Showing posts with label Chief of Defence Staff. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chief of Defence Staff. Show all posts

Thursday, November 21, 2019

Finally A CDS For The Indian Armed Forces – Analysis

SOURCE:
https://www.eurasiareview.com/19082019-finally-a-cds-for-the-indian-armed-forces-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29




Indian Army soldiers. Photo Credit: US DoD, SGT Mike MacLeod, Wikipedia Commons.







    Finally A CDS For The Indian Armed                            Forces – Analysis 

                                By

                  Maj Gen Alok Deb*



19 August , 2019 
UPDATED 15 JAN 2021


The Prime Minister’s announcement on Independence Day from the ramparts of the Red Fort that a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for the Indian armed forces would be announced soon, has given rise to elation within the uniformed fraternity. What model should be followed for institutionalising such an appointment and what it entails in terms of reorganisation and operational control has been a matter of heated debate, both within the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy. Some seem to be hailing it as the panacea for all ills afflicting national security, while others are dismissive, predicting that the appointment will be more ceremonial than anything else. 
Given the different models being followed by countries such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) which have trodden this path earlier, as also the reorganisation (on for a couple of years now) in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the existing dispensation in the Pakistan armed forces, such discussions are understandable and, indeed, welcome. 
Jointness is a term that achieved a fresh lease of life after the Kargil War and the subsequent recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee. It has been the focus of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the last few years, based on the directions given by the Prime Minister with great clarity in his address at the Combined Commanders Conference held aboard INS Vikramaditya in December 2015.A further fillip to Jointness has been given by the word ‘Integration’. The implications of these two words differ as evinced by all that has been written on the subject in recent years, including the views of the Army and Navy and the perspective of the Air Force. 
Though India has an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), what such integration might actually entail in terms of integrated headquarters (instead of joint), preparing for war in terms of common doctrines, force structures, policies and training objectives, amalgamating logistic resources and other assets and so on is yet to be fully accepted by all stakeholders, and thus not spelt out in detail. Obviously, the way forward is long and challenging. 
At the end of it all, what should finally come about is an India specific model born out of its own peculiarities, current state of individual services, and an overarching long-term perspective of just what the nation requires in the security sphere. While the scope of responsibility of the CDS (in addition to commanding various joint organisations) is being worked out in South Block, as an exercise, it would be instructive to see what changes could be implemented immediately within the current organisational structures through greater jointness, before getting into the gamut of full integration which should be the logical end state. More so, since (for now at least) the Indian armed forces have not been force fed, as their counterparts in the US were with the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act in the last century. 
In the December 2015 speech referred to earlier, two observations made by the Prime Minister deserve greater attention today: “At a time when major powers are reducing their forces and rely more on technology, we are still constantly seeking to expand the size of our forces. Modernisation and expansion of forces at the same time is a difficult and unnecessary goal.”2
Given the defence budgeting constraints, a fact accepted by realist defence planners, the necessity for a single point agency to prioritise our weapons procurements based on an accepted joint warfighting doctrine, predicated in turn on national security policy aims and proposed end states, becomes mandatory. A step towards this has been taken with the issue of a joint operational doctrine by HQ IDS in 2018. The CDS would have the authority to bring greater coherence to the doctrine and authorise corresponding amendments if warranted to the Long Term Integrated Procurement Plan (LTIPP), which would automatically acquire greater salience in future. As a corollary, the CDS would be actively involved in formalising newer and modern force structures in consultation with the three services. As the single point of advice to the Government, his recommendations would receive due consideration. He would also provide major inputs for the National Security Strategy and will be responsible for producing the National Military Strategy. 
The above are some of the major responsibilities that the CDS could discharge even today, without any other type of reorganisation, resulting in efficient budgeting and effective warfighting. Needless to say, whatever is proposed must have the appropriate governmental sanction failing which the purpose of setting up such an office would be defeated. There are other tasks which a CDS can perform with minimum restructuring. One is to manage integrated logistics, a concept whose time has come. Some initial steps have been taken in this direction in selected stations, but the matter remains in its infancy. 
Whether it is repairs and recovery, infrastructure development, victualling for all the three services, or procurement of rations, fuels, oils or lubricants, or management of military lands, much can be done by integrating all or some of these functions. Training is another area. While some level of joint training already exists in important staff courses conducted by the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) at Wellington, it is time to substantially enhance the joint syllabus in such courses. More importantly, while inter service organisations have enough officers from each service, the numbers from one service posted to the headquarters of the other services continue to be miniscule.
As a worldwide phenomenon, militaries being hierarchical societies are known to be averse to major change. The Government has provided an opening to the Services to commence the process of change in a graduated manner. The level of success achieved depends on the sagacity of both the civil and the military brass. The opportunity must be grasped if India’s security aspirations are to be met in full in the near future. A successful beginning by a first time CDS will be a keynote for the same.
                                 ----------------------------------

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
*About the author: Maj Gen Alok Deb, SM, VSM (Retired) is Deputy Director General at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). 

Source: This article was published by IDSA

Sunday, November 10, 2019

PART 30 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA : Central Theater Command ( R )

SOURCE:
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/tc-central.htm

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Theater_Command

https://sinoinsider.com/2018/02/military-watch-chinas-central-theater-command-gets-a-new-deputy-commander/

CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

Part 28 of N Parts


Part 27of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html


Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html


Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html


Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html


Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html






               Central Theater Command

















The five theater commands, which are identified by their strategic locations in east, south, west, north and central China, base their army headquarters in Fuzhou, Fujian Province; Nanning, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region; Lanzhou, Gansu Province; Jinan, Shandong Province and Shijiazhuang, Hebei Province, respectively. The five replaced the former seven military area commands in Beijing, Nanjing, Chengdu, Ji'nan, Shenyang, Lanzhou and Guangzhou as of early 2016. Infrastructure, including communication facilities in the previous seven military area commands, has been taken into consideration for the locations of the headquarters, so that follow-up work on military reform could start as soon as possible.
China's Ministry of National Defense (MND) held a special press conference in Beijing on February 1, 2016, at which the Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun answered journalists' questions about the adjustment and establishment of the theater commands. The new system separates the combat and construction or logistic missions. The theater commands will focus on engagement, while the PLA army, navy and air force will focus on developing their respective forces, said the source. All five commands are expected to have their own army and air force, while naval forces are not likely to be deployed by all five commands. There's no need to build a temporary command system when war erupts, as the joint operations of each theater command will suffice, which is also helpful for troops to successfully fulfill their training and mission, said the source. The five commands will only deploy their own force against security threats, and they need to report to the CMC for additional support.
The Army's subordinate organs within the five theater commands are built on the basis of certain functions and institutions of the former MACs, the Navy's subordinate organs within the five theater commands are built on the basis of relevant naval fleets, and the Air Force's subordinate organs within five theater commands are built on the basis of the air force of former MACs. To date, the adjustment and establishment of the services' organs within five theater commands has been completed.

Central Theater Command is one of the five military regions of People's Liberation Army of China,[1] and was founded on February 1, 2016.[2] Its predecessor was the Beijing Military Region.[citation needed Its          jurisdictionincludes BeijingTianjinHebeiShaanxiShanxiHenan and Hubei.[3] Its commander is Gen. Yi Xiaoguang and its political commissar is Gen. Yin Fanglong.[4][2]                                                                                                             
The International Institute for Strategic Studies attributes to the command of 300,000 personnel, consisting of three group armies (the 27th Army38th Army, and the 65th Army), two armoured divisions, one mechanised infantry division, five motorised divisions, one artillery division, three armoured, seven motorised infantry, four artillery, a total of five various anti-aircraft brigades, and one anti-tank regiment.[5] The command is also augmented by the Beijing Capital Garrison, which consists of the 1st Guards and the 3rd Guards Divisions, and the Beijing Garrison Honor Guard Battalion and Color Guard Company, both of them are charged with public duties, and is also home to the PLA Navy (PLAN) North Sea Fleet and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) 10th Air Force Corps.[citation needed]
In addition to guarding the capital, the CTC is also in charge of training key personnel for leadership positions through the numerous military academies in the region.[citation needed]



CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND

Addendum III: PLA Organization of Theater Forces
https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Annual_Report/Chapters/Chapter%202%2C%20Section%202%20-%20China%27s%20Military%20Modernization%20in%202017.pdf  See page 220



PLA Army** 

81 Group Army

 Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes
 Artillery Bde 
Air Defense Bde  
Special Operations Bde
 Army Aviation Bde 


82 Group Army

 Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes 
 Artillery Bde
 Air Defense Bde 
 Special Operations Bde
 Army Aviation Bde

83 Group Army 

Up to 6 Combined Arms Bdes
 Artillery Bde† 
Air Defense Bde 
 Special Operations Bde 
Army Aviation Bde

PLA Air Force 

Central Theater Air Force Fighter Div 8 

 Fighter/Attack Air Bdes 2
 Bomber Divs Specialized Air Rgt Transport Div
   SAM Div
  4 SAM Bdes
  PLA Air Force Airborne Corps

PLA Rocket Force
    66 Base
     4 Missile Bdes


Note: The order of battle and theater structure presented in addenda I through III reflect Commission assessments based on available open-source information. It is necessarily partial, due to several factors, including: incomplete reporting on China’s military modernization developments; uncertainties surrounding China’s military reform and reorganization, which is only partially complete; and the general opacity surrounding China’s military modernization and reforms. The Commission will continue to track these developments and provide periodic updates.


CENTRAL THEATER COMMAND




















------------------------------------------------------------


References[edit]

  1. ^ Zhen, Liu (January 4, 2018). "Xi Jinping calls for battle readiness as troops stage massive winter drills across China"South China Morning Post. Retrieved January 4, 2018Dressed in a winter camouflage uniform and flanked by the other members of the supreme Central Military Commission, Xi issued the call from a military base in the Central Theatre Command, one of the country’s five military zones, as troops in 4,000 sites across the country took part in simultaneous drills in the armed forces’ annual new year exercises on Wednesday. Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  2. Jump up to:a b "President Xi announces establishment of five PLA theater commands". Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China. 1 February 2016. Retrieved 14 June 2019A grand inauguration ceremony was held to mark the founding of the five theater commands of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in Beijing on Feb. 1, 2016....and Han Weiguo and Yin Fanglong, commander and political commissar of the Central Theater Command....
  3. ^ Teo, Cheng Wee (3 Feb 2016). "Military rezoning shows China's focus is on winning wars"The Straits Times. Singapore Press Holdings. Retrieved 14 June 2019[see map graphic for list of provinces]
  4. ^ "Military Watch: China's Central Theater Command Gets a New Deputy Commander"SINOINSIDER. 14 February 2018. Retrieved 14 June 2019Yi Xiaoguang’s appointment as CTC commander appeared to be confirmed as early as Oct. 18, 2017 when he attended a 19th Party Congress delegate meeting wearing a CTC unit patch and seated beside CTC political commissar Yin Fanglong, a scene aired by China Central Television.
  5. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2006











Saturday, November 2, 2019

Part 28 CDS JOINTNESS PLA Snapshot: China’s Eastern Theater Command (r)

SOURCE:
https://jamestown.org/program/snapshot-chinas-eastern-theater-command/


CDS

Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html


Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html


Part 28 of N Parts

Part 27of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-26-cds-jointness-pla-n-strategic.html

Part 25 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-25-cds-jointness-pla-southern.html

Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html


Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html


Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

Part 10 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-10-cds-jointness-pla-series.html

Part  9 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/source-httpwww.html

Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/cds-part-6-chief-of-defence-staff-needs.html

Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html


Part 5 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/part-4-cds-or-gateway-to-institutional.html

Part 4 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/chief-of-defence-staff.html


Part 3 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/fighting-separately-jointness-and-civil.html

Part 2 of Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html








              CDS PLA JOINTNESS 

                      Snapshot: 

  China’s Eastern Theater Command

Delivering his work report to the National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang noted that “the Chinese mainland will resolutely oppose and contain ‘Taiwan independence separatist activities’” (“台独”分裂活动) (Xinhua, March 5). [1] President Xi Jinping, however, was even more explicit in early November 2016, when he said “1.3 billion Chinese people will oppose Taiwan independence. We have the ability, the determination and are prepared to deal with Taiwan independence. If we do not, we will be overthrown (推翻) by 1.3 billion people” (Apple Daily, November 2, 2016). China’s ability to “deal” with Taiwan involves political and economic pressure. These tools have already seen some success as the number of countries that recognize Taiwan shrinks, and Taiwan’s participation in international organizations is severely restricted. However, as China’s military becomes more effective, military coercion is increasingly a viable option. 

An overview of China’s Eastern Theater Command (ETC) provides some insight into the Chinese military’s current capabilities against Taiwan.

China’s Eastern Strategic Direction
Although eastern China is one of the most densely populated and important areas of the country, China’s east coast has not always been its primary strategic direction. Chinese military writings note that China’s historical focus on ground forces arose out of a lack of maritime threats to China from the east. In ancient times, and again during the 20th century, the threat of land invasions from the west and north outweighed threats to the east and south. [2] With the renewal of ties with Russia in the mid-1980s the strategic focus shifted again to the east, raising the importance of aerospace and maritime forces.
In the mid-1990s, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis put the region back in headlines. Missile launches in 1995 and 1996 prompted the United States to send two carrier strike groups to the area around Taiwan. The incident also revealed a number of deficits in PLA capabilities. While Taiwan remained a key issue for the PLA, its lack of sufficient maritime lift capacity, air superiority and even intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities meant that an invasion across the strait would not succeed. The U.S. navy’s ability to operate without real challenge was another major problem, and Chinese defense planners recognized the need to have layered offensive and defensive systems to project power into the East China Sea.

The Japanese governments’ 2012 purchase of the Senkaku Islands from a private owner sparked tensions and prompted widespread protests throughout China. Projecting power not just toward Taiwan but throughout the East China Sea gained additional importance. The Chinese government followed up on this by declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone in late November 2013 (China Brief, December 5, 2013). The area has since seen a steady increase in Chinese military aviation and maritime patrols (China Brief, October 26, 2016). Accompanying these events, ........
China’s military has reformed and reorganized to better deal with security issues along its eastern strategic direction.

The military organizations responsible for most of eastern China have undergone a number of changes since the 1980s. Until 1988, China had 11 military regions (MR) including ones centered on Fuzhou in northern Fujian province and Nanjing. The Fuzhou MR was incorporated into the Nanjing MR, which, after the latest round of reforms, has been folded intact into the Eastern Theater Command. An important result of the 2015 military reforms is that the Theater Command acts as joint headquarters for Army, Navy and Air Force (China Brief, June 21, 2016). The Rocket Force also has units present in the ETC, although they are directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission, China’s highest military body.