Friday, November 29, 2019

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS INDIA : Curb Rampant Copying of Military Uniform

SOURCE:
https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/curb-rampant-copying-of-military-uniform/867021.html





Curb Rampant Copying of Military Uniform

                               By

           Lt Gen Harwant Singh (retd)


                     Whoever designed the new uniform for Parliament marshals was either ignorant of what he was doing or it was yet another attempt to denigrate the military. It is for the Centre to ensure that no one copies any item of the military uniform.


DRESS CODE: The marshals appeared in their new uniform when the 250th session of the Rajya Sabha began on November 18.








    New Dress Code of marshals || Rajya Sabha Chairman Ordered Review


MARSHALS in Parliament stand beside the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and carry files and papers to them. Since long, they wore special turbans as part of the ceremonial dress, but all too suddenly, they have found these turbans to be cumbersome and heavy for their heads. So, the best option was to let them wear Gandhi caps in place of these turbans. 
However, whosoever worked on this issue of replacing turbans seems to have gone overboard and redesigned the entire dress of these marshals. This new dress copies the headgear (peak cap) of a general officer of the army and ranks on their shoulders are copies of those of the Indian Air Force officers. In addition, some more items of the military uniform are also added. 

The law does not permit copying and wearing of any item of military uniform. However, this law has been openly flouted  by not only a range of police organisations, both in their dress and badges of rank, but even the private security staff of a number of security companies.   
While all this not only tends to denigrate and diminish the military, it has serious security implications. After all, the military is the ultimate instrument of the government to combat security threats to the country: both internal and external.  Often, during threatening internal security situations, mere deployment of the military has the necessary salutary effect on the rampaging mobs and order is restored without having to use force. 
In this context, it would be appropriate to recall an incident in Kashmir that took place in the sixties. The Holy Relic (Muay Mukadus)  went missing from the Hazratbal mosque. As word of this went around, nearly half a million people collected in Srinagar. The mob set fire to the local police station and tehsil headquarters. It then turned to the five-star hotel of the then Chief Minister (Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad) under construction and set it on fire. The fire brigade vehicles, as they arrived to put out the fire, too were set ablaze. 


At this stage, a call for the military’s fire brigade was made. Fire brigade vehicles from the military’s ordnance depot were sent along with a fully armed platoon of infantry. The mob stayed away from these fire brigade vehicles, while they dealt with the fires. 

Being winter time, the state government had moved to Jammu and the local commissioner, thinking that his police will not be able to cope with the deteriorating situation, decided to hand over the city of Srinagar to the military. Since we had only one JAK Rifle Battalion in Srinagar, two battalions were moved from Baramulla to Srinagar. For the next three days, a crowd numbering nearly half a million, kept assembling in Srinagar, yet there was not even a single incident of arson or damage to any property. Such was the salutary effect of the presence of the military on the unruly mobs. 
Unfortunately, all that has vanished and one of the reasons is that it has become difficult for the mobs to tell the military from the central police. 
However, at present, the military, when called to deal with terrorists in J&K, is subjected to stone-pelting, attacks on their vehicles and even attempts at snatching weapons from soldiers. The reasons for this sad state of affairs are many, though the one that stands out is the indiscriminate copying of the military’s uniform by all and sundry, particularly by the central police organisations. Thus, during the Jat agitation in Haryana, military’s columns, during flag marches, had to carry huge posters which noted the column as that of the military, because it was near impossible for an average citizen to tell a military column from a central police column. In insurgency-affected regions, often terrorists are able to take advantage by wearing military-pattern dresses and are thereby mistaken for the Central police personnel.  
Whoever designed this new uniform (later withdrawn) for the marshals of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha was either ignorant of what he was doing or it was yet another attempt to denigrate the nation’s military. It is indeed surprising that no Member of Parliament felt offended and demanded the removal of this new dress of the marshals. All else apart, the cap in this dress of the marshals is the same as worn by general officers of the Indian military.  
It is for the Central government to ensure that no one is allowed to copy any item of the military uniform. If that does not come about, then the military, in its own interest, needs to revert to the olive green (OG). After all, the Indian army fought through the Burma campaign wearing the OG.








Thursday, November 21, 2019

Finally A CDS For The Indian Armed Forces – Analysis

SOURCE:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/19082019-finally-a-cds-for-the-indian-armed-forces-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29




Indian Army soldiers. Photo Credit: US DoD, SGT Mike MacLeod, Wikipedia Commons.







    Finally A CDS For The Indian Armed                            Forces – Analysis 

                                By

                  Maj Gen Alok Deb*



19 August , 2019 
UPDATED 15 JAN 2021


The Prime Minister’s announcement on Independence Day from the ramparts of the Red Fort that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the Indian armed forces would be announced soon, has given rise to elation within the uniformed fraternity. What model should be followed for institutionalising such an appointment and what it entails in terms of reorganisation and operational control has been a matter of heated debate, both within the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy. Some seem to be hailing it as the panacea for all ills afflicting national security, while others are dismissive, predicting that the appointment will be more ceremonial than anything else. 
Given the different models being followed by countries such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) which have trodden this path earlier, as also the reorganisation (on for a couple of years now) in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the existing dispensation in the Pakistan armed forces, such discussions are understandable and, indeed, welcome. 
Jointness is a term that achieved a fresh lease of life after the Kargil War and the subsequent recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee. It has been the focus of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the last few years, based on the directions given by the Prime Minister with great clarity in his address at the Combined Commanders Conference held aboard INS Vikramaditya in December 2015.A further fillip to Jointness has been given by the word ‘Integration’. The implications of these two words differ as evinced by all that has been written on the subject in recent years, including the views of the Army and Navy and the perspective of the Air Force. 
Though India has an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), what such integration might actually entail in terms of integrated headquarters (instead of joint), preparing for war in terms of common doctrines, force structures, policies and training objectives, amalgamating logistic resources and other assets and so on is yet to be fully accepted by all stakeholders, and thus not spelt out in detail. Obviously, the way forward is long and challenging. 
At the end of it all, what should finally come about is an India specific model born out of its own peculiarities, current state of individual services, and an overarching long-term perspective of just what the nation requires in the security sphere. While the scope of responsibility of the CDS (in addition to commanding various joint organisations) is being worked out in South Block, as an exercise, it would be instructive to see what changes could be implemented immediately within the current organisational structures through greater jointness, before getting into the gamut of full integration which should be the logical end state. More so, since (for now at least) the Indian armed forces have not been force fed, as their counterparts in the US were with the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act in the last century. 
In the December 2015 speech referred to earlier, two observations made by the Prime Minister deserve greater attention today: “At a time when major powers are reducing their forces and rely more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces. Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal.”2
Given the defence budgeting constraints, a fact accepted by realist defence planners, the necessity for a single point agency to prioritise our weapons procurements based on an accepted joint warfighting doctrine, predicated in turn on national security policy aims and proposed end states, becomes mandatory. A step towards this has been taken with the issue of a joint operational doctrine by HQ IDS in 2018. The CDS would have the authority to bring greater coherence to the doctrine and authorise corresponding amendments if warranted to the Long Term Integrated Procurement Plan (LTIPP), which would automatically acquire greater salience in future. As a corollary, the CDS would be actively involved in formalising newer and modern force structures in consultation with the three services. As the single point of advice to the Government, his recommendations would receive due consideration. He would also provide major inputs for the National Security Strategy and will be responsible for producing the National Military Strategy. 
The above are some of the major responsibilities that the CDS could discharge even today, without any other type of reorganisation, resulting in efficient budgeting and effective warfighting. Needless to say, whatever is proposed must have the appropriate governmental sanction failing which the purpose of setting up such an office would be defeated. There are other tasks which a CDS can perform with minimum restructuring. One is to manage integrated logistics, a concept whose time has come. Some initial steps have been taken in this direction in selected stations, but the matter remains in its infancy. 
Whether it is repairs and recovery, infrastructure development, victualling for all the three services, or procurement of rations, fuels, oils or lubricants, or management of military lands, much can be done by integrating all or some of these functions. Training is another area. While some level of joint training already exists in important staff courses conducted by the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington, it is time to substantially enhance the joint syllabus in such courses. More importantly, while inter service organisations have enough officers from each service, the numbers from one service posted to the headquarters of the other services continue to be miniscule.
As a worldwide phenomenon, militaries being hierarchical societies are known to be averse to major change. The Government has provided an opening to the Services to commence the process of change in a graduated manner. The level of success achieved depends on the sagacity of both the civil and the military brass. The opportunity must be grasped if India’s security aspirations are to be met in full in the near future. A successful beginning by a first time CDS will be a keynote for the same.
                                 ----------------------------------

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
*About the author: Maj Gen Alok Deb, SM, VSM (Retired) is Deputy Director General at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). 

Source: This article was published by IDSA

Sunday, November 10, 2019

PART 30 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA : Central Theater Command ( R )

SOURCE:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/tc-central.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Theater_Command

https://sinoinsider.com/2018/02/military-watch-chinas-central-theater-command-gets-a-new-deputy-commander/

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts


Part 27of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html


Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html


Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html


Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html


Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html






               Central Theater Command

















The five theater commands, which are identified by their strategic locations in east, south, west, north and central China, base their army headquarters in Fuzhou, Fujian Province; Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; Lanzhou, Gansu Province; Jinan, Shandong Province and Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, respectively. The five replaced the former seven military area commands in Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Ji'nan, Shenyang, Lanzhou and Guangzhou as of early 2016. Infrastructure, including communication facilities in the previous seven military area commands, has been taken into consideration for the locations of the headquarters, so that follow-up work on military reform could start as soon as possible.
China's Ministry of National Defense (MND) held a special press conference in Beijing on February 1, 2016, at which the Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun answered journalists' questions about the adjustment and establishment of the theater commands. The new system separates the combat and construction or logistic missions. The theater commands will focus on engagement, while the PLA army, navy and air force will focus on developing their respective forces, said the source. All five commands are expected to have their own army and air force, while naval forces are not likely to be deployed by all five commands. There's no need to build a temporary command system when war erupts, as the joint operations of each theater command will suffice, which is also helpful for troops to successfully fulfill their training and mission, said the source. The five commands will only deploy their own force against security threats, and they need to report to the CMC for additional support.
The Army's subordinate organs within the five theater commands are built on the basis of certain functions and institutions of the former MACs, the Navy's subordinate organs within the five theater commands are built on the basis of relevant naval fleets, and the Air Force's subordinate organs within five theater commands are built on the basis of the air force of former MACs. To date, the adjustment and establishment of the services' organs within five theater commands has been completed.

Central Theater Command is one of the five military regions of People's Liberation Army of China,[1] and was founded on February 1, 2016.[2] Its predecessor was the Beijing Military Region.[citation needed Its          jurisdictionincludes BeijingTianjinHebeiShaanxiShanxiHenan and Hubei.[3] Its commander is Gen. Yi Xiaoguang and its political commissar is Gen. Yin Fanglong.[4][2]                                                                                                             
The International Institute for Strategic Studies attributes to the command of 300,000 personnel, consisting of three group armies (the 27th Army38th Army, and the 65th Army), two armoured divisions, one mechanised infantry division, five motorised divisions, one artillery division, three armoured, seven motorised infantry, four artillery, a total of five various anti-aircraft brigades, and one anti-tank regiment.[5] The command is also augmented by the Beijing Capital Garrison, which consists of the 1st Guards and the 3rd Guards Divisions, and the Beijing Garrison Honor Guard Battalion and Color Guard Company, both of them are charged with public duties, and is also home to the PLA Navy (PLAN) North Sea Fleet and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 10th Air Force Corps.[citation needed]
In addition to guarding the capital, the CTC is also in charge of training key personnel for leadership positions through the numerous military academies in the region.[citation needed]



CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND

Addendum III: PLA Organization of Theater Forces
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%2C%20Section%202%20-%20China%27s%20Military%20Modernization%20in%202017.pdf  See page 220



PLA Army** 

81 Group Army

 Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes
 Artillery Bde 
Air Defense Bde  
Special Operations Bde
 Army Aviation Bde 


82 Group Army

 Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes 
 Artillery Bde
 Air Defense Bde 
 Special Operations Bde
 Army Aviation Bde

83 Group Army 

Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes
 Artillery Bde† 
Air Defense Bde 
 Special Operations Bde 
Army Aviation Bde

PLA Air Force 

Central Theater Air Force Fighter Div 8 

 Fighter/Attack Air Bdes 2
 Bomber Divs Specialized Air Rgt Transport Div
   SAM Div
  4 SAM Bdes
  PLA Air Force Airborne Corps

PLA Rocket Force
    66 Base
     4 Missile Bdes


Note: The order of battle and theater structure presented in addenda I through III reflect Commission assessments based on available open-source information. It is necessarily partial, due to several factors, including: incomplete reporting on China’s military modernization developments; uncertainties surrounding China’s military reform and reorganization, which is only partially complete; and the general opacity surrounding China’s military modernization and reforms. The Commission will continue to track these developments and provide periodic updates.


CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND




















------------------------------------------------------------


References[edit]

  1. ^ Zhen, Liu (January 4, 2018). "Xi Jinping calls for battle readiness as troops stage massive winter drills across China"South China Morning Post. Retrieved January 4, 2018Dressed in a winter camouflage uniform and flanked by the other members of the supreme Central Military Commission, Xi issued the call from a military base in the Central Theatre Command, one of the country’s five military zones, as troops in 4,000 sites across the country took part in simultaneous drills in the armed forces’ annual new year exercises on Wednesday. Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  2. Jump up to:a b "President Xi announces establishment of five PLA theater commands". Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. 1 February 2016. Retrieved 14 June 2019A grand inauguration ceremony was held to mark the founding of the five theater commands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Beijing on Feb. 1, 2016....and Han Weiguo and Yin Fanglong, commander and political commissar of the Central Theater Command....
  3. ^ Teo, Cheng Wee (3 Feb 2016). "Military rezoning shows China's focus is on winning wars"The Straits Times. Singapore Press Holdings. Retrieved 14 June 2019[see map graphic for list of provinces]
  4. ^ "Military Watch: China's Central Theater Command Gets a New Deputy Commander"SINOINSIDER. 14 February 2018. Retrieved 14 June 2019Yi Xiaoguang’s appointment as CTC commander appeared to be confirmed as early as Oct. 18, 2017 when he attended a 19th Party Congress delegate meeting wearing a CTC unit patch and seated beside CTC political commissar Yin Fanglong, a scene aired by China Central Television.
  5. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006