Monday, April 25, 2022

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, APRIL 25 r

GOOGLE TO GLIMPSE THE WAR

(P) RUSSIA & UKRAINE'S PROGRESSIVE DISPOSITIONS:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine.svg

(Q) WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP:

https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl

(R) (UKRAINE CRISIS COVERAGE:

Click here to see a full list of ISW's Ukraine Conflict Updates.

https://www.understandingwar.org/ukraine-crisis-coverage

SOURCE:

(A) https://www.understandingwar.org/

(B) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-25

(C) https://www.understandingwar.org/user/3100/track

(D) GRAPHIC PRESENTATION:

https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/42526/Russian_offensive_campaign_assessment_%E2%80%93_day_33?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter&utm_campaign=gngraphicnews

(E) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide: https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

(F )UKRAINE WAR LIVE ON MAP; https://liveuamap.com/
(G) ALL WORLD WAR ACTIVE ZONES LIVE ON MAP: https://t.co/63fVbMXIWl

INDEX

( ) ORBAT : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/section-2-revised-23-mar-2022-orbat.html

(1) HOT ENGAGEMENTS: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/list-of-military-engagements-during.html

( ) TIME LINE : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/a-timeline-of-2022-russian-invasion-of.html

( ) MAR 25: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-25-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 26: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-26-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 27: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-27-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 28: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/source-b-c-index-1-httpsbcvasundhra.html

( ) MAR 29: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-29-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 30: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/03/march-30-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) MAR 31: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/march-31-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 01 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o1-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 02 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o2-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 03 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/blog-post.html

( ) APR 04 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o4-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 05 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o5-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( )APR 06 : ((i) https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o6-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 06: (ii) https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/situation-on-06-apr-2022-on-ukrainian.html

( ) APR 07: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/april-o7-assessment-russian-offensive.html

( ) APR 08: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/file-attachments.html

( ) APR 09 : https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessments-special-edition-russian.html

( ) APR 10: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/source-b-c-d-graphic-presentation.html

( ) APR 11: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/apr-11-2022-surmising-revised-russian.html

( ) APR 12: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign.html

( ) APR 13: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/04/assessment-russian-offensive-campaign_13.html

RUSSIAN ARMY LITERATURE

( A ) THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

( B ) 2017- The Russian Force Structure, Tactics and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251#

( C ) The Russian Army and Maneuver Defense :

https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-monographs/376503

(D)THE RUSSIAN WAY OF WAR

https://www.google.com/search?q=2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf&rlz=1C1CHBD_enIN988IN988&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

( E ) ORBITS WORLD BATTLES :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Orders_of_battle

(F) (U) Russian Forces in the Western Military District https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Forces-in-the-Western-Military-District.pdf

(G) Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Ground%20Forces%20OOB_ISW%20CTP_0.pdf

(H) Russia Military: Quick Reference Guide: https://irp.fas.org/world/russia/tradoc-refguide.pdf

(J) 2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf

ASSESSMENT

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN

APR 25,2022

MASON CLARK, GEORGE BARROS,

AND

KATERYNA STEPANENKO

April 25, 5:00 pm ET

Russian forces conducted precision missile strikes against five Ukrainian railway stations in central and western Ukraine on April 25 in a likely effort to disrupt Ukrainian reinforcements to eastern Ukraine and Western aid shipments. A series of likely coordinated Russian missile strikes conducted within an hour of one another early on April 25 hit critical transportation infrastructure in Vinnytsia, Poltava, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[1] Russian forces seek to disrupt Ukrainian reinforcements and logistics. The Kremlin may have additionally conducted this series of strikes—an abnormal number of precision missile strikes for one day—to demonstrate Russia’s ability to hit targets in Western Ukraine and to disrupt western aid shipments after US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s surprise visit to Kyiv over the weekend. However, Russian precision strike capabilities will remain limited and unlikely to decisively affect the course of the war; open-source research organization Bellingcat reported on April 24 that Russia has likely used 70% of its total stockpile of precision missiles to date.[2]

Local Ukrainian counterattacks retook territory north of Kherson and west of Izyum in the past 24 hours. Russian forces continue to make little progress in scattered, small-scale attacks in eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are successfully halting Russian efforts to bypass Ukrainian defensive positions around Izyum, and Russian forces are struggling to complete even tactical encirclements. Local Ukrainian counterattacks in Kherson Oblast are unlikely to develop into a larger counteroffensive in the near term but are disrupting Russian efforts to completely capture Kherson Oblast and are likely acting as a drain on Russian combat power that could otherwise support Russia’s main effort in eastern Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces resumed ground attacks against Mariupol’s Azovstal Steel Plant in the last 24 hours. Russian officers may assess they will be unable to starve out the remaining defenders by May 9 (a possible self-imposed deadline to complete the capture of Mariupol). Russian forces will likely take high casualties if they resume major ground assaults to clear the facility.

Russian forces are accelerating efforts to secure occupied Mariupol but will likely face widespread Ukrainian resistance.

Continued Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine took little to no additional territory in the past 24 hours.

Prudent tactical Ukrainian counterattacks around Izyum are likely impeding Russian efforts to complete even tactical encirclements of Ukrainian forces.

Russian forces are preparing for renewed attacks to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast in southern Ukraine after minor losses in the past 48 hours.

Russian forces likely conducted a false flag attack in Transnistria (Russia’s illegally occupied territory in Moldova) to amplify Russian claims of anti-Russian sentiment in Moldova, but Transnistrian forces remain unlikely to enter the war in Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts Russian forces are engaged in at this time:

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate supporting efforts);
Supporting effort 1—Kharkiv and Izyum;
Supporting effort 2—Southern axis;
Supporting effort 3—Sumy and northeastern Ukraine.

Main effort—Eastern Ukraine

Subordinate Main Effort—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)

Russian forces resumed ground assaults against Ukrainian defenders in the Azovstal Steel Plant and continued heavy bombardment on April 25 but did not secure any discernable advances.[3] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych and advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko separately reported that Russian forces are carrying out ground attacks against Azovstal despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s April 21 statement that Russia would cease its assaults on the plant to prevent further Russian casualties.[4] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed that Russia may employ chemical weapons against Ukrainian positions to ”smoke out” defenders and civilians, though ISW cannot independently confirm the possibility of these threats.[5] ISW cannot independently confirm the scale of these reported Russian assaults, but Russian commanders may assess that they will be unable to starve out remaining Ukrainian defenders in the coming weeks, necessitating hasty and likely costly Russian attacks to clear the facility by the Kremlin’s possible self-imposed deadline of May 9. It is otherwise unclear why Russian forces would resume ground attacks on the facility after previously stating their intent to starve out the remaining defenders, who are highly unlikely to be able to break out and are almost certainly low on supplies.

Russian forces continue to consolidate control over occupied Mariupol. Deputy Ukrainian Prime Minister Iryna Verushchuk said that Russia continues to refuse to engage with evacuation efforts, denying Russian claims that Russian forces opened humanitarian corridors to facilitate evacuations from Azovstal.[6] Advisor to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian troops are using former police officers who were mobilized into the militia of the Russian-backed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) to patrol the streets.[7] Russian artillery continues to inflict massive damage on civilian infrastructure in areas of Mariupol that are already under Russian control.[8] Russian naval infantry units are reportedly redeploying away from Mariupol in the direction of Volnovakha, but ISW cannot independently confirm the status of such redeployments at this time.[9]

Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued shelling along the entire frontline in Donetsk and Luhansk and did not secure any confirmed advances in continuing ground attacks on April 25.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults against Koroviy Yar and Rubizhne and that fighting is ongoing in Popasna.[11] Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov claimed on April 25 that Russian forces have completely captured Rubizhne (after making a similar claim on April 20), though this claim is likely false.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that elements of the 30th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army suffered heavy losses around Severodonetsk, confirming that Central Military District units previously active on the Chernihiv axis are fighting in eastern Ukraine.[13]

Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv and Izyum: (Russian objective: Advance southeast to support Russian operations in Luhansk Oblast; defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to the Izyum axis)

Russian forces continued to mount unsuccessful ground offensives southward from Izyum toward Barvinkove and Slovyansk on April 25.[14] Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a limited counterattack and expelled Russian troops from Zavody, about 20 km directly west of Izyum.[15] Russian forces are likely trying to advance through Zavody to bypass deeper-entrenched Ukrainian defences along the direct highway route to Barvinkove. Effective Ukrainian counterattacks are likely impeding the ability of Russian forces to conduct even tactical encirclements, let alone the operational encirclement of Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine that Russian forces likely intend to achieve. Russian forces maintained their positions around Kharkiv city and continued artillery and aviation strikes on Kharkiv city and the surrounding settlements.[16]

Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)

The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are consolidating in the southern direction to conduct limited attacks west toward Mykolaiv and north toward Kryvyi Rih after conducting limited withdrawals from several forward positions in the past two days.[17] ISW could not verify Ukrainian claims to have recaptured five settlements in Mykolaiv Oblast on April 24 and eight in Kherson Oblast on April 23, though Ukrainian forces are likely conducting successful local attacks.[18] Limited Ukrainian counterattacks in the past 48 hours northwest of Kherson city likely disrupted Russian offensive preparations and forced some Russian forces to retreat to Chornobaivka on April 23.[19] Ukraine’s Operational Command “South” reported that two Russian sabotage and reconnaissance units attempted to advance toward Mykolaiv but lost half their personnel and retreated on April 24.[20] Ukrainian counterattacks continue to disrupt Russian efforts to capture the entirety of Kherson Oblast.

Russian forces likely conducted a false flag attack in Transnistria (Russia’s illegally occupied territory in Moldova), but Transnistrian forces remain unlikely to enter unsupported actions in Ukraine. The Transnistrian Internal Affairs Ministry reported that unknown forces targeted the Ministry of State Security with two grenade launchers on April 25; Transnistrian officials stated the attack was “an attempt to sow panic and fear in Transnistria.”[21] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) claimed the attack was organized by Russia’s FSB ”to instill panic and anti-Ukrainian sentiment” and that the FSB will carry out further provocations in Transnistria, though ISW cannot independently confirm this claim. The Kremlin (or local Transnistrian actors) may seek to depict threats to Russian speakers in Moldova to echo a common Russian talking point. The Moldovan government has not commented on the claimed attack as of publication.

Supporting Effort #3—Sumy and Northeastern Ukraine: (Russian objective: Withdraw combat power in good order for redeployment to eastern Ukraine)

There was no significant change in this area in the past 24 hours.

Immediate items to watch

Russian forces will likely continue attacking southeast from Izyum, west from Kreminna and Popasna, and north from Donetsk City via Avdiivka or another axis.

Russian officers may assess they will be unable to starve out remaining defenders by May 9 (a possible self-imposed deadline to complete the capture of Mariupol) but will likely take high casualties if they resume major ground assaults to clear the facility.

Russian forces will likely increase the scale of ground offensive operations in the coming days, but it is too soon to tell how fast they will do so or how large those offensives will be. It is also too soon to assess how the Russians will weight their efforts in the arc from Izyum to Donetsk City.

References :

[1] https://t dot me/stranaua/38447;

https://t.me/vitalykoval8/5393;

https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/364;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518430753612251136;

https://t.me/truexanewsua/43435;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518433322053033985;

https://t.me/truexanewsua/43437;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518434143117393925;

https://t.me/truexanewsua/43444;

https://twitter.com/IntelCrab/status/1518305019719823362;

https://t dot me/mod_russia/14732;

https://t.me/DMYTROLUNIN/1470;

https://t.me/DMYTROLUNIN/1475;

https://t.me/vinnytskaODA/2036

[2] https://www.ukrinform dot net/rubric-ato/3466423-russia-has-used-up-about-70-of-its-highprecision-missiles-since-warstart-bellingcat.html;

https://inforesist dot org/bellingcat-v-pervoj-faze-vojny-rf-poteryala-90-svoih-luchshih-desantnikov/.

[3] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302697315376687;

https://t dot me/OP_UA/6372;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302312052081880;

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1518319428567502850;

https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1518296972666580993

[4] https://t dot me/OP_UA/6372;

https://interfax dot com.ua/news/general/826778.html;

https://t.me/andriyshTime/469.

[5] https://www.facebook.com/DefenceIntelligenceofUkraine/posts/298690512442376

[6] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2022/04/25/po-azovstali-okupanty-ne-hochut-jty-na-bud-yaki-peremovyny-cze-vijskovyj-zlochyn-iryna-vereshhuk/;

https://www.rferl dot org/a/russia-mariupol-humanitarian-corridor-azovstal/31819961.html;

https://interfax dot com.ua/news/general/827024.html

[7] https://t dot me/andriyshTime/470;

https://t dot me/andriyshTime/471

[8] https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1518319428567502850; https://twitter.com/zcjbrooker/status/1518296972666580993

[9] https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1518309788605632515;

https://twitter.com/doppelot/status/1518222851941318656

[10] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302697315376687;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302312052081880;

https://t dot me/luhanskaVTSA/1974;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302312052081880;

https://twitter.com/coshelewalara/status/1518500350298316801;

https://t dot me/pavlokyrylenko_donoda/3139;

https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1518403969386782723

https://t.me/npo_dvina/6093;

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1518280890870288385;

https://t.me/millnr/8224;

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1518320367869337601;

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1518516831350312960

[11] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302697315376687;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302312052081880

[12] https://lenta dot ru/news/2022/04/25/kadurovrubezhnoe/;

https://russian dot rt.com/ussr/news/995103-lnr-kadyrov-osvobozhdenie?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=RSS.

[13] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302413012071784;

https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1505835700998004736.

[14] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302697315376687;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302312052081880

[15] https://twitter.com/GirkinGirkin/status/1518574717975904257;

https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1518541609977225217 ;

https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1518602943599108096;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302697315376687

[16] https://t dot me/synegubov/2980;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302697315376687;

https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302312052081880

[17] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/302697315376687

[18] https://24tv dot ua/zrosla-aktivnist-rozvidki-drg-voroga-bik-mikolayivskoyi-oblasti_n1962363;

https://www.facebook.com/528312067340051/posts/2040630916108151/?d=n; https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2039927556178487

[19] https://www.facebook.com/okPivden/posts/2039927556178487

[20] https://24tv dot ua/zrosla-aktivnist-rozvidki-drg-voroga-bik-mikolayivskoyi-oblasti_n1962363;

https://www.facebook.com/528312067340051/posts/2040630916108151/?d=n

[21] https://tass dot ru/proisshestviya/14469567;

https://novostipmr dot com/ru/news/22-04-25/v-tiraspole-u-zdaniya-mgb-progremeli-vzryvy

Tags

Ukraine Project

File Attachments:

Kherson and Mykolaiv Battle Map Draft April 25,2022.png

Kharkiv Battle Map Draft April 25,2022.png

Luhansk Battle Map Draft April 25,2022.png

Mariupol Battle Map Draft April 25,2022.png

DraftUkraineCoTApril25,2022.png

Information Wars and Disinformation campaigns as Important Tools of International Politics r

SOURCE:

(A) https://tgme.org/2021/06/information-wars-and-disinformation-campaigns-as-important-tools-of-international-politics/

(b) https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-AI-and-the-Future-of-Disinformation-Campaigns.pdf

The shape of "Information Wars and Disinformation " changes and adapts internationally geopolitically from region to region.

[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3hiDeWUL_yY&t=2378s ]

Information Wars and Disinformation

Campaigns as Important

Tools of International Politics

Ali Hajizade

8 Jun 2021

People tried to manipulate each other since ancient times, and various methods were used for these purposes, such as fear of curses, natural forces, higher powers (gods, religion), or deliberate spread of rumours/false information, in order to mislead the opponents or strike terror into their hearts, etc.

During the Cold War, the parties would stoop to anything; the KGB invented a story according to which “AIDS was created by the Americans,” and the CIA, in turn, financed publication of the novels by anti-Soviet authors. I am not even talking about projects such as Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

But now, in the age of the Internet and social networks, “information war” and “psychological operations” obtained such tools that they have never possessed before. It is safe to say that the means for waging information warfare and conducting psychological and disinformation operations have not only gone far ahead but practically achieved perfection.

Never before in the entire history of humankind have people and organizations, involved in the process of information warfare, possessed such a large set of tools.

I disagree with those who argue that the Cold War ended in 1991, in my opinion, the Cold War was paused in 1991 and resumed in the mid-2000s.

But there are certain changes in the actors of the Cold War, or rather wars; ,in the past the Cold War was a confrontation between two camps, two systems, and two ideologies, in which the USSR and the United States were the main antagonists, now it is multifaceted. Moscow and Washington are still opponents and are some of the main actors in the new Cold War. But at the same time, we also have China (China-US confrontation) and Iran (Iran-Israel/US/Saudi Arabia confrontation), and I cite just the examples that influence global politics, leaving aside predominantly regional powers.

New technologies, artificial intelligence, and methods of automated data analysis, on the one hand, facilitate the task for people/organizations involved in the information warfare or “active measures” in the information field, on the other hand, they help significantly reduce the expenses. Now a group of 7-8 analysts with laptops, who have an Internet connection, a couple of hundred dollars to buy paid content, and some operational skills, can do in one week the same amount of work that was done 20 years ago by a large department of an intelligence service of an average NATO country in a couple of months, both in the field of collecting and analyzing information and in the field of “active measures” in the information space.

Facebook alone (as well as Instagram) provides within a couple of minutes extremely detailed information on almost every country or a group of countries in the world, for collection and analysis of which it was previously necessary to employ sizable personnel of analysts and field agents. The same applies to services such as Flight Radar, Marinetraffic, Google Ads Tools, Google Maps, Google Street View, Wikipedia, and more.

I believe special mention should be made of the “lucky” Cambridge Analytica [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Analytica ] who managed to collect data of almost 50 million Facebook users. Unfortunately, or fortunately, not everyone has such an advantage.

Although social networks take a number of measures to limit or even prevent their use for manipulation and disinformation purposes, loopholes always remain. These loopholes always coincide with the painful subjects of society, for example, many Western media write about “Russian interference in the American elections”; many understand interference as hacker attacks, but few pay attention to the activities of the Russian “Troll Factory”, and even fewer specialists and journalists pay attention to how successfully the “Russian trolls” pinpointed the problems of the American society, acting on the principle “where something is thin, that’s where it tears” (social inequality, racism, inadequacy of social elevators, rift between the right and the left). I would say that these directions are much more important for Moscow than the momentary success of a certain candidate in the elections. During the Cold War, the KGB operated in the United States and carried out the intensive activity, i.e. Moscow already had the experience of operations in the American information field, but social networks and the Internet provided a strong impetus and great opportunities. The majority of Western experts and journalists who write about the “Russian troll factory” do not know the specifics of Russia and how this system works in Russia. Fortunately for the Americans, however, Moscow was and remains limited in staff and finances. With a sufficient number of staff and finances, without a doubt, the Russians could have achieved much more, and not only on the American and European, but to a certain extent also in the South American information space.

Many believe that only the special services of certain countries resort to this kind of method, but this is by no means the case. Various political parties, terrorist or semi-terrorist organizations, businesses and some influential and wealthy individuals can also resort to information warfare, psychological operations, manipulation of public opinion, etc.

Large corporations, for example, Russian or Middle Eastern oil and gas producing companies, can afford to have their own departments that are engaged in intelligence, counterintelligence (not to be confused with Competitive Intelligence), can organize and manage large-scale operations for manipulation of public opinion (and not only in their own country), and of course, they have a wide range of operational capabilities (including technical means of tracking and encrypted communication), except maybe the possibility of making legal arrests. Large corporations can easily lure secret service operatives and analysts (local and foreign) to their service to acquire hardware and software for surveillance and hacking. In turn, the material obtained by surveillance (including surveillance with the use of technical means), as well as by hacking, is then used in information operations against competitors or enemies. There are also those that lack the means to maintain their own departments or “information troops” (corporations, governments, political groups), and they often resort to the help of mercenaries. Usually, Western firms disguised as “PR agencies” act as such mercenaries, operating outside the jurisdiction of their own countries, and performing as full-fledged information troops, while their activity goes far beyond PR.

One can cite the example of the British company Bell Pottinger, whose actions almost caused a civil unrest in South Africa.

In my experience, there were cases when one company simultaneously served two opposing camps, while the clients were not aware of that.

I believe that the use of mercenaries is not always an effective method, because mercenaries are not always familiar with local specifics and realities. They often try to apply one or two successful cases to every situation. But it is possible to combine the strengths of foreign mercenaries and local specialists. With the right approach, a very effective hybrid mechanism could be created.

Through my work on the project tgme.org and within my PR agency, I have dealt extensively with issues of information warfare and detection of disinformation and manipulation operations. For the most part, these were operations, conducted against my country, friendly countries or organizations, or Iranian operations directed at the Greater Middle East. My country has been in a permanent state of information warfare for almost 30 years, as the interests of various regional and global players intersect here. On the one hand, this creates difficulties for us in the fight with information attacks and manipulations, but on the other hand, it gives us a unique chance to study the methods and approaches of all the players, as they say, “without leaving the house.”

In information warfare, it is necessary to learn a couple of important lessons. Firstly, the side that appeals only to the truth and real facts may have less space for manoeuvre, because it is limited solely to the truth and facts. It should be taken into account that if the facts are on your side, it does not necessarily mean that you will prevail in the information war.

Secondly, “starting the game first”, “shouting first”, and “taking the first step” give a serious tactical advantage, which could be increased if no strategic mistakes are made. Those who hesitate often lose precious time, thereby giving their enemies more time for preparation and mobilization.

Thirdly, availability of staff and resources. I saw how the parties that got involved in the information wars motivated just by the principle “we are right, therefore we will win” ended in fiasc because they lacked professionals, clear understanding, flexibility and means to wage such wars. Getting involved in a war relying on a faith in the rightness of one’s cause is a fairly common phenomenon, and if you are in such a situation, I advise you to think twice. If the truth is on your side, but you lack the resources, do not forget that your opponents, who have the resources and experience, can create an “alternative truth”.

Staff and resources are two very important elements. Sometimes one is available, but the other one is missing. In particular, state organizations often suffer in terms of staff. Typically, talented and experienced specialists either do not seek employment in governmental institutions or leave after reaching a certain level there. Brain drain and weak motivation for attracting new staff are perhaps the main reasons why the government or individual governmental organizations are forced to outsource some projects in this field.

Fourthly, timely detection. Timely detection of the elements of “psychological operations”, “deliberate manipulations”, and “attempts to inject information infection” is almost half the battle for successful defence (of course, if resources are available). Often individuals, governments, and organizations that became targets of well-thought-out psychological / information operations, and organizations have a small, almost illusory chance to identify at the early stages of an organization's operation against them. One of the German philosophers once said a brilliant phrase: “Randomness is an unknown pattern”. When there is a sign, post or video on social networks, an article on an unknown site, or victim/victimsa stupid at first glance report on a small TV channel, the “victim / victims” may consider it to be nonsense, a coincidence and not pay much attention. But this “mere coincidence” could be a harbinger of something big. When the KGB started operation Infection, many specialists in the west did not notice the beginning of this operation, and later did not pay due attention, but as a result, there was a large number of people and activists, who trusted in the truthfulness of this information and started to spread Soviet propaganda clichés themselves.

Certainly, there are plenty of other nuances that can vary depending on the situation, but obviously, it is not possible to cover everything in one essay.

In general, the development and proliferation of the Internet and subsequently of social networks create some opportunities for communication and making new connections, and provide others the tools of influence and manipulation.

Countries handle this phenomenon in different ways; more advanced ones use the Internet and social networks to spread their own propaganda (do not think that only authoritarian regimes do it) and at the same time counteract the propaganda of other countries, while other governments, taking into account their scarce resources, try only to resist the of propaganda of their political opponents, ignoring, and sometimes not even comprehending information operations conducted by other countries in their information space. Of course, there are also those who resort to radical methods, such as blocking Internet resources and social networks that are undesirable for them At first glance, this radical method appears to be effective, but for experienced professionals, it is a clear signal that the government that chose the method of blocking actually admits its helplessness in this issue and that it cannot manipulate the information flow and counteract it. With consideration of the availability of numerous ways of circumventing the blocks, the government, which was not able to build its own information warfare system, could, in the long run, fall victim to its adversaries/competitors, who are more patient and advanced in informational affairs.

In summary of the above, I want to note that the world has entered a new era of information warfare, and as time goes on, the methods of information warfare will become more sophisticated, and its instruments more accessible. There will be (and already are) those who jump on the bandwagon, and, of course, there will be those who will have to chase it…