03/20/zamkomanduyushhego-chernomorskogo-flota-Andrey-plays-login-na-ukraine.html; https://www.kommersant dot RU/doc/5269657. 

27 https://twitter.com/mod_russia/status/1505471226625540097. 

28 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781. 

29 https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276416378004781; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/276724107974008. 

30 https://twitter.com/mod_russia/status/1505471226625540097.


Tags

                         Ukraine Project

                  

 File Attachments:                     








Friday, March 18, 2022

What Happens In Russia If Putin Dies In Office

 SOURCE :

 (a)    https://instanthub.net/politics/what-happens-in-russia-if-putin-dies-in-office/?crst=1647653106&wrst=1647653105   

(b)   VIDEO :      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KPkAha7w5vg&t=13s


       Video:-    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N0bnt7hYmDY


                                                                OR

   CLICK/ GOOGLE TO OPEN VIDEO:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N0bnt7hYmDY



             

  Videos: The Death of Stalin - Beria Trial and Execution

  

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bygG3_Cl5KA&t=41s]



 CLICK / GOOGLE TO OPEN  VIDEO                                            https://www.youtube.com/watchv=bygG3_Cl5KA&t=41s ]



Video:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjT2FhubAf0 


                                                                              OR

  [  CLICK/ GOOGLE TO OPEN VIDEO:- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YjT2FhubAf0 ]




What Happens In Russia If Putin Dies In Office





            
Right now, it’s fair to say that Russian President Vladamir Putin is the most hated man in the world. He is currently leading Russia in a ruthless invasion of Ukraine. And while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky is fighting the good fight, much of the Western world is doing its part by sanctioning Russia and exploring other options to stop Putin in his tracks.

Of course, the surest way to stop Putin is one that South Carolina Senator Lindsey Graham recently proposed. He took to Twitter and asked some surprising questions: “Is there a Brutus in Russia? Is there a more successful Colonel  Stauffenberg in the Russian military? The only way this end is for somebody in Russia to take this guy out. You would be doing your country — and the world — a great service.”

Many criticized a sitting U.S. senator for openly asking for a world leader to be assassinated. But in Graham’s defence, he is saying what countless others have been thinking.

But what happens if Putin dies while still in office? The answer is more complex than you might think!


Understanding Russia’s Chain Of Succession




Like many countries, Russia has a chain of succession. And this chain of succession spells out who would assume control if Putin were to die or otherwise be unable to carry out his presidential duties.

Where gets interesting is that Putin made changes to Russia’s constitution in 2020 that affect how this chain of succession works. Part of these big changes involved dismissing Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and his cabinet and installing Mikhail Mishustin (a tax official that hardly anyone had ever heard of) in his place

If Putin dies, Mishustin would be interim president for 90 days or until an election was completed. However, political analyst Kirill Rogov told the Associated Press that Putin’s changes (specifically, dismissing ambitious veteran politicians and installing unambitious loyalists) are probably a way for him to simply maintain power. “Such a model resembling the Chinese one would allow Putin to stay at the helm indefinitely while encouraging rivalry between potential successors.”

RELATED20 Oddest Vladimir Putin Moments Caught On Camera







Putin’s current term as Russia’s president is over in 2024. However, many who have studied both his political machinations and his unexpected invasion of Ukraine think that Putin may be trying to hold onto power for much longer than that.

How would this work, exactly? As reported by Business Insider, the idea is that Mishustin could be Putin’s successor and then appoint Putin as Prime Minister or place him in another valuable political position. Putin could effectively call the shots while the country is nominally run by his handpicked “yes man.”

If that sounds farfetched, keep in mind this already happened back in 2007. As the Associated Press reports, Putin named Medvedev as his successor and Medvedev then made Putin Prime Minister. Many within Russia and beyond believe Putin was functionally running the country with Medvedev as a puppet until Putin officially became president once more.

Could Putin Stay In Power For Life?


As you can see, Putin can remain in power for a good, long time. But that brings us to a scary question: could Putin theoretically stay in power for life?

Strident Putin critic Alexei Navalny certainly thinks so. According to the Associated Press, Navalny said, “The only goal of Putin and his regime is to stay in charge for life, having the entire country as his personal asset and seizing its riches for himself and his friends.”

If that sounds crazy, Navalny asks us to consider how other powerful people try to hold onto their power. According to Business Insider, Navalny asked, “Do you see a lot of Mafia bosses decide, after decades of stealing and killing, to retire quietly to some beach house with all their money? How about narco-traffickers? Also, think about the major dictators … How many of them end their reigns with a peaceful retirement?”

Thanks, Navalny. It’s not like we wanted to get some sleep tonight or anything!

The Likelihood Of A Coup


It seems the likeliest way for Putin to die on any given day would be some kind of coup. But given the recent changes he made, how likely is such a coup to happen?

In a word, unlikely. The prime minister would be the likeliest person to lead a coup against Putin. And many think that’s exactly why he installed Mishustin (who, again, is an unambitious and previously-unknown tax official) as PM. Not only is Mishustin unlikely to rise against Putin, but he would be unlikely to garner much public support, either, given his lack of political experience.

The Daily Mail thinks that Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu might be a candidate to lead a coup. After all, Shoygu has proven himself as both a soldier and a politician. But he also helped orchestrate the invasion of Ukraine. Not only does that mean he may not have the support of the average Russian citizen, but his goals and Putin’s goals seem very well-aligned at the moment.

The Dangers Of A Power Vacuum

If Putin dies, the Russian Constitution says that an election should be held within 90 days for a new president. Mishustin would become president for the interim until the election is held. But just because an election for a new president would be held doesn’t mean there wouldn’t be a power struggle in the event of Putin’s death.

When a Western European intelligence official spoke anonymously about this to Business Insider, they didn’t mince words. “It will be ‘Death of Stalin,'” they said, referencing a dark comedy film about the power vacuum created by (you guessed it) the death of Stalin. “The oligarchs that selected Putin have been destroyed by Putin, he set about doing that first. We have our eyes on some people at the higher levels of the security services and army that we think could be contenders to win a struggle but until Putin is gone or greatly diminished it’s always going to be nearly impossible. He’s intentionally making sure there’s never any clear candidates.”