SOURCE:
https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/national-security-vol-1-issue-1-colloquium.pdf
Google url TO OPEN pdf
https://www.vifindia.org/sites/default/files/national-security-vol-1-issue-1-colloquium.pdf
Two-Front War: What Does it Imply?
N C Vij
R K Dhowan
K K Nohwar
Krishan Varma
There has been much public concern about a potential two-front war provoked by Pakistan or China from the west and north as the strategic alliance between China and Pakistan deepened through the past decade. Persistent
terror attacks and armed support by the Pakistani military to jihadi groups and
separatists in the Kashmir Valley and the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that runs through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), whose legal
sovereignty belongs to India, are deeply disturbing and pose serious strategic
threats. The concerns have not dissipated despite the recent improvement in India-China relations and the Confidence Building Measures in place, since Beijing’s
strategic stakes in Pakistan are rising and it has shown little willingness to
restrain Islamabad from pursuing its dangerous course or lower the risks of conflict escalation that may drag it in.
To understand the risks involved in conflict escalation flowing from nuclear armed Pakistan and China’s military strategies and alliance operations, in this
segment we carry the perspectives of three highest level senior retired officers
and strategic thinkers of the armed forces and that of an equally senior civilian
analyst. The views are those of the individual experts and do not represent current official thinking. The aim is to better understand the issues, the possibility of
such a scenario emerging, and what needs to be done to prevent such an
outcome.
***************************
Defending the Land Frontiers
N C Vij*
[ *N C Vij, Former Chief of Army Staff & former Director Vivekananda International Foundation. ]
“Let him who desires peace, prepare for war”
Vegetius, De ReMilitari, iii, 378
O
ne of the earliest pronouncements, free India’s first Prime Minister
Pandit Nehru is reported to have made on assuming office was, “India
does not need an army, it needs a police force. We have no enemies…” This
view, however, proved to be misplaced and ironically India has been subject to
aggressions, once by China in 1962 and four times by Pakistan in 1947, 1965,
1971 and 1999. Unfortunately, India does not appear to have learnt its lessons
from these five blatant aggressions, unlike other countries of the world.
Security Threats and Challenges
At the global and the regional level the stature of India is on the rise. It
has been termed as a pillar of regional security in the Indo-Pacific region by
both US Presidents Obama and Trump. The significant role of India in the
regional security architecture is also recognised in the latest US Security Strategy. India’s intent to take on this role is evident from its continuing efforts
towards its economic and military capability development, though the latter
leaves a lot of scope for improvement both in terms of quantum and pace.
India’s quest for ‘Make in India’ and self-reliance are steps in this direction, but
have not yet made notable progress.
The major external threats emanate from Pakistan and China, India’s
two nuclear armed neighbours.
Pakistan
With Pakistan, India shares a delineated and demarcated international
boundary (IB) of 2545 Km and 778 Km along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K and 110 Km of Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)
in the mountainous and high altitude area of Siachen. India has never had
peace with Pakistan, and Kashmir is only a symptom of that problem; the
actual problem in Pakistan’s case is existential. It cannot bring itself to believe
that India has accepted the Partition as a legacy of history and, hence, reconcile to that reality. On Pakistan’s part, waging a State sponsored proxy war by
using terrorists in J&K is an important part of its strategy to bleed and keep a
stronger India tied down. Pakistan has also allowed China to construct a road
through Pakistan Occupied Indian Territory in Kashmir and up to the Arabian
Sea, as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Besides, this
they have virtually handed over the Gawadar Port to China, which solves its
Malaca dilemma up to a point.
China
India shares a 4057 KMs un-demarcated border with China. Frequent
transgressions by both sides are the norm due to differing perceptions regarding the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). China, at times talks of
sharing a border of only 2000 km with India, implying indirectly its nonrecognition of J&K as a part of India. India is the only neighbour of China, besides Bhutan, with whom it has an unsettled land border. Although India has
been pressurising China to mutually resolve the disputed border, Beijing is
keen on leaving this for the future generation. This, therefore, remains a seed
of possible conflict at all times.
Forays by PLA Navy (PLAN) ships and submarines into the Indian
Ocean are on the increase and China’s influence on our neighbours is also on
the rise. In the Indo-Pacific region the Chinese have acquired virtually dual
purpose sea ports in Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Pakistan and Djibouti, thereby encircling India by what has been called a ‘string of pearls’.
Doklam Flare-up: The 2017 China-India border standoff took place over
Chinese construction of a road in Doklam near the Tri-Junction border area in
Bhutan, from 16 June - 28 August 2017. Although, both sides have now disengaged and the Chinese road construction has stopped, there will always
remain a possibility of a flare-up. This could be used by China to try to coerce
India and keep Bhutan under intense pressure.
China-Pak Nexus
It is widely assessed that collusion between China and Pakistan adds
another serious dimension to their capability enhancement. It is also assessed
that if there is a war-like situation between India and Pakistan, China is unlikely to intervene directly. However, it may carry out some deployments to tie
down the Indian troops in the Northern and Eastern Sectors as it has done earlier. If there was to be a war between China and India, Pakistan would almost
definitely activate the Western borders with a view to try and seize Kashmir, as
Indian troops would be reduced to less than half the normal deployment opposite Pakistan. There will be very little possibility of switching troops and resources from one front to another in case of a war on two fronts.
Nuclear exchange
In case of a war with both China and Pakistan in collusion, there will be
a very remote or negligible possibility of a nuclear dimension coming into play.
But should ever an India-Pak flare up take place, Pakistan will always threaten
with a nuclear response {to start with tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)} to neutralise India’s conventional superiority and try to halt India in its tracks. Unfortunately, India has bought this ruse.
Additional ‘Half-Front’ – Kashmir
Pakistan has been able to create a tense security environment, with
radicalisation in the valley, a limited civil unrest and a situation of hybrid conflict there. India has, therefore, to continue to stabilise the situation in J&K
through a combination of military domination and good governance. This necessitates heavy commitment of troops and, hence, can be termed as ‘Half
Front’.
Cyber and Space Domains
In case of collusion between Pakistan and China, rising cyber threats,
especially from China, and its growing Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR), aerospace, artificial intelligence and unmanned weapon systems
will add another critical dimension to their capabilities. India has to develop its
own capabilities in this field over and above its full preparation for conventional war.
Implications of a Two or Two and a Half-Fronts War
- (a) It will not be possible for India to deal with both the fronts piecemeal; they will have to be handled simultaneously. The only constant factor will be the Kashmir insurgency, but major burden of that will have to be passed on to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). This, however, imposes a limitation.
- (b) Vast geographical separation also precludes rapid movement of large quantum of troops from one sector to another, not only for the Army but also for the Air Force. This will result in separation of forces: a major disadvantage for India
- (c) Navy of course will have to be divided into the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal
- (d) A war on two fronts will also result in much higher degree of ammunition consumption and thus much higher stocks of ammunition and spares need to be available from ‘ab initio’.
- (e) Strategically, India may consider adopting a posture of deterrence against Pakistan and dissuasion against China. This will result in optimisation and application of Forces as best-suited for such an operational scenario with available resources. Higher level of inter-theatre mobility will enhance operational options.
Are We Prepared for a Two-Front War?
Presently there are some major limitations, which are listed below:
(a) Strategic Direction for the Armed Forces. The only political direction to the
Armed Forces in existence is Raksha Mantri’s operational Directive of 2009. It
is now outdated and hence needs to be revised. It lays down that, ‘We should be
prepared to fight on both fronts simultaneously a war at 30 days (intense) and
60 days (normal) rates.
(b) Are We Prepared? No Armed Forces in the world, and least of all the
proud Indian Armed Forces, will ever raise their hands in case of operations
because of their lack of wherewithal. They will fight to the very best of their
capabilities. They have made suitable plans to optimise their potential in every
scenario. However, it is better for the country to be aware of the actual situation, and for that they need to be guided by the recent Army Vice Chief’s
presentation to the ‘Parliamentary Committee for Defence’. Briefly, Army’s
thrust was that:
- (i) 65 per cent of the arsenal is obsolete,
- (ii) the ammunition holdings are far below the operationally desirable stocks, and
- (iii) forces lack artillery, missiles and helicopters which could enable them to fight on both fronts simultaneously.
Way Forward
Space does not permit a detailed discussion of this aspect. However,
very briefly, India need to divide our preparation based on twin approaches of
- (a) what needs to be done in immediate future (not more than 2-3 years at the most) and
- (b) what all must be achieved in next 5-7 years (mid-term).This needs to address all areas warranting attention, (i) organisational issues,
- (ii) structural issues,
- (iii) financial aspects and finally,
- (iv) the aspects of joint-ness among services.
Immediate Future (2-3 years)
(a) Strategic Direction for the Armed Forces:
India must develop a ‘National Security Doctrine Strategy’ and from
that the military will draw out its ‘National Military Strategy’. Raksha Mantri’s
updated and revised operational Directive must be issued which should clearly
lay down that the preparedness has got to be related to a ‘two-front war’ simultaneously and indicate the likely duration. From this our budgetary requirements must be closely established. The anomalous situation, as existing at
present, must be removed.
(b) Improving Operational Stocks of Ammunition, Munitions and Spares to Improve Serviceability Rate of Equipment and Preparedness:
- (i) At least 50 per cent of the ammunition required (15 days intense) and 30 (Normal) must be stocked over the next one-two years, and for the balance, arrangement must be arrived at with friendly countries for their assured supply at a notice of 15 days.
- (ii) Minimum serviceability rate for all types of equipment and armament must be maintained at a readiness level of minimum 70 per cent at all times. For this the assistance of our indigenised companies in the Defence Industrial Base should be taken as a permanent measure.
(c) Refining the Higher Defence Organisation and Inculcating Joint-ness
amongst Armed Forces.
The report of Group of Ministers on National Security (2001) had recommended the creation of a post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) for
- (i) Single point military advice,
- (ii) administering strategic forces,
- (iii) enhancing effectiveness of planning process, and
- (iv) promoting joint-ness. Subsequent committees have also forcefully recommended implementation of this report. Joint-ness serves as a force multiplier operationally and will also help in substantial financial savings.
(d) Budgetary Allocations to be Rationalised. An appropriate and thus much enhanced allocation of budget is a pre-requisite to attain preparedness and thus security. This will have to be done for a long period. An allocation of around $200 billion over a period of 10 years will help India attain the desired level of preparedness which will enable it to measure up to the challenges and be seen as a credible security provider in Indo-Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions. As a starter, the Defence Budget must be raised to 3 per cent of the GDP. The newly-created Defence Planning Committee (DPC) is likely to be a great help in expediting all matters.
Long-Term Measures
- (a) Budgetary allocations need to be increased to 3 per cent of the GDP.
- (b) The Higher Defence Organisation has to be refined.
- (c) Civil-military relations to be improved by posting military representatives in the MoD at key decision making posts.
- (d) Force structure to be refined.
- (e) Expedite the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps to enhance and upgrade dissuasive posture against China to one of deterrence.
- (f) Defence Industrial Base to be strengthened, and procurement procedures refined.
- (g) ‘Make in India’ – to be given a push.
Conclusion
As far as the three Services are concerned they must try and ensure
that the allotted resources are optimally utilised and joint-ness is implemented
in letter and spirit. India has to be prepared to fight future wars with due emphasis on Cyber and Space dimensions without sacrificing our capabilities for
conventional warfare. A two-front war can be a live possibility.
*****************************
A Maritime Perspective
R K Dhowan*
[ *R K Dhowan, Chairman, National Maritime Foundation and the Former Chief of the Naval Staff. ]
I
ndia’s quintessential maritime character and vital geo-strategic location in
the Indian Ocean are twin factors that define her vast maritime interests.
The responsibility of protecting these assets fall squarely on the shoulders of
men in white uniform, and it is the responsibility of the Navy to ensure that
these maritime interests, which have a vital relationship with the nation’s
economic growth, are allowed to develop unhindered, both in peace and war.
A ‘two-front war’ is a sub-set of a multi-front ‘State-on-State’ armed
conflict. As the former term indicates, this is an armed conflict on two separate fronts. These ‘fronts’ could involve armed conflict waged in separate
domains (air war and land war, war-at-sea and war-on-land, etc.), or, the
conflict could be waged in geographically distinct theatres (for instance, the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal). Conversely, the term could indicate a
simultaneous conflict of one State against two others. History is replete with
examples of each type. For instance, the aim of the 600-ship US Navy of the
1980s was to gain Command of the Seas and also fight the Soviets on two
maritime fronts, namely the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans.1
In the Indian
context, the 1971 conflict with Pakistan, too, was a two-front campaign,
fought in all the three domains – sea, land, and air.
The possibility of simultaneous armed conflict between India on the
one hand and, China and Pakistan acting either in cooperation or collusion
with each other, on the other, is the subject of this analysis.
In an armed conflict against India, China and Pakistan could choose
either a collaborative or a collusive approach. The former involves one country
openly aiding its partner/ ally, whereas the latter involves more covert cooperation between the two. These approaches could lead to the following
scenarios, among others:
(a) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan, and China intervenes
with actual combat deployments in support of Pakistani forces. The cost of
conflict (to China) in such a scenario would be inordinately high, without commensurate gains either in terms of actual combat winnings or gaining and sustaining a favourable global opinion. Consequently, the likelihood of such a scenario is relatively low.
(b) India is engaged in an armed conflict with Pakistan and China offers moral
and logistic support to Pakistan. The likelihood of such a scenario is high, as it
involves minimal costs and few adverse implications for China.
(c) India and China are engaged in armed conflict and Pakistan supports China
by activating India’s western front. Given the general leanings of Pakistan, Islamabad is unlikely to have any of the inhibitions as applied to China, and
would probably not hesitate in joining hands with China, whether overtly or
covertly, as desired by China. The likelihood of such support being extended
by Pakistan to China, both overt and covert, is, therefore, high.
It may, therefore, be assumed that an armed conflict primarily with
China is quite likely to lead to India facing a two-front war scenario, involving
China and Pakistan.
What is to be done?
There is no gainsaying that two Armies do not, by themselves, go to
war. Nor do two Navies, or two Air Forces. Two nations go to war. In recognition of this truism, a two-front war ought not to be planned-for (and certainly
not executed) at the level of individual armed forces. On the contrary, all three
Services must meaningfully and synergistically contribute towards the political
and military aims of such an armed conflict. India’s joint approach should exploit the principle of manoeuvre — not at the Corps level, but at the ‘Theatre’
one. Basically, rather than confronting the adversary solely at his chosen point
-of-attack, Insia should be in a position to stem or contain such an attack.
Simultaneously, it should draw the adversary into an engagement in a
geographical area or a domain of our choosing, where India is strong, and the
adversary is weak or vulnerable.
