SOURCE :
(a) https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2016/ssi_wortzel_160714.pdf
(b) https://www.academia.edu/34294489/Taking_the_Fight_to_the_Enemy_SSI_pub1322_pdf?email_work_card=view-paper
(c) https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA300/RRA394-1/RAND_RRA394-1.pdf
PLA MODERNIZATION
TAKING THE FIGHT TO THE ENEMY: CHINESE THINKING ABOUT
LONGDISTANCE
&
EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS
LARRY M. WORTZEL
FOREWORD
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was
once focused on China’s immediate periphery. The
PLA Navy had no “blue water” naval capabilities and
very limited combat logistics support. The Air Force
could not fly long-distance missions overwater or operate effectively in conjunction with the Navy or naval air forces; nor could it coordinate joint, precision
strikes with the missiles of the Second Artillery. Land
forces, meanwhile, could move effectively within China by rail, and could operate on China’s periphery,
but were neither capable of nor equipped for long distance force projection.
Dr. Larry M. Wortzel’s Letort Paper analyzes a
body of literature that provides internal critiques of
PLA capabilities. He starts with an analysis of the
book Long-Distance Operations, by a strategist from
the Academy of Military Science of the Chinese PLA,
published in 2007. Although Long-Distance Operations
was an aspirational book urging the military to “take
the fight to the enemy” and hold an enemy’s population and infrastructure at risk, as Wortzel points out in
his analysis, other books of a similar genre in the PLA
called for similar capabilities. His discussion calls for
a more expeditionary PLA. He shows how, with new
weapons systems, a series of major exercises, and new
operational concepts, the PLA is evolving into an expeditionary armed force. These include: electronic
warfare, space surveillance; improved command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR); and integrated
ballistic and cruise missile operations. As Wortzel shows, Long-Distance Operations called for capabilities
to take the fight to a distant enemy’s homeland and
foreshadowed current PLA training and operational
activities
In Wortzel’s view, the focus of Long-Distance Operations on expeditionary capabilities and operations
is a response to the challenge of protecting the everexpanding geographic interests of the Chinese state.
Factors driving these changes include an evolution in
the PLA’s strategic and organizational culture as well
as the availability of high-technology capabilities that
influence the PLA’s concepts for distance operations.
At about the same time Long-Distance Operations was
published, a number of other military thinkers at different institutions in China advocated similar forms
of operations and the development of similar weapons systems, indicating common thinking in the PLA
about future warfare. The fact that a number of institutions and authors deal with the same topics in the
same time frame likely means that the publication of
Long-Distance Operations and other books discussed in
this Letort Paper reflected not only the aspirations of
PLA strategists, but also the objectives of high-level
PLA national leaders who saw a need for new forms
of expeditionary operations. Indeed, in late-2015,
changes in the PLA organization and force structure
show that many of the critiques discussed by Wortzel foreshadowed changes that China’s leaders wanted to
bring about.
Over several years, the PLA has conducted a series
of military exercises to improve capabilities, improve
force projection, employ advanced intelligence and reconnaissance systems, and refine command and control. In December 2015 and January 2016, the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission (CMC) changed the way intelligence and logistics
for the PLA are organized and provided. The CMC
also reorganized China’s seven military regions into
five theateres of war (sometimes translated as theaters
of operation) with integrated joint staffs. The Second
Artillery Corps was reorganized into the PLA Rocket
Force; the logistics, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, cyber and electronic warfare, and space
control organizations have been reorganized into the
Strategic Support Force; and the ground forces of the
PLA were made a separate branch of the armed forces,
the PLA Army. To facilitate command and control and
strengthen the leadership of the CMC, the General
Staff Department, the General Armaments Department, the General Political Department, and the General Logistics Department were disestablished, and
their functions were moved into a reorganized CMC.
Meanwhile, a new General Headquarters became part
of the CMC.
Wortzel’s analysis provides some of the rationale
for these changes in the Chinese military. His use of
doctrinal materials suggests that there is value in following the writings of PLA officers who are advocating new forms of weapons and operations. Although
it is common for many policy analysts and scholars
to dismiss such writings as “aspirational,” they do,
however, capture trends in PLA military operational
development. Wortzel concludes that even if there is
a gap in time between the publication of books with
aspirational ideas and operational concepts, and the
fielding of new weapons and forms of operations that
put those concepts into effect, the research offers accurate insights into future PLA operations and systems.
Observers must compare the ideas in aspirational
future studies to PLA exercises and training to determine which concepts are being put into practice.
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press
SUMMARY
This Letort Paper analyzes Long-Distance Operations, a Chinese-language book published by the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military
Sciences (AMS) in 2007, as well as several other contemporaneous PLA publications.
An assessment of
this body of literature shows that Long-Distance Operations provides an internal critique by a PLA strategist
of PLA operational and equipment deficiencies. Many
of the capabilities, concepts for engaging an enemy,
and forms of expeditionary operations called for in
Long-Distance Operations have become operational
doctrine in the PLA or have been reflected in weapons
development programs since the book’s publication.
For instance, the PLA has made long-distance deployments with flotillas and expeditionary task groups,
conducted long-range air operations, conducted exercises for long-distance ground force deployments, and
used expeditionary forces for non-combatant evacuation operations.
At about the same time Long-Distance Operations
was published, other Chinese military thinkers advocated for similar forms and concepts of operations,
along with the development of similar weapons systems, indicating that these authors represent important currents of thinking in the PLA about future warfare. The publication of Long-Distance Operations and
the other books discussed in this Letort Paper were aspirational. However, the publications appear to have
followed calls from high-level PLA leaders for new
forms and concepts of expeditionary operations, as
well as new capabilities for undertaking them. Most
notable, Long-Distance Operations called for capabilities to take the fight to a distant enemy’s homeland.
The focus of Long-Distance Operations on expeditionary capabilities and operations may be seen as a
response to the challenge of protecting the ever-expanding geographic interests of the Chinese state. Factors including the PLA’s strategic and organizational
culture as well as the availability of high-technology
capabilities will influence the PLA’s concepts for distance operations.
Thus far, the recommendations related to expeditionary operations have all been couched under the
rubric of China’s longstanding “active defense” strategy. As part of active defense, one of the key ideas
advanced in Long-Distance Operations is the need to
target an adversary’s homeland and bring the threat
to an enemy’s civilian population
This analysis suggests that there is value in tracking the writings of PLA officers who are advocating new weapons systems, forms of operations, and
operational concepts. The research can offer leading
indicators of, and context for, emerging PLA capabilities. Observers should compare the aspirational literature to actual PLA exercises and training to determine
which concepts are being put into practice and at what
rate.
Finally, it is important to realize that tracking the
careers of individual Chinese military strategist-authors who participate in debates about future capabilities may be a useful window into the salience of
particular currents of thought and the relative importance of particular domains of warfare as perceived by
the PLA.
INTRODUCTION
As a point of departure for additional research,
this Letort Paper examines a 2007 book, Long-Distance
Operations (远战), published by the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) Academy of Military Science
(AMS).1
The book is noteworthy because it examines
what the author, Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), believes to
be serious deficiencies in PLA capabilities that leave
China’s mainland and populace open to attacks by
a “hegemonistic,” advanced military power.2
Jiang
makes recommendations for the PLA to prepare and
engage in military operations at far distances from
China’s immediate periphery and to develop the capability to engage a distant enemy. Jiang argues that
the PLA needs to be able to engage enemies with longdistance and expeditionary operations at far distances
from China’s immediate shores and waters, as well
as be able to threaten an enemy’s civilian populace
in the same ways that he believes China’s populace is
threatened.
This Letort Paper first provides background on Jiang and his Long-Distance Operations publication and
then puts Long-Distance Operations into the context
of other military publications of the time before examining Jiang’s assessments of PLA weaknesses and
vulnerabilities. After discussing Jiang’s views on gaps
and deficiencies in PLA military capabilities that leave
the military and China’s populace open to aggression
by an advanced, expeditionary foreign military power, this Letort Paper reviews military tions, exercises, and activities in the PLA to address
the gaps that Jiang has identified. In the Conclusion,
this Letort Paper assesses the PLA's progress in its
operational capabilities to conduct long-distance and
expeditionary operations.
BACKGROUND ON JIANG’S LONG-DISTANCE
OPERATIONS
At the time he wrote Long-Distance Operations, Jiang Yamin was a PLA senior colonel assigned as a researcher at the AMS (军事科学院), the PLA’s pre-eminent military studies and strategy institution. The AMS
works directly for the PLA General Staff Department
and advises the Central Military Commission (CMC),
the highest civil-military authority in the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and China. Since the publication of the book, Jiang Yamin has been promoted to
major general and at present, is the deputy director
of the AMS Combat Theory and Regulations Research
Department (作战理论和条令研究部).3
Long-Distance Operations was published 3 years after CMC Chairman Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) challenged the
PLA to develop the capacity to protect China’s developing international interests. Hu made this challenge
in a December 24, 2004, speech to the CMC and PLA
political commissars entitled “Historic Missions of the
Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century.”4
As a gauge of the PLA’s reaction to the speech, in
2008, the PLA Navy sent its first task force to the Gulf
of Aden as a response to a piracy attack on a Chinese
ship.5
The view inside the PLA that China’s military
needed to be able to operate outside China’s periphery developed over time. PLA strategists and military thinkers studied the 1982 Falklands War between
Britain and Argentina for lessons in modern warfare. PLA military thinkers learned the importance
of air support for naval operations, forward basing
for long-distance combat operations, and the effectiveness of submarines and anti-ship cruise missiles
in maritime combat.6
PLA military thinkers reinforced those lessons by observing U.S. operations in
Iraq and Kosovo. PLA studies show a combination
of envy, admiration, and fear of U.S. operational capabilities, attitudes reflected in Jiang’s Long-Distance
Operations.
Since publishing Long-Distance Operations, Jiang
has raised his public profile and lectured in public
fora on the use of gaming to prepare the PLA for operations.7
Jiang also discussed the Chinese Internet,
Internet security, and information operations at meetings in China.8
At a 2011 meeting of China’s gaming
industry held in Beijing’s Western Hills, where the
AMS is located, Jiang discussed how gaming can help
address civil-military integration and assist the PLA
in addressing strategic issues.9
In writing Long-Distance Operations, Jiang attempted to establish himself as an innovator of new military
concepts and terminology. Since 2004, the PLA has
used the term “joint, integrated operations” (“联合一
体作战”) to describe how the military should ensure
that all arms and services, as well as reserves, militia,
and paramilitary forces, should be able to conduct operations in a coordinated manner across the domains
of war.10 Jiang also introduces the concept of “unified,
collaborative operations” (“统一配合作战”). Although
Jiang’s attempt at a neologism did not catch on in the
PLA, his conceptual framework is the same as the
established PLA doctrine of joint, integrated operations.11 In other areas, Jiang departs from the standard
terminology in PLA doctrine. He suggests that training should be “pluralistic and integrated” (“多元集成
化训练”) instead of using the PLA’s accepted doctrinal
term “joint integrated training” (“联合一体训练”).12 Jiang also insists that the PLA ensure that the proper
strategy (谋略) is applied in a manner consistent with
operational art (战法).13
Long-Distance Operations does not appear to have
been reviewed or approved by an editorial writing
group, as are formal doctrinal publications from the
AMS. Thus, the book does not represent the collective
judgment of the institution. Jiang’s ideas do have some
authority in the sense that he holds a senior position at
the AMS, which has published his work. However, the
book should be viewed as Jiang’s attempt to capture
trends in future military art and to suggest ways the
PLA should approach future operations while seeking to burnish his own identity and reputation as an
innovator of new military doctrine.
Jiang’s title for the book, Yuan Zhan (远战), is a contraction of the Chinese term Yuan Cheng Zuo Zhan (远
程作战), which has been a concept in PLA operational
art for a long time. In justifying a shift for the PLA
to “long-distance or expeditionary operations,” Jiang
reminds readers that China has a long history of expeditionary operations. He wrote that:
600 years ago, China was one of the world’s greatest
economic and military powers, and at the same time
had the world’s greatest capacity for long-distance
military operations.14
What Jiang describes is PLA operational art in
Long-Distance Operations and the importance of taking
the battle out of China’s peripheral waters into the far seas and beyond. He also adds to the “active defense”
concept the need to be able to conduct attacks on an
enemy homeland that bring the threat to an enemy’s
civilian population
JIANG’s LONG-DISTANCE OPERATIONS IN
PERSPECTIVE
To put Long-Distance Operations into perspective,
it should be understood as an attempt to move away
from China’s traditional, peripheral close-in or “nearseas” defense posture as it transitions to great power
status. The crux of Jiang’s most important argument is
that long-distance operations “in no way [mean] that
China must change its traditional defensive orientation” (“绝不意着要改变防御性的国防政策”).15 However, to establish a strong capability to conduct longdistance operations, China must adapt its defense
posture to one more suited to modern “informatized
conditions” and be ready to “make rational choices
and prepare for combat under information systemsbased long-distance warfare conditions” (“信息化远
站条件下进行争政准备的合理的选择”).16 In this sense,
the book advances the concept of “active defense” and
urges the PLA to develop new forms of weapons that
are suitable for this strategy.17
Jiang was not alone in advocating what later translated into shifts in China’s strategy. Other officers of
his grade and generation: colonels, senior colonels,
and major generals, who are officers in their 30s
through late-40s, either explicitly or implicitly urge
similar changes in strategy and strategic culture. Careful analyses of publications by these younger PLA authors help capture trends in their thinking and that of
their peers, which often reveal future trends in military posture or doctrine.
Long-Distance Operations fits into a genre that is not
established PLA doctrine, but attempts to push doctrine and military operations in new directions. To a
certain extent, the books are aspirational and advocate
capabilities and weapons systems that would make
the PLA a more effective actor in a global context.
Among the other books that fit this mold are:
• Unrestricted Warfare (超限战) by Qiao Liang
(乔良) and Wang Xiansui (王湘穗);18
• Unhappy China (中国不高兴) by Song Xiaojun
(宋晓军) and coauthors;19
• The Study of Integrated Aerospace Operations (
空天一体作战学) by Cai Fengzhen and Tian
Anping;20
• Integrated Aerospace Information Operations (空天
一体信息作战) by Li Rongchang and his writing team;21 and,
• A Discussion of China’s National Maritime Interests (国家海上利益论) by Wang Lidong.22
In each of these cases, the authors are from the
PLA, and many were assigned to positions that require them to explore new military concepts. All of the
authors seem to believe that within the context of active defense, and the transition to major power status,
China must be able to impose its will quickly and at
extended distances with effective military forces. All
of these authors are writing books that are aspirational in terms of doctrine, force posture, new weapons,
and tactics.
Qiao and Wang advance the case for a combination of legal warfare, information warfare, and space
warfare directed against an enemy and its populace,
combined with the development of “new concept
weapons” for the PLA.23 Song argues for a navy that can operate on the high seas, commenting that the escort operations the PLA Navy is conducting off of Africa are not sufficient for national security or to protect
sea lines of communication (SLOCs).24 Cai and Tian
are major proponents for the capacity to conduct longdistance air operations combined with information
warfare, space warfare, and anti-satellite programs.25
Li, Cheng, and Zheng, like their Air Force counterparts
Cai and Tian, want to see the PLA be able to orchestrate integrated offensive operations against an enemy
on its homeland, in the air, and in space, by combining information attacks, electronic warfare, traditional
air operations, and space warfare.26 Wang expressed
the view that as the PLA gets stronger to carry out the
kinds of external missions implied in Hu’s “historic
missions” speech, it would need to develop a stronger
maritime capacity as part of China’s “comprehensive
national security.”27 The common denominator among
these writers is the need to shift from close-in defensive strategies to active defense and greater deterrence
in a regional or global context.
The books are not doctrine; they should be read
as texts produced by journeyman PLA strategists or
military thinkers who are not senior leaders or combat force commanders. These authors have caught
what appears to be a popular current among their
peers, providing ideas about changes in strategy. Of
course, the fact that these books were published by
established publishing houses under central military
control may also mean that these currents of thinking
represent trends that are at least tacitly supported by
more senior PLA officers. Certainly, if such writings
were seen as heretical or disloyal by senior leaders
in the CCP or PLA, the books would be pulled off
the market, the authors would likely be subject to re-education, and probably be forced to leave active
duty in the PLA. However, it does not appear that this
has happened.
JIANG ON CHINA’S WEAKNESSES AGAINST A
POWERFUL “HEGEMONISTIC” ENEMY
Jiang is emphatic that if China is to become a “developing great power” (“发展中的大国”) it must have
a powerful capacity to conduct long-distance operations, both to engage the enemy at far distances from
China’s coast and to develop expeditionary capabilities in the PLA.28 According to Jiang, the only way that
China can oppose “great power hegemonism” is to be
able to engage an enemy at far distances from China’s
mainland.29 Doing so, Jiang asserts, is the key to securing stability and national security. Of course, by using
the formulation he did, “oppose hegemonism” (“反霸
权主义”), without naming the United States as the potential enemy, Jiang makes it clear that it is the threatening capabilities of the “hegemonist great power”
that force China to respond with its own long-distance
military operational capabilities.
Jiang develops this theme with a chart that demonstrates China’s deficiencies in long-distance operations against an enemy’s capabilities to conduct such
operations. See Table 1.
Table 1. Enemy Capabilities and
China’s Deficiencies.30
Jiang concludes that to be able to conduct an effective conventional conflict in which nuclear weapons
are not used, the PLA needs to develop a number of
long-distance operational capabilities, without which
China cannot become a 21st-century great power:
1. The capacity to conduct sustained conventional
long-range ballistic missile strikes;
2. Ground fires, naval fires, air fires, and cruise
missile fires that can engage the enemy at long
ranges;
3. Long-distance artillery strikes with guided
weapons;
4. Numerous types of air platforms capable of
long-distance precision strikes;
5. Long-range, stealthy strike aircraft;
6. Long-range unmanned aerial vehicles capable
to strike;
7. Unmanned, long-range electronic warfare platforms;
8. Effective submarine attack capabilities;
9. Unmanned naval and submarine strike platforms;
10. Effective offensive mine-laying capabilities;
11. Aerostats (浮空器) (lighter than air platforms)
for air strikes, communications, reconnaissance,
electronic warfare, and bombing;
12. Ground-launched anti-satellite weapons;
13. Space-based anti-satellite weapons and surface
attack weapons;
14. New-concept, advanced-attack weapons (e.g.,
millimeter wave, rail gun, directed energy);
and,
15. Deep-insertion special operations forces.31
The attention Jiang paid to developing the capability to conduct sudden attacks from deep space and
concentrated fires from air and space to break up enemy formations and destroy troops and equipment
is not unique in PLA thinking. As early as 2002, PLA
publications on future warfare called for the development of these capabilities.32 However, Jiang argues for
a comprehensive approach to long-distance operations that extends to the enemy’s rear areas and holds
its non-combatant populace at risk.
According to Jiang, the key to a long-distance
strike network is the availability of satellite reconnaissance with excellent resolution.33 He makes reference
to the success of the United States in the first Iraq war
as an example of the types of long-distance operations that such satellite reconnaissance enables.34 For
China, however, according to Jiang, the PLA needs
enough satellite coverage so a target is not acquired
only once or twice a day.35 In other words, persistent
coverage and persistent strike require a geostationary look, a network of satellites with different orbits, or
unmanned platforms that can keep a target under persistent observation.
With regard to platforms for long-distance operations, Jiang makes the case for developing nuclear powered aircraft carriers and miniaturizing the size of
nuclear reactors so that space weapons, ground combat vehicles, and more ships can employ nuclear power.36 To be able to conduct precision strikes on critical
targets, China needs to develop weapons like the U.S.
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).37 Jiang also advocates the development of unmanned strike aircraft
that operate in space and can attack surface targets
with guided JDAM-like munitions. 38 For future operations into the 2020 to 2025 time frame, Jiang wants
to see the PLA develop a generation of submarine launched, long-distance, high-speed attack missiles
that can be effective against ground and sea targets.39
Addressing the need for weapons that can support long-distance operations, Jiang foresees a range
of new platforms, weapons, and equipment requirements.40 He thinks most of China’s current systems
support mid-distance operations, but in order to conduct long-distance operations, all of China’s weapons
systems must be capable of greater speed, endurance,
and increased lethality.41 Specifically, with respect to
“new concept weapons,” Jiang believes China needs:
• Long-range cruise missiles with precision accuracy;
• Conventional long-distance munitions with
greater killing power;
• Long-distance electronic warfare capabilities;
• Directed energy munitions and weapons like
lasers and electric guns;
• Network attack systems that can paralyze enemy command control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems;
• Networked offensive weapons systems that
can attack a distant enemy; and,
• New and advanced forms of propellants and
explosives. 42
In the concluding chapters of Long-Distance Operations, Jiang discusses the need to develop long-range
precision-strike capabilities, the ability to operate on
or above the high seas, and new forms of weapons.43
This final section is entitled “Weilai de Yuan Zhan”
(“未来的远战”) (“Future Long-Distance Operations”).
In its four chapters, Jiang discusses the structure of
a long-distance strategy as creating a “long-distance
killing axe” (“远战止戈”),44 the weapons and equipment that create a long-distance warfare system, the
“shape” or “pattern” of future long-distance operations, and the need to create a new culture of national
defense in China that supports long-distance operations (which the author of this Letort Paper interprets
as a more active offensive posture). As in the book’s
initial chapters, Jiang spends more time reviewing the
evolution of weaponry than he does explaining how
new weapons translate into the basis for new forms
or concepts of operations. The book looks very much
like the review of the relationship between range,
weaponry, precision fires, and warfare in Robert H.
Scales, Jr.’s book Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the
Gulf War, in which Scales begins a conceptual exploration of how operations in future wars may evolve, focusing on a historical review of weapons, tactics, and
operations.45
Jiang borrows extensively from American thinking about the conduct of war but does not attribute
his terms. In his discussion of the art of war (战法) (or
methods of war), Jiang draws heavily on U.S. operational concepts. Citing only “profound expressions”
(“奥达”) used by foreign armies, Jiang explains the observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) loop concept in U.S.
doctrine,46 prevalent since the 1950s. In Jiang’s view,
the ability to adopt the art of long-distance warfare
means that in China, the OODA loop should be adopted as (观察-定位-判断-决策) (Guancha [scrutinize or
observe], Dingwei [locate or orient], Panduan [judge],
and Juece [make a strategic decision]).47 Jiang believes
the process should inform all practical command and
control decisions a leader may face.48 Under the modern conditions of informatized and networked warfare, operational troops and commanders must use
all of the C4ISR systems available to them in making
operational decisions.49
Jiang notes the importance of developing unmanned operations platforms (无人作战平台) that
combine precision strike and killing power, but does
not discuss the specifics of platform capabilities.50 Nor
does he address how employing the new platforms
will allow the PLA to transform warfare or operations,
except to reiterate the concept of a “long distance killing axe.” According to Jiang, being able to employ
long-distance platforms requires China to develop a
strong aerospace information network.51 In addition,
this network requires a precision timing and satellite navigation network on par with the U.S. Global
Positioning System,52 something that China had only
begun to deploy with its BeiDou navigation satellite
system when the book was written in 2007. The coordination of joint operations in future war means that all of the arms and services of the PLA must be part of
an information systems network to collectively support all of the arms and services of the PLA.53
Since 2007, when Jiang published Long-Distance
Operations, the PLA has actively worked to address
many of the deficiencies that he identified. The PLA
has made long-distance deployments with flotillas
and expeditionary task groups, conducted long-range
air operations, exercised for long-distance ground
force deployments, and used expeditionary forces for
non-combatant evacuation operations.
A General Logistics Department officer, Zeng Youchun (曾友春), writing in China Military Science in 2009,
called for the development of a strategic force projection capability for the PLA in order to keep up with
the materiel and support needs and speed of modern
operations.54 Zeng called for the PLA to modernize its
strategic force projection and to develop “new types of
airdrop precision systems, using datalink technology,
and to implement precision force projection at the right
time, place, and quantity.”55 Expressed in U.S. terms,
this amounts to on-time logistics support at precise locations for deployed forces. In addition, Zeng believes
the PLA must develop strategic stockpiles of materiel
to meet battlefield needs.56 Another authoritative publication was the 2014 PLA AMS three-volume, 1,978-
page, work by the former commander of the Nanjing
Military Region, retired General Zhu Wenquan (朱
文泉), On Island Warfare (岛屿战争论).57 Zhu’s work
contains a preface by former Chinese Minister of Defense and deputy director of the CMC, Chi Haotian
(迟浩田), who points out that without developing into
a strong maritime power, China cannot develop along
the path to become a strong world power.58 In closing
the three-volume work, Zhu emphasizes that in order to be effective in strategic deterrence (战略威慑), China must be able to have strong military power, the will
to use that power, and the capacity to make sure that
an enemy believes that the foregoing two points are
a real threat.59 In pursuit of that, the PLA is actively
conducting exercises and publishing doctrine to realize the capacity to conduct long-distance operations.
MILITARY PUBLICATIONS AND ACTIVITIES
THAT ADDRESS GAPS IDENTIFIED BY JIANG
The PLA Navy did not deploy outside the first
island chain, extending from Japan through Taiwan,
from 2004 through 2006.60 It refined operations through
exercises in the “near seas” (the Bohai Gulf, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the
South China Sea).61 In 2005 and 2008, for example, the
North Sea Fleet conducted long-distance operations,
exercises, and training to focus on integrated operations between surface ships and submarines.62 In 2008,
the PLA sent its first escort task force to the Gulf of
Aden. The task force consisted of two destroyers and
a replenishment ship. On April 3, 2015, the PLA Navy
sent its 20th task force of the same size for escort missions in the Gulf. 63 Before that, a 10-ship flotilla transiting 500 kilometers from the Shandong area to the
Yellow Sea was considered a long-distance operation,
even though the flotilla never left China’s near seas
inside the first island chain.64
From 2007 to 2009, the PLA Navy began to operate in the Western Pacific in the Philippine Sea as part
of a strategy of near-seas active defense.65 After a series of deployments into the Philippine Sea in 2010 to
2012, the PLA Navy began a transition to a “far-seas”
defense capability, sending naval task forces in the
Western Pacific.66 According to the PLA Daily, a North Sea Fleet surface action task force conducted reconnaissance and patrol operations through the Miyako
Strait (in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands, Okinawa, and Taiwan) into the Western Pacific.67 Earlier,
the PLA Navy had sent an expeditionary task force
into the Indian Ocean after landing exercises in the
Spratly Islands.68 This task force transited the Sunda
and Lomboc Straits. Analysts at the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence believe that President and Chairman
of the CMC Xi Jinping and senior PLA leaders “are
pushing development of mission sets such as military
operations other than war (MOOTW) and sea lines of
communication (SLOC) protection,” making a transition from offshore defense to “blue water defense.”69
Chinese strategists perceive a potential vulnerability
in SLOCs for trade coming from the Indian Ocean, the
bulk of which passes through the Malacca Strait. For
the PLA Navy, this creates a requirement to be able
to secure these SLOCs. The PLA refers to this as its
“Malacca Dilemma,” fearing that in a conflict, a hostile power, primarily India or the United States, may
interdict shipping to China there.70
In his study for the U.S. National Defense University, Christopher Sharman, a Navy officer and former
naval attaché in China, argued that China is ready
to modify its maritime strategy and create a far-seas
strategy with regular patrol operations in the Indian
Ocean and Western Pacific.71 Between 2010 and 2012,
Sharman documents 13 PLA naval operations from
all three PLA Navy fleets through straits and channels that pass through the first island chain into the
Western Pacific.72 Moving to a strategy of “far-seas
defense,” according to Sharman, in 2013 and 2014, the
PLA Navy sent 19 naval task forces into the Western
Pacific, making deployments there part of normal routine.73 Sharman also documents PLA Navy aircraft being integrated into operations in the Philippine Sea,
including Y-8 and Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft and
PLA Navy H-6 bombers.74
With respect to space intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR), Cai Fengzhen, a PLA Air Force
(PLAAF) major general, and Tian Anping, a PLAAF
senior colonel, agree with Jiang and believe that China
must develop a robust, space-based reconnaissance
capacity to support precision-strike and long-distance
operations.75 Imaging satellite capabilities, according
to Cai and Tian, must be complemented by electronic warfare and electronic sensor systems in space to
target a distant enemy.76 Pursuing paralyzing effects
from computer attack and electronic warfare, Dai
Qingmin (菜风震), former director of the PLA General
Staff Department Radar and Electronic Countermeasures Department, laid out a vision of future combat
operations that focuses on:
the destruction and control of the enemy’s information infrastructure and strategic life blood, selecting
key enemy targets, and launching effective networkelectronic attacks.77
Jiang also suggests that in doing so the PLA expects to
weaken and paralyze an enemy’s decisionmaking and
the political, economic, and military aspects of its entire war potential. With respect to Jiang’s suggestions
about the use of aerostats, according to Defense News:
Chinese academic, commercial, and military institutions are aggressively studying the use of lighter-thanair (LTA) platforms for a variety of missions, including
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, special
operations, transportation over rugged terrain and as
communications relays.78
A survey by Defense News in 2010 identified over thirty
academic, military, and science and technology institutions involved in the program.79
The PLA also has fielded two versions of stealth
fighter aircraft, the J-20 and the J-31, developed at
two different state-owned aircraft factories.80 In 2014,
a hypersonic missile, the WU-14, was tested as part
of research into hypersonic glide weapons.81 According to Mark Stokes of Project 2049, a Washington,
DC-area think tank, the PLA may be able to conduct
“boosted hypersonic . . . intercontinental strike by
2020” and field “before 2025 . . . hypersonic scram-jetpropelled cruise vehicle for global operations.”82 In
2010, the PLAAF conducted its first long-range fighter
deployment to Turkey for a joint exercise.83 During
this deployment, the aircraft were refueled in flight by
PLA tankers and also made a stop in Iran. In pursuit
of long-range bomber strike capabilities, the PLAAF
“deployed bombers for strikes on ground targets” in
support of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization exercise in Kazakhstan.84 The aircraft also were refueled
in flight in order to conduct the long-distance strike
mission.
The PLAAF conducted its first long-distance “mobility and combat drill” over the western Pacific in
March 2015. 85 In this exercise, a number of aircraft
conducted a patrol around the Bashi Channel, between the Philippines and Taiwan.86 New versions of
the PLAAF H-6G bomber from the Guangzhou Military Region (MR) conducted this training.87 This may
be an attempt by the PLAAF to catch up with the PLA
Navy in operations capacity; however, the concept
of “joint, integrated operations” means that the Air
Force should be able to do these things along with the
Navy.88
There also are commentaries being published on
support mechanisms for long-distance operations.
In a PLA web blog, one author complains about the
PLAAF’s shortcomings in “advanced fighter jets,
bombers, large aircraft, missiles and precision-guided bombs.” 89 However, the author notes that even if
these capabilities are improved, a major limitation to
long-distance air operations is the inability to conduct
the necessary search and rescue.90 The commentator
argues that in air combat in and beyond the Diaoyu
Islands (the Senkaku Islands) or in the South China
Sea, the capability to conduct long-distance combat
search and rescue will be important to sustaining operations.91 The author believes that the PLAAF must
develop a long-distance special operations capability
to complement search and rescue activities.
The PLA is carrying out a number of exercises to
sharpen its ability to conduct joint warfare, project
force, and carry out precision strikes.92 In 2010, the
PLA conducted “Mission Action” (“使命行动”) transregional joint exercises to refine the ability to project
power.93 The “Joint Action” (“联合”) exercises by the
PLA will continue through 2054, and are designed to
respond to Xi’s instructions to “raise the combat level
of military training” for all forces.94 These exercises
include long-distance force projection training for the
PLA at sea, overland, and in the air, focusing on improving joint force coordination in exercises that involved opposing forces.95 The Second Artillery Corps
forces are integrated into the exercises to improve
coordination among arms and services. They are conducted along with joint firepower exercises (火力),96
including the “Kua Yeu” (“long-stride”) exercises,
which are designed to improve integrated and rapid
force projection over long distances.97
In an overwater long-distance air exercise on April
14, 2014, a PLAAF regiment “sent three mid-sized
transport planes . . . on a long-distance journey to a
target area in long-range waters to implement over-sea
flight training.”98 In this mission, the Air Force practiced “over-sea flying, low altitude mobility, airdrop
and air landing [operations], and formation forming.”99 The PLAAF newspaper said that this was the
longest flying time for overwater flight training and
the farthest distance for such operations in 50 years.100
The airborne drops mean that the training probably
involved units one or more divisions subordinate to
the PLAAF 15th Airborne Corps, headquartered in
Xiaogan, Hubei Province in Guangzhou MR.101 Transports probably came from the 14th Air Transport Division, which according to Indian publications, support
the 15th Airborne Corps.102
To reach these objectives for long-distance operations, the PLA is adding improved surveillance and
target acquisition capabilities with new airborne
early-warning and control aircraft that can operate
from shorter airfields, such as those being constructed
in the Spratly Islands. There has been a good deal of
progress in the PLA in improving long-distance target
acquisition and management in operations. According
to an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly, the PLA has put
into active service a new airborne early-warning and
control aircraft, the KJ-500, with a new radar.103 The
radar is mounted on the Y-9, an aircraft smaller than
the PLA Y-8 and IL-76, and “can acquire and track 6 to
100 targets simultaneously at a range out to 470 kilometers.” 104 The author of the article, Richard D. Fisher,
finds the phased array radar on the KJ-500 “strikingly
similar” to the Swedish Saab Erieye radar, which has
a field of view of 240 degrees.105 In a further comment on the significance of the new system, Fisher stated
that the Y-9 can use a 1,300 meter airstrip, so it “could
be deployed to the Spratly Island Group” and operate
in support of a South China Sea Air Defense Intercept
Zone if one was established.106 The Y-9 is a mediumsized transport and support aircraft developed as an
improvement on the Y-8.107 In comparison, the U.S.
E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS) aircraft has a target acquisition range of 375
kilometers for low-flying targets and 650 kilometers
for medium- and high-altitude targets, but requires
a 2,600 meter runway.108 The smaller U.S. Navy E-2C
can take off and land from an aircraft carrier and can
track 600 targets.109
Other organizations and military thinkers in the
PLA also are exploring improving information networks. Three authors from the PLA National Defense
University have sketched out a plan to improve command and control coordination in theaters of war
(战区) with an emphasis on conducting joint operations.110 Among their suggestions is ensuring that subordinate to the Theater of War headquarters, there
should be a PLAAF Campaign Group Command
and Control headquarters that can ensure that subordinate airborne forces and Air Force combat and
support elements are able to operate jointly with the
PLA Navy forces and PLA Marines.111 Their objective
is to overcome the tendency in the PLA for each service and branch (ground forces, Navy, Air Force, and
Second Artillery Corps) to operate independently in
“silos” or cones and to ensure that the Theater of War
commander and staff can conduct joint operations
at distances away from the immediate periphery of
China.112 All of this is designed to create a “system of
systems” approach to C4ISR and to ensure that command, control, reconnaissance, and strike operations
are jointly coordinated.113 The United States tends to
be the model PLA officers use to demonstrate the need
for a comprehensive C4ISR system. A team of authors
from the AMS wants to see a national-level, strategic
C4ISR system that can support long-distance missile
operations and networked service and arms specific
C4ISR capabilities for theater operations.114 In December 2015, many of these changes were implemented in
the PLA, the full implications and outline of which are
still to be assessed.115
Further exploring this idea of the advantages
and inherent weaknesses of a “system of systems”
approach to military operations, one PLA officer assesses the limitations of information systems-based
approaches to command and control and the ways to
use those weaknesses against an enemy that employs
information-based C4ISR in war.116 Zhang Wenyong
argues that:
In informatized conditions, with operational systems
supported by information systems, it is now possible
to break out of the situation in which connections are
“vertically strong but horizontally weak” among the
various military branches, eliminate the “information
islands” which existed in the past, and realize complementary coordination of functions and mutual support among the various military branches. 117
Zhang continues his assessment by pointing out
that one can take advantage of the ability to paralyze
an enemy’s “system of systems” to carry out:
long-range damaging attacks, precision point strikes,
and decapitation strikes against enemy operational
systems . . . using precision firepower strike to implement structural damage; using saboteurs to ment structure damage; and using information attack
methods to implement structural damage. 118
There is a strong current in PLA military literature
arguing for the sorts of “new concept weapons” advocated by Jiang. Writing in the Winged Missiles Journal,
three authors from the 63650 unit of the PLA General
Armaments Department assess U.S. successes with
directed energy weapons and point out that:
1. Directed energy weapon systems are diverse in
form and purpose. They are defensive systems
that provide cover for other main battle weapons,
and they are offensive systems that can directly
attack enemy armaments.
2. They are a combination of various battle modes:
electronic warfare, information warfare, network
warfare, and psychological warfare. Directed energy weapons in joint operations can deter enemy
strategic intentions to initiate battle and engage in
warfare. On the campaign level, they can scramble
the enemy’s decision-making programs; on the
tactical level, they can accomplish the goal of paralyzing enemy force systems.
3. Because directed energy weapons can become the
main battle weapons for seizing electromagnetic
supremacy and information dominance on future
battlefields, the main counteractive measures will
be soft kill and hard destruction attacks against
directed energy weapon positions; the question
that must be resolved then is: How are directed
energy weapons to be protected and quickly
restored to action? 119
Although such systems are not yet matured, they
imply that there is great potential for improving China’s operational capabilities in developing similar
systems.120
The progress made by the PLA in making its active defense strategy more relevant to a nation with
international interests is remarkable, although slow.
If one compares the changes documented above, how
do they compare to what Jiang recommended in 2007?
EVALUATING THE 2015 PLA USING JIANG’S
2007 STANDARDS
The PLA’s long-distance operations training is
probably more noteworthy for the tentative and exploratory nature of its operations and limited size and
scope than it is for what the PLA has accomplished to
date. All of this suggests that the PLA and its senior
leadership are slowly and carefully developing the capacity for long-distance operations, but are not rushing to rapidly convert the PLA into an expeditionary
force.
Examining Jiang’s comparison of China’s deficiencies in long-distance operations against an enemy
(see Table 1.), China has only minimally improved its
capacity to strike the enemy’s forward-deployed platforms. The DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile may be
fielded, but it is very dependent on ISR capabilities
that the PLA may not be able to sustain in combat. Efforts to improve the strike and engagement capability
with bombers and fighters are not yet fully developed,
and still require the use of air-to-surface anti-ship
cruise missiles. Meanwhile, the United States has improved its own capabilities for striking China’s bases,
platforms, and rear areas and incorporated new systems into concepts like air-sea battle and rapid, flexible deployments of combat aircraft.
The PLA has achieved a notable capacity to conduct
cyberattacks on the United States and can attack the
United States with strategic nuclear weapons. However, it is a long way from developing the capability
to threaten U.S. rear areas. The United States would be
able to conduct operations in essential peace, so long
as nuclear deterrence holds in a conventional conflict. The PLA however, can strike U.S. forward bases
in Asia with a combination of missiles, aircraft, and
potentially, naval fires.
China’s ISR capabilities have improved significantly over the intervening years, primarily over the
Western Pacific. The PLA still does not have the type
of sophisticated, redundant surveillance over the
United States and the forward bases that the United
States can employ. In addition, although China is
improving its overwater surveillance, it has limited
airborne warning and control assets and only one
aircraft carrier from which to base AWACS systems.
That said, the newer Y-9 aircraft could operate from
Chinese-controlled land features in the South China
Sea. U.S. operations, mobility, and tactics, therefore,
remain better concealed than China’s.
China’s rear areas are still relatively easy to be disrupted by U.S. forward-deployed forces and concepts
like global strike, if not with cyber penetrations. The
U.S. homeland, in comparison, remains relatively safe,
except for the problem of China’s cyberattack capabilities. However, there is no real threat to the U.S. populace right now from China in a conventional conflict,
since China has made only incremental improvements
in the security of interior lines of communication with
its “far-seas strategy” thus far.
Addressing the types of weapons and capabilities
Jiang wanted the PLA to develop, there is no question that the PLA can conduct effective conventional
ballistic missile strikes, but how sustained they can be
may not meet Jiang’s criteria. In cruise missiles, naval, and air fires, the PLA has made improvements,
but to have effective precision fires, the PLA still must
improve its ISR.
There are now PLA stealth aircraft programs in
the process of testing and initial fielding, but these do
not currently meet the level of capability that Jiang
envisioned. The same is true for China’s developing
unmanned air and naval vehicle capabilities. In areas
like mine-laying, long-range aerial reconnaissance,
and submarines, the PLA capability has improved,
but not to the point that they would be crippling factors in a conflict.
In space attack and anti-satellite weapons, whether space-based or ground attack, the PLA is quite
capable.
At a December 24-25, 2015 meeting on the reform
of the PLA, President and CMC Chairman Xi called
for a restructuring of the military and reforms in the
armed forces by 2020.121 The first elements of the reform Xi announced were the consolidation and restructuring of area commands: the seven military regions were made into five “battle zones” or theaters
of war (战区) referred to earlier in this Letort Paper.
Command of the new theaters was moved directly
under the CMC, and the four general departments
(General Staff Department, General Logistics Department, General Armaments Department, and General
Political Department) were also reorganized into offices under the CMC. According to an analysis by a
Japanese reporter, the objectives were to eliminate a layer of command, strengthen Xi’s control of the PLA,
and help control corruption.122 Joint command centers
were established to ensure that the services and the
theaters were run through the CMC. Dr. David Finkelstein, vice president and director of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) China Studies, in a CNA study,
also notes that on December 31, 2015:
the former Second Artillery Force (二炮), a branch
(兵种）of the PLA ground forces was disestablished.
In its place, a new service (军种) co-equal to the Army,
Navy, and Air Force was established: the People’s Liberation Army PLA Rocket Force (中国人民解放军火箭
军).123
The PLA also established the Strategic Support
Force (战略支援部队), another new service that will
function separately like the Navy and Air Force. The
Strategic Support Force will provide logistics, space
support, ISR, electronic warfare, cyber support, and
may also conduct information operations.124 The CMC
also established a PLA Army (中国人民解放陆军) as
a separate service with its own dedicated headquarters and command structure.125 In testimony before a
congressional commission, Finkelstein said that the
PLA refers to this new organizational arrangement
as a “two level joint operations command system”
(“两级联合作 战指挥体制”); however, he argued that
the full implications of all the reforms will take some
time to understand.126
CONCLUSION
Jiang Yamin urged the PLA to develop a military
force and weaponry that can engage an enemy at long
ranges with precision weapons and “new concept”
weapons. He argued that the lack of long-distance operational capabilities for China is a major deficiency
that limits the strength of China’s national defense
capacity.127 His ideas are also infused with indignation that for decades, China has been essentially able
to defend itself and conduct military operations only
in its immediate periphery. Meanwhile, the most capable potential enemy, the United States, can hold
the population and PLA rear areas at risk with deep
strike precision weapons. Jiang advocates developing
weapons and even a new strategic national defense
culture to bring the fight to the enemy on the enemy’s
shores.128
Jiang was promoted since he published Long-Distance Warfare. However, this is the only book openly
available on this subject from him. After its publication, he moved up in rank and position in the AMS
and has been allowed to establish a high public profile. Jiang’s public work seems to have shifted in recent times, though; he now apparently specializes
in wargaming as it applies to military strategy and
operations. Qiao Liang also was promoted to major
general, although not much has been heard of Wang
Xiansui after the publication of Unrestricted Warfare.
Tian, although now retired, was promoted, and Cai
ran the PLAAF Command College.
Despite the urgings of Jiang and like-minded
thinkers, neither the CMC nor the Politburo Standing
Committee has rushed to change PLA posture. The
moves by Chairman Xi and the CMC in November and December 2015 followed years of tentative operational explorations of long-distance military operations by
elements of the PLA. Whether the series of publications reviewed in this Letort Paper was orchestrated by
the General Staff Department is still not clear, but the
PLA is changing in ways that mirror the U.S. combatant command structure. However, there are so many
other issues that Xi is trying to address, from corruption to factional infighting in the Communist Party,
that it will take some time to fully assess the ultimate
objectives of the reforms and how they contribute to
expeditionary operations. At this time, although the
“active defense” contains within it a need for offensive action and allows for forms of preemption, there
has been no fundamental shift of China’s traditionally
defensive military posture to an offensive posture that
resembles that of the former Soviet Union.
It is possible that what we see in official utterances
about the defensive nature of China’s military posture
are only forms of perception management or reassurance to foreign observers that there is no change
in strategic orientation. In the Asia-Pacific region,
certainly, the PRC has become more aggressive as
the PLA gains in strength and capacity. Outside the
theater of operations, however, the PLA posture remains defensive. We cannot know how the PLA or the
CMC will conceive of operations as China’s strength
and capacity grows. Nor can we see the military’s
contingency plans that may well call for rapidly executed, long-distance operations that would threaten
a distant enemy, its military, and its population on its
own shores. The PLA already is capable of bringing
the fight to an enemy with ballistic missiles, computer
network operations, and space operations.
Books like Long-Distance Operations from a strategist at the PLA AMS may offer only a peek into what
operational PLA commanders and combat staff officers may be thinking and writing about in papers at
Military Region operations conferences and service
command colleges. In a decade, the younger officers
attending command colleges and writing these papers
will lead or staff combat divisions, fleets, or group
armies. Some may later lead the PLA. Therefore, to
complement research on military doctrine like the
work in this study on Long-Distance Operations, more
research into operational literature is needed. Such research may reveal where a new generation of leaders
will take China’s defense posture and what types of
operations they will adopt.
A review of Long-Distance Operations 8 years after
its publication still provides a good internal critique
of the PLA’s operational and equipment deficiencies.
Few of the deficiencies pointed out by Jiang have been
fully addressed. Still, many of the weapons systems,
concepts for engaging an enemy, and forms of expeditionary operations called for in Long-Distance Operations became operational doctrine in the PLA or are
reflected in weapons development programs today.
At about the same time Long-Distance Operations
was published, a number of other military thinkers at
different institutions in China advocated similar forms
of operations and the development of similar weapons
systems, indicating that these military authors reflect
a current of thinking in the PLA about future warfare.
The fact that a number of institutions and authors deal
with the same topics in the same time frame likely
means that the publication of Long-Distance Operations
and other books discussed in this Letort Paper reflect aspirations of PLA strategists and came after highlevel PLA leaders called for new forms of expeditionary operations.
Ultimately, this analysis suggests that there is
value in following the writings of PLA officers advocating new forms of weapons and operations. Many
policy analysts and scholars dismiss such writings as
“aspirational;” however, such writings capture trends
in PLA military operational development. Even if
there is a gap in time between the publication of books
with aspirational ideas on operational concepts and
the fielding of new weapons and forms of operations
that put those concepts into effect, the research offers accurate insights into future PLA operations and
systems. Observers must compare the ideas in future
aspirational studies to PLA exercises and training to
determine which concepts are being put into practice.
ENDNOTES
1. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), Yuan Zhan (远战) (Long-Distance Operations), Beijing, China: Military Science Publishing House, 2007.
2. The author of this Letort Paper acquired the book at the
AMS bookstore in Beijing. According to a PLA Navy senior captain with whom the author was discussing the book in 2008,
Long-Distance Operations was on the required reading list for PLA
general and flag officers attending the PLA National Defense University’s “Capstone Course,” designed to prepare senior leaders
for high-level command and staff positions involving strategic
thinking and operations.
3. United States Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence
Agency, Directory of PRC Military Personalities, Washington, DC:
Defense Intelligence Agency, 2014, p. 353.
4. Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), “Renqing Xin Shiji Xin Jieduan Wojun
Lishi Shiming” (“认清新世纪新阶段我军历史使命”) (“Understand
the New Historic Missions of Our Military in the New Period of the New Century”), speech to the CMC of the CCP, December
24, 2004, available from gfjy.jiangxi.gov.cn/htmnew/11349.htm, accessed November 17, 2009. Hu’s “Historic Missions” for the
People’s Liberation Army are:
To reinforce the armed forces’ loyalty to the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) to help ensure that the CCP
maintains its grasp on power; to help ensure China’s
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and domestic security
in order to continue its national development; to continue to play an important role in handling Taiwanese
and ethnic separatist movements, territorial land and
sea disputes, non-traditional security problems, and
social stability issues; to help safeguard China’s expanding national interests; and to help ensure world
peace.
5. Marc McDonald, “China Confirms Naval Role in Gulf of
Aden,” The New York Times, December 18, 2008, available from
nytimes.com/2008/12/19/world/asia/19patrols.html?_r=0.
6. Flashpoints, “Four Lessons of the Falklands War,” The
Diplomat, April 10, 2013, available from thediplomat.com/2013/04/
four-enduring-lessons-of-the-falklands-war/; also see Lyle Goldstein,
“China’s Falklands Lessons,” Survival, Vol. 50, No. 3, June-July
2008, pp. 65-82, available from https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/
survival/sections/2008-4e2e/survival-global-politics-and-strategy-junejuly-2008-acbb/50-3-08-goldstein-05c5; and Christopher D. Yung,
“Sinica Rules the Waves? The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s
Power Projection and Anti-Access/Area Denial Lessons from the
Falklands/ Malvinas Conflict,” in Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and
Roy Kamphausen, eds., Chinese Lessons from Other People’s Wars,
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
and National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011, pp. 75-114.
7. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), “Dong Man Youxi yu Xiandai Guofang” (“动漫游戏与现代国防”) (“Animation Games and Modern
National Defense”), a speech at the 2012 annual conference of
China’s gaming industry, March 23, 2012, available from games.
sina.com.cn/y/n/2013-03-23/1447696428.shtml
8. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), “Zai Kaifang de Wangluo Kongjian
Jianli Guojia Anquan Jizhi” (“在开放的网络空间建立国家安全机
制”) (“Establishing a National Security Mechanism in Open Network Space”), People’s Daily Online, July 22, 2014, available from
theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0722/c386965-25316284.html.
9. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), “Youxi Ke Cujin Guofang Shunlian”
(“游戏可促进国防军训练”) (“Games Can Advance Defense Force
Training”), speech at the 2011 Western Hills Conference of China’s gaming industry, January 12, 2011, available from zhuayoukong.com/37948.html.
10. The armed forces of China are the active PLA, the Air
Force, Navy, Army, and Second Artillery; their reserve forces are
the militia and the paramilitary forces like the People’s Armed
Police.
11. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), Yuan Zhan (远战) (Long-Distance
Operations), pp. 157-159, 163-164.
12. Ibid., pp. 163-164.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 1, Introduction.
15. Ibid., p. 99.
16. Ibid., p. 99. The terms “prepare for combat or combat preparations” (“战争准备”) are common in speeches to the military in
China. The exhortation does not necessarily mean that hostilities
are imminent. Instead, leaders often urge military units to “make
preparations for combat” when they want to see a more intense
training focus or to make clear that a particular issue is critical to
China’s security. For example, see Hu Jintao’s speech to the CMC
on the situation in the South China Sea, “China’s Hu Reportedly
Tells Navy to Get Ready for Military Combat,” Associated Press
and Fox News, December 11, 2011, available from foxnews.com/
world/2011/12/13/chinas-hu-reportedly-tells-navy-to-get-ready-formilitary-combat/
17. Perhaps the best and most authoritative brief explanation
of the active defense is by AMS strategist Chen Zhou (陈周), “Xin
Shiqi de Jiji Fangyu Junshi Zhanlue” (“新时期极防御军事战略”)
(“The Military Strategy of Active Defense for the New Period”),
Xuexi Shibao (学习时报) (Study Times), March 18, 2008, available
from china.com.cn/xxsb/txt/2008-03/18/content_12996594.htm; the
most recent, authoritative discussion of the active defense strategy is in Shou Xiaosong (寿晓松) et al., Zhanlue Xue 2013 Ban
(战略学 2013 版) (Science of Military Strategy 2013 Edition), Beijing,
China: PLA Academy of Military Science Publishing House, 2013,
pp. 41-50.
18. Qiao Liang (乔良) and Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗), Chai Xian
Zhan (超限战) (Unrestricted Warfare), Beijing, China: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999. Both of these officers are
associated with the General Political Department of the PLA.
19. Song Xiaojun (宋晓军), “Zhongguo Wufa bu Xing Qi Da”
(“中国无法不显其大”) (“China Can do Nothing but [Must] Display its Greatness”), in Song Xiaojun (宋晓军), et al., Zhongguo Bu
Gaoxing: Da Shidai, Da Mubiao, ji Women de Nei YouWai Huan (中国
不高兴: 大 时代，大目标,及 我们的内忧外患) (Unhappy China:
The Time of Greatness, Grand Vision and Our Internal Strengths and
External Perils), Nanjing, China: Jiangsu People’s Press, 2009.
20. Cai Fengzhen (菜风震) and Tian Anping (田安平), et al.,
Kongtian Yiti Zuozhan (空天一体作战学) (The Study of Integrated
Aerospace Operations), Beijing, China: PLA Publishing House, 2006.
21. Li Rongchang (李荣常), Cheng Jian (程建), and Zhang Lianqing (郑连清), Kongtian Yiti Xinxi Zuozhan (空天一体信息作战)
(Integrated, Informationalized Aerospace Operations), Beijing, China:
Military Science Publishing House, 2003.
22. Wang Lidong (王立东), Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun (国家海
上利益论) (A Discussion of China’s National Maritime Interests), Beijing, China: PLA National Defense University Publishing House,
2007.
23. Qiao Liang (乔良) and Wang Xiangsui (王湘穗), p. 19.
24. Song Xiaojun (宋晓军), pp. 95-97
25. Cai Fengzhen (菜风震) and Tian Anping (田安平), et al.,
pp. 270-301.
26. Li Rongchang (李荣常), Cheng Jian (程建), and Zhang Lianqing (郑连清), pp. 198-236, 258- 294.
27. Wang Lidong (王立东), Guojia Haishang Liyi Lun (国家
海上利益论) (A Discussion of China’s National Maritime Interests),
pp. 29-51, 128-161.
28. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), Yuan Zhan (远战) (Long-Distance
Operations), p. 99.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., p. 100.
31. Ibid.
32. Bi Xinglin (薜兴林), ed., Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan (战役理
论学习指南) (Guidebook to the Study of Campaign Theory), Beijing,
China: PLA National Defense University Press, 2002, pp. 140-141.
33. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), Yuan Zhan (远战) (Long-Distance
Operations), p. 195.
34. Ibid., p. 194.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 197.
37. Ibid., p. 198.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., p. 200.
40. Ibid., pp. 201-205.
41. Ibid., pp. 201-202
42. Ibid., pp. 202-205.
43. Ibid., pp. 175-230. This final section is entitled “Weilai
de Yuan Zhan” (“未来的远战”) (“Future Long-Distance Operations”).
44. The ge (戈) or dagger axe is an ancient weapon on a pole
that combines a sword-like long knife with a chopping axe. Its
use in warfare in China predates the chariot and tightly packed
infantry formations.
45. Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the
Gulf War, Herndon, VA: Brassey’s, 1994. See also Robert H. Scales,
The Past and Present as Prologue: Future Warfare Through the Lens of
Contemporary Conflicts, Washington, DC: Project for a New American Century, April 2009, available from cnas.org/files/documents/
publications/Scales_Past%20and%20Present_April2009.pdf.
46. The OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) Loop concept
was developed by U.S. Air Force Colonel John Boyd in the 1950s,
based on his experience as a fighter pilot in the Korean War. Boyd
contributed to the art of air warfare by explaining pilot response
in combat as a process of “observe” (what is happening), “orient” (one’s attention to what was observed), “decide” (what to
do about what you have observed and oriented your attention
to), and “act” (on that decision). See Tracy Hightower, “Boyd’s
O.O.D.A. Loop and How We Use It,” available from tacticalresponse.com/blogs/library/18649427-boyd-s-o-o-d-a-loop-and-how-weuse-it; and David K. Williams, “What a Fighter Pilot Knows About
Business: The OODA Loop,” Forbes, February 19, 2013, available
from forbes.com/sites/davidkwilliams/2013/02/19/what-a-fighter-pilotknows-about-business-the-ooda-loop/.
47. Jiang Yamin, (蒋亚民), Yuan Zhan (远战) (Long-Distance
Operations), pp. 152-153.
48. Ibid., p. 153.
49. Ibid., p. 154.
50. Ibid., pp. 175-176.
51. Ibid., p. 193.
52. Ibid., p. 194.
53. Ibid., p. 195.
54. Zeng Youchun (曾友春) “Shilun Wo Jun Zhanlue Tousong Ying Queli de Gainian” (“试论我军战略投送应确立的观念”)
(“Concept that China Should Establish Strategic Force Projection”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (中国军事科学) (China Military Science), No. 5, 2009, pp. 77-82, 156.
55. Ibid., p. 156.
56. Ibid., p. 82.
57. Zhu Wenquan (朱文泉), Daoyu Zhanzheng Lun
(岛屿战争论) (On Island Warfare), Three Volumes, Beijing, China:
Academy of Military Science, 2014.
58. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
59. Ibid., pp. 1749-1750.
60. Christopher Sharman, “Exposed: How China’s Navy Went
Global,” The National Interest, April 2, 2015, available from nationalinterest.org/feature/exposed-how-chinas-navy-went-global-12523.
61. Ibid.
62. Wei Zhonggao (魏垂高) and Wang Qinghou (王庆厚),
“Huang Hai Haiyu, Fengda Langgao, Jizhan Zhenghan. Beihai
Jiandui Mou Zuozhan Jiyuan Jiandui” (“黄海海域 风大浪高 激
战正酣 北海舰队某作战支援舰支队成功举行了制远程综合保障演
练-海战, 支援编队为战舰护航”) (“In the Yellow Sea Area, Amid
Wind and High Waves, Drink of a Fierce Battle. A Certain North
Sea Fleet Support Operations Detachment Succeeds in Conducting a Long-Distance, Composite Support Exercises, Forming Columns to Support Large Warship Combat Battles”), Jiefangjun Bao
(解放军报) (PLA Daily), January 28, 2008, p. 3
63. “20th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Leaves for
Gulf of Aden,” Xinhua, April 4, 2015, available from en.people.
cn/n/2015/0404/c90786-8873946-7.html; for a more detailed treatment of these escort operations and their effect on the PLA Navy,
see Andrew S. Ericson and Austin M. Strange, No Substitute for
Experience: Chinese Antipiracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden, China
Maritime Study No. 10, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College,
November 2013.
64. Unattributed, “Miaozhun Shizhan Tigao Budui Yuancheng
Jidong Nengli, Shandong Mou Chuan Dadui Kua Fangqu Qian Li
Chuang Si Xiang, Di Yi” (“Take Aim at Real Combat, Raise Force
Long-Distance Mobility Capabilities, A Certain Shandong Military District Naval Flotilla Goes Beyond 1,000 Kilometers Four
Times for the First Time in a Mobility Exercise”), Jiefangjun Bao
(解放军报) (PLA Daily), January 28, 2008, p. 2.
65. Sharman, “Exposed: How China’s Navy Went Global,”
p. 1.
66. Ibid.
67. Du Yuhan (杜雨翰) and Wang Xu (王旭), “Beihai Jiandui
Zhanbei Xunluo Yuanhai Xunlian” (“北海舰队战备巡逻远海训练
编队赴西太训练”) (“North Sea Fleet Task Force Conducts Combat
Preparation Patrols in the Distant Seas with Formation Training
in the Western Pacific”), Jiefangjun Bao (解放军报) (PLA Daily),
June 9, 2014, p. 8.
68. Rory Medcalf, “China Makes Statement as it Sends Naval Ships off Australia’s Maritime Approaches,” The Lowy Interpreter, February 7, 2014, available from lowyinterpreter.org/
post/2014/02/07/China-makes-statement-as-it-sends-naval-ships-offAustralias-maritime-approaches.aspx?COLLCC=960857631&.
69. Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, Washington, DC: ONI,
April 2015, p. 47. available from www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/
Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.
pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081058-483.
70. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the
21st Century, 2nd Edition, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2010, p. 55.
71. Christopher H. Sharman, China Moves Out: Stepping Stones
Toward a New Maritime Strategy, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, April 2015,
pp. 36-39.
72. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
73. Ibid., pp. 26-27.
74. Ibid., p. 25.
75. Cai Fengzhen (菜风震) and Tian Anping (田安平), et al.,
pp. 141-145.
76. Ibid., p. 142.
77. Dai Qingmin (戴青民), “Lun Wangdian Yiti Zhan”
(“论网点一体战”) (“On Integrating Network Warfare and Electronic Warfare”), Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (中国军事科学) (China
Military Science), February 1, 2002, pp. 112–117.
78. Wendell Minnick, “Chinese See Intel, Surveillance Role for
Airships,” Defense News, March 31, 2010, available from archive.
defensenews.com/article/20100531/DEFFEAT06/5310306/ChineseSee-Intel-Surveillance-role-airships.
79. Ibid.
80. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(USCC), 2014 Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, November 2014, pp. 311-312.
81. Ibid, pp. 291-292.
82. Mark Stokes, “China’s Quest for Joint Aerospace Power:
Concepts and Future Aspirations,” in Richard P. Hallion, et al.,
eds., The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2012,
pp. 50-51.
83. USCC, p. 284.
84. Ibid.
85. AFP, “First China Air Force Drills in ‘Far Offshore’ Pacific,” March 31, 2015, available from https://www.yahoo.com/news/
first-china-air-force-drills-far-offshore-pacific-051102692.html?ref=gs.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. The author thanks Christopher Sharman for his insights
on these operations.
89. Unattributed, “Qianxi Zhongguo Kongjun Duanban:
Zhandou Soujiu Nengli Changqi Bu Zu” (“浅析中国空军短板：
战斗搜救能力长期不足”) (“PLA Air Force Shortcomings in LongRange Search and Rescue”), Chinanet, December 30, 2013, available from military.china.com/critical3/27/20131230/18252427.html.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Maj. Gen. P. JS. Sandhu, China’s Quest for Global Dominance: Reality or Myth, New Delhi, India: Vij Books, 2010, pp. 181-
182. Also see Dennis J. Blakso, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition
and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd Edition, New York:
Routledge, 2012.
93. “Mission Action 2010 Transregional Joint Exercise,” China
Daily, November 25, 2010; “The Chinese Army Today, Deep-Rooted Peacetime Practices Out of Training Grounds,” Zhongguo Qingnian Bao Online, in Chinese, available from chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/25/content_11607284.htm; also see “Shiming Xingdong
2010A Shibing Shidan Yanlian zaai Dongbei Daxiang” (“使命行
动—2010A实兵实弹演练在东北打响”) (“Mission Action 2010A
Realistic Live Fire Field Exercise Training in Northeast China Begins”), Xinhua, October 21, 2010, available from wzdaily.66wz.com/
wzrb/html/2010-10/21/content_772071.htm.
94. “2014年之中国军演：把和平积习赶出训练场” (“China’s
Military Exercises in 2014: Driving Deep-Rooted Peacetime
Practices Out of Training Grounds”), Gansu Daily, December 26,
2014, p. 9.
95. Ibid.
96. “Huoli 2014 Xilie Yanxi Chengxian 7 Tedian” (“火力2014
系列演习呈现7个特点”) (“Firepower Strike 2014 Series of Exercises Have 7 Special Features”), Jiefangjun Bao (解放军报) (PLA
Daily), September 25, 2014, p. 1.
97. “Ju Li bushi Zhang Ai, Kua Yue 4500 Gongli de Xinfu”
(“距离不是障碍，跨越4500公里的幸福”) (“Long distance is Not
an Obstacle, the Happiness of a 4,500 Kilometer Stride”), Jiefang
jun Bao (解放军报) (PLA Daily), August 4, 2014, p. 10.
98. Zhao Dan, Guo Zheng, and Yu Yi, “PLA AF Airborne
Corps Air Transport Regiment Long-Term Success With LongRange Airdrops Examined,” Kongjun Bao (空军报) (PLA Air Force
Daily), May 8, 2014, p. 3.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency,
Directory of PRC Military Personalities, Washington, DC: Defense
Intelligence Agency, 2014, p. 75.
102. See Lieutenant General J.S. Bajwa, Modernization of the
Chinese PLA: From Massed Militia to Force Projection, New Delhi,
India: Lancer Publishers, 2014; and Richard J. Fisher, Jr., China’s
Gathering Amphibious and Airborne Expeditionary Capabilities, Alexandria, VA: International Strategy and Assessment Center, 2012,
pp. 27-29, available from strategycenter.net/docLib/20120612_ChinaExpedCapMay2012.pdf.
103. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., “China’s KJ-500 AEW&C Platform
‘Enters Service’,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 24, 2015, available
from janes.com/article/50136/china-s-kj-500-aew-c-platform-entersservice.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
107. Phillip C. Saunders and Eric Quam, “Future Force
Structure of the Chinese Air Force,” January 2007, p. 399, available from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254927824_The_
Future_Force_Structure_of_the_Chinese_Air_Force.
108. U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, E-3 Sentry (AWACS),
available from www.tinker.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print.
asp?fsID=6807.
109. E-2C Hawkeye, Federation of American Scientists, available
from fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/e-2.htm.
110. Liu Wei (刘伟), Wang Zhongyuan (王忠远), and Wang
Mingjiang (王令江), Zhanqu Lianhe Zhanyi Zhihui Gailun (战区联合
战役指挥概论) (Outline of Theater of War Campaign Joint Command
and Control), Beijing, China: National Defense University Publishing House, 2003, pp. 72-89.
111. Ibid., p. 88.
112. Ibid., p. 185.
113. Larry M. Wortzel, The Dragon Extends its Reach: Chinese
Military Power Goes Global, Washington, DC: Potomac Books,
2013, pp. 134-135, 210 note 3.
114. Li Rongchang (李荣常), Cheng Jian (程建), and Zhang
Lianqing (郑连清), pp. 94-96.
115. U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
“Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities,” Hearing on Thursday, January 21, 2016,
Washington, DC, Room 106 of Dirksen Senate Office Building,
transcript available from origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript_01.21.16.pdf.
116. Zhang Wenyong (张文舅), “‘Tixi Huitan’: Zhanfa Qianxi”
(“‘体系毁瘫’战法浅析”) (“Brief Analysis of ‘System-of-Systems
Destruction and Paralysis’ Tactics”), Zhanyou Bao (战友报) (Comrade in Arms Daily), November 14, 2014, p. 3b.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Fu Anzhen (付安镇), Yang Chuncai (杨春才), and Lu Huling (卢慧玲), “Qianxi Meiguo Dingxiang Neng Wuqi de Zuozhan
Moshi” (“浅析美军定向能武器的作战模式”) (“Analysis of Operational Models of U.S. Military Directed Energy Weapons”),
Feihang Daodan (飞航导弹) (Winged Missile Journal), No. 11, 2013,
pp. 40-44.
120. Ibid., p. 40.
121. Oki Nagai, “Chinese Military: Xi Advances Plan to restructure the Armed Forces,” Nikkei Asian Review, November 26,
2015, available from asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Xi-advances-plan-to-restructure-armed-forces.
122. Ibid. Also see Bai Ruixue (白瑞雪) and Wang Jingguo
(王经国), “以中央军委改革工作会议召开为标志” (“The Historic
Reform of China’s Military Structure Starts”), 新华社 (Xinhua
News Agency), Beijing, China, November 26, 2015.
123. David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA, Alexandria, VA: CNA Corporation,
January 15, 2016, pp. 13-14.
124. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
125. Ibid., p. 14.
126. U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission,
“Developments in China’s Military Force Projection and Expeditionary Capabilities,” Hearing on Thursday, January 21, 2016,
Washington, DC, Room 106 of Dirksen Senate Office Building, p.
49, transcript available from origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/
transcripts/Hearing%20Transcript_01.21.16.pdf.
127. Jiang Yamin (蒋亚民), Yuan Zhan (远战) (Long-Distance
Operations), p. 85.
128. Ibid., pp. 215-230.
