Thursday, October 31, 2019

Part 26 CDS & JOINTNESS PLA( N ) : Strategic Strong Points and Chinese Naval Strategy

CDS

 Part 30 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/cds-jointness-pla-part-central-theater.html

 Part 29 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/11/part-29-cds-jointness-pla-strategic.html

 Part 28 of N Parts

 Part 27of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/chinas-future-naval-base-in-cambodia.html

Part 26 of N Parts
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Part 24 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-24-cds-jointness.html

Part 23 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-22-cds-jointness-pla-chinas-three.html


Part 22 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/05/peoples-liberation-army-deployment-in.html

Part 21 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-9-cds-jointness-pla-part-x-of.html

Part 16 TO Part 20 of N Parts

https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/10/part-16-to-part-20-cds-jointness-list.html

Part 15 of  N  Parts 
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cds-part-10-pla-q-mtn-war-himalayan.html

Part 11 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/china-defense-white-papers1995.html

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Part  9 of N Parts
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Part  8 of N Parts
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/09/cda-part-goldwater-nichols-department.html

Part 7 of N Parts
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Part 6 of N Parts:
https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-constitutional-provisions-for.html

Part 5 of N Parts:
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Part 4 of N Parts:
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Part 3 of N Parts:
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Part 2 of N Parts:
  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2019/08/jointness-in-strategic-capabilities-can.html



SOURCE:

https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Read-the-03-22-2019-CB-Issue-in-PDF-1.pdf?x87069




                                 

          China's Geography Problem


                     [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiBF6v5UAAE ]

                                           

     Why China is building islands in 

the 

    South China Sea


                   [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=luTPMHC7zHY ]

                                                          Feb 17, 2017

                          Why China is building islands in the South China Sea



 China's TrillionDollar Plan Global Trade
                   

 [ https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=EvXROXiIpvQ ]
  [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EvXROXiIpvQ ]


                   


   STRATEGIC STRONG POINTS 
                             AND               
       CHINESE  NAVAL STRATEGY
                             BY 
                Conor Kennedy
               

                                      
                    



PLA Navy Vice Admiral Tian Zhong reviews Chinese 

 and Djiboutian troops at the PLA Navy support base 

 in Djibouti, August 1, 2017. (Source: China Daily)

Introduction

On August 1, 2017, China opened its first overseas 

 military base, in the East African nation of Djibouti. 

 This was a landmark event that raised a whole host 

 of questions for Indo-Pacific states: Is Djibouti the 

 first of other bases to come? If so, how many? 

 Where will China build them? How will they be 

 used? Where do they fit into Chinese military 

 strategy? Chinese policymakers and analysts are 

 pondering these same questions. However, they are 

 employing concepts unique to Chinese strategic 

 discourse, and it is essential to grasp these concepts 

 in order to understand how Beijing intends to 

 project military power abroad.

For the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the term 

“overseas military base” (haiwai junshi jidi, 海外军事

 基地) carries significant historical baggage:       
           

 foreign imperialists built them on the soil of other countries 

 in order to colonize and exploit them. On the other 

 hand, Chinese policymakers have come to recognize 

 the value of maintaining locations overseas where 

 the Chinese military—above all, the People’s 

 Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)—can concentrate 

resources needed to support operations abroad. 
To distinguish Chinese actions from the predatory 

 deeds of Western and Japanese imperialists, 

 Chinese military thinkers have adopted a 

 specialized term: the “strategic strong point” 

 (zhanlüe zhidian, 战略支点). [1] A careful analysis of 

 the Chinese use of this concept offers valuable 

 insights into Beijing’s strategic intentions outside of 

 East Asia.

 Understanding the 

“Strategic Strong Point” Concept
The term “strategic strong point” has different 

meanings, depending on the context in which it is

 used. In some cases it refers to a quasi ­alliance

 relationship; in other cases, it is used in the context 

of overseas ports ( Journal of Strategy and Decision­

Making , No. 2, 2017). The 2013 Science of Military 

Strategy describes them as locations that “provide 

support for overseas military operations or act as a 

forward base for deploying military forces 

overseas” ( Military Science Publishing , December 

2013). The PLAN’s new facility in Djibouti 

 has been called China’s first “overseas strategic      

 strong point” ( World Affairs , July 26, 2017).


The term is not just applied to Chinese bases: U.S. 

bases in the Pacific and Indian Oceans are also 

sometimes described as strategic strong points, and 

Chinese observers have spent considerable time 

examining these bases in order to inform their own 

thinking on developing overseas strategic strong

 points. Between 2016 and 2017, the PLAN’s official

 magazine Navy Today ran a series of articles, each

 one discussing the features and strategic roles of

 individual U.S. bases. One refers to Pearl Harbor 

as a “strategic strong point in America’s forward

defense,” without which its defensive lines would be

 limited to the homeland ( Navy Today , June 24

 2016). Two others describe the roles of Diego Garcia

 and Guam as strategic  strong points critical to

   Washington’s global strategy.  [2]




 However, Chinese experts are quick to point out

 that China’s strategic strong points are 

 fundamentally different from those of other states. 

 They state that China’s strategic strong points offer 

 benefits to host states and provide them with public 

 security goods. Moreover, these sites will not be 

 used to conduct offensive operations, as is the 

   case with the overseas bases of other states.  [3]
The Need for Strategic Strong Points
Strategic strong points will improve the Chinese 

military’s ability to operate overseas. Currently, the 

PLAN conducts the vast majority of the PRC’s 

military missions abroad. The PLAN serves two 

primary functions: protecting China’s sea lines of 

communication (SLOCs), and safeguarding China’s 

overseas interests. Both require forward presence 

in strategically important areas of the Indo­Pacific. 

According to the Science of Military Strategy, an 

expansion of the geographic scope of naval 

operations requires the establishment of 

replenishment points and “various forms of limited 

force presence” ( Science of Military 

Strategy, December 2013). 

Strategic strong points fulfill these demands. An 

 engineer at the Academy of Military Science’s 

 Institute of Logistics explains that overseas strategic 

 strong points will support the military’s long­range 

 projection capabilities by effectively shortening 

 resupply intervals and expanding the range of 

 support for Chinese forces operating abroad 

 ( National Defense , December 2017). However, 

 replenishment ships alone cannot meet the Navy’s 

 needs. As the deputy chief of the PLAN Operations 

 Department wrote in 2010, personnel relief, 

 equipment servicing, and the uncertainties of 

 foreign berthing facilities were limiting factors in 

 the long ­term regularization of overseas operations. 

 Chinese facilities in overseas ports are the next step 

 in building an “overseas support system.”  [4]
PLAN Commander Adm. Wu Shengli talked about 

 the importance of strategic strong points in 

 December 2016, during an event commemorating 

 the eighth anniversary of China’s anti ­piracy 

 operation off the Horn of Africa. Wu Shengli

  pointed out that “overseas strategic strong point

  construction has provided a new support for escort

  operations… We must give full play to the

  supporting role of the overseas support system to

  carry out larger scale missions in broader areas and 

 to shape the situation.” [5]

Establishing several strategic strong points near 

 crisis regions is integral to ensuring the sustained

  and effective use of forces in these roles. [6] When

  incidents and crises erupted in the past, efforts to

  protect China’s overseas interests were highly

  reactive. Strategic strong points allow China to

  gradually shift its posture to stabilize and control

  situations before they become crises. They might

  even play a role in stabilizing local governments

  and economies, and in ensuring civil order

  ( International Herald Tribune , October 13 2015). 
Accurate and timely intelligence is vital to effective

 operations, and PLA thinkers believe that strategic

 strong points will serve intelligence support

 functions. [7] Two authors from the PLA Equipment

 Academy write about the PLAN’s development of a

 “sea & space battlefield versatile situation picture”

 that integrates various intelligence sources to

 provide real­ time visualized information support for

 the PLAN’s overseas actions. This system, they state,

 will support the PLAN’s defensive strategy in its

 strategic strong points, maritime  passages,

 and core interest areas ( Journal of Equipment  

Academy , April 2017). 

One is Not Enough
The 2013 Science of Military Strategy declared that

 China “must build overseas strategic strong points

 that depend on the homeland, radiate into the

 surrounding areas, and move toward the two

 oceans.” The “two oceans” refer to the Pacific Ocean

 and the Indian Ocean. Chinese sources clearly place

 an emphasis on the Indian Ocean, across which

 extends China’s most important SLOC: often called

 China’s “lifeline” ( shengming xian, 生命线), this

 SLOC runs from the mainland across the South

 China Sea, and through the Malacca Strait into the

 Indian Ocean. There are two primary straits at the

 end of this lifeline: the Bab­el ­Mandeb Strait and the

 Strait of Hormuz ( Grand Strategies for

 Strengthening the Nation: Research on the

 Forefront Issues of National Strategy , June 2016).

 Securing the end of this lifeline is China’s first

 overseas strategic strong point, 

the PLA(N) support base in Djibouti ( World Affairs , 

 July 26, 2017).
The Maritime Silk Road follows China’s lifeline

 through the Indian Ocean, connecting the ports of

 many of the countries along this route. The

 secretary general of the China Port Association

 explains that Chinese port companies are expanding

 their investment layout overseas through mergers

 and acquisitions, joint ventures, and other methods.

 These ports are referred to as important nodes for

 constructing the Maritime Silk Road ( China Ports ,

 July 2018). According to an expert from the Dalian

 Naval Academy, each of these nodes can potentially

 be transformed into a strategic strong point ( Ocean

 Development and Management , January 2016). 
Chinese strategists also view the PLAN’s island bases

 in the South China Sea (SCS) as strategic strong

 points, and believe that a network of mutually

 supporting strategic strong points will help China

 secure the SCS leg of its maritime lifeline. The PRC

 established and expanded Sansha City in the 

Paracels in 2012, and began constructing artificial

 islands in the Spratlys in 2013 ( China Ocean Press ,

 December 5, 2016; China News Weekly , May 12, 

2016). Authors from the PLA and government

 sponsored institutes describe these efforts as

   the construction of strategic strong points

 meant to strengthen China’s position in the SCS
Three authors from the Dalian Naval Academy

 discuss the strategic logic of building this network

 in the SCS, and the support that these island points

 might offer for the PLAN’s operations along the

 Maritime Silk Road ( Proceedings from the 8 th

 Maritime Power Strategy Forum , October 21,

 2016).

  Figure 1 (below) shows their depiction of the

  interlocking nature of strategic strong points in the 

 South China Sea. 





Figure 1: —Hypothetical Map of Strategic Strong 

Point Construction in the South China Sea

“ ( Proceedings from the 8th Maritime Power

 Strategy Forum, October 21, 2016).
Linked to the PRC mainland, this network of strategic

 strongpoints is intended to secure a military presence

 on theeastern entrance to the Malacca Strait. With the

 Djiboutinaval base in place, China has secured a

 military presence on the far end of its lifeline. However

, the PLAN has notbeen sufficiently engaged on the

 western entrance to theMalacca Strait, and many

 Chinese analysts believe that thisis the logical next step

 (The New Orient, September 23,2014). [8]




Discussion of the strategic strong point concept is not

 confined to the Indian Ocean and the SCS. Other

 authoritative sources have recently used the term in a

 grander context, citing the expansion of China’s

 interestsglobally (World Affairs, June 2018). Indeed, the

 deputydirector of the Center for National Strategic

 Research at theChinese Academy of Governance

 advocates the building ofnumerous strategic strong

 points across multiple regions(Administrative Reform,

June 2016). For example, some propose building a

 similar network of strategic strong points in the South


, 2017), stating that the control of strategic strong points

 in these areas can help relieve strategicpressure from

 maritime challenges closer to home in the SCS (Ministry

 of Commerce, May 23, 2017).




However, there currently exists a wide gap in strategic 

strong point coverage of China’s lifeline across the

 northern Indian Ocean between Djibouti and the SCS,

making this area the current priority. In the northern

 Indian Ocean, the ports of Gwadar (Pakistan) and

 Hambantota (Sri Lanka) are frequently cited as

 candidates to become future strategic strong points

 (Reformation & Strategy, March 2017). Gwadar is well-

positioned to cover the Strait of Hormuz, a key passage

 for Chinese energy imports; whereas Hambantota

 provides an excellent Indian Ocean mid-transit point for

 replenishment, repair, and berthing (China 

WaterTransport, December 2015).




Creating an Overseas Support System


Chinese strategists are already discussing the need to

 integrate individual strategic strong points into an 

overseas support system. The need to connect

 individual “points”(dian, 点) into “lines” (xian, 线) is a

 common theme in discussions about strategic strong

 points (Administrative Reform, June 2016). Officers from

 the PLAN Command College describe a future basing

 layout that “combines points and lines” and “controls

 chokepoints.” [9] Chinese experts also point out that

 these lines should eventually combine to form “fronts”


 Strategy Forum, October 21, 2016).




Faculty at the Dalian Naval Academy have explained the

 functions of strategic strong points in what they refer to

 as the “Points, Lines, and Fronts Strategy for ‘Maritime

 SilkRoad’ Strategic Strong Point Construction”


 Forum, October 21,2016). This concept is illustrated in

 Figure 2 (below)

(Original graphic modified to provide author‘s

 translation of the original Chinese)
The subject of “fronts” is currently unclear and some

what sensitive. Some discussions of a mutually

 supporting network of strategic strong points intent

ionally avoid drawing connections between each 

 point, fearing that doing so could raise fears about 

 China’s grander ambitions. As one author from the

  Institute of Strategic and Security Studies at the

  PLA’s National Defense University explains, the

 relationship between“points” and “fronts” in

  strategic strong point construction must be properly

 managed to reduce the risk of sparking alarm 

 among foreign observers and host states, who might

 interpret such expansion negatively. China must

  realistically plan numerous “points,” but only let so

me of them “bloom.” Some can make developmental

  breakthroughs, but multiple “lines” should not

   coincide with each other. The most strategically

 valuable strategic strong points must be developed

  first.  [10]



If such an approach is ultimately adopted, it is likely that 

we are witnessing an initial period of rapid strategic

 strong point construction. What follows may be a

 gradual maturation of civilian port infrastructure into a

 more robust logistics support network–one located

 along the mid-section of the lifeline route, which will link

 up with locations in the South China Sea.




Conclusions



This article has attempted to answer some critical

 questions about China’s approach to developing its

 overseas military support capabilities. Tracking Chinese

 discussion on strategic strong points can shed light on

 the PRC’s intent to establish an overseas military

 presence. Significantly, the term demonstrates a

 relationship between the seeming unrelated military

 facilities that the PRC has constructed in the Horn of 

Africa and the South China Sea. Academic discussions

 on strategic strong points are widespread, and there are

 numerous Chinese experts exploring this subject on

 two levels. Many examine in-depth the role of strategic

 strong points in supporting Chinese sea power (Journal


However, there is also a branch of discourse that utilizes

 the term as an alternative concept to an alliance: 

scholarly discussions of strategic strong points in this

 context often advocate that China relax, but not

 abandon, its non-alliance policy (Journal of





Beijing has sought to minimize the security dimensions

 of its Belt and Road strategy in order to mitigate

 negative press coverage regarding the PRC’s future

 geopolitical intentions (China Defense News, May 5

, 2017). However, the widespread use of the term

 “strategic strong points” appears to have successfully

 allowed an open discussion since 2013 of China’s

 construction of overseas military presence and basing,

 while still allowing the PRC to posture itself as a more

 virtuous international actor than the rapacious imperial

 powers of the past. Understanding the terms and

 concepts of this discussion will prove fundamental to 

assessing future Chinese naval strategy.

                                ========================
Conor Kennedy is an Instructor at the China Maritime Studies Institute of the US Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He received his MA from the Johns Hopkins University­Nanjing University Center for Chinese and American Studies.

                         ------------------------------

Notes

[1]  The term “strategic strong point” is also often written as 战略支撑点  (zhanlüe zhichengdian) ,   used interchangeably. See: 王多月 [Wang Duoyue], “战略支撑点与 ‘21世纪海上丝绸之路’ 的建设” [Strategic Pivot Countries and the Construction of the ‘Maritime Silk Road’ in 21 st  Century], May 20, 2017, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, p. 27. 

[2] 李大光 [Li Daguang], "关岛基地: 美军西太军事要塞" [Guam Base: The US Military's Fortress in the Western Pacific], 当代海军 [Navy Today], No. 2, 2016, pp. 60­62; 杨燕南 [Yang Yan'nan], "迪戈加西亚: 美军印度洋上不沉的 '航母'" [Diego Garcia: US Military's Unsinkable 'Aircraft Carrier' in the Indian Ocean], 当代海军 [Navy Today], No. 7, 2016, pp. 52­55. 

[3] 许可 [Xu Ke], “构建 ‘海上丝路’ 上的战略支点” [On the Establishment of Strategic Fulcrums for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road: A Reference of Diego Garcia Base for China], 亚太安全与海洋研究 [Asia­Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs], No. 5 2016, p. 13. 

[4] 王滨 [Wang Bin], “护航行动海外保障点建设思考” [Thoughts on the Construction of Overseas Support Points for Escort Operations], 海军杂志 [Navy Magazine], No. 12, 2010, p. 2. 


[5]  Commander Wu Shengli’s original quote: "海外战略支点建设为护航行动提供了新支撑。我们必 须充分发挥海外保障体系的支撑作用，以便在更大范围、更广领域遂行任务、塑造态势." See: 梁庆松 [Liang Qingsong], 王元元 [Wang Yuanyuan], "海军召开亚丁湾护航8周年研讨会" [The Navy Holds a Seminar on the 8th Anniversary of the Gulf of Aden Escorts], 人民海军 [People's Navy], December 30, 2016, p. 1. 

[6] Xu Ke, p. 12.

[7] Ibid. 

[8] Xu Ke, p. 10. 

[9]  The original Chinese for the phrase describing China’s basing layout is “点线结合、控制咽喉、依托 城市、重在长远.” See: 谌力, 汪丽, 韦政 [Chen Li, Wang Li, Wei Zheng], “新安全观视域下海外基地 转型重塑的影响及启示” [The Impact and Lessons of the Transformation and Reconstruction of Overseas Military Bases Under the New Security Concept], 国防 [National Defense], No. 9, 2017, pp. 41­45. 

[10]  Original Chinese is “ 可以多点运筹,  但不宜全面开花;  适宜重点突破,  不能多线并进.” See: 胡 欣 [Hu Xin], “中国的海外战略支点建设需要处理好五对关系” [China’s Construction of Overseas Strategic Strong Points Must Deal with Five Relationships], 世界知识 [World Affairs], No. 3, 2018, p. 74.



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