Sunday, January 7, 2024

2023: THE REVENGE OF HISTORY

SOURCE :
 (   ) 2023: THE REVENGE OF HISTORY:   https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/2023-the-revenge-of-history/




           2023: THE REVENGE OF HISTORY

  • DECEMBER 26, 2023
  • HELEN THOMPSON
  • THEMES: GEOPOLITICS 




                                                       
  • Events in Europe and the Middle East in 2023 shattered the idea that history had reached a stable plateau. The world is a more dangerous place at the year’s end than it was at the start.





Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Fumio Kishida at the Hiroshima memorial, 21 May 2023. Credit: G7 Pool / Alamy Stock Photo


This was a year – 2023 – that found new ways to shatter the End of History hope that the nightmarish spectres of the 20th century had been buried in the 1990s under the promise of peaceful change to political borders, and global material advancement across them. What began with the horrors of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine – for land catastrophically fought over by Hitler and Stalin – ended with the return of Jerusalem to centre stage as a place for people to take sides in a highly dangerous moral reckoning about the meaning of world history.

For Ukraine, even when bursts of optimism have punctured the gloom it has been wrenched from misery. After visiting the Hiroshima Memorial Park on a trip to Japan for the G7 summit in May, Volodymyr Zelensky compared the pictures on display to the fate of the town of Bakhmut, which the Russian army had, in capturing, destroyed. Despite the hopes that Kyiv could repeat this summer the successful counter-offensives that last year saw Ukrainian troops retake the city of Kherson and significant territory in the Kharkiv Oblast, Russia’s manpower advantages are now exercising their pull. For all of Ukraine’s resilience, its self-defence must rely on poor Russian military performance in relation to its resources. That is why the enormous toll of the lengthy Russian effort for such a small gain in Bakhmut had paradoxically offered brief hope. In the last weeks of the battle, Yevgeny Prigozhin repeatedly raged about insufficient ammunition and massive casualties who were not replaced. There was, he pronounced, ‘nothing left to grind the meat with’ in Bakhmut. The month after Russia seemed to have established control allowing the regular army to replace the Wagner soldiers, Prigozhin marched his loyalists towards Moscow. But while Putin seemed for a few days in late June to be at risk of being overwhelmed by the very men to whom he had entrusted the war to avoid large-scale conscription, the moment also quickly passed.

In moving to a new defensive stance across the existing line that would appear to foreclose a big strategic loss for Russia, Ukraine is now badly exposed to Western indifference. Even providing the military and economic support on which Ukraine depends simply to protect the territory it retains is contested in European and North American domestic politics. Last year, Ukraine largely floated above democratic conflicts, as if asking probabilistic questions about its future and the sacrifices required to support its independence was a taboo that could not be broken without succumbing to the cold realism over Ukraine’s prospects on which Putin had mistakenly gambled in launching the invasion. By the early autumn of this year, Ukraine was mired in the trade-offs of Western politics, before, on 7 October, attention lurched southwards toward Jerusalem and stayed there.


For Israel, Hamas’ pogrom that day brought a reckoning with a prior complacency supposing that transnational economic exchange can eventually ride roughshod over the most bitter territorial conflict. The big prize of the bid to normalise relations with the Gulf Arab kingdoms was expanding Jewish-Arab economic interdependence beyond that already founded over the last decade by Israel’s emergence as a significant regional gas exporter. In this spirit, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government launched a ‘Tracks for Regional Peace’ programme in 2017, the centrepiece of which was a railway running from Haifa to Dubai. Since its construction requires a formal peace between Israel and all the Arab states through whose territory the track would be laid, it became pivotal to the Abraham Accords and to what Israel hoped to gain from the US-Saudi talks on normalisation prior to 7 October. With the Memorandum of Understanding signed in September 2023 to establish an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, the Netanyahu government appeared to believe that it had within its grasp a future where Israel would be protected by economic interdependencies flowing from the rapidly growing south-Asian markets through the oil-rich Persian Gulf to Europe via Israel’s Mediterranean coast.

Of course, whatever the economic reward, any land transport route established to bypass the Red Sea and the Suez Canal inevitably had a geopolitical motive. Here, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and India have a common interest in containing the threat to freedom of navigation through the Red Sea posed by the Iranian-backed Houthis since the outbreak of the civil war in Yemen in 2014. But that very motivation has unravelled Netanyahu’s bid for an economically-driven peace. An anti-Iranian move could not be made without regard to the Palestinians when the Palestinians in Gaza are led by an Iranian-backed group. Now, the Houthis have closed the Bab al-Mandeb – the entrance to the Red Sea from the Gulf of Aden – to all shipping bearing the flag of a state they deem hostile to the Palestinian cause, starting with Israel, hugely complicating much existing regional trade.

Rather than successfully detach the Palestinians from the conditions for peace in the Middle East, Netanyahu only intensified Israel’s predicament. His ‘peace’ project rested on a division of labour in stopping major Palestinian violence, whereby Hamas – with Israel facilitating the transit of Qatari money – ruled in Gaza, technology in the form of the Iron Dome and the Gaza Barrier protected Israel from rocket attacks, and the IDF prevented an uprising in the occupied West Bank. Instead under this folly, on 7 October, Israel found its southern border was less secure than ever.

Behind Netanyahu’s spectacular misjudgement lay two ahistorical conceits. The first assumed that the cause of Palestinian nationhood was politically defunct when the singular history of Palestinian nationhood is its resilience. As the likely fate of the 100,000 Armenians expelled this year from the Azerbaijani region of Nagorny-Karabakh will testify, those dispossessed by conflicts over territory are generally forgotten. During the long middle of the twentieth century, the Arabs of British-ruled Palestine were one of many peoples forcibly displaced from their ancestral lands. But alone among all the millions of people across Eurasia who suffered this fate, the Palestinians have never accepted defeat in claiming back the land that they lost, even during periods when their fate has seemed hopeless. Indeed, since the 1960s they have constructed such a potent idea of Palestinian nationhood that it is strengthened externally at the very times the Palestinians suffer most from their political weakness. It is, this year has emphatically demonstrated, far too late for the Palestinian claim to Israel’s territory in the name of the Palestinian nation to disappear into the history of those other peoples who were in the same time period forced to detach their national or religious identity from their homelands. This does not mean that the Palestinians will one day secure what they want, but rather that Israel cannot make remotely prudent choices as if Palestinian nationhood has been defeated by the long-term absence of a Palestinian state.

Netanyahu’s second fatal mistake came from the assumption that Hamas could be treated as something other than a millenarian sect for whom genocidal violence against the Jews is redemptive and the suffering of Palestinians a tool to realise an Islamic universal history. Hamas’ territorial ambition of overthrowing the Israeli state is inseparable from a religious conviction, evident in parts of all three of the world’s Abrahamic faiths, that divine providence makes Jerusalem the place where this earthly world will end. This apocalyptic obsession was made manifest in Hamas naming its terror on 7 October after the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem’s Temple Mount. It also grounds the alliance between Hamas and the present Iranian leadership beyond geopolitical convenience. It was the new revolutionary regime in Tehran that proclaimed in 1979 that a Quds (Jerusalem) Day would be held on the last Friday of Ramadan to oppose Zionism. The religious fervour that sees Iranian leaders regularly call on Quds Day for the ‘Death of Israel’ also marked the extra-territorial Quds force created by General Qassem Soleimani to support Iranian proxies from Yemen to Lebanon to Gaza. Of course, there may be reasons to doubt whether Iranian politicians mean what they say about Jerusalem and the end of Israel: after all Iran did covert oil business with Israel through the first years of the revolution while instigating Quds Day and Israel’s nuclear arsenal deters any direct Iranian attack. Yet this rhetoric, allied as it is to Iran’s attempted geopolitical encirclement of Israel from Gaza to southern Lebanon to Syria to the Iranian-backed groups in the West Bank, keeps alive Jerusalem’s bloody history over three millennia where every once religious victor in time has lost the city and can only encourage Hamas’ faith that eventually it will prevail.

While seemingly shattered, each illusion remains alive. Netanyahu still has no vision of the future that can accommodate any political manifestation of Palestinian nationhood and his failure here only reinforces the unwillingness of many outside Israel to recognise Hamas’ purposes and their relation to Iran for what they are. But these last months of 2023 have also made clear that this ongoing blindness goes far deeper than anything that can be explained by what the Israeli government has done by killing thousands of civilians in Gaza or what Netanyahu misjudged prior to 7 October. This is especially true in those Western countries whose democratic political discourse rests on historical amnesia about the violence in which most states originate. Here, an ideal of political life has been separated from all past historical experience, including the curse of centuries of antisemitism. The evident impulse to sacralise the terrible suffering of Palestinian civilians and detach it from all the other moral disasters inherent to the conflict places, yet again, the world’s collective burden of historical evils on the Jewish people. Since this urge has most clearly arisen in the very state that must act as Israel’s primary external guarantor and where a bloc of other voters are in thrall to Christian prophecies about the end times occurring in Jerusalem, this year has ended on a terrifying note.

Seen this way, 2023 was the year when the horror inflicted by Hamas in the name of Jerusalem on Israel to invite unbearable suffering back on the Palestinians in Gaza most viciously mocked the End of History narrative. Only Germany could ever be deemed an End of History state, reunified as it was with Berlin as its capital entirely by peaceful consent, and willing, after Helmut Kohl’s initial temptation to reopen old territorial grievances, to accept the Oder Neisse line, leaving the 12 million Germans expelled from the lands over which Hitler and Stalin fought to historical memory. To generalise from this moment even about Europe was strange, especially when the Soviet Union’s dissolution reworked state borders overnight in line with a federal polity worked out by Lenin in the early 1920s to advance a now defeated alternative historical vision. But in the Middle East, any idea that events in Germany in 1990 marked an end to territorial conflict was quite delusional. During the first years of the post-war world, Jerusalem, just like Berlin, was severed across an East-West axis by an international border. By the end of the 1990s, the status of a still divided Jerusalem was the biggest single obstacle to Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation reaching a peace settlement on the basis of the Oslo Accords. Indeed, for Jerusalem, the very idea that there was ever an End of History – in the liberal sense – seemed absurd, when for many people it remained the place where the meaning of religious history would be played out.

The millenarian turbulence refired in late 2023 need not mean that the world is heading towards more wars over territory. The Russian mobilisation problems that drove Prigozhin’s rage over Bakhmut raise a profound question of just what people are willing to sacrifice for issues around land and identity. If Putin ever had any confidence that millions of Russian men were willing to kill and die to wreck Ukraine, he would not have put so much of the Russian war effort in the hands of men who could threaten the regime. Meanwhile, many Iranians loath the regime’s territorial expansionism, especially that directed against Israel, as reflected in the opposition slogan ‘Neither Gaza, Nor Lebanon; My Life for Iran’. Even in wars of self-defence, as Ukraine has discovered, human fighting power is hard to sustain. Tellingly, those in Israel who were most worried before 7 October that Netanyahu was courting disaster in relying on technology for military protection, like the former IDF general Yitzhak Brick, charged that the state’s weakness was that its army was too weak to deter the kind of terror Hamas launched.

But however hard land wars are for twenty-first century states, the world is undeniably a more dangerous place at this year’s end than it was at the start. People across the globe have once again been drawn towards the conflict in the long contested, and still divided, city of Jerusalem. They are bringing to what they choose to see and ignore in Israeli and Palestinian suffering a scarcely understood desire for religious struggle, not least in those societies once deceived by the End of History illusion.

AUTHOR

Helen Thompson



Thursday, January 4, 2024

SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT UPDATE SPECIAL EDITION: ETHIOPIA-SOMALILAND PORT DEAL ALTERS HORN OF AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM AND RED SEA GEOPOLITICS

 SOURCE : 

(   ) SALAFI-JIHADI MOVEMENT UPDATE SPECIAL EDITION: ETHIOPIA-SOMALILAND PORT DEAL ALTERS HORN OF AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM AND RED SEA GEOPOLITICShttps://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-alters-horn

    SUMMARY OF ETHIOPAIN GEOPOLTICS ON 

                          HORN OF AFRICA

Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto independent Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, to lease a naval port that will give it Red Sea access in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland. The port deal has severely strained Somali-Ethiopian relations and increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment in southern Somalia, which will likely weaken regional counterterrorism cooperation and energize al Shabaab. Ethiopia’s African Red Sea neighbors in Djibouti, Egypt, and Eritrea will likely view an Ethiopian base as a threat, while the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) strong ties with the Ethiopian government will strengthen the Emiratis’ position in its regional rivalry with other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.


Salafi-Jihadi Movement Update

 Special Edition: Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal Alters Horn of Africa Counterterrorism and Red Sea Geopolitics

Author: Liam Karr

Data Cutoff: January 4, 2024, at 10 a.m.

Key Takeaway: 

Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto independent Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, to lease a naval port that will give it Red Sea access in exchange for formally recognizing Somaliland. The port deal has severely strained Somali-Ethiopian relations and increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment in southern Somalia, which will likely weaken regional counter-terrorism cooperation and energize al Shabaab. Ethiopia’s African Red Sea neighbors in Djibouti, Egypt, and Eritrea will likely view an Ethiopian base as a threat, while the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) strong ties with the Ethiopian government will strengthen the Emiratis’ position in its regional rivalry with other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with the de facto independent Somaliland Republic, a breakaway region of Somalia, on January 1, which will give Ethiopia access to the Red Sea in exchange for recognizing Somaliland independence. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed described Red Sea access in July and October 2023 as an existential issue and “natural right” that Ethiopia would fight for if it could not secure it through peaceful means.[1] The memorandum of understanding grants Ethiopia access to a leased military base near the port city of Berbera along Somaliland’s coast on the Gulf of Aden.[2] The port will give Ethiopia access to Red Sea shipping lanes via the Bab al Mandeb strait between Djibouti and Yemen that connects the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Agreement Gives Ethiopia Red Sea Access

 Source: Liam Karr.

Economic issues are a significant driver of Abiy’s move to secure the deal. The Ethiopian economy has struggled since the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and the two-year civil war that ended in 2022 and related sanctions.[3] This has led Ethiopia to make multiple debt relief requests since 2021 and default on bond payments in December 2023.[4] Ethiopia also pays at least $1 billion in port fees annually to Djibouti.[5] Abiy asked Djibouti to reduce the fees in 2022.[6] Djibouti declined, however, because its economy relies on rents and services secured from Ethiopian shipping fees. Djibouti’s port handles 95 percent of inbound and outbound trade from Ethiopia.[7] The logistics surrounding this trade drive Djibouti’s services sector, which accounts for almost 76 percent of Djibouti’s gross domestic product.[8]

The Somaliland president and Ethiopian foreign minister said that Ethiopia would formally recognize Somaliland and give Somaliland a proportional stake in Ethiopian Airlines in return for the base.[9] However, the Ethiopian government’s official readout of the deal was less committal and said that Ethiopia would “make an in-depth assessment towards taking a position regarding the efforts of Somaliland to gain recognition.”[10] Taiwan is the only country that has formally recognized Somaliland’s independence from Somalia since Somaliland declared autonomy in 1991, although Somaliland has significant diplomatic and economic relations with numerous countries.[11]

On January 2, the Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the port deal as “null and void” as it has no legal basis and violates Somali sovereignty and international law, and it threatened to retaliate if Ethiopia followed through on the deal.[12] In an address to parliament on January 2, the Somali president reiterated the stance that Somaliland is a member state of the Somali Federal Republic and that only the federal government has the authority to lease land to foreign powers.[13] The SFG also warned that it reserved the right to respond in any means and legal process necessary.[14] Shortly after Ethiopia and Somaliland announced the deal, Somalia recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia for consultations.[15] Somalia temporarily cut ties with Kenya in 2020 after it announced plans to open a consulate in Somaliland, which sets a precedent for further diplomatic retaliation.[16]

The SFG is attempting to rally its allies to amplify diplomatic pressure on Ethiopia and Somaliland because it is too weak to disrupt the deal unilaterally.[17] The Somali president called on the UN Security Council, African Union (AU), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Arab League, and the East Africa trade block—Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—to “unequivocally condemn Ethiopia’s serious violations and force it to return to the confines of international laws” in remarks on January 2.[18] The Arab League, Egyptian foreign ministry spokesperson, and OIC released separate statements condemning the deal as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty on January 3 and 4.[19] The African Union (AU), EU, Turkey, and US made separate statements between January 2 and 4 urging de-escalation and respect for Somalia’s sovereignty, indicating support for the SFG without explicitly rejecting the deal.[20] IGAD took a more neutral stance by only calling for a peaceful resolution that “upholds shared values.”[21] Somalia condemned the IGAD response for falling short of condemning Ethiopia and called on the IGAD executive secretary—an Ethiopian—to withdraw the statement.[22]

Figure 2. Notable Statements Supporting the SFG’s Stance Against the January 1, 2024, Ethiopia-Somaliland Port Deal

 Source: Liam Karr; https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20230103/chairperson-commission-calls-mu...

The rupture of Somali-Ethiopian relations would weaken regional counterterrorism cooperation. Somalia cutting diplomatic ties with Ethiopia would almost certainly affect the continued legal presence of Ethiopian soldiers in Somalia, which are fighting the al Qaeda affiliate al Shabaab.[23] Ethiopia currently has at least 4,000 troops deployed in Somalia as part of the AU Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and another 1,000 soldiers deployed as part of bilateral agreements with Somalia.[24] Ethiopian forces comprise between a quarter and a third of the 14,000-strong ATMIS force and are responsible for sectors in central and southwestern Somalia that border Ethiopia.[25] ATMIS is undergoing a multiphase drawdown to withdraw entirely by the end of 2024, but it remains crucial to bolstering the SFG’s capacity as Somali forces increase their size and clear al Shabaab from contested areas of the country in preparation for the SFG assuming responsibility for its own security.[26]

An Ethiopian withdrawal would also significantly complicate the SFG’s plans to clear al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia by the end of 2024, given it has courted Ethiopian support for the offensive.[27] At least 1,000 non-ATMIS Ethiopian troops deployed to Somalia in mid-2023 at the SFG’s behest to supplement a planned offensive against al Shabaab’s primary leadership and governance havens in southern Somalia.[28] Several political and operational challenges have so far prevented any such offensive, but the Somali president insisted in December that operations would begin soon and be completed before the ATMIS withdrawal at the end of 2024.[29]

Al Shabaab will likely increase its attacks against Ethiopian forces in the Horn of Africa to capitalize on anti-Ethiopian sentiment among Somalis to boost funding and recruitment. The Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal prompted an anti-Ethiopian backlash in southern Somalia.[30Al Shabaab has historically capitalized on anti-Ethiopian sentiment to boost support among the Somali population across the Horn of Africa.[31] The Somali president and head of the Arab League separately warned that Ethiopia’s move would fuel a dangerous rise in extremism.[32]

Al Shabaab’s spokesperson spoke out against the agreement as “invalid” on January 2 and threatened to retaliate.[33] Al Shabaab regularly attacks AU forces in Somalia and carried out two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attacks against Ethiopian positions in southwestern Somalia in June 2023.[34] Al Shabaab also has the capability to carry out attacks inside Ethiopia. Al Shabaab last launched a major incursion into Ethiopia in the summer of 2022, and nearly 500 surviving militants established a rear base in the Bale Mountains along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[35]

  • Al Shabaab brands Ethiopia as Somali Muslims’ archenemy and has historically advanced a pan-Somali narrative rooted in anti-Ethiopian sentiment to boost recruiting and funding support among the Somali population spread across the Horn of Africa.[36] This rhetoric frames Ethiopia as a foreign, Christian occupier in ethnically Somali lands that seeks to “enslave Somalia, revive an Ethiopian empire, and control Somalia’s seaports.”[37] This narrative played a significant part in al Shabaab’s initial rise after the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 that led to al Shabaab nearly toppling the internationally recognized government before the AU intervention in 2011.[38] The al Shabaab spokesperson’s statement on January 2 reiterated this framing and called on Somalis to “take up arms to wage jihad” against Ethiopia.[39] The spokesperson also compared Ethiopia to Israel and warned that Ethiopia will continue to encroach on Somalia the same way Israel has “occupied the land of Palestine.”[40]

  • Al Shabaab launched a massive offensive involving at least 2,000 fighters into Ethiopia in July 2022.[41] It was the group’s first attack along the Ethiopian border since at least 2016.[42] Ethiopian forces reestablished control of the Ethiopian border after two weeks, but local and diplomatic sources said the attack’s primary aim was to enable several hundred militants to infiltrate Ethiopia and set up a base in the Bale Mountains near Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[43] Initial estimates in September 2022 said that at least 100 fighters reached the mountains, but more recent sources in September 2023 say that roughly 500 fighters are in the area.[44] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and carried out two SVBIED attacks against Ethiopian positions in southwestern Somalia in June 2023 for the first time since its 2022 offensive.[45]

  • Al Shabaab has not claimed any attacks in Ethiopia since mid-2022 to maintain the enclave’s operational security.[46] It is unclear if al Shabaab views the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal as either a significant enough threat to its legitimacy as a defender of Somali sovereignty or a significant enough opportunity to gain support that it would change this calculus.

Ethiopia’s African Red Sea neighbors in Djibouti, Egypt, and Eritrea will likely view an Ethiopian base as a threat. Previous reports discussing partial Ethiopian ownership of the Emirati port in Berbera in 2016 estimated that Berbera would capture 30 percent of Ethiopia’s cargo volume from Djibouti, which would threaten Djibouti’s fragile economy.[47]

Egypt has been at odds with Ethiopia over the latter’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project since Ethiopia began its construction on the Nile River in 2011.[48] Egypt and Sudan have argued that Ethiopia’s GERD should not be filled without a legally binding agreement that resolves concerns about the dam’s downstream effects on Egypt and Sudan.[49] Egypt has grown closer to the current SFG administration and offered more military and counterterrorism assistance to court Somali support on GERD discussions in international institutions, where the SFG has so far remained neutral.[50] Egypt has also courted Somali support for its position on the GERD, which incentivizes it to back Somalia’s rejection of the deal.[51]

Eritrea will view an Ethiopian port on the Gulf of Aden as a threat given the high tensions between the two countries in the aftermath of the Tigray war. Eritrea allied with Abiy’s government in 2020 to destroy the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, which it views as a threat to its borders and internal cohesion.[52] It views the 2022 peace deal that ended the Tigray war as dangerous to its national security by allowing the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front and its fighters to survive and increasing alignment between Tigray and Addis Ababa.[53] This has led Eritrea to keep forces in northern Ethiopia despite Ethiopian requests to withdraw, hampering the peace process.[54]

Many analysts view that Abiy’s statements about Ethiopia’s natural rights” to the Red Sea and threat to use force were aimed at Eritrea, given their shared border and Ethiopia’s historical control of the port city of Assab until Eritrea gained independence in 1993.[55] Diplomats and humanitarian workers said that Ethiopia and Eritrea mobilized troops near their shared border after Abiy’s October statements.[56] An Ethiopian port will only amplify Eritrea’s longer-term concerns of Ethiopian aggression, even if it allays short-term fears of an imminent invasion.

An Ethiopian port will likely strengthen the UAE’s position in its regional rivalry with other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, due to its strong ties with the Ethiopian government. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have increasingly competed for economic dominance over the Horn of Africa and vital waterways off its coast since 2021.[57] The Ethiopia-Somaliland deal creates another potential Emirati client port given that the UAE is a prominent backer of Abiy’s Ethiopian government and previously tried to help Ethiopia secure a stake in the Emirati-owned port in Berbera in 2019.[58] The Saudis have been wary of the Abiy government due to its UAE backing and created a Council of Arab and African littoral states on the Red Sea in 2020 that notably excluded both Ethiopia and the UAE.[59]

  • The UAE and Saudi Arabia led a coalition that unsuccessfully attempted to economically and politically isolate Qatar in 2017 for its alleged support for terrorism and political Islam movements that Emirati and Saudi leaders viewed as a threat to their power and stability.[60] Qatar responded by increasing ties with other countries, including states in the Horn of Africa, to offset the economic and political pressure.[61] The UAE and Saudi Arabia formally abandoned their efforts in 2021 and have been slowly mending relations since, which has created space for a growing Emirati-Saudi rivalry as both countries compete to establish themselves as global logistics and trade nodes via Red Sea ports along vital global shipping lanes.[62] This has led both countries to pursue divergent approaches on issues such as the Sudanese and Yemeni civil wars.[63]

  • The UAE has been a steadfast supporter of Abiy since he took power in 2018. The UAE helped broker the 2018 peace agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea that won Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize and provided extensive military support throughout the Tigray war by establishing an air bridge.[64] The UAE also brokered a deal for partial Ethiopian ownership of its Berbera port in 2019, but the deal fell through in 2022 after Ethiopia failed to make necessary payments.[65]

 


References:

[1] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port

[2] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/landlocked-ethiopia-signs-pact-use-...

[3] https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/01/ethiopia-s-fragile-stability-re...

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-becomes-africas-latest-sov...

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port... https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa

[6] https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-africa-and-the-horn/2022/03/3...

[7] https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era

[8] https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era

[9] https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-secures-access-to-sea-after-deal-with...

[10] https://x.com/FdreService/status/1742511010315919641?s=20

[11] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/landlocked-ethiopia-signs-pact-use-...

[12] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-rejects-ethiopia-sea-access-deal-with-...

[13] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-rejects-ethiopia-sea-access-deal-with-...

[14] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-rejects-ethiopia-sea-access-deal-with-...

[15] https://thesomalidigest dot com/somaliland-ethiopia-deal-somalia-recalls-ambassador

[16] https://thesomalidigest dot com/somaliland-ethiopia-deal-somalia-recalls-ambassador

[17] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1742575200632209555?s=20

[18] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-rejects-ethiopia-sea-access-deal-with-...

[19] http://www.leagueofarabstates dot net/ar/news/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?RID=4418; https://x.com/OIC_OCI/status/1742837130705944769?s=20

[20] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-t...

[21] https://igad.int/statement-of-the-igad-executive-secretary-on-the-recent...

[22] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1742533605476180394?s=20

[23] https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/ethiopia-sends-non-atmis-troops-to-somalia-in-fight-against-al-shabaab

[24] https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/ethiopia-sends-non-atmis-troops-to-somalia-in-fight-against-al-shabaab

[25] https://atmis-au.org/military-component

[26] https://www.voanews.com/a/au-mission-in-somalia-resumes-drawdown-after-3...

[27] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setba... https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/ethiopia-sends-non-atmis-troops-to-somalia-in-fight-against-al-shabaab

[28] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setba...

[29] https://garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/somalia-president-vows-to-step-up-fight-against-terrorism-in-2024

[30] https://en.goobjoog dot com/thousands-throng-mogadishu-streets-to-protest-ethiopia-somaliland-deal; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984?s=20

[31] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304987134_Al_Shabaab_in_Somalia...

[32] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-rejects-ethiopia-sea-access-deal-with-... http://www.leagueofarabstates dot net/ar/news/Pages/NewsDetails.aspx?RID=4418

[33] SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Spokesman Threatens to Make ‘Nightmare’ of Alleged Ethiopian Dream of Foothold in Red Sea,” January 3, 2024, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[34] https://shabellemedia dot com/wararkii-ugu-dambeeyay-qaraxyo-iyo-weerar-toos-ah-oo-ka-dhacay-degmada-baardheere; https://www.caasimada dot net/dowladda-ethiopia-oo-war-ka-soo-saartay-weerarkii-doolow

[35] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setba...

[36] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304987134_Al_Shabaab_in_Somalia...

[37] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Al-Shabaab-IMEP...

[38] https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs5746/files/Al-Shabaab-IMEP...

[39] SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Spokesman Threatens to Make ‘Nightmare’ of Alleged Ethiopian Dream of Foothold in Red Sea.”

[40] SITE Intelligence Group, “Shabaab Spokesman Threatens to Make ‘Nightmare’ of Alleged Ethiopian Dream of Foothold in Red Sea.”

[41] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2022/09/14/al-shabaab-...

[42] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaa...

[43] https://www.voanews.com/a/why-did-al-shabab-attack-inside-ethiopia/66747...

[44] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/le-monde-africa/article/2022/09/14/al-shabaab-...

[45] https://shabellemedia dot com/wararkii-ugu-dambeeyay-qaraxyo-iyo-weerar-toos-ah-oo-ka-dhacay-degmada-baardheere; https://www.caasimada dot net/dowladda-ethiopia-oo-war-ka-soo-saartay-weerarkii-doolow

[46] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setba...

[47] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-04/ethiopia-somaliland-s...

[48] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiop...

[49] https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-controversy-over-the-grand-ethiop...

[50] https://www.theafricareport.com/229733/egypt-looks-to-somalias-mohamud-f...

[51] https://www.theafricareport.com/229733/egypt-looks-to-somalias-mohamud-f...

[52] https://horninstitute.org/the-tigray-conflict-and-the-role-of-eritrea; ...

[53] https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/12/taking-ethiopia-eritrea-tensio...

[54] https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/11/07/ethiopia-eritrea-war-tplf

[55] https://lansinginstitute.org/2023/11/17/estimations-will-ethiopia-and-er...

[56] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-pm-abiy-seeks-quell-neighb...

[57] https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/is-a-saudi-emirati-rift-on-the-horizon

[58] https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366

[59] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.rfi.fr/en/a...

[60] https://www.iemed.org/publication/gulf-regional-crisis-qatar-saudi-arabi...

[61] https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-pe...

[62] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-55538792; https://www.aljaze...

[63] https://carnegie-mec.org/2023/10/30/future-of-gulf-cooperation-council-a...

[64] https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1KT1RS; https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2021/11/25/uae-air-bridge-provides-military-support-to-ethiopia-govt; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turk... https://www.newarab dot com/analysis/why-rival-powers-are-backing-ethiopias-government

[65] https://www.theeastafrican dot co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/ethiopia-stake-in-port-of-berbera-3845366

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