Showing posts with label INDIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label INDIAN MILITARY MODERNIZATION. Show all posts

Wednesday, January 20, 2021

CDS : Eventful First year for CDS, Challenges Remain.(r)

 SOURCE:   https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/eventful-first-year-for-cds-challenges-remain-199981



Bugbears: The three areas of prime concern in the charter of General Rawat (left) relate to jointry, acquisitions and administration. 




Eventful First year for CDS,  Challenges Remain

                                   By 

            Gp Capt Murli Menon (Retd)

                         Defence analyst


Monday, 18 January 2021


Tasked essentially with promoting inter-service jointry and giving much-needed fillip to defence modernisation through timely and optimal defence acquisitions, the first incumbent to the post of CDS hasn’t performed lackadaisically, however contentious his initiatives have turned out to be in one year. His latest desire to win a war for India by employing indigenous weaponry, though laudable, is easier said than done.


Two decades after the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) and the consequent Group of Ministers recommended the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), and eight years after the Naresh Chandra Committee recommended a permanent chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, the Indian government instituted the first CDS in January 2020.

Tasked essentially with promoting inter-service jointry and giving much-needed fillip to defence modernisation through timely and optimal defence acquisitions, the first incumbent to the post, General Bipin Rawat, has not given a lackadaisical performance, however contentious his initiatives have turned out to be so far. 

His latest desire to win a war for India by employing indigenous weaponry, though laudable, is easier said than done, given the large gap that exists between the state-of-the-art and homegrown capabilities. Serious limitations exist in our indigenous defence capability, more so in the arena of advanced avionics, aerial weaponry and other cutting-edge technologies, such as aircraft carriers and main battle tanks.

The fact that the government chose to have a ‘first among equals’ four-star CDS rather than a five-star one as recommended by the KRC, would in the long term impinge on the effectiveness of the new dispensation.

Be that as it may, perhaps it is premature to judge whether the CDS idea was a good one or not. Three areas of prime concern comprising his charter will be analysed herein: jointry, acquisitions and administration.

Jointry has been a bugbear for most modern militaries, with single service rivalries ruling the roost generally. But this is a difficult tree to bark up, which a mere joint doctrine manual cannot deliver. The career profiles of officers and men have to build in frequent cross attachments to other sister services and mandatory ‘maroon’ tenures for the leadership for career progression.

Understanding the operating culture and peculiarities of other services is one challenge and ‘unified thinking’, more importantly, is the crucial bit.

The CDS needs to initiate policy moves in this respect to gradually build up jointmanship over time. We have a big advantage by way of initial joint training at the National Defence Academy, but a lot needs to be done to enhance tri-service jointry and consequent combat-effectiveness.

Realistic international exercises would help, no doubt, but the ultimate challenge will be to evolve as an Integrated Defence Force, wherein meaningful savings in deployment of combat assets and added combat efficiency could be achieved. Ideas of theaterisation, such as the Air Defence Command and Maritime Theatre Command, mooted by the CDS are perhaps a bit ahead of their time, given the situation in the defence forces as of now.

On defence acquisitions, whilst Make in India is a good guiding principle, practicality in technology exploitation has to be kept in mind. A classic example would be that of the Kaveri engine for the LCA, which the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) has been struggling to indigenise, but to little avail. Hence, the recourse to the US GE 404/414 engines. There are similar handicaps for helicopter, ship and tank engines and other areas, where import becomes inescapable.

The story is the same for most high-tech weaponry for all three services, such as artillery shells, aerial weaponry like the Spice series bombs and naval anti-ship and anti-aircraft weaponry. The recent government decision to grant Rs 48,000 crore for 83 Tejas jets is another doubtful starter in indigenisation, with a proven prototype of the machine not yet being available!

The third contentious policy matter initiated recently by the Department of Military Affairs under the aegis of the CDS is the proposed modification in colour service and pension criteria. Whilst increasing the retirement age to 60 may be attractive to a section of the uniformed fraternity, it may not really assist in bringing down the defence pension Bill, which at 24 per cent of the defence budget — a whopping Rs 1.12 lakh crore — is worrisome, no doubt.

But let us not forget that the defence budget is a mere 1.15 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product, and not 3 per cent, as is expected to be, as per the recommendations of a Parliamentary Committee on Defence. Were that to be realised, the pension Bill would be 8.86 per cent of the defence budget.

Also, some of the already instituted measures, such as permanency to the short service commission, OROP already sanctioned etc. would find the DMA struggling to control its inflating pension Bill, a virtual drag on modernisation and general funding.

More innovative measures by way of lateral mobility, compulsory military service and reservists need to be put in place to achieve the desired tooth-to-tail ratio and pyramidical age and career profiles demanded by the military. Getting a handle on the often infructuous Defence Industrial Complex under the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and meaningful indigenisation through privatisation are other areas the CDS needs to address to improve the overall combat efficiency and cutting of the flab.

The pension of defence civilians is another substantial loadstone that the CDS needs to do something about. Also, increasing the years of service to earn pension (effectively suggesting a reduction in pension to 50 per cent for service up to 35 years) may not go down well with the new entrants to the defence services, even if applied prospectively.

In any event, the malaise of a bloated manpower situation in the military has been the result of flagrant flouting of norms and uncalled-for beefing up of manpower requirements at the stage of government approval over the years.

To rectify this situation, drastic steps for manpower rationalisation would be called for.


Sunday, January 17, 2021

Strike Corps Reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs Larger Restructuring(R)

 SOURCE: 

 https://theprint.in/opinion/strike-corps-reorientation-comes-for-ladakh-but-army-needs-larger-restructuring/584936/

   https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0




Army Chief General M M Naravane addresses an annual press conference at the Manekshaw Centre in New Delhi on 12 January 2021 


Strike Corps Reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs Larger Restructuring

At last the Army has recognised that it is China, and not Pakistan, that is the principal threat to India’s national security.

 14 January, 2021

VIDEO :-     Google the URL to open U-TUBE

                                      [ https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0 ]

Strike Corps reorientation comes for Ladakh but Army needs larger restructuring: HS Panag

#Army #China #LAC

crisis is an opportunity riding a dangerous wind’ goes a Chinese proverb. The Chinese-perpetrated crisis in Eastern Ladakh seems to have inspired the Indian Army to seize the opportunity to initiate structural and organisational reforms. Without much ado, it has given directions for 1 Corps — one of the three mechanised forces, predominant Strike Corps focussed on Pakistan — to be restructured and reoriented as the second Mountain Strike Corps for Ladakh. 17 Mountain Strike Corps will now become the strategic reserve dedicated only to the Northeast, and it will be restructured into three-four Integrated Battle Groups, or IBGs.

This move signals that, at last, the Army has recognised that it is China, and not Pakistan, that is the principal threat to India’s national security. However, it also allows the flexibility of using the Mountain Strike Corps against Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir/Western Ladakh. One sincerely hopes that this does not remain a one-off change but becomes part of larger, holistic reforms for optimisation of the Army through restructuring and reorganisation. The Army is still based on World War-II organisations, living with incremental changes tailored to the wars of the 20th century. We need to come to terms with strategic compulsions that will influence the way we engage in future conflicts/wars.

VIDEO :-     Google the URL to open U-TUBE

                                 https://youtu.be/lCDBWuGoUi0


The Strategic Compulsions

    • Nuclear weapon armed States cannot engage in decisive conventional wars.
    • Conflict/wars will be fought below the nuclear threshold, will be driven by high-technology and limited in time and space. For this type of conflict/war,agile and multi-capability formations are required.
    • Indian economic compulsions do not permit any substantial increase in the  defence budget in the near future. Currently, the bulk of the defence budget goes in sustaining a manpower-intensive army.

And this is why the restructuring of our mechanised and infantry formations becomes important.

Restructuring of Mechanised and Infantry Formations

We are an infantry predominant army, organised in 17 Mountain Divisions (including three, otherwise designated as Infantry Divisions) and 18 Infantry Divisions (including 4-6 Reorganised Plains Infantry Divisions, or RAPID, which also have an armoured brigade in lieu of an infantry brigade). In addition, we have some Independent Infantry  Brigades. The mechanised formations are organised into three Armoured Divisions, 18-20 Independent Armoured/Mechanised Brigades, including those part of RAPIDs. All Infantry Divisions operating in plains and two Mountain Divisions also have an armoured regiment. The divisions operate under 14 Corps, seven each for mountains and plains.

A decision has already been taken to reorganise the divisions into tailor-made Integrated Battle Groups, or IBGs, with varying numbers of combat arms and combat support units dictated by the mission and terrain. All modern armies have or are in an  advanced stage of adaption to these organisations. The PLA has already implemented this concept in the form of Combined Arms Brigades. India’s progress has been painfully slow and needs to be expedited. Unfortunately, the basic fighting units of the IBGs — armoured regiments and infantry battalions —continue to be organised as they were 80 years ago. We seem to have discounted our own war-fighting experience and the impact of technology. The organisations have become part of regimentation, and the fighting arms remain smug and revel in status quo.

An infantry battalion has four rifle companies of 120 soldiers each. In addition, it has specialist platoons for mortars and anti-tank guided missiles apart from a logistics subunit. Based on the World War experience, particularly causality rates, and the advent of modern technology, all modern armies have switched to a three, instead of four-rifle  company system and provide armour protection with Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICV) or Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC). Our own experience supports this change.

In Kargil War, we suffered 527 killed (462 were due to actual combat) and 1,363 wounded. Thirty infantry battalions took part in the operations. Since 90 per cent of casualties are suffered by the infantry, mathematically, on an average, each battalion suffered 16 killed and 41 wounded, that is just 6 per cent of the unit strength of 800 personnel. As a defending and defeated army, Pakistan suffered approximately 453 killed and 665 wounded, out of nearly six infantry battalions in the battle, that is about 20 per cent of the total strength. These figures justify adopting the three-company system. Modern weapon systems and reconnaissance/surveillance resources further reinforce the logic.

We have 390 infantry battalions (including 10 Scouts Battalions), nine Para Special Forces Battalions, five Para Battalions, 63 Rashtriya Rifles Battalions and 40 Assam Rifles Battalions. If all/most of these are reorganised on basis of three rifle companies, we can spare approximately 50,000 troops, giving us enough infantry battalions for at least 12-18 IBGs, with 4-6 Infantry Battalions each. Alternatively, this manpower could be utilised to meet other shortfalls or be simply reduced.

An armoured regiment in the Indian Army has 45 tanks since 1940, organised into three squadrons and four troops each, with 14 and 3 tanks respectively. Regimental Headquarters has three tanks and Squadron Headquarters two tanks each. Since those days, tank design has undergone revolutionary changes in terms of mobility, protection and firepower. Our war experience makes a very strong case for reducing the number of tanks to 31, that is 10 tanks per squadron with three troops of three tanks each, and one tank each for squadron commander and regimental commander. Infantry Combat  Vehicles (ICVs)/Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) can be used for command and control by the regimental/squadron second-in-command and adjutant.

The maximum number of tanks lost by a regiment in 1965 or 1971 wars has been only 15. In the battle of Chawinda in 1965, out of 225 tanks in the battle, as part of five armoured regiments, we lost only 29 (we were on the offensive). Pakistan, out of its 150 tanks, lost 44. In the battle of Asal Uttar, 1965, (we were on the defensive) out of the 135 tanks, we lost only 10-14. Pakistan, out of its 220 tanks, lost 99, that is 20 tanks per regiment, primarily due to flawed tactics and boggy terrain. The biggest of tank battles of the 1971 War was at Basantar, where we lost 10-14 tanks and Pakistan 46, once again a higher number for Pakistan due to the flawed tactics adopted.

We have approximately 70 armoured regiments, including those that are being raised. If these are reorganised on the basis of 31 tanks, 980 tanks will be available, which is equivalent to 32 armoured regiments organised on 31-tank basis, enough for 16 IBGs at scale of two regiments per IBG.

Similarly, there is scope for reducing one ICV per ICV platoon in mechanised infantry battalions, that is 9 ICVs per battalion. With 50 mechanised infantry battalions, 450 ICVs will become available, enough for nine additional mechanised infantry battalions.

On a transparent battlefield, unprotected infantry cannot carry out any movement without incurring heavy casualties. Hence, in a gradual manner, all infantry battalions operating in the plains and relevant terrain of Ladakh and the Northeast must be equipped with a simple, cost-effective wheeled APC.

The above restructuring/reorganisation will enable us to switch to the IBG concept, fulfilling 100 per cent requirement of fighting arms, including the formations in Ladakh and the Northeast. A similar exercise can be carried out for combat support arms and combat support services. However, in respect of these, it is their need-based allotment as per mission and terrain which is relevant and not placing them under command.

It is time for the Army to get out of inertia and restructure, reorganise and modernise for wars of 21st century, and it can be done from within. 

                       'Concentration' is a principle of war. 

In future battles/wars, what will matter is agile and usable combat potential at the point of decision and not a huge elephantine mass per se.

                                          ____________________

Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.


Friday, January 15, 2021

CDS INDIA : Chief of Defence Staff – Game Changer or Damp Squib? (R)

 SOURCE ;  http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/chief-of-defence-staff-game-changer-or-damp-squib/

ALSO  SEE : https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/book-defence-reform-3.pdf






Chief of Defence Staff

 – Game Changer or Damp Squib?

                              By 

          Brig V Jai Kumar (Retd)


12 Jan , 2021


It has been a year since the much-awaited post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was created to provide single point military advice to the national leadership. Almost two decades after a Group of Ministers recommended the creation of the post, General Bipin Rawat took over as the first CDS on 01 Jan 2019. It is perhaps the right time to see whether the manner of its creation and tenancy is a harbinger of enhanced military might and an efficient and cost-effective military machine or just another damp squibs

To put things in perspective, the military is the single source of hard national power, to exert the national will against an adversarial nation, or to prevent aggression by one as seen in Kargil, Doklam and Galwan. While the other sources of national power including economic, political, diplomatic, social and cultural cannot substitute for military power, the hard component, they have a role in enhancing soft power. Eviction of the Pakistani intruders from the icy heights of Kargil or stopping Chinese intrusions in Doklam and Galwan etc would not have been possible without application of military power. The Chinese annexation of Tibet and vast portions of Mongolia as well as extension of its territorial limits well into the South China sea, are all due to exercise of her hard power. It is difficult to imagine these results being achieved through other means.

Military power thus provides the foundation of national power, over which other elements build up. It is not without reason that developed countries with strong economies and highly developed diplomatic and other systems devote a substantial portion of their GDP to sustaining their military might as an essential means of compellence or deterrence

Development and sustenance of military power involves, besides creating well trained military units and formations, for land, sea and air warfare, equipping and training them, providing them with higher direction to synergize their potential, where the whole is greater than the sum of all, and to ensure their development through a continuous cycle of threat assessment, capability gap analysis, capability building, training and testing. Military power must also be supported with timely and comprehensive intelligence inputs, R&D, capital acquisitions and logistics support. There is need of an overarching authority to direct, coordinate, control and take responsibility for all these aspects. In a democracy, this authority must function directly under the political-executive, to enable it to merge the military might of the nation with the other sources of national power. This is the rightful role of the Chief of Defence Staff.

A review of the pre-CDS system and how the nation and its military fared on the parameters of military preparedness, intelligence, R&D, capital acquisitions and logistics would be useful. The pre-CDS Ministry of Defence (MoD), consisted of the Department of Defence (DoD), Department of Defence Production (DoDP), Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Department of Veteran Affairs (DVA), each headed by a Secretary level officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS). ..A financial cell of the Finance Ministry was attached to the MoD. There appears to be no one, other than the Defence Minister, who exercises control to ensure that the departments work together or to synergize their energies. Till a few years back the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister also headed the DRDO – an arrangement which was flawed.

The three service headquarters were initially “attached offices” and, post-Kargil, became became “Integrated Offices” of the MoD. Files from the service headquarters were routed through a Joint Secretary in the DoD. Parametric analysis of the four wars that the nation fought under this dispensation would be useful to comment on its appropriateness.

The 1948 Kashmir war, which was fought before the present MoD was in place, saw well trained and equipped army units airlifted to Srinagar airfield to evict the tribal lashkar hordes let loose and actively supported by the Pakistani military in a bid to capture Jammu and Kashmir. Decisive military action executed with grit and valour soon had the marauders on the run. Disaster came in the form of Jawahar Lal Nehru’s decision, without the benefit of cabinet approval to declare a cease fire (on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah) and to refer the matter the UNO, even before the marauders were completely evicted. Refusal to postpone the cease-fire by a fortnight as advised by his Army Chief resulted in a large portion of J&K remaining in the hands of the marauders, which constitutes Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).

The debacle of 1962 was a direct consequence of Nehru’s naivety, inane concepts of statesmanship and obdurate dismissal of expert advice as well as of realities on the ground. The military was relegated to a ceremonial force, its powers severely curtailed in a dispensation created under Nehru’s orders by Defence Secretary HM Patel (Oct ’47 to Jul ’53). { Google :-   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirubhai_M._Patel }  As a consequence, an ill prepared, un-acclimatised and ill-equipped army under an incompetent military leader (Lt Gen BM Kaul, an incompetent and unqualified relative that Nehru imposed upon the Army), was run over by the Chinese PLA, despite raw display of courage, valour and dedication and awe-inspiring junior leadership in the field. Nehru’s refusal to permit use of India’s superior air power, which would yet have resulted in defeating the Chinese aggression, was perhaps his crowning folly that cemented the outcome.


Despite being surprised in ’65, the Indian military, equipped with WW II vintage bolt action rifles, Sherman tanks (the Vijayanta was yet in prototype stage), fighter aircraft fleet of Vampire, Mysteres, Gnats and Hunter aircraft fought the Pakistani aggressors, equipped with superior Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre Jets and F 104 Star Fighters aircraft, to a stand-still. Intelligence failure apart, the political leadership under Lal Bahadur Shastri gave the military its full support and complete freedom of action to grab the initiative by opening a front against Lahore rather than fighting as per Pakistan’s design. This forced Pakistan to divert military resources to protect its hinterland and effectively halted its aggression. Post-war analysts showed a lack of coordination between the Army and the Air Force at the highest levels, with the Army and Air Force not sharing plans.

India created history in 1971 with a brilliant campaign that liberated Bangladesh in under a fortnight (3 to 16 Dec 1971). Backing her Chief’s decision to launch the campaign in December rather than in March, the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi ably complemented General Manekshaw’s efforts through a whirlwind diplomatic initiative and domestic synergy that geared up the entire nation for the effort. One (but not the only) reason to postpone the campaign was deficiency in wherewithal to sustain the military campaign. Unstinting efforts by the defence production agencies and synergizing of all required national energies for the upcoming national effort saw a sharp ramp up of military preparedness. Tri-service synergy was in full display during the entire campaign. Under-whelming performance by the Vijayanta was a        set-back, for which it would be unfair to blame the Heavy Vehicle Factory or the design agency alone.



Surprised again by the surreptitious occupation of heights on our side of the LOC in Kargil by Pakistani forces in May 1999, the army, actively supported by the air force evicted the intruders from virtually invincible positions under harsh environmental conditions. Vajpayee’s directive prohibiting our forces from crossing the LOC, while giving India international brownie points, imposed severe constraints on its military. The Bofors howitzer imported in the 1980s, served the campaign well though India had to resort to emergency procurement of ammunition, normal procurement of which had been derailed due to the corruption scandal.

To summarize, the only instance of close linkage between the political-executive and the military leadership, which happened in 1971, purely due to the personal equations between Mrs Indira Gandhi and General Sam Manekshaw, led to brilliant results. 

The Ministry of Defence, specifically designed by HM Patel, under Nehru’s directives, to debilitate these links and the resultant structure has served the nation ill.

Lack of a single point of accountability for the military being starved of modern of modern weapon systems, munitions and wherewithal to manifest its capabilities also points to inappropriateness of the system by which India conducted her military affairs before institutionalization of the CDS.

So, can the CDS change all this? The answer, sadly, is NO. There has been no meaningful restructuring to address the well-known shortcomings in the conduct of the defence of India. There has been no meaningful restructuring of the MoD. Specifically, the aforementioned lack of an authority, acting under the orders of the Defence Minister, to coordinate, control and take responsibilities for all facets of the MoD is still unchanged.


The much- vaunted CDS is just another department head in the MoD. Further, the newly created “Department of Military Affairs” that he heads is not involved with policy making for the defence of India, preparation for defence or for acts conducive to prosecution of war. These matters continue to remain the preserve of the Department of Defence headed by the Defence Secretary.


Which begs the question – what affairs other than military affairs does the Ministry of Defence engage with. Be it defence policy, defence preparation, defence actions, defence R&D, defence procurements, defence supplies, and defence production all these are part and parcel of Military Affairs. All of them must be controlled, coordinated and directed by a single authority who will then take sole responsibility for any success or failure.


The Chief of Defence Staff, answerable to the Minister of Defence and to the Union Cabinet, must be that single authority. The nation needs that this person has the capability and credentials to shoulder these responsibilities and a sufficiently long tenure, of say five years, to make a difference. Restructuring of the MoD to support him in this endeavour and seating him on the high table of national decision making are also of essence to enable India to maximize her national power through synergy of all its national energies in the fulfilment of her national will.


                                  _________________________

Friday, December 4, 2020

MODERNIZATION INDIAN ARMED FORCES : The High Seas Command (r)

 SOURCE:   https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/special-report/story/20201207-the-high-se-as-command-1744377-2020-11-27 




Indian Navy Proposal For Maritime Theatre Command; Will it take wings?


                                             VIDEO : Click / Google url to open

                                            [  https://youtu.be/7bbIX7BbFS4  ]


Indian Navy proposes a Maritime Theatre Command in Karwar, Karnataka. This Maritime Theatre will not only patrol the country’s 7,516-km-long coastline but also from North Arabian sea to South China sea responsible for protecting India's interests in the Indo-Pacific region.The creation of the post of maritime theatre commander and a new integrated command, subsuming all operational aspects of the four existing naval commands, are key recommendations of a recent Indian Navy study. The proposed MTC will also include Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jets, helicopters and transport aircraft on the Indian peninsula, two Indian Army brigades, comprising around 10,000 soldiers, and, interestingly, all Coast Guard patrol vessels, helicopters and aircraft.
#IndiaFirst #IndianNavy #MaritimeTheatreCommand


    The High Seas Command 

A joint study draws up the ambitious Maritime Theatre Command by restructuring existing military commandsto straddle India's entire maritime sphere. Will it take wings or meet the fate of its predecessor?

Sandeep Unnithan

Executive Editor, India Today  


From his headquarters near the picturesque Binaga Bay in Karwar, Karnataka, the commander-in-chief (C-in-C) of India’s first Maritime Theatre Command (MTC) will have an overview of his enormous responsibilities. His ships will not only patrol the country’s 7,516-km-long coastline but also its distant maritime interests astride the world’s most important ocean, stretching as far as the Cape of Good Hope off South Africa and to the southern shores of the Indonesian archipelago.

The creation of the post of maritime theatre commander and a new integrated command, subsuming all operational aspects of the four existing naval commands, are key recommendations of a recent Indian Navy study. The proposed MTC will also include Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter jets, helicopters and transport aircraft on the Indian peninsula, two Indian Army brigades, comprising around 10,000 soldiers, and, interestingly, all Coast Guard patrol vessels, helicopters and aircraft.

The study, part of a government mandate to reduce India’s 17 single-service commands into five joint commands, and prepared by vice chief of naval staff Vice Admiral G. Ashok Kumar, will soon be handed over to chief of defence staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat.

Government officials told india today that the study proposes a model that can be implemented in a short timeframe, nine months to a year, and does not require the creation of additional posts or flag ranks or even office space. It will use existing manpower and resources. It is the most complex of the two tri-services theatre commands to be created in the next two years, the other one being the Integrated Air Defence Command headed by the IAF.

Significantly, the MTC will be the first one that loosens a service chief’s command over operations and assets. A parallel study for setting up the Air Defence Command is underway, but it’s not as radical because the IAF chief will hold on to his fighter, transport and combat fleets.

The MTC commander-in-chief will report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee headed by the CDS. The navy chief will shed their operational roles and be primarily responsible for ‘Raise, Train and Sustain’ functions, administration, acquisitions and training. The three C-in-Cs will be reported to the CNS for ‘raise train and sustain’ functions and to the Maritime Theatre Commander for operations. The navy study, thus, paints a picture of the desired end state of independent India’s most significant military reform that kicked off this year with the appointment of the first CDS and the bifurcation of the military into theatres and service headquarters.

The MTC, earlier called the Peninsular Command, is likely to be the more significant of the first two theatres because it has a larger share of assets from the air force and the army. It could serve as a template for other more complex theatre commands to follow. The northern, eastern and western theatre commands, which directly address China and Pakistan, portend greater inter-services rivalry and will have to be undertaken on live borders. This could push their implementation to the second phase of the theaterisation.

The  Commands'  Challenge

General Rawat completes the first year of his CDS tenure on January 1, 2021. He has just two more years to complete his biggest task, of creating integrated theatre commands. A command is a military formation headed by a three-star C-in-C and is responsible for all military tasks in a given operational space. All of India’s 18 commands presently are single-service commands, which means they are exclusively run by the army, navy or the air force. The army and the air force have seven commands each; the navy has the remaining four. The Strategic Forces Command, which has operational control of India’s nuclear weapons, is the sole joint-services command.

The 18 commands are not co-located, and train, plan and exercise separately. If the IAF commander, for instance, needs to ask for a naval platform to assist his operations, he will have to initiate a complicated bureaucratic procedure through two service verticals.

Theaterisation pools in all resources, army, navy and air force, under a single theatre commander. “The setting up of such a maritime command, especially if it is to operate under the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, is a right step that will address the issue of dual-hatted chiefs, which is an anomaly and a managerial nightmare,” says Anit Mukherjee, associate professor in the South Asia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore. “It is encouraging, though, as it seemingly addresses a fundamental tenet for jointness/ unity of command and control.”

The MTC integrates all Indian navy, army, air force and coast guard assets to achieve what the 2017 ‘Joint Forces Doctrine’ terms the addressing of the ‘integrated theatre battle’. This operationally adaptable force will ensure decisive victory in a network-centric environment across the entire spectrum of conflict in varied geographic domains. The Joint Maritime Theatre will not only have to address the growing power of China’s PLA Navy, which with 350 warships is the world’s largest, but also integrated Chinese military power. China’s president Xi Jinping recently set the goal of turning the PLA into a ‘fully modern military’ matching the US by 2027.

“Indian sea power today will not have the luxury of fighting the PLA Navy alone,” says Rear Admiral Sudarshan Shrikhande, who once headed naval intelligence. “It will also be fighting all the combined elements of the PLA’s military power, from air power to long-range ballistic missiles, range of expeditionary capabilities, cyber warfare and space-based assets. Our responses against the PLA Navy likewise, ought to be joint.”

Before that, MTC will have to deal with inter-services rivalries arising from the sharing of assets. The navy might not have trouble persuading the army to shed two amphibious brigades, based in Thiruvananthapuram and Port Blair, a force of nearly 12,000 infantry soldiers who can be transported on naval utility vessels to enemy shores. But it could face resistance while getting the IAF to move its maritime strike assets to the MTC, the Jaguars based in Jamnagar and Su-30MKIs and Tejas aircraft in Thanjavur.

Senior IAF commanders loathe tying their air assets to geographical theatres. Top navy officials say they have addressed this by proposing service verticals within the MTC. While the command will be headed by a three-star navy officer, the army and IAF verticals will be better interfaces with their respective services. The MTC will have a similar vertical for the Coast Guard, which presently reports to the defence minister through the defence secretary.

While this reporting chain will continue, Coast Guard assets will be placed under the MTC. The maritime theatre commander, for instance, could deploy Coast Guard patrol vessels for the navy’s ‘mission-based deployments’, warships deployed at seven vital points in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. Navy officials cite the government designating the navy as the principal authority for overall maritime security post-26/11 as the logic behind this move.

The MTC is being created with the navy’s inhouse resources. The MTC C-in-C will be based out of the navy’s existing base, INS Kadamba in Karwar, and function with less than 300 staff, lesser than the crew strength of a Delhi-class destroyer.

Moreover, 2021 could well be the time to implement drastic restructuring in the service. The navy will see a rare and unprecedented reshuffle of its top brass when chief of naval staff Admiral Karambir Singh, vice chief of naval staff Vice Admiral Ashok Kumar, C-in-C West Vice Admiral Ajit Kumar, C-in-C East Vice Admiral A.K. Jain and C-in-C South Vice Admiral A.K. Chawla all retire within months of each other.

The Cost  Benefit

The navy is yet to calculate savings on account of this command. Top navy officials point to potential savings by halting acquisitions and new infrastructure for the Coast Guard. “The nation can ill-afford two maritime forces,” says a senior naval official.

Former Coast Guard director general Prabhakaran Paleri terms as “ridiculous” the move to place the Coast Guard under the navy in peacetime. (It is done so only in war.) “Navies cannot enforce maritime law; they are meant for war, which is why the navy itself had proposed the raising of the Coast Guard in 1978,” he says. The MTC structure will call for modifying the Navy Act and the Coast Guard Act, he adds.

The MTC is a gigantic version of the much smaller Andaman and Nicobar tri-services command that India had unsuccessfully attempted to create in 2001. The command was held in rotation by three-star officers from each service. This experiment was envisaged as a template for other geographically and functionally delineated joint commands. Lack of political will and inter-services rivalry thwarted this model from being replicated. Finally, in 2016, the navy took this command back.

Under MTC, the Andaman and Nicobar Command will go back to what it was in the mid-1990s, Fortress Andaman or FORTAN, just another outpost in the maritime theatre commander’s new domain.


Tuesday, November 10, 2020

MODERNIZATION : Don’t Tinker with Indian Military’s way of life to fix Your Out-of-Control Fiscal Deficit

SOURCE:

https://theprint.in/opinion/dont-tinker-with-indian-militarys-way-of-life-to-fix-your-out-of-control-fiscal-deficit/539018/


 


Don’t Tinker with Indian          Military’s way of life to fix Your Out-of-Control                Fiscal Deficit 


Some half-baked economist came up with the 

specious argument to reform military life to save 

money — and CDS Bipin Rawat-led DMA 

swallowed the bait hook line and sinker.


MANVENDRA SINGH 

 9 November 2020.


hse Narendra Modi government flew a kite,

 its string handled by the Department of 

Military Affairs, to test conditions among the 

soldier community on the ground. 

The message displayed by the kite caused such severe turbulence in the fraternity of the fearless that it is unlikely to be a smooth ride for it from now on. Soldiers, those in service and veterans, have seen a slow erosion of their way of life. Perquisites have been chiseled away, one slice at a time. Chinese  WAY  of  Salami slicing of the border has been copied, aimed at service privileges. Pension and service reforms are the latest target, and anger is palpable among soldiers.

Military institutions in India have taken generations to mould and develop. Beginning from humble origins, much like their recruitment base, the military has successfully created its ethos and culture that is uniquely Indian. It is in fact a society that reflects the best of India, from inculcating a sense of belonging to this vast land to echoing its civilisational vision in a masterly way. Military life in India is deeply spiritual, completely professional, and uncompromisingly inclusive. Soldiers are drawn from Kupwara to Kanyakumari, Kutch to Kohima, and everywhere in between.

Each soldier is driven by a pride in the uniform, embodying a work culture that doesn’t accept laxity. Unlike any other Indian institution, the military doesn’t make concessions with prejudice or non-performance. The soldiers live, train, fight, and even die, for their pride, battalion and mother India. Living largely isolated from the vagaries of civilian India, they have developed systems and practices that sustain their unique way of life — an existence that is increasingly seen as peculiar and in need of tweaking. This episodic tinkering has suddenly got the soldier community ablaze because of an outlandish proposal to increase service age and pare down pensions.

Reform? Call it by its name

“[Chief of Defence Staff] General (Bipin) Rawat had made it very clear that the increase in retirement age would come through by 2021 as it was the need of the hour. Both the measures would lead to substantial financial savings as the increase in retirement age will also lead to lesser intake of officers at cadet level,” The Indian Express reported, citing a military source. A draft Government Sanction Letter (GSL) follows on the heels of earlier proposals that recommended a strange cadre review, some reversal of canteen entitlements, even changes in the much-valued Ex-Servicemen Contributory Health Scheme, functioning of military messes, bands, and regimental institutions including the hallowed quarter-guard.

The driver of all this tinkering is a ballooning pension bill that was estimated at 28 per cent of the last defence budget. Some half-baked economist came up with the specious argument to reform military life, so as to save precious money. The Department of Military Affairs (DMA) swallowed the bait hook line and sinker, without a thought to how it impacts the functioning life of a combat unit. By all estimations, the military is one institution that delivers on every task it is called upon. It is indeed the best value for money spent by the government. And yet it is the singular establishment that is expected to clip its perquisites so that an out-of-control fiscal deficit can be better managed. Under the guise of pension reform, this is yet another raid on a way of life that is celebrated nationwide.

Military reforms are always welcome if war-fighting capabilities improve. But such improvements can never succeed when they piggyback on financial setbacks to soldiers. They cannot help battle efficiency when a time-tested system is tinkered. They can only succeed when structures are created that extract the best from an effective institution and existing ethos. Neither of these two fundamentals can be raised overnight. But they can certainly be damaged even before the ink has dried on an order. If the Modi government wants to save money, it should begin with the vast leaky reservoir of rural development schemes. Every bureaucrat and politician in India knows the extent of the leakage, but they know nothing about military life, ethos, and morale.

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The author is a Editor-in-Chief of Defence & Security Alert. Views are personal.