PEOPLE LIBERATION ARMY SET TO BECOME "China's Americanized Military"

SOURCE:
https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/chinas-americanized-military/

         China's Americanized Military

                                By 

                          Don Tse

          [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jeOSvUMm_tU ]

The PLA is set to become the largest “American” military force to pose a threat to the U.S.

Chinese soldiers shout slogans as Chinese President Xi Jinping inspects the troops of People's Liberation Army (PLA) Hong Kong Garrison (June 30, 2017).

Image Credit: AP Photo/Kin Cheung

December 13, 2017

Two Chinese armored brigades clashed in 

a week-

long training exercise at the Zhurihe Training Base

 in Inner Mongolia in 2015. Both brigades were 

equipped with identical armored vehicles and 

weapons. The Blue opposing forces brigade 

(OPFOR), however, was organized and fought in the 

fashion of a United States brigade combat team.

The Red friendly force was crushed. 

“Within an hour we were hit with airstrikes, enemy satellite reconnaissance, and cyberattacks … Frankly, I never imagined it would be this hard,” 

said Wang Ziqiang, the armored brigade commander

 of the Red force. Wang’s political commissar Liu

 Haitao was caught on camera sobbing after the 

defeat. In a documentary aired on state television 

days before the 19th Party Congress in October, Liu 

said that his unit was initially very confident of 

victory over the Blue team, which was formerly a 

sister unit. “But over the course of seven days, we were 

beaten … we lost because we didn’t meet realistic combat 

standards when training our troops,” he said.

Subpar training tells only part of the story. Between

 2014 and 2016, the “American” Blue team scored a 

total of 32 victories and one defeat against Red 

forces that comprised some of the best and most 

well-equipped units in the People’s Liberation Army

 (PLA). On average, Red forces sustained 70 percent 

simulated casualties after clashing with the Blue 

team. The PLA’s poor performance against a modern

 military unit gave President and Commander-in-

Chief Xi Jinping sufficient reason to seek an 

overhaul.

In September 2015, Xi announced sweeping military 

reforms that included a 300,000 troop cut, the 

creation of a joint command structure that 

has drawn comparisons with the United States’s 

Goldwater-Nichols Act, and a military-civilian 

integration program that appears to draw 

inspiration from the American military-industrial 

complex. During his speech at the 19th Party 

Congress, Xi set three goals for the PLA: 

By 2020, 

achieve basic mechanization, make significant 

progress in using information technology, and 

elevate strategic ability; 

by 2035, 

become a modernized defense and military force; 

by 2050, 

become a world-class military.

If Xi can fully implement his reforms while 

successfully fending off military and political 

opponents, the PLA should most closely resemble 

the U.S. military in terms of organization and chain 

of command. The reformed PLA, however, is 

unlikely to best the U.S. military in a conventional 

war given its technological gap and lack of 

warfighting experience. But factor in 

unconventional warfare tactics and next-generation 

technology, and the PLA may stand a chance of 

rivaling the world’s strongest fighting force.

Reasons for Reform

Xi’s military reforms appear to be driven by two 

factors:

   (a)  China’s need as an aspiring world power for

          a modern military that can fight and win wars, 

          and 

   (b) Xi’s need to consolidate power in the Chinese 

          Communist Party (CCP).

The former factor is the more obvious of the two. 

While previous CCP leaders had carried out some 

military reform and updated the military’s 

weaponry, the PLA had long remained organized 

along the Soviet model. Combat tactics and doctrine 

didn’t differ much from the low-tech, ground forces-

heavy style utilized during the 1950 Korean War. 

While militaries around the world had been moving

 toward joint service operations since the 1980s, the

 army was still the most prominent service branch in

 the PLA. The navy and air force played an auxiliary 

role.

From a national defense and overseas security 

standpoint, the relative backwardness of the PLA is a

 pressing concern for the Xi administration. China 

has pledged hundreds of billions of dollars for its 

Belt and Road Initiative, a major transnational 

development strategy to promote trade between 

China and Eurasian countries through an overland 

route and a maritime route. The PLA also 

periodically faces border issues with India and 

Vietnam, and maritime run-ins with neighboring 

countries in the South China Sea. And in the east, 

China has to contend with a nuclear-capable North 

Korea whose leadership is aligned with Xi’s political 

rivals.

The need for modern tactics and joint operations 

was firmly impressed upon the commanders who 

participated in or observed the training exercises in 

Zhurihe. Previously, training exercises were 

formulaic affairs that usually ended up with friendly 

Red teams defeating Blue teams made up of rotated 

units. Xi, however, required a professional OPFOR 

to test the combat effectiveness of PLA units more 

rigorously. So the 195th mechanized infantry 

brigade under commander Xia Minglong underwent 

reorganization between 2013 and April 2014 to serve

 as a dedicated Blue team. State media hinted that 

the “foreign combat doctrine” embraced by the Blue

 team was similar to that of the U.S. military, and its 

organization should more closely resemble a U.S. 

combat brigade.

A typical training exercise at Zhurihe would see the 

Blue team launch nuclear strikes, carpet bombing

 runs, and electronic attacks against the attacking 

Red force, as well as conduct nightly raids. Special 

forces tactics were also utilized — Blue team troops 

impersonating local government representatives 

delivering goodwill provisions to a Red team force 

successfully met with and captured their 

commander. While the Blue team was equipped with

 outdated Type 59 main battle tanks and Type 63

 armored troop carriers, it is likely that they were 

simulated as M1 Abrams and Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles using multiple integrated laser engagement 

systems. Lastly, the Blue team usually emerged 

overwhelmingly victorious as both a defender or 

aggressor force.

The sobering performance of the various PLA units 

at Zhurihe seemed to be sufficient for Xi to convince

 the top PLA brass to adopt deep reforms for the 

military to stay relevant. The reforms that have been

 rolled out thus far appear to largely take reference

 from the United States:

• The Central Military Commission (CMC) was reorganized to accommodate a permanent joint command and control structure. This is reflected in the abolishing of the four General Departments and the creation of 15 new departments, as well as inclusion of top naval and air force generals in the CMC of the 19th Central Committee.

• The chain of command was separated into an operational chain and an administrative chain. For instance, the new military theaters oversee combat preparations, while the service branch headquarters see that the various units are organized, trained, and equipped for missions.

• The PLA is now organized around brigade combat teams as opposed to divisions.

• China’s new civilian-military integration program is geared toward the development of a military-industrial complex like the United States’

• On November 10, the CMC announced regulations governing the creation of a new civilian service.

• On November 24, state media announced the piloting of a military professional education program.

Operationally, the PLA may more closely resemble 

the U.S. military after reform, albeit with a Leninist 

dual command structure that allows the CCP to 

retain full control over the troops.

The success of Xi’s military reforms, however, 

hinges on his efforts to consolidate power in the 

CCP. While Xi emerged from the 19th Party Congress

 with greater authority, he still faces resistance from

 the influential Jiang Zemin faction. Top CMC 

members and the PLA newspaper continue to stress 

the importance of cleaning out the “pernicious 

influence of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou,” two 

former CMC vice chairs and Jiang faction elites, 

from the military. Many of the other 64 top ranking 

generals who were purged under Xi’s anti-

corruption campaign are also associated with the 

Jiang faction. Furthermore, there might be senior 

military leaders who aren’t clearly linked with the 

Jiang faction but are unhappy with Xi — Hong Kong 

media reported that vanished former CMC members

 Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang (who was later 

confirmed to have committed suicide) were 

dissatisfied with Xi’s military reforms. Perhaps the 

best indicator that Xi is genuinely worried about 

internal resistance is the inclusion of CMC Discipline

 Inspection chief Zhang Shengmin in a downsized 

CMC.

 China vs. The United States: The Gap

The PLA should become a modernized fighting force 

if Xi is successful in implementing his reforms, but it

 will unlikely surpass the U.S. military in a 

conventional skirmish.

Every year, America spends 3.3 percent of its GDP 

(about $611 billion in 2016) to develop and maintain

 a military force that is widely regarded as the 

strongest in the world. In terms of equipment, the 

U.S. military has 10 aircraft carriers, combat-proven

 vehicles like the M1 Abrams tank and the Apache 

helicopter, next-generation fighter jets like the F-35,

 advanced military communications satellites, and 

about 6,800 nuclear warheads. There are about 1.3 

million active-duty personnel, of which under 

200,000 are deployed overseas. Training standards 

and professionalism are high, and U.S. troops have 

participated in conflicts around the world since 

World War II.

In contrast, China spends just 1.9 percent of its GDP 

(about $216 billion in 2016) on its military. China’s

 defense ministry acknowledges a “definite gap” 

between the PLA’s military technology and that of 

other developed countries. For instance, China’s 

maiden aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, is a 

refurbished Soviet-era steam turbine vessel, while 

the PLA’s next-generation fighter jet, the J-31, lacks 

an advanced engine to fly at the supersonic speeds of

 an F-35. The Type 99 is a modern main battle tank, 

but it hasn’t been combat-tested. And except for a 

handful of senior commanders who fought in 

China’s disastrous war against Vietnam in 1979, 

most of the PLA’s 2 million-strong military is lacking

 in combat experience. Worse, the PLA has to 

overcome a severe professionalism problem: Under 

Jiang Zemin’s era of dominance (1997-2012), senior 

military officials had to bribe their way up the ranks,

 training exercises were routine and conducted for 

show and profit, and the military had a problem 

with binge drinking.

                 Bypassing the Gap

To match or even surpass the United States, the 

modernized PLA will resort to the unconventional 

means that it has already been experimenting with 

in recent years.

In his bestselling book The Hundred-Year 

Marathon, Pentagon consultant Michael Pillsbury 

described simulated war games between the 

American military and the PLA where the Chinese 

side “was the victor” whenever it “employed 

Assassin’s Mace methods.” Assassin’s Mace, 

or shashoujian, are weaponry that the PLA has 

developed to cripple or bypass technologically 

superior militaries. Such weaponry includes anti-

satellite and anti-aircraft carrier missiles, high-

powered microwave and electromagnetic pulse 

weapons, and radar jammers. 

Because Assassin’s Mace weapons are far cheaper 

than carriers or next-generation fighter jets, they are

 a cost-effective way for the PLA to gain an advantage

 over more powerful militaries that rely on satellites,

 networks, and the internet for communications.

Getting China-manufactured components into the 

high-tech military hardware of other countries is

 another way that the PLA can gain an edge. 

Microchips made in China are known to be 

counterfeit in some cases or actual spyware in 

others. In 2010, the U.S. Navy found that it had 

bought 59,000 fake computer microchips from 

China. These chips were meant for use in missiles, 

fighter planes, warships, and other 

equipment. Reuters  reported in 2014 that the 

Pentagon had approved the use of Chinese magnets

 in the construction of the F-35’s sensitive hardware. 

In the best case scenario, the made-in-China parts 

work as advertised and no harm is done. In the 

worst case scenario, the Chinese parts could cause 

catastrophic system failure or serve as surveillance 

devices for the PLA.

Perhaps more disturbing is what the PLA could

 potentially develop. Stuart Russell, an artificial 

intelligence scientist at the University of California 

in Berkeley, released a short film on November 13 

which highlighted the devastating capabilities of 

fictional autonomous “slaughter bots” — using tiny 

weaponized AI drones, malicious figures eliminate 

politicians and activists in broad daylight.

                       [ https://youtu.be/9CO6M2HsoIA ]

 Russell’s vision of the future is stark, but China 

could make ita reality. Presently, China is at the 

forefront of drone manufacturing and has a sizable 

slice of the civilian drone market (Dajiang 

Innovation alone has 70 percent of the global 

market share). Meanwhile, Beijing plans to spend 

$100 billion to grow its semiconductor industry 

under a Made in China 2025 program. It is not 

inconceivable that the PLA could eventually develop 

advanced AI-powered drones and put them to use, 

even if their ethical use becomes a concern. The CCP 

has proven that it has no scruples about crushing 

“anti-revolutionaries” (political opponents, students

 at Tiananmen, ethnic minorities, and religious 

groups), and its military will likewise pursue 

asymmetrical hybrid warfare tactics to achieve its 

ends against external foes.

Finally, the PLA is a legitimate cybersecurity threat.

 In recent years, PLA cyber units have successfully 

breached the networks of U.S. businesses, 

infrastructure companies, and the government. In 

May 2014, the U.S. Justice Department announced 

indictments against five members of the former 

General Staff Department’s Unit 61398 for hacking 

Westinghouse Electric, the United States Steel 

Corporation, and other companies. Chinese hackers 

backed by the state also allegedly breached the 

computer system of the U.S. Office of Personnel 

Management, compromising the private data of its

 4 million current and former government 

employees. Militaries that rely on cyber networks for

 communications may find their operations severely

hampered in a conflict with the PLA.

This year, four U.S. Navy vessels were involved in

collisions in the East China Sea. Internal 

investigations indicated that crew negligence was to 

blame. But the particularly severe collisions of 

destroyers USS Fitzgeraldand the USS John S. 

McCain with commercial ships, as well as the 

frequency and close timing of the accidents, have le

d government investigators and technology experts 

to consider the possibility of the warships 

being targeted by cyber attacks. If cyber sabotage is 

indeed a reason for the collisions, then the PLA 

is  suspect.

                              Conclusion

Xi Jinping’s military reforms appear to draw 

inspiration from the U.S. military, and serve the 

dual purpose of modernizing the PLA and 

consolidating his control over the CCP. A 

modernized PLA will unlikely surpass the United 

States in a conventional engagement, but the 

outcome will scale toward the PLA if it uses 

unconventional tactics and weapons. In this 

scenario, the PLA is set to become the largest 

“American” military force to pose a threat to the U.S.

Translated by Larry Ong.

Don Tse is the CEO and co-founder of SinoInsider Consulting LLC, a consulting and research company based in New York City.

Larry Ong is a senior analyst with SinoInsider Consulting LLC.