FARMER AGITATION : The Might of Kisan & Jawan

 SOURCE:  https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/the-might-of-kisan-jawan-201904

TRYSTS AND TURNS

          

             The Might of Kisan & Jawan

                                    By

                    

Farmers, together with veterans, should celebrate                                Republic Day

22 January 2021

The protesting farmers of Punjab and Haryana have threatened to organise a tractor procession through well-trod streets of Delhi on Republic Day. This procession should not clash with the government’s Republic Day parade or other celebrations. The farmers will lose public support if they do that. In fact, they should be alert lest saboteurs try to provoke them to violence.

No political slogan should be raised that day. All sections of the populace, even those that the ruling party dubs anti-national, should be one on this day.

The best solution would be to have a celebratory parade of their own in another part of the city after prior notice to the Delhi Police and obtaining its permission to celebrate the sacred day. If they can muster the support of armed forces veterans, it would be a sort of coup! The armed forces are studded with soldiers, sailors and airmen from kisan families, who will surely be sympathetic to the cause of the farmers.

‘Jai Jawan, Jai Kisan’ is a cry that is extremely popular with the common man and that cry has reverberated through the ages. No political party can afford to belittle it. So, if service veterans are added to the parade of tractors with farmers’ families atop tractors, a memorable supporting parade can be organised in another prominent area of Delhi, distant from Rajpath.

If given due publicity, it will draw sufficient attention. There will be no antagonist feelings floating around — in truth, the atmosphere created should be deliberately fraternal. No political slogan should be raised that day. All sections of the populace, even those that the ruling party dubs anti-national, should be one on this day.

After all, the Prime Minister and Home Minister Amit Shah have both repeated often that their sole intention in introducing the three farm laws is the good of the farmers. They affirm that farm incomes will double. The farmers do not think so! They feel that the big industrial houses will fatten themselves on the farmers’ sweat and blood! Who is right? Can or will the farmers wait to find out? Or is it that they know better since it is they who till the fields and sow and harvest the crops. The politicians and experts' knowledge, according to the farmers, is based on theories that have not been tested, though genuine research should never be brushed aside.

The Supreme Court has dared to enter the arena where wiser men had feared to tread. There was no constitutional or legal adjudication involved, and yet it rushed in with eyes wide open. By doing so, the court gave the government some breathing space. More importantly, it gave the government time that could weaken the resolve of the protesters. The latter cannot afford to neglect their fields for such prolonged periods. And that is the possible gamble that seems to be enfolding.

As of now, both sides are adamant. Our Prime Minister is a man of steel, like his role model, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. He refuses to budge, though he is willing for a compromise. The farmers fear that the government’s experiment will fail, like demonetisation did. They refuse to take part in an experiment that may leave them ruined permanently.

But let us leave this political debate to the politicians and the object of their supposed largesse, the farmers, and revert to the issues that propelled me to write in the first place. I was influenced by an email I received from an old friend, a committed Modi supporter and a lady paediatric cardiac surgeon, who once was a co-trustee with me in the Public Concern for Governance Trust (PCGT) in Mumbai. Dr Ratna Magotra felt that the CCG, a group of retired IAS, IFS and IPS officers who write to the PM and other constitutional authorities on things that matter, should also write to the farmers’ leaders not to disturb the Republic Day celebrations, in particular, and not to defy the PM and his government in the manner they were now doing.

Since I agree with her view that Republic Day should be treated as sacred by every Indian, I had made my stand clear in one of my previous articles which had escaped her attention. I cannot in any conscience agree with her that no one should disagree with the PM, for that would mean that I agree that he is the repository of all knowledge. For instance, his calculations about demonetisation were proved wrong. I believe that a dose of humility in every human bosom will make the world a much better place to live in.

I understand my friend’s frustration when she finds that her hero is being baulked on his way to achieving stardom and a place in history. But even normal mortals face obstacles to success. In the case of world leaders, like Modiji, the tests will be infinitely more difficult. That is to be expected. The felicity and ease with which he tackles these difficulties will determine his place in history.

I do not pretend to know who is right in this debate between the government and the farmers. Will the three new farm laws double the income of the farmers? The government is certain they will. The farmers think just the opposite. If they were just playing a political game, they would have given up their protest long before. The government will require to think out of the box to cut this Gordian knot.

Staunch followers of Modiji should find a way to advise their idol to convince intended beneficiaries in advance that laws they intend to ram through Parliament, without much debate, are truly for the good of the beneficiaries, and not for the benefactor’s financiers.

POST SCRIPT:-  

  https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/nation/tractor-parade-to-go-ahead-as-planned-on-republic-day-farmer-leaders-202153

Tractor parade to go ahead as planned on Republic Day: Farmer leaders

Coming out of the meeting, Balbir Singh Rajewal said it was for the government to ensure that the rally was peaceful

New Delhi, January 22

Protesting farmer leaders on Friday have said their proposed January 26 tractor 'parade' will take place on Delhi’s busy Outer Ring Road as decided earlier, after their 11th round of talks with the government ended in a deadlock.

Coming out of the meeting, farmer leader Balbir Singh Rajewal said it was for the government to ensure that the rally was peaceful.

“Tractor march on January 26 will take place as decided by us on Outer Ring Road. We have informed the police that it is for the government to ensure that it should be peaceful,” Rajewal said.

The government’s negotiations with protesting farm unions hit a roadblock on Friday as protesting unions stuck to their demands for a complete repeal of three farm laws, even after the Centre asked them to reconsider its proposal for putting the Acts on hold for 12 to 18 months.

Unlike the last 10 rounds of talks, the 11th round could not even reach a decision on the next date for the meeting as the government also hardened its position saying it is ready to meet again once the unions agree to discuss the suspension proposal.

Union leaders said they would intensify their agitation while keeping it peaceful.

Thousands of farmers, mostly from Punjab and Haryana, have been camping at several Delhi border points since November 28, demanding a repeal of three farm laws and a legal guarantee on minimum support price for their crops. PTI

CDS : Eventful First year for CDS, Challenges Remain.(r)

 SOURCE:   https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/eventful-first-year-for-cds-challenges-remain-199981

Bugbears: The three areas of prime concern in the charter of General Rawat (left) relate to jointry, acquisitions and administration. 

Eventful First year for CDS,  Challenges Remain

                                   By 

            Gp Capt Murli Menon (Retd)

                         Defence analyst

Monday, 18 January 2021

Tasked essentially with promoting inter-service jointry and giving much-needed fillip to defence modernisation through timely and optimal defence acquisitions, the first incumbent to the post of CDS hasn’t performed lackadaisically, however contentious his initiatives have turned out to be in one year. His latest desire to win a war for India by employing indigenous weaponry, though laudable, is easier said than done.

Two decades after the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and the consequent Group of Ministers recommended the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and eight years after the Naresh Chandra Committee recommended a permanent chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, the Indian government instituted the first CDS in January 2020.

Tasked essentially with promoting inter-service jointry and giving much-needed fillip to defence modernisation through timely and optimal defence acquisitions, the first incumbent to the post, General Bipin Rawat, has not given a lackadaisical performance, however contentious his initiatives have turned out to be so far. 

His latest desire to win a war for India by employing indigenous weaponry, though laudable, is easier said than done, given the large gap that exists between the state-of-the-art and homegrown capabilities. Serious limitations exist in our indigenous defence capability, more so in the arena of advanced avionics, aerial weaponry and other cutting-edge technologies, such as aircraft carriers and main battle tanks.

The fact that the government chose to have a ‘first among equals’ four-star CDS rather than a five-star one as recommended by the KRC, would in the long term impinge on the effectiveness of the new dispensation.

Be that as it may, perhaps it is premature to judge whether the CDS idea was a good one or not. Three areas of prime concern comprising his charter will be analysed herein: jointry, acquisitions and administration.

Jointry has been a bugbear for most modern militaries, with single service rivalries ruling the roost generally. But this is a difficult tree to bark up, which a mere joint doctrine manual cannot deliver. The career profiles of officers and men have to build in frequent cross attachments to other sister services and mandatory ‘maroon’ tenures for the leadership for career progression.

Understanding the operating culture and peculiarities of other services is one challenge and ‘unified thinking’, more importantly, is the crucial bit.

The CDS needs to initiate policy moves in this respect to gradually build up jointmanship over time. We have a big advantage by way of initial joint training at the National Defence Academy, but a lot needs to be done to enhance tri-service jointry and consequent combat-effectiveness.

Realistic international exercises would help, no doubt, but the ultimate challenge will be to evolve as an Integrated Defence Force, wherein meaningful savings in deployment of combat assets and added combat efficiency could be achieved. Ideas of theaterisation, such as the Air Defence Command and Maritime Theatre Command, mooted by the CDS are perhaps a bit ahead of their time, given the situation in the defence forces as of now.

On defence acquisitions, whilst Make in India is a good guiding principle, practicality in technology exploitation has to be kept in mind. A classic example would be that of the Kaveri engine for the LCA, which the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) has been struggling to indigenise, but to little avail. Hence, the recourse to the US GE 404/414 engines. There are similar handicaps for helicopter, ship and tank engines and other areas, where import becomes inescapable.

The story is the same for most high-tech weaponry for all three services, such as artillery shells, aerial weaponry like the Spice series bombs and naval anti-ship and anti-aircraft weaponry. The recent government decision to grant Rs 48,000 crore for 83 Tejas jets is another doubtful starter in indigenisation, with a proven prototype of the machine not yet being available!

The third contentious policy matter initiated recently by the Department of Military Affairs under the aegis of the CDS is the proposed modification in colour service and pension criteria. Whilst increasing the retirement age to 60 may be attractive to a section of the uniformed fraternity, it may not really assist in bringing down the defence pension Bill, which at 24 per cent of the defence budget — a whopping Rs 1.12 lakh crore — is worrisome, no doubt.

But let us not forget that the defence budget is a mere 1.15 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, and not 3 per cent, as is expected to be, as per the recommendations of a Parliamentary Committee on Defence. Were that to be realised, the pension Bill would be 8.86 per cent of the defence budget.

Also, some of the already instituted measures, such as permanency to the short service commission, OROP already sanctioned etc. would find the DMA struggling to control its inflating pension Bill, a virtual drag on modernisation and general funding.

More innovative measures by way of lateral mobility, compulsory military service and reservists need to be put in place to achieve the desired tooth-to-tail ratio and pyramidical age and career profiles demanded by the military. Getting a handle on the often infructuous Defence Industrial Complex under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and meaningful indigenisation through privatisation are other areas the CDS needs to address to improve the overall combat efficiency and cutting of the flab.

The pension of defence civilians is another substantial loadstone that the CDS needs to do something about. Also, increasing the years of service to earn pension (effectively suggesting a reduction in pension to 50 per cent for service up to 35 years) may not go down well with the new entrants to the defence services, even if applied prospectively.

In any event, the malaise of a bloated manpower situation in the military has been the result of flagrant flouting of norms and uncalled-for beefing up of manpower requirements at the stage of government approval over the years.

To rectify this situation, drastic steps for manpower rationalisation would be called for.

PLA : Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations (r)

 SOURCE: https://jamestown.org/program/integrating-the-pla-rocket-force-into-conventional-theater-operations/

Image: A soldier attached to an unidentified brigade under the PLA Rocket Force operates an optical sighting device in conjunction with the erection of a reported DF-21A medium-range ballistic missile system during a night training exercise in February 2020. 

(Image source: China Military Online, February 27, 2020)

Integrating the PLA Rocket Force into Conventional Theater Operations 

                                By

                        Roderick Lee

                      ( Publication: China Brief Volume: 20 Issue: 14 )

August 14, 2020 

Introduction

Currently, only limited analytical discussion exists regarding the command authorities over China’s land-based ballistic and cruise missile inventory. Much of the discourse surrounding the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF)—the military service that operates most of China’s land-based precision strike systems—focuses on nuclear command and control. Further discussions regarding the PLARF’s conventional land-based ballistic and cruise missile systems are limited, and make only vague references as to how the PLA is working to integrate PLARF units into the theater command structure—without going into detail about the major obstacles that preclude full integration of the PLARF.

This article makes the case that PLA theater commands almost certainly have clearly defined operational control authorities over some of the PLARF’s conventional missile force. This conclusion is based on the evidence of command authorities granted to certain PLARF bases; the integration of missile operations into theater joint operations command structure; and indications from PLA press outlets that PLARF units are subordinate to the theater command operational structure.

Understanding the Difference Between Administrative and Operational Control

This section briefly discusses how the PLA conceptually exerts administrative and operational control over its forces. Figure 1 broadly displays how the PLA oversees issues relating to manning, training, and equipment. It is also more closely aligned with what most observers traditionally associate with the PLA’s organizational structure.

Figure 1: The PLA’s Administrative Organization Chart

However, the PLA’s organizational hierarchy looks a little different when it comes to operations. Figure 2 displays the operational chain of command, as well as the primary command node at each level.

Figure 2: Operational Command in the PLA

Although there are many similarities between the PLA’s administrative and operational chains of command, they are not identical. Notably, the PLA uses elements of standing division and regiment-level organizations to create temporary operational and tactical groupings, termed jituanqun (集团群), biandui (编队), and qun (群). This means that in practice, units that report to the same higher administrative headquarters may report to two different operational commands.

Empowering PLARF Bases

As seen in Figure 2, the PLARF does not have a theater service headquarters at each of the theater commands, as the PLA’s other services do. This apparent lack of theater service headquarters leads to some confusion as to how PLARF units are integrated into theater operations. This confusion is resolved by understanding that PLARF bases appear to fill a role similar to that of theater service headquarters. PLARF bases are corps or corps deputy-grade organizations that are responsible for geographic or functional areas. [1] In addition to providing administrative oversight for PLARF units under its command, a PLARF base with missile launch units also acts as the PLARF’s primary campaign-level organization (基本战役单位, jiben zhanyi danwei) in wartime. This means that PLARF bases are expected to conduct conventional missile strike campaigns independently or as part of a larger joint campaign. [2]

In order to enable PLARF bases to leverage joint forces when executing a conventional missile strike campaign, the PLA designates at least some PLARF base joint operation duty offices as “theater conventional missile sub-command centers,” according to authoritative PLA press from late 2017. [3] This nomenclature makes a clear connection between the theater commands and PLARF bases. Not only do these bases exert operational control over conventional missiles on behalf of the theater command, but these bases also have the authority to coordinate operations with army, navy, and air force units.

Theater Rocket Forces

In addition to designating some PLARF bases as “theater conventional missile sub-centers,” the PLA also envisions PLARF bases as being roughly analogous to theater services headquarters. They also maintain their own subordinate forces. Limited press and social media reports suggest that the PLA identifies certain PLARF units as “theater command PLARF units” (战区火箭军某部, zhanqu huojianjun moubu). This designation suggests that the PLA gives certain PLARF units a status analogous to that of army, navy, or air force theater-level command nodes within the theater command structure.

At the corps level, the Eastern Theater Command (and possibly other theater commands) identify PLARF bases as theater service component equivalents. The following image from a CCTV-7 series on the PLARF depicts how the Eastern Theater Command generates combat power:

Image: A still image from a CCTV-7 (state television) series, which lists service branch components of the Eastern Theater Command. “Rocket Force Bases” (火箭军基地, Huojianjun Jidi) are listed alongside the “Theater Army,” “Theater Navy,” and “Theater Air Force.” (Image source: 军事报道 20180521)

This image indicates that Rocket Force bases are equivalent to theater services and contribute directly to theater command combat power. Corroborating this graphic is the fact that an Eastern Theater Command social media account also regularly reports on Number 61 Base, suggesting that this base falls under the theater command structure (Eastern Front View (Weixin), November 13, 2018).

At the tactical level, various PLA press sources identify multiple PLARF units as being “theater PLARF units.” To date, PLA social media has identified at least five different PLARF units across three separate PLARF bases as “theater PLARF units,” as shown below:

Figure 3: Identified Theater-Level PLARF Units in the Eastern and Southern Theater Commands

Unit	Equipment	Theater
612th Launch Brigade	DF-21A (probable)	Eastern Theater Command
617th Launch Brigade	DF-15/16	Eastern Theater Command
61 Base Training Regiment	N/A	Eastern Theater Command
623rd Launch Brigade	CJ-10	Southern Theater Command
635th Launch Brigade	CJ-10	Southern Theater Command

Source: Compiled by the author.

Unauthoritative PRC press sources have also identified PLARF units subordinate to the Northern, Central, and Western Theater Commands. This small list of PLARF units under theater commands suggests that launch brigades equipped with short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) fall under the theater command. Assuming that the trend of PLARF SRBM and GLCM units being subordinate to the theater command holds true for the entire force,

Figure 4: Locations of Other Known SRBM and GLCM Launch Brigades in the Eastern and Southern Theater Command Areas of Responsibility

Image: China Aerospace Studies Institute PLARF Map

Notably, with the exception of a single DF-21A unit, all of the units identified by PLA social media as being a theater PLARF unit are conventional in nature, with a range limited to roughly the First Island Chain. The single Eastern Theater Command-based DF-21A unit may also be an exception due to mission and warhead limitations. Extrapolating from this small data set could suggest that the PLA withholds theater command access to conventional systems that are intended for strategic targets—such as the DF-21D or DF-26—in addition to nuclear-only systems such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Why Is There No “Theater Rocket Force”?

The rationale behind the PLA not designating PLARF bases as “theater rocket forces” is likely a result of the PLARF’s relatively small force size. Theater armies, navies, and air forces control two or more corps-level entities. Those corps-level entities in turn oversee more than half a dozen division or brigade level organizations. In total, a theater service headquarters could oversee 20 or more division or brigade level organizations either directly or indirectly.

PLARF launch bases, on the other hand, oversee approximately six launch brigades and six support regiments. Half of the launch bases oversee the administration of primarily nuclear-equipped ICBM units, which most likely are under the direct operational control of the Central Military Commission. This means that PLARF launch bases only have a fraction of the responsibility of larger theater service headquarters. As such, it makes little sense for the PLA to form fully-fledged rocket force headquarters at the theater command level.

Integrating Conventional Missile Operations at the Theater Commands

Given that most conventional missile strike campaigns are to be executed as part of a larger joint campaign, the theater commands must also have an organic capability to plan and execute conventional missile operations. Theater commands have accomplished this by providing theater command staff with officers who have a PLARF background, as well as command information systems that have the functionality to pass commands to conventional missile units.

In order to help integrate and execute missile operations as part of a larger joint campaign, some if not all theater commands have dedicated PLARF staff officers. For example, Southern Theater Command (STC) deputy chief of staff Tan Jianming (谈建明) is a career PLARF officer (Southern Daily, December 5, 2018; Peng Pai News, July 29, 2017). He previously served in various capacities at Base 63 (formerly Base 55), which is a unit well positioned to support STC operations. It is not unreasonable to assume that other theaters also have a PLARF officer serving in similar capacities. Theater-level joint operations command centers (JOCCs) also have dedicated “conventional missile seats” from which staff officers can direct missile operations (Xinhua, January 7, 2018).

In order to execute the plans developed by PLARF staff officers in theater commands, and to oversee conventional missile operations conducted in support of theater joint campaigns, at least some theater commands may have technical systems in place to pass commands to PLARF units.

Image: A still image from a CCTV-7 (state television) series, which shows a probable command information system used in the Eastern Theater Command JOCC. The screen includes an icon labeled “missile orders” (导弹命令, daodan mingling). (Image source: 军事报道 20180521)

Conclusion

Although units capable of both nuclear and conventional missions may pose some challenges for command and control, these difficulties are almost certainly overstated. The PLA’s administrative organization does not perfectly reflect how the PLA is organized for operations. Conceptually, PLARF units can task organize into operational and tactical groups during crises or wartime, just like any other service. Although a nuclear-capable PLARF missile brigade may be administratively subordinate to a base acting as a theater command conventional missile sub-center during peacetime, under warfighting conditions that missile brigade will simply be assigned to a CMC-controlled operational group.

It appears that the PLA has taken appropriate steps to empower the theater commands by providing clearly defined operational authorities over some, if not most, PLARF conventional missile units. Although PLARF base boundaries do not perfectly match theater geographic boundaries, the PLA has clearly defined command relationships between the two. Furthermore, the PLA has empowered the theater commands with resident expertise in the form of dedicated PLARF staff officers. This provides theater commanders with what is almost certainly a major component of their regional land attack capability.

The apparent command relationship between theater commands and certain PLARF units has several implications for the United States and its regional partners. First, U.S. and partner nation planners should treat theater command PLARF units as valid targets that do not pose significant additional risks for nuclear escalation. One of the points of contention in Western discourse is that the PLARF’s integration of conventional and nuclear forces complicates targeting: this is because any destruction of a PLARF unit may be perceived by the PLA as a step towards nuclear escalation. However, because the PLA has publicly identified certain units as not falling under the direct authority of the CMC, the United States and its partners should not treat these PLARF units any differently than a PLA fighter brigade or combined arms brigade.

Second, this knowledge should be used as a starting point of discussion with the PLA on issues related to escalation. A clear understanding of conventional versus nuclear command and control in the PLA at the operational and tactical level allows interlocutors to move beyond PLA attempts to stonewall conversations through claims that the opposing side simply does not understand the PLA. This in turn provides a greater chance of clarifying which PLARF units the PLA will allocate to nuclear and strategic missions.

                         _____________________

Roderick Lee is the Director of Research at the Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), where he oversees research on Chinese military aerospace forces and the Chinese civilian aerospace sector as it relates to the military. Prior to joining CASI, he served as an analyst with the United States Navy covering Chinese naval forces. He earned his Master of Arts degree from The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. The views expressed here are his own, and are not intended to represent those of the Air University or any other U.S. government institution.

Notes

[1] See: ‘PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces’ 2nd ed., China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), 2019, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/Books/Primer_2nd_Edition_Web_2019-07-30.pdf.

[2] See: ‘Science of Campaigns [战役学],’ ed. Zhan Yuliang (张玉良), 2nd ed., Beijing: National Defense University Press (国防大学出版社), 2006.

[3] See: “PLA Rocket Force Follows Reform Process and Further Advances Realistic Combat Training,” [火箭军部队紧跟改革进程深入推进实战化训练], Han Xinbang (韩兴邦), Liu Ya (刘亚), Rocket Force News [火箭军报], November 15, 2017.

[4] See: CCT-7 Military Report 30 January 2018[ 军事报道 20180130], CCTV-7, January 30, 2018.

 

Strike Corps Reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs Larger Restructuring(R)

 SOURCE: 

 https://theprint.in/opinion/strike-corps-reorientation-comes-for-ladakh-but-army-needs-larger-restructuring/584936/

   https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0

Army Chief General M M Naravane addresses an annual press conference at the Manekshaw Centre in New Delhi on 12 January 2021 

Strike Corps Reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs Larger Restructuring

At last the Army has recognised that it is China, and not Pakistan, that is the principal threat to India’s national security.

LT GEN H S PANAG (RETD) 14 January, 2021

VIDEO :-     Google the URL to open U-TUBE

                                      [ https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0 ]

Strike Corps reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs larger restructuring: HS Panag

#Army #China #LAC

crisis is an opportunity riding a dangerous wind’ goes a Chinese proverb. The Chinese-perpetrated crisis in Eastern Ladakh seems to have inspired the Indian Army to seize the opportunity to initiate structural and organisational reforms. Without much ado, it has given directions for 1 Corps — one of the three mechanised forces, predominant Strike Corps focussed on Pakistan — to be restructured and reoriented as the second Mountain Strike Corps for Ladakh. 17 Mountain Strike Corps will now become the strategic reserve dedicated only to the Northeast, and it will be restructured into three-four Integrated Battle Groups, or IBGs.

This move signals that, at last, the Army has recognised that it is China, and not Pakistan, that is the principal threat to India’s national security. However, it also allows the flexibility of using the Mountain Strike Corps against Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir/Western Ladakh. One sincerely hopes that this does not remain a one-off change but becomes part of larger, holistic reforms for optimisation of the Army through restructuring and reorganisation. The Army is still based on World War-II organisations, living with incremental changes tailored to the wars of the 20th century. We need to come to terms with strategic compulsions that will influence the way we engage in future conflicts/wars.

VIDEO :-     Google the URL to open U-TUBE

                                 https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0

The Strategic Compulsions

• Nuclear weapon armed States cannot engage in decisive conventional wars.
• Conflict/wars will be fought below the nuclear threshold, will be driven by high-technology and limited in time and space. For this type of conflict/war,agile and multi-capability formations are required.
• Indian economic compulsions do not permit any substantial increase in the  defence budget in the near future. Currently, the bulk of the defence budget goes in sustaining a manpower-intensive army.

And this is why the restructuring of our mechanised and infantry formations becomes important.

Restructuring of Mechanised and Infantry Formations

We are an infantry predominant army, organised in 17 Mountain Divisions (including three, otherwise designated as Infantry Divisions) and 18 Infantry Divisions (including 4-6 Reorganised Plains Infantry Divisions, or RAPID, which also have an armoured brigade in lieu of an infantry brigade). In addition, we have some Independent Infantry  Brigades. The mechanised formations are organised into three Armoured Divisions, 18-20 Independent Armoured/Mechanised Brigades, including those part of RAPIDs. All Infantry Divisions operating in plains and two Mountain Divisions also have an armoured regiment. The divisions operate under 14 Corps, seven each for mountains and plains.

A decision has already been taken to reorganise the divisions into tailor-made Integrated Battle Groups, or IBGs, with varying numbers of combat arms and combat support units dictated by the mission and terrain. All modern armies have or are in an  advanced stage of adaption to these organisations. The PLA has already implemented this concept in the form of Combined Arms Brigades. India’s progress has been painfully slow and needs to be expedited. Unfortunately, the basic fighting units of the IBGs — armoured regiments and infantry battalions —continue to be organised as they were 80 years ago. We seem to have discounted our own war-fighting experience and the impact of technology. The organisations have become part of regimentation, and the fighting arms remain smug and revel in status quo.

An infantry battalion has four rifle companies of 120 soldiers each. In addition, it has specialist platoons for mortars and anti-tank guided missiles apart from a logistics subunit. Based on the World War experience, particularly causality rates, and the advent of modern technology, all modern armies have switched to a three, instead of four-rifle  company system and provide armour protection with Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV) or Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC). Our own experience supports this change.

In Kargil War, we suffered 527 killed (462 were due to actual combat) and 1,363 wounded. Thirty infantry battalions took part in the operations. Since 90 per cent of casualties are suffered by the infantry, mathematically, on an average, each battalion suffered 16 killed and 41 wounded, that is just 6 per cent of the unit strength of 800 personnel. As a defending and defeated army, Pakistan suffered approximately 453 killed and 665 wounded, out of nearly six infantry battalions in the battle, that is about 20 per cent of the total strength. These figures justify adopting the three-company system. Modern weapon systems and reconnaissance/surveillance resources further reinforce the logic.

We have 390 infantry battalions (including 10 Scouts Battalions), nine Para Special Forces Battalions, five Para Battalions, 63 Rashtriya Rifles Battalions and 40 Assam Rifles Battalions. If all/most of these are reorganised on basis of three rifle companies, we can spare approximately 50,000 troops, giving us enough infantry battalions for at least 12-18 IBGs, with 4-6 Infantry Battalions each. Alternatively, this manpower could be utilised to meet other shortfalls or be simply reduced.

An armoured regiment in the Indian Army has 45 tanks since 1940, organised into three squadrons and four troops each, with 14 and 3 tanks respectively. Regimental Headquarters has three tanks and Squadron Headquarters two tanks each. Since those days, tank design has undergone revolutionary changes in terms of mobility, protection and firepower. Our war experience makes a very strong case for reducing the number of tanks to 31, that is 10 tanks per squadron with three troops of three tanks each, and one tank each for squadron commander and regimental commander. Infantry Combat  Vehicles (ICVs)/Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) can be used for command and control by the regimental/squadron second-in-command and adjutant.

The maximum number of tanks lost by a regiment in 1965 or 1971 wars has been only 15. In the battle of Chawinda in 1965, out of 225 tanks in the battle, as part of five armoured regiments, we lost only 29 (we were on the offensive). Pakistan, out of its 150 tanks, lost 44. In the battle of Asal Uttar, 1965, (we were on the defensive) out of the 135 tanks, we lost only 10-14. Pakistan, out of its 220 tanks, lost 99, that is 20 tanks per regiment, primarily due to flawed tactics and boggy terrain. The biggest of tank battles of the 1971 War was at Basantar, where we lost 10-14 tanks and Pakistan 46, once again a higher number for Pakistan due to the flawed tactics adopted.

We have approximately 70 armoured regiments, including those that are being raised. If these are reorganised on the basis of 31 tanks, 980 tanks will be available, which is equivalent to 32 armoured regiments organised on 31-tank basis, enough for 16 IBGs at scale of two regiments per IBG.

Similarly, there is scope for reducing one ICV per ICV platoon in mechanised infantry battalions, that is 9 ICVs per battalion. With 50 mechanised infantry battalions, 450 ICVs will become available, enough for nine additional mechanised infantry battalions.

On a transparent battlefield, unprotected infantry cannot carry out any movement without incurring heavy casualties. Hence, in a gradual manner, all infantry battalions operating in the plains and relevant terrain of Ladakh and the Northeast must be equipped with a simple, cost-effective wheeled APC.

The above restructuring/reorganisation will enable us to switch to the IBG concept, fulfilling 100 per cent requirement of fighting arms, including the formations in Ladakh and the Northeast. A similar exercise can be carried out for combat support arms and combat support services. However, in respect of these, it is their need-based allotment as per mission and terrain which is relevant and not placing them under command.

It is time for the Army to get out of inertia and restructure, reorganise and modernise for wars of 21st century, and it can be done from within. 

                       'Concentration' is a principle of war. 

In future battles/wars, what will matter is agile and usable combat potential at the point of decision and not a huge elephantine mass per se.

                                          ____________________

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.