NUKES : INDIA TRAPPED IN THE NUCLEAR WEB (r)

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/trapped-in-the-nuclear-web/490819.html








                               PART  one  OF  two  

NUKES : INDIA TRAPPED IN THE NUCLEAR WEB  

      Monster cloud: India got down to its N-programme
                  after a veiled threat from Pakistan.

                           The challenges India faces

                                   G Parthasarathy

 Nov 2, 2017

LED by the US and Soviet Union, the five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council tried to ensure, some five decades ago, that they alone had the divine right to possess nuclear weapons in perpetuity, with the signing of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Their nuclear arsenals steadily increased and pleas for nuclear disarmament arrogantly disregarded. The world nuclear scenario today is now different to what the five envisaged. Nuclear stockpiles have steadily grown. In the past few decades, Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea have joined the “nuclear club”. Others like Japan and Iran are capable of doing so when needed. There are an estimated 14,900 nuclear warheads in nine countries, with 93 per cent of these in the possession of the US and Russia.

While China tested and acquired nuclear weapons in the 1960s, the next country to acquire nuclear weapons was Pakistan, which commenced its quest for nuclear weapons after the 1971 Bangladesh conflict. India crossed the nuclear threshold only after it received a veiled nuclear threat from Pakistan during tensions over military exercises named “Operation Brasstacks” in January 1987. Instructions were issued in 1988 to nuclear scientist PK Iyengar and scientific adviser VS Arunachalam to assemble a nuclear arsenal. India’s distinguished strategic thinker, K Subrahmanyam, provided the strategic rationale for the nuclear weapons programme. India decisively demonstrated its nuclear weapons capabilities 10 years later, with the Pokhran tests. Pakistan predictably followed suit, barely a fortnight later. 

 India is today confronted with a situation where China has not only provided Pakistan with designs and equipment for manufacturing nuclear weapons, but has also given Pakistan the knowhow and materials for manufacturing missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons to every part of India, including the Andaman islands. While these facts are known to those involved inside and outside the government in monitoring nuclear developments, it is astonishing that public knowledge on this crucial issue is limited. Sadly, it has never been debated seriously in Parliament. Surely, the public and Parliament need to know more on these issues, to promote awareness of the challenges the nation faces from two hostile neighbours working together dangerously. American nuclear analyst Gary Milhollin has perceptively noted: “If you subtract China’s help from Pakistan’s nuclear programme, there is no Pakistani nuclear weapons programme.”

While Zulfikar Ali Bhutto moved to establish a nuclear weapons capability within weeks of the Bangladesh conflict, his prison memoirs suggest that he was guaranteed of Chinese assistance after his meeting with Chairman Mao in 1976. China, with antiquated uranium enrichment facilities, benefited from designs stolen by AQ Khan from European (URENCO) enrichment facilities. By the early 1980s, China was providing Pakistan designs for nuclear weapons. China currently has approximately 280 nuclear warheads for delivery by 150 land-based and 48 sea-based missiles and fighter aircraft. While India is estimated to possess 110-120 nuclear warheads. Pakistan has 130-140 nuclear warheads, designed for delivery by ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft. Experts estimate that Pakistan’s stockpile could potentially grow to 220-250 warheads by 2025, making it the world’s fifth-largest nuclear weapons state. Pakistan’s missiles, with ranges up to 2,750 km, are all of Chinese design and produced at the National Defence Complex facilities in the Kala Chitta Dhar mountain range to the west of Islamabad. The development, production and test launching of missiles is done at locations south of Attock, using road mobile Chinese-designed missile launchers, produced in Fatehjang.

According to former US Air Force Secretary Thomas Reed, himself a designer of nuclear weapons at America’s Los Alamos Laboratories: “The Chinese did a massive training of Pakistani (nuclear) scientists, brought them to China for lectures, even gave the design of the CHIC-4 device, which was a weapon that was easy to build as a model for export. There is evidence that AQ Khan used Chinese designs for his nuclear designs. Notes from those lectures later turned up in Libya. And the Chinese did similar things for the Saudis, North Koreans and Algerians.” The great champions of nuclear non-proliferation in the US, who lectured India for decades on non-proliferation, covered up and did nothing to curb these Chinese activities. Pakistan is also known to have received liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles from North Korea in exchange for information on uranium enrichment, in a deal evidently undertaken with Chinese blessings.

Though Pakistan has not enunciated a formal nuclear doctrine, its then head of strategic planning division of its nuclear command authority, Lt-Gen Khalid Kidwai, had averred that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistani territory, or destroys a large part of its land and air forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of using nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically strangulate” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation. India has declared that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will use nuclear weapons only if its territory or armed forces face an attack anywhere, in which nuclear, chemical or biological weapons are used. Since India has no desire to conquer large parts of Pakistani territories or destroy its armed forces, there is no possibility of India provoking a nuclear conflict. But, given Kidwai’s utterances about a “full spectrum” deterrent, involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons, issued after he retired, New Delhi has to carefully review nuclear strategy imaginatively, bearing in mind that our “no first use” doctrine has served us well internationally.

It is obvious, especially after Xi Jinping’s recent enunciation of Chinese global ambitions at the Party Congress, that missile and nuclear proliferation by China to Pakistan will continue in its efforts to “contain” India. Pakistan has already tested a sea-based missile and China is set to strengthen Pakistan’s navy with substantial supply of submarines and frigates. China appears determined to use Pakistan as its stalking horse for its maritime ambitions to promote its OBOR projects in the Indian Ocean. The most crucial challenge we now face is how to deal with a jingoistic China, for which “containing” India has been a continuing strategic effort for over four decades now. Balancing Chinese power necessarily involves developing partnerships with others across the Indo-Pacific region. China’s policies are multi-faceted and Beijing will likely avoid open hostility, even as it continues to keep up pressures along its borders with India and uses proxies across India’s immediate neighbourhood to keep India tied up in South Asia. These issues will, hopefully, be reviewed and discussed in Parliament.

                    

                            PART  two  OF  two            

[ https://world-defense.com/threads/fas-pakistan-has-130-140-nuclear-warheads.4225/ ]




Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons                              Infrastructure
  Nuclear Weapons, Pakistan 
                           By 
              Hans M. Kristensen


Nov.16, 2016

 
Pakistan’s tactical NASR nuclear-capable                  mobile rocket launcher 
      now appears to be deployed.
                            By 
                Hans M. Kristensen

In our latest Nuclear Notebook on Pakistani nuclear forces, Robert Norris and I estimate that Pakistan has produced an estimated stockpile of 130-140 nuclear warheads for delivery by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and fighter-bombers.

Pakistan now identifies with what is described as a full-spectrum nuclear deterrent posture, which is though to include strategic missiles and fighter-bombers for so-called retaliatory strikes in response to nuclear attacks, and short-range missiles for sub-strategic use in response to conventional attacks.

Although there have been many rumors over the years, the location of the nuclear-capable launchers has largely evaded the public eye for much of Pakistan’s 19-year old declared nuclear weapons history. Most public analysis has focused on the nuclear industry (see here for a useful recent study). But over the past several years, commercial satellite pictures have gradually brought into light several facilities that might form part of Pakistan’s evolving nuclear weapons launcher posture.

This includes 10 facilities, including 5 missile garrisons (soon possibly 6) as well 2 (possibly 4) air bases with fighter-bombers.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons related infrastructure includes at least 10 major industrial facilities and about 10 bases for nuclear-capable forces. Click map to view full size.
The nuclear warheads that would arm the launchers are thought to be stored at other secure facilities that have not yet been identified. In a crisis, these warheads would first have to be brought to the bases and mated with the launchers before they could be used.

Security at these and other Pakistani defense facilities is a growing concern and many have been upgraded with additional security perimeters during the past 10 years in response to terrorist attacks.

There are still many unknowns and uncertainties about the possible nuclear role of these facilities. All of the launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means they can deliver both conventional and nuclear warheads. So even if a base has a nuclear role, most of the launchers might be assigned to the conventional mission. Further analysis in the future might disqualify some and identify others. But for now, this profile of potential road-mobile launcher garrisons and air bases are intended as a preliminary guide and accompany the recent FAS Nuclear Notebook on Pakistani nuclear forces. 

Nuclear-Capable Road-Mobile Missile Launcher Bases

The total number and location of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missile bases is not known. But analysis of commercial satellite photos has identified features that suggest that at least five bases might serve a role in Pakistan’s emerging nuclear posture. This includes army garrisons at Akro (Petaro), Gujranwala, Khuzdar, Pano Aqil, and Sargodha. A sixth base at Bahawalpur (29.2829, 71.7955) may be under construction. There is also a seventh base near Dera Ghazi Khan (29.9117, 70.4922), but the infrastructure is very different and not yet convincing.

An obvious difficulty in identifying nuclear missile bases is that the infrastructure is not yet publicly known, that commercial satellite photos do not have sufficient resolution to positively identify nuclear-capable launchers with certainty (especially smaller shorter-range types), that all launchers are dual-capable (not all bases with a certain launcher may have a nuclear role; and not all nuclear-capable launchers at a particular base may be assigned nuclear warheads), and that Pakistan (like other nuclear-armed states) most likely is engaged in considerable efforts to conceal and confuse identification of nuclear launchers.

With these caveats, here is a description with images of what we consider to be the five primary nuclear-capable bases and the primary TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) production facility in Pakistan:





Akro Garrison: 

This base is located (25.5483, 68.3343) approximately 18 km (11 miles) north of Hyderabad between Akro and Petaro in the southern part of the Sindh Province approximately 145 kms (90 miles) from the Indian border. The garrison covers an area of 6.9 square kms (2.7 square miles) and has been expanded significantly since 2004 (the base was first pointed out to me by Martin Bulla, a German amateur satellite imagery enthusiast). The Akro Garrison includes a unique underground facility located under what appears to be a missile TEL garage complex. The underground facility consists of two star-shaped sections located along a central corridor that connects to two buildings with covered access ramps. The six TEL garages appear to be designed for 12 launchers.

The Akro Garrison has a TEL area with unique underground facility. Click image to view full size.
It is not possible to identify the suspected launchers in the TEL complex from the available photos. But analysis of a vehicle training area in the northeast corner of the garrison shows what appears to be five-axel  TELs for the Babur cruise missile weapon system.

In a hypothetical crisis the launchers presumably would load their complement of missiles at the base and disperse outside to predetermined launch locations in the region. The range of the Babur is uncertain; NASIC reports it as 350 km (217 miles) while the Pakistan government claims a range of more than 500 kms (373 miles), sometimes as much as 700 kms (435 miles). The Akro unit would be able to defend all of the southeastern part of Pakistan, including Karachi.


Gujranwala Garrison: 
This sprawling base complex covers an area of approximately 30 square kms (11.5 square miles) and is located (32.2410, 74.0730) in the northeastern part of the Punjab Province approximately 60 kms (37 miles) from the Indian border. Since 2010, the base has added what appears to be a TEL launcher area in the western part of the complex. There is also what appears to be a technical area for servicing the launchers. The TEL area became operational in 2014 or 2015. The TEL area appears to be made up of two identical sections (each consisting of launcher garages, a weapons loading hall, and a weapons storage igloo), each similar in design to the TEL area at Pano Aqil. The security perimeter appears to have room for a third TEL section. (This and other facilities have also been spotted by 
https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven.)






The Gujranwala Garrison appears to be a base for the NASR tactical nuclear-capable launcher. Click image to view full size.

Several trucks have been seen on the satellite pictures that strongly resemble the NASR short-range missile launcher. It is impossible to identify the launchers with certainty due to the relatively poor quality of the pictures (the launchers could potentially also be multiple rocket launchers), but the resemblance is strong with a drivers cabin, a power and hydraulics unit, and a twin box launcher seen on NASR test launch photos published by the Pakistan military. The range of the NASR is equal to the base’s distance from the Indian border.



Khuzdar Garrison: 

Of the missile garrisons located so far, the Khuzdar Garrison some 220 kms (136 miles) west of Sukkur in south-east Balochistan Province is the one located (27.7222, 66.6241) the farthest from the Indian border (295 kms or 183 miles). The base is split in two sections: a northern section and a southern section (where the TELs are based).

Possible launchers have not been seen and identified in Khuzdar photos, but the TEL garages are longer than at all the other bases except the Sargodha Garrison. This could potentially be a base for Shaheen-2 medium-range missile launchers.

The Khuzdar Garrison might deploy Shaheen-2 launchers. Click image to view full size.
The TEL area includes what appears to be an underground facility similar to the one identified at the Akro Garrison. It consists of two buildings on covered access ramps that probably provide TEL access to an underground weapons storage and handling facility.

Khuzdar appears to also have a second underground facility approximately 600 meters (1,800 feet) east of the TEL area. This facility has roughly the same overall dimensions as the suspected underground facility between the access ramps inside the TEL area, but the second facility has no TEL facilities on top of it and does not appear to have clear access points. One potential possibility is that this facility may be intended for a second TEL area in the future.



Pano Aqil Garrison:

 The Pano Aqil Garrison is split up in several sections that cover a combined area of nearly 20 square kms (7.7 square miles). This includes the main garrison area, a TEL area (27.8328, 69.1575), a munitions depot, an airfield, and a shooting range. The base is located approximately 80 kms (50 miles) from the Indian border in the northern part of the Sindh Province.


The TEL area is located 1.8 kms (1.2 miles) northeast of the main garrison and includes five TEL garages (a sixth is under construction) and a service building. At the north end of the facility are located a weapons storage igloo and a weapons handling hall. The layout of the TEL area is similar to the Gujranwala Garrison (which appears to have twice the capacity). The five TEL garages can potentially hold 25 TELs although some of the spaces are probably used by support vehicles.

The Pano Aqil Garrison has a remote TEL area. Click to view full size.
Identification of TEL type is difficult due to the relatively poor quality of the satellite pictures, but it could potentially be NASR, Shaheen-1 or Ghaznavi short-range missile launchers.




Sargodha Garrison:

 The large munitions storage depot at Sargodha has long been rumored to include TEL garages. The facilities date back to the mid-1990s when Pakistan was first reported to have acquired M-11 missiles from China (DF-11 or CSS-7), which was used to produce what is now known as Pakistan’s Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 short-range ballistic missiles. But the garages (31.9722, 72.6838) at Sargodha are nearly twice the size that would be needed by short-range Ghaznavi and Shaheen-1 launchers and seem better sized for medium-range Ghauri or Shaheen-2 launchers. There appear to be 10 TEL garages plus two garages with different dimensions that might be used for maintenance.

Yet the Sargodha complex has less of the type of infrastructure seen at other potential TEL bases. Much of the infrastructure seen might be used by personnel that maintain the large weapons depot itself. Whatever the large garages are used for, they are currently being upgraded and additional infrastructure is being added.

The Sargodha Garrison has large garages and underground facilities. Click to view full size.
The Sargodha complex also includes several underground facilities, including a section with two large buildings that could potentially be missile handling halls. Additional tunnels are under construction.



National Development Complex:


 Several of the TEL types seen or suspected at the different missile garrisons are assembled at the National Development Complex (sometimes called National Defense Complex), or NDC. It consists of a string of facilities scattered across the Kala-Chitta Mountain Range west of Islamabad. But the heart of the complex is the TEL assembly section north of Fateh Jang (33.6292, 72.7106). NDC reportedly emerged in the mid-1990s to produce Gazhnavi and Shaheen-1 short-range ballistic missiles based on technology supplied by China.

Since then NDC has expanded considerably to include facilities west and east of the central TEL assembly area. The central area has expanded considerably since 2003, with the addition of a TEL truck assembly facility as well as three large high-bay TEL assembly halls for mounting missile compartments onto TEL trucks. For the past ten years, these facilities have been busy producing Shaheen-2 medium-range ballistic missile launchers and Babur ground-launched cruise missile launchers.

The National Development Complex assembles Shaheen and Babur missile launchers. Click image to view full size.

Satellite pictures give an example of the flow of production of different TEL types at NDC and also provide valuable reference points for comparing dimensions of TELs seen at individual missile garrisons. Several pictures from 2016, for example, show both 6-axel Shaheen-2 TELs and 5-axel Babur TELs, and possibly also 4-axel Shaheen-1 TELs, in the process of assembly or maintenance. The 8-axel Shaheen-3 TEL has not yet been seen as this weapon system is still very early in production and not yet operationally deployed.





                                Air Bases

Pakistan has a large number of air bases but only a small number is thought to be involved in the nuclear mission. This includes bases with Mirage and F-16 fighter-bombers. United States officials have stated that F-16s were sold to Pakistan on the conditions that they could not be uses to deliver nuclear weapons, but other sources have indicated that some of the planes were converted nonetheless. French-produced Mirage aircraft are widely assumed to be equipped to deliver the Ra’ad air-launched cruise missile.

Masroor Air Base: This base is located (24.8855, 66.9280) west of the city of Karachi and has long been suspected of serving a role in Pakistan’s airborne nuclear deterrent. The base is home to the 32nd Fighter Wing with Mirage fighter-bombers and is located only 5 kms (3 miles) from a potential nuclear weapons storage site (24.9429, 66.9083).

Over the past decade, unique facilities have been construction at Masroor Air Base that might potentially form part of Pakistan’s nuclear posture. This includes a large underground facility that is located inside a high-security area. The purpose of the facility has not been confirmed and could potentially also involve command and control. Yet the facility is clearly unique compared with other Air Bases and might potentially serve as an underground nuclear weapons storage and handling facility. 

(Update: the underground facility is possibly a command center.)

Masroor Air Base includes unique underground facilities. Click image to view full size.

Another unique facility at Masroor Air Base is a hardened aircraft shelter connected by an underground tunnel to what appears to be a weapons storage facility. The purpose of this facility (first spotted by https://twitter.com/rajfortyseven) is unknown but could potentially be designed to enable concealed nuclear weapons loading of Mirage fighter-bombers.

It should be emphasized that despite the interesting features of some of the facilities at Masroor Air Base, there is no official publicly available information that explicitly identifies them as nuclear.




Mushaf Air Base:
 One of Pakistan’s oldest suspected nuclear-capable air bases is Mushaf Air Base located (32.0431, 72.6710) near Sargodha in the Punjab Province. The base is the home of the 38th Wing with F-16 squadrons that have long been suspected of forming part of Pakistan’s air-borne nuclear deterrent.

One pair of hardened aircraft shelters at the base are located inside an area with additional security perimeter but there is little visible evidence of nuclear facilities at the base. The munitions storage area shows no unique structures that suggest a nuclear weapons storage role.

Mushaf Air Base has long been rumored to have a nuclear role. Click image to view full size.

Instead, nuclear bombs for the F-16s at Mushaf Air Base might be stored at the nearby Sargodha weapons storage facility less than 10 kms (6 miles) to the south.



Others Air Bases: There are a couple of other Mirage and F-16 Air Bases that could potentially also serve a role as part of Pakistan’s airborne nuclear strike mission. This includes the Mirage-equipped base at Rafiqui (30.7580, 72.2822), which has been upgrade over the past three years. The F-16 base at Shahbaz (28.2825, 68.4506) has been upgraded considerably to accommodate the new F-16s (Block 52).

These and other bases could potentially serve a dispersal bases for Mirage and F-16 nuclear-capable bombers. But there is little visible physical evidence to suggest they serve a nuclear role. Likewise, Kamra (Minhas) Air Base (33.8697, 72.4004) has often been suspected to have a nuclear role but appears to serve as conversion facility for aircraft.



Conclusions and Implications

Commercial satellite pictures provide new information about Pakistan’s emerging nuclear weapons posture that includes missile garrisons for short-range nuclear-capable missiles, unique underground facilities potentially intended for nuclear weapons storage, and air bases with possible nuclear-related facilities.


The tactical nuclear-capable launchers do not present a strategic threat to India due to their short range, but their introduction into the Pakistani armed forces raises important questions about early dispersal of nuclear warheads and launch authority in a crisis as well as potential earlier use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with India.

We estimate that Pakistan currently has a stockpile of 130-140 nuclear warheads and is building more. But we also take note of statements by some Pakistan officials that the country might not intend to continue to increase it arsenal indefinitely but may soon reach the goal for the size of its full-spectrum deterrent. Whether and when that will happen remains to be seen. For now the Pakistani arsenal is in a dynamic phase.



Additional Information:

• FAS Nuclear Notebook: Pakistani Nuclear Forces, 2016

• Pakistan’s Strategic Nuclear and Missile Industries

This publication was made possible by a grant from the New Land Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.


http://fas.org/blogs/security/2016/11/pakistan-nuclear-infrastructure/