Russia’s Policy Shift Towards Taliban And Pakistan

SOURCE:http://www.eurasiareview.com/02032017-russias-policy-shift-towards-taliban-and-pakistan-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

Russia’s Policy Shift Towards Taliban And Pakistan – Analysis

                             By 

            Manabhanjan Meher

                           IDSA 

Taliban fighters in Afghanistan. Source: Wikipedia Commons.

MARCH 2, 2017

For the second time in the last few months, Russia hosted a Conference on Afghanistan in Moscow on February 15, 2017, this time with an expanded representation of six countries – Russia itself, Iran, China, India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Interestingly, a key player, the United States, which still maintains 9,800 troops to support the Afghan government’s counter-insurgency efforts against the Taliban, has been kept out of the meeting. But for its part, the US appears to be contemplating an increase in its military commitment, with its commander in Afghanistan, Gen. John Nicholson, advocating to the Senate Armed Services Committee recently that “a few thousand” more NATO trainers are needed to break the stalemate against the Taliban.1 India welcomed the Moscow meeting which brought together countries that have stakes in Afghanistan’s peace and security. However, raising concerns on the Russia-led efforts for talks with the Taliban, External Affairs Ministry Spokesman Vikas Swarup noted that “We underlined that it is up to the government of Afghanistan to decide whom to engage in direct talks.”2

The two regional meetings (the first was held in December 2016) represent Russia’s first post-Soviet attempt to replay the Afghan game and that too in a big way. However, in contrast to the Soviet motivation of propping up the communist government of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) against a growing insurgency in December 1979, the Russian interest in Afghanistan now is the prevention of the growth and influence of the Islamic State (IS), which, in turn, may have a negative fallout on the security of Central Asia. A further Russian motive in Afghanistan appears to be aimed at keeping the US out of the region.

This major shift in Russia’s Afghanistan policy came immediately after it expressed concerns about the possibility of Afghanistan turning into a safe sanctuary for the Islamic State militants fleeing from Iraq and Syria.3 Speaking at the ‘Heart of Asia’ conference held in Amritsar on December 5, 2016, Russia’s special envoy to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, described the Islamic State as being more dangerous than the Taliban. And three days later, on December 8, 2016, the Russian Ambassador to Afghanistan stated that “Our concern is that Daesh not only threatens Afghanistan, but it is also a potent threat to Central Asia, Pakistan, China, Iran, India and even Russia. We have ties with the Taliban to ensure the security of our political offices, consulates and the security of central Asia.”4 

Incontrast, Ahmad Murid Partaw, former Afghan National Representative to US CENTCOM, asserted that the presence of the IS in Afghanistan has been overemphasized by Russia, China and Iran as a pretext not only to intervene in the country’s affairs but also to counter the growing influence of the US in the region. He further stated that “the Af-Pak region is not a suitable ground for proliferation of such rejectionist beliefs enforced by IS and its supporters. This region has been influenced by the Deobandi school of Islam rather than Takfiri version.”5

During the latter half of the 1990s, Russia accused the Taliban of training Chechen rebels and fomenting Central Asian radical Islamic networks. As a result, Russia, in collaboration with Iran and India, supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime. Today, Russia no longer views the Taliban as a major threat to its security and interests. There is even a suspicion among Afghan political leaders and officials that Russia is militarily helping the Taliban, with parliamentarians alleging in the upper house that Russia is supplying arms to the Taliban. However, Russian officials have dismissed such Afghan claims and suspicions. They have said that “We have never ever provided any kind of assistance to Taliban. Instead, Russia is assisting the Afghan government and has provided some light weapons on grant basis to its forces and is running programs to train Afghan police and military personnel in Russian institutions.”6

For its part, the Taliban has begun to respond favourably to Moscow’s outreach. Syed Muhammad Akbar Agha, a former Taliban commander who lives in Kabul and still espouses Islamic rule in Afghanistan, said in an interview to Komsomolskaya Pravda that “We are ready to shake hands with Russia in order to rid ourselves of the scourge of America.” He further noted that “history has proven that we are closer to Russia and the former Soviet republics than to the West.”7

It seems clear that Russia and the Taliban share common concerns about both the Islamic State and the continued US presence in Afghanistan. Such thinking is also shared by China and Iran and consequently Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran are pursuing a policy towards Afghanistan that is very different from that of India.

Meanwhile the Afghan government continues to face a host of security challenges posed by the Taliban forces. As recently as January 10, 2017, the Taliban claimed responsibility for a suicide attack in Kabul that killed more than 30 people and wounded some 70 others including the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to Afghanistan and the governor of Kandahar province. One analyst even asserts that “the Taliban isn’t interested in peace and security. The jihadist group wants to win the Afghan war and it is using negotiations with regional and international powers to improve its standing.”8

Therefore, to expect that the Taliban would give up its terrorist activities is highly unlikely, which means that Russia will not be able to bring about a reconciliation between Kabul and the Taliban. In addition, Russia also has to contend with the view of the Afghan government, which was articulated by its representative Mohammad Ashraf Haidari at the February 15 meeting in Moscow. Haidari emphasized that the National Unity Government (NUG) is the only legitimate government representing all Afghans. And as for the role of the Taliban in the peace process, he stated that “Taliban lack the national and moral legitimacy to represent the Afghan people, who reject terrorism perpetrated by the Taliban and their foreign terrorist allied networks in the name of Islam—a religion of peace, tolerance, and co-existence.”9

Russia is not only taking a relatively benign view of the Taliban but it is also cosying  up to Pakistan, the Taliban’s sponsor. Russia’s decision to send troops to Pakistan for a joint military exercise in September 2016 demonstrated this, especially as it came in the wake of the terrorist attack in Uri carried out by the Pakistan-based and-backed jihadi group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Russia justified its military overture to Pakistan by saying that military cooperation was aimed at fighting against the Islamic State. Kabulov argued that “We understand all concerns of India about your western neighbour…But we cannot combat (terrorism) efficiently and productively and eliminate (it) without the cooperation of Pakistan. We need their cooperation and they should realise their importance and responsibility.”10

Clearly, Moscow’s decision to side with the Taliban and Islamabad has fundamentally changed the peace building efforts in Afghanistan. New Delhi and Kabul, on the other hand, still consider the Taliban and its Pakistani sponsor as the main threats to peace and stability in Afghanistan. India is also against the incorporation of the Taliban into the Afghan government so long as it does not renounce terrorism. For their part, Afghan analysts and lawmakers suggest that the regional countries, particularly Pakistan, have never been honest in fighting terrorism.11 In addition, they allege that the International Community has never pressed Pakistan to wipe terrorists out from its soil.12

Given all this, there is little or no prospect of Russia becoming a successful anchor of peace in Afghanistan. Further, the memory of the Soviet invasion is still fresh in the Afghan mind. And Russia has little chance of succeeding so long as the United States maintains troops in Afghanistan. Russia needs to be mindful of the fact that the rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan can be countered only through close cooperation with Afghanistan’s National Unity Government and the Afghan National Security Forces. Its efforts to differentiate between the Islamic State and Taliban are also a mistake given that both groups share a similar ideology, albeitwith slight variations. Engaging the Taliban for the sake of fighting the Islamic State is likely to further alienate Afghanistan’s National Unity Government as well as other stake holders in the Afghan peace process. That, in turn, would only aggravate the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/russia-policy-shift-towards-taliban-and-pakistan_mmeher_010317

• 1. “General sees Russian meddling in Afghanistan, need for more troops to fight Taliban,” Washington Times, February 9, 2017

• 2. “Moscow Six-Party Talks on Afghanistan Commit to ‘Red lines’ on Taliban Engagement,” The Wire, February 16, 2017

• 3. “Rise of ISIS in Afghanistan is threat to Russia – Moscow,” September 13, 2016

• 4. Shabir Ahmadi, “Envoy Confirms Russia Has Relations With Taliban,” December 8, 2016

• 5. Ahmad Murid Partaw, “The Illusion of the Islamic State in Afghanistan,”  Foreign Policy Journal, February 10, 2017

• 6. “Russia strongly supports China-Pakistan economic corridor as it is crucial for Pakistan’s economy, regional connectivity: Russian envoy,” December 16, 2016

• 7. “The Taliban Wants Closer Ties With Moscow to Rid Afghanistan of ‘U.S. Scourge’,” Moscow Times, February 13, 2017

• 8. Thomas Joscelyn, “Russia’s new favorite jihadis: The Taliban,” Long War Journal, January 4, 2017

• 9. “At Moscow meeting, Afghanistan says Taliban shouldn’t be supported,” February 16, 2017

• 10. Devirupa Mitra, “Pakistan Critical to Defeating ISIS, Says Russian Special Rep to Afghanistan,” The Wire, December 5, 2016

• 11. Suraya Raiszada, “Regional Meeting On Afghanistan To Be Held In Near Future, UN,” February 11, 2017

• 12. Rafi Sidiqi, “International Community Not Committed to Afghanistan in Fight Against Terrorism: Analysts,” February 10, 2017

TOPICS:AfghanistanCentral AsiaForeign PolicyPakistanRussiaTalibanTerrorism

AFGHANISTAN - Game for the throne : More instability expected in Afghanistan

SOURCE:
http://southasiamonitor.org/detail.php?type=sl&nid=19104



                Game for the throne
: More instability expected in Afghanistan
                            By
                Lt Gen P. C. Katoch                   

                                                                

 

 

Updated:Sep 2, 2016

In April-June 2012, ‘Democracy International’ surveyed 176 Members of the Afghan Parliament (121 from Lower House and 55 from Upper House) seeking their views on elections, electoral laws and governance. Most agreed that electoral reforms were necessary to strengthen the country's electoral system and improve the government’s legitimacy. Majority of them wanted change of electoral laws and electoral system, introduction of safeguards for appointment of electoral commissioners, plus confirmed women representation in Parliament. Political stability may be defined as a set of characteristic which allow the state exercise its authority, prominent ones being: lack of violence within the polity; absence of threatening changes to the core political structure; sufficient capacity by the state to control its polity, and; absence of deficient state functionality to meet its political responsibilities and a reasonable degree of regularity in the political behavior of a polity. Any changes to these patterns will serve as a catalyst to instigate instability in the nation.

 

In the case of Afghanistan, a survey conducted by National Centre for Policy Research based in Kabul in 2011 had opined that political instability in Afghanistan was related to: unemployment and poverty; social fragmentation; return of migrants; poppy crops and trafficking; lack of rule of law; civil society and political parties; trust and legitimacy of government; Islamic radicalism and Taliban control in some areas; weak justice; ‘Great Power Games’, and intervention of neighboring countries as more fundamental dimensions of external causes of political instability – maximum from Pakistan. 

 

Much water has flown under the bridge since then. Take the external factor of intervention by Pakistan, assessed in 2011 by 43 percent of those surveyed as the highest among neighboring countries that would have gone up exponentially today with: Afghan clerics publicly calling for jihad against Pakistan; evidence of Pakistani involvement in frequent terror attacks in Afghanistan; Afghan President Ashraf Ghani repeatedly pointing the finger at Pakistan including for the recent terror attack on American University of Afghanistan in Kabul; former Afghan National Directorate of Security Chief, Rahmatullah Nabil releasing classified documents about Pakistan support to Afghan militant groups, specifically Haqqani network; July 2016 report by UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) stating Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-i-Mohammed (JeM) are operating in Afghanistan, and  Afghanistan officially telling Pakistan that Hafiz Saeed, former LeT chief is directing ISIS operations in  Afghanistan.

 

Getting back to the political scene in Afghanistan, the aftermath of last Presidential election had witnessed considerable dissent and political turmoil. It was only because of the master of ceremonies, the USA, that a National Unity Government (NUG) was forged with Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun, as President and Abdullah Abdullah, a Tajik, as the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). It is well known that the crux of ethnic rivalry in Afghanistan is symbolized by the struggle by Pashtuns to re-establish dominance, and Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek minorities seeking adequate representation in political power at the centre and autonomy of respective areas, with Taliban adding to the complexity  compounded by external factors like Pakistan. 

 

Talks with the Taliban itself are subject of debate in Afghanistan. Significantly, in his statement titled ‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community’ to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 9 February 2017, James Clapper, Director National Intelligence had said, “The Kabul government will continue to face persistent hurdles to political stability in 2016, including eroding political cohesion, assertions of authority by local powerbrokers, recurring financial shortfalls, and countrywide, sustained attacks by the Taliban.  Political cohesion will remain a challenge for Kabul as the National Unity Government will confront larger and more divisive issues later in 2016, including the implementation of election reforms, long-delayed parliamentary elections, and a potential change by a Loya Jirga that might fundamentally alter Afghanistan’s constitutional order”.

 

The implication of “potential change by a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) that might fundamentally alter Afghanistan’s constitutional order” as stated by James Clapper could be interpreted as  the Loya Jirga preceded by parliamentary elections likely institutionalizing the CEO as the Prime Minister of Afghanistan and the Parliament hitherto largely ineffective with powers centralized with the President, would have a larger and effective role in ruling and administering Pakistan – possible change to Parliamentary democracy? As per Dr Davood Moradian, Director General, Afghan Institute of Strategic Studies, when US Secretary of State John Kerry brokered the agreement to form the National Unity Government in Afghanistan, the government was expected to implement a number of electoral and political reforms by September 2016, including organizing parliamentary elections and conveying the constitutional Loya Jirga, the grand assembly. According to Moradian, no meaningful step has been taken to honour these promises. Many are anxiously watching how Washington and the Afghan government will handle the looming September deadline; underlying causes and possible corrective measures “being overshadowed by Washington”. To top this, everything between Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah doesn’t appear to be all hunky dory.

 

The looming political crisis in Afghanistan could not have at a worse time. The assessment by James Clapper in February had said that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) Khorasan branch will probably remain a low-level threat to Afghan stability as well as to US and Western interests in the region during 2016, but the reverse appears happening with frequent terror attacks in Afghanistan, supported by Pakistan. Pakistan is also deliberately targeting Afghanistan’s ethnic harmony by orchestrating terrorist attacks and killing Hazaras; to polarize the Afghan society on lines of the  Pashtun and  the non-Pashtun. Without open discussions, countermeasures and accommodation, this is recipe for more instability. According to Dr Moradian, “Failure to manage ethnic politics is one of the drivers of socioeconomic underdevelopment, ethnic and civil wars, state collapse, ethnic cleansing and even genocide”. To compound the problems, the Taliban offensive and influence doesn’t appear to be abating either. Pakistan will continue to support anti-Afghan forces especially since it has China backing her with Chinese commercial interests in Afghanistan protected through Pakistani proxies. It is imperative for Afghanistan to arrive at a political agreement on the framework and principles of political power to govern Afghanistan, and implement it speedily.

 

(Lt Gen P. C. Katoch is veteran Indian Army. Comments and suggestions on the article can be sent on: editor@spsindia.in)