MARITIME GEOPOLTICS : China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Should India Worry?

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/28052016-china-pakistan-economic-corridor-should-india-worry-analysis/

            China-Pakistan Economic Corridor:

                 Should India Worry? – Analysis

                                            By

                   Pramod Jaiswal and Aditi Paul*

                           South Asia Monitor

 

May 28, 2016

 

 

 

Pakistan's Gwadar Port. Photo by Paranda, Wikipedia Commons.

 

 

  

The groundbreaking ceremony for the new expressway, linking Peshawar and Karachi, was held on the first week of May this year in Pakistan. It is the single biggest transit project planned for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is a key project of China’s “One Belt, One Road Initiative”. The Peshawar–Karachi expressway will be 392 kilometers long, with a total contract cost of USD 2.9 billion, with a designed speed of 120 kilometers per hour. The construction of this huge infrastructure in Pakistan with Chinese investment has raised India’s security concerns. In this context, it would be worthwhile to understand CPEC, the feasibility of the project, China’s vested interest, strategic moves or calculations of the Pakistan Army, and the impact on India’s national interest.


Regionalism has failed to take off in South Asia due to political differences, congeneric economies, socio-religious cleavages and deep rooted conflicts between the states, particularly India and Pakistan. These differences have not only created an obstacle for proper galvanization of interest both within and around South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), but its procedural and operational products, such as the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTD) and other regional economic agreements are also suffering from lack of commitment. As a result, the member states of SAARC have chosen to collaborate with extra-regional powers in various bilateral and trilateral engagements. China has shown special interests in South Asia and the potential vast market that the region provides. However, it is the emerging power’s most ambitious geo-political and economically significant initiative called ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) that has necessitated China to befriend states of Asia, Europe, Middle East and Africa. It is through OBOR that China is building roads, railways, pipelines, communication networks and industrial economic zones for connecting and expanding its partnerships beyond Asia.


One such connecting thread in OBOR is the CPEC. It connects West China with Arabian Sea and seeks to economically transform the area from Pakistan to China’s north western Xinjiang province through a network of highways, railways and pipelines spreading across 3000 kilometers. CPEC provides China the opportunity to access the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. According to the five year development plan of China, CPEC values 17 percent of Pakistan’s GDP and has the capacity to generate more than 25000MW of electricity to the energy starved Pakistan.


Mega projects, like CPEC, require secure and stable environment for not just its construction but to reap its sustainable benefits. Pakistan is beset with political, economic, socio-cultural and security issues. And, it seems there is no safety for the USD 46 billion investment. Nawaz Sharif government believes that, if implemented successfully, CPEC will be a game-changer. It will provide economic growth and help to overcome threats from terrorism. But, the successful implementation of CPEC depends on the political situation of Pakistan. The state is entrenched with inter-provincial conflicts. There are repeated distress raised by the provinces on the massive and unequal distribution of resources, and non-transparent nature of the government’s actions on CPEC.


On the other hand, the Pakistani business communities believe that they are in a non-benefitting situation and the cheap Chinese products will harm the indigenous manufacturers. The economists argue that since the Chinese imports will have reduced or no taxes; there is a possibility that Pakistan’s economy will be negatively impacted and a steep decline in the revenue collection is estimated. In addition, the federal government of Pakistan has promised to build the western route so as to benefit Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but its implementation is unlikely. As a result, CPEC is facing less encouragement from the political and economic stakeholders, and local people. Added to which, the whole Pakistan-China collaboration is being touted as Nawaz’s own political ambition.


Considering the conflict ridden state in Pakistan, China demands support and encouragement from the Pakistan army generals. Pakistan’s army has always played a dominant role in shaping and guiding Pakistan’s foreign and security policy. The state has sailed through four military coups since its independence in 1947. Interestingly, the Pakistan Army has taken special interest in this project. It called for installing a CPEC Authority for efficient plan execution. Over 15000 troops have been set up for overlooking the security of the Chinese workers and contractors involved in upgrading the transit facilities based in Balochistan, the stronghold of Afghan and Pakistan Taliban forces. However, it is argued that the greater involvement of the army vis-à-vis developmental projects with the external powers may heighten the ever-present civil-military tensions in Pakistan.


It is no secret that Pakistan is a breeding ground for dissensions and rebel groups. It becomes tedious then for viable bilateral and multilateral projects to work and sustain. For example, the Baloch rebels have constantly opposed the CPEC, and threaten to attack the people involved and destroy the infrastructures. Yet, projects like CPEC are important for the growth and prosperity of Pakistan. The proposed corridor and a place in the OBOR plan, has brought economic and strategic implications for Pakistan. As a result, crucial steps have beeb taken to remove obstacles in the path of CPEC. According to Media reports, the China Great Wall Industry Cooperation and the Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission have signed an agreement to install a Pakistan Remote Sensing Satellite (PRSS-1) System, to be launched in June 2018, for safeguarding and monitoring the execution of the plan.


Amidst these developments in the neighborhood, India is alarmed. It has objected to CPEC on the grounds that it runs through the disputed territory – Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). India has claimed that three divisions of the Chinese Army are stationed in the PoK. Yet, there is clear lack of public debate on the impact of CPEC on India. The strategic thinkers need to articulate a clear stand on the situation because after the CPEC completes, China would have total access to the state of Pakistan and not just to PoK. Therefore, the solution lies in aligning India with its ‘strategic partners’ and devise a pragmatic move at the earliest.


*Dr Pramod Jaiswal is Senior Research Officer at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi and Aditi Paul is Research Scholar at Nelson Mandela Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. They can be reached at: editor@spsindia.in

TOPICS:

China  East Asia   Economics  India  OBOR   Pakistan 

Silk Road     South Asia     Trade

About the Author

South Asia Monitor

South Asia Monitor is an independent web journal and online resource dealing with strategic, political, security, cultural and economic issues about, pertaining to and of consequence to South Asia and the whole Indo-Pacific region. Developed for South Asia watchers across the globe or those looking for in-depth knowledge, reliable resource and documentation on this region, the site features exclusive commentaries, insightful analyses, interviews and reviews contributed by strategic experts, diplomats, journalists, analysts, researchers and students from not only this region but all over the world. It also aggregates news and views content related to the region.

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PAKISTAN BALOCHISTAN : INSURGENCY- A Brief History of Balochistan

SOURCE::http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/a-brief-history-of-balochistan/



               A Brief History of Balochistan

Image Credit: Public Domain image via Wikimedia Commons

 

 

 

How did the Baloch nation come to be?

                             By
               Akhilesh Pillalamarri


 for The Diplomat

February 12, 2016

 

 

 

60 Comments

The arid region of Balochistan, situated at the eastern end of the Iranian plateau, is split almost evenly between Pakistan’s Balochistan province and Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province (a small portion of the southern parts of Afghanistan’s Nimruz, Helmand, and Kandahar provinces are also part of Baluchistan). Balochistan is today at the forefront of major geopolitical events. Pakistan has faced almost constant turmoil in Balochistan since its independence, even as it struggles to secure and develop the region with Chinese help.

 

The port access offered by Gwadar in Balochistan is an important component in China’s emerging transportation network across Asia. Right across the border in Iran, India is struggling to complete Chabahar, its attempt to answer Gwadar and link to Afghanistan by going around Pakistan. Iranian Balochistan is Iran’s soft underbelly, a restless Sunni region in a mostly Shia country, a place where Saudi Arabia can make mischief using groups like the radical Sunni Jundallah.

 

But what about Balochistan itself?

 How did it come to be divided and ruled by other peoples?

Surprisingly, very little has been written about Balochistan. It has always been uncomfortably sandwiched between the great Persian and Indian empires to its west and east. And unlike their Afghan neighbors to the north, who also felt the constant tug of war between Persia and India, the people of Balochistan had no mountains to protect them. It is a region at once neglected, exploited, and ignored.

 

Balochistan takes its names from the Baloch who inhabit it, a mostly Sunni Muslim people who speak an Iranian language, Balochi, that is oddly classified neither as an eastern Iranian language like Pashto to its north or a southwestern Iranian language like Persian to its west. Rather, Balochi is a northwestern Iranian language, most closely related to Kurdish. It is thus a matter of some conjecture as to when and how the Baloch actually got to Balochistan.

 

In ancient times, the region was a part of the Achaemenid Persian Empire and then various Persian and Indian empires and local kingdoms and was presumably inhabited by some mix of Iranian and Indian peoples. People in Baluchistan followed Hinduism, Buddhism, and Zoroastrianism. The region acquired a notorious reputation due to Alexander the Great disastrously marching back to Babylon after his Indian campaign through its deserts, leading to the deaths of thousands of soldiers.

 

By the time of the rise of Islam in the 600s, Balochistan was loosely controlled by the Sassanid Persian empire, but as that empire faced the onslaught of the Arabs, Balochistan, then known as Makran (after the name of its coastal region), passed to the control of the Rai Dynasty of Sindh. The Arabs defeated this dynasty in 644 at the Battle of Rasil and conquered Makran, which converted to Islam but continued to remain a lightly populated, peripheral region.

 

In the 11th century, the Seljuk Turks invaded Persia. This is thought to have stimulated the eastward migration of the nomadic tribes (ancestors of today’s Baloch) of central Iran and the area south of the Caspian sea into Balochistan. As these tribes were used to living marginally in arid territory, the move to the even more arid Balochistan was not a catastrophe and was indeed a path of less resistance than fighting the invaders, who competed for the same pasture space in Iran. Around the same time, Balochistan’s largest minority group, the Brahui (who speak a Dravidian language like other South Indian languages) migrated to Balochistan from central India and formed a symbiotic relationship with the Baloch. Many Baloch become sedentary during this period, farming oases. They formed many kingdoms and tribal confederations, sometimes independent, sometimes under the suzerainty of external empires.

 

In the 1500s, Balochistan, like Afghanistan to its north, became divided into zones of control between the Safavid Persian Empire to its west and the Mughal Empire to its east. This approximately reflects the Iran-Pakistan border today. Because Persia’s Sistan province is a frontier province, it was loosely controlled and its people had leverage over its central government (they could swear allegiance to the Mughals if they wished). As a result, unlike most of the rest of Iran, it managed to escape the central government’s policy of implementing Shia Islam. As for the Mughals, while initially they ruled Balochistan directly from Multan in the Punjab (in today’s Pakistan), it was never a place of much importance. Control was delegated to a local vassal who organized the Khanate of Kalat in 1666 (located in central Balochistan). On behalf of the Mughals, Kalat ruled over the vassals of the states of Las Bela, Kharan, and Makran, which make up most of Pakistani Balochistan. In 1783, the Khan of Kalat granted suzerainty to the port of Gwadar to a man who later became the Sultan of Oman and who decided to keep it as part of his domains. Pakistan had to buy it back from Oman in 1958.

 

The division of Balochistan into western and eastern halves temporary lapsed during the 18th century as first the Safavid and then the Mughal Empire, and finally the brief empire of Nader Shah collapsed. Balochistan reverted to a collection of principalities, some of which then fell under the control of Afghanistan, but most remained independent. The most important of these independent principalities was Kalat. Within a century, though, the Qajar dynasty established itself in Persia, and the British in India, squeezing the Baloch again. The British attacked Kalat in 1839 as part of their related invasion of Afghanistan, installing a friendly ruler. In 1854, Kalat became an associated state of the British, and in 1877 the British established the Baluchistan Agency to deal with the Baluch princely states in its Indian Empire and directly rule of the northern half of Balochistan, including Quetta.


 

In the meanwhile, Persia re-conquered western Balochistan, which has remained part of Iran ever since except for a brief period in the 1920s when it acquired its own “king.” The British and Persians demarcated the boundary between their territories in 1871-1872, with some changes made in 1895-1896. Pakistan, which absorbed the princely state of Kalat in 1955 (allegedly Kalat had tried to find a way to join India instead), reconfirmed this boundary with Iran with some very minor changes during a demarcation in 1958-1959.

 

These agreements basically established the modern frontier between Iran and Pakistani Balochistan, but it is not an arbitrary division that suddenly severed the Baloch nation in two. The control of the western part of Balochistan from Iran and the eastern from the subcontinent has been a fact more or less for over five centuries, and its current division, based on the Anglo-Persian division represented zones of existing control on the ground rather than an unenforceable, random line. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that ethnic Baloch on both sides of the frontier are getting the short end of the stick, because their needs are subordinated to the needs of their states, but unlike the Pashtun and Kurds, they have neither the numbers nor the firepower to seriously contest this and negotiate further rights.