TERRORISM J & K Hizb-ul-Mujahideen : MAPPING MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS

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      Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

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CONTENTS

• Basic Information
• Narrative Summary
• Leadership
• Ideology & Goals
• Size Estimates
• Relationships with Other Groups
• 
  

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Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

Formed	1989
Disbanded	Group is active.
First Attack	January 16, 1990: HM militants attacked Jammu and Kashmir Police Constable and hanged him from a tree in Srinagar, Kashmir, India. (1 killed, 0 wounded) [1].
Last Attack	November 10, 2010: HM along with Jameeat-ul-Mujahideen militants attacked and killed two Indian Central Reserve Police Force in Pattan, Kashmir, India. (2 killed, 0 wounded) [2].
Updated	August 8, 2012

NARRATIVE SUMMARY

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen(HM) was formed in Pakistan controlled Kashmir in 1989. Pakistan's famous religious political party Jamaat-e-Islami reportedely formed HM under the influence of Pakistan's intelligence agency ISI to counter the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Fron(JKLF), an organization which had advocated complete independence of the State.

HM's organization was formalized in June 1990, when its 'Constitution' was approved and Syed Salahuddin was made the patron of the organization. But soon after, there were differences between the Jamaat-e-Islami and non Jamaat-e-Islami elements of HM which led to a split; one of the factions was led Syed Salahuddin, while the other one was led by Hilal Ahmed Mir, who was killed in 1993. 

LEADERSHIP

1. Muhammad “Master” Ahsan Dar (1989 to 1990): Master Ahsan Dar was the founder of Hizbul Mujahideen.[3]
2. Mohammed "Syed Salahhudin" Yusef Shah (1990 to Unknown): When the HM "Constitution" was agreed upon in 1990 it named Syed Salahhudin as Patron of HM.[4]

IDEOLOGY & GOALS

• Jihadist

HM’s primary goal is to unite both Azad Kashmir (Pakistan controlled) and Jammu and Kashmir (Indian controlled) into one entity that would then join with the Pakistani state[5].  Many claim that HM was started by the ISI for the sole purpose to act as a counter to the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, a militant organization that also fights against the Indian government, but strives to create an independent Kashmiri state[6].

SIZE ESTIMATES

According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP), HM cadres are in the range of 1500 in total. 

• 1990: 10,000 (Jamestown Foundation)[7]
• 2011: 1500 (SATP)[8]

RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS

HM’s relationship with Jamaat-i-Islami is unclear, with some sources claiming HM to be the armed wing of the group, while others maintain that they are only closely linked.[9]  Whatever the case may be, the two groups are connected and it appears that they do act independently on occasion, which is of great embarrassment to JI.[10]  Adding to the difficulty of discerning the full extent of the relationship is the fact that both groups are intent on denying that any such relationship exists, though for observers some sort of link is obvious.

It has also been reported that HM trained alongside the Afghan Hizb-i-Islami, run by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar throughout the mid-1990’s until the Taliban gained power.[11]

HM is further part of an umbrella organization known as the United Jehad Council (UJC), which is headed by HM chief Syed Salahuddin.

·      Al-Badr split from HuM in 1998 after helping to form HuM in 1989.[12] 

·      As of ’05 HM was part of the United Jihad Council, a collection of groups fighting in Kashmir.[13]

·      Some claim that HM has been infiltrated by AQ.

·      HM has reportedly carried out attacks in coordination with LeT.

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REFERENCES

1. ^ Global Terrorism Database Incident Summary, Incident # 199001160014. Accessed on May 3, 2012 at http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199001160014
2. ^ Shabir Ibn Yusuf, “Militants kill two CRPF troopers at Pattant; high alert sounded in north Kashmir,” The Kashmir Times, November 11, 2010. Accessed from LexisNexis Academic on May 3, 2012.
3. ^ “Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)” GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed on May 2, 2012 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hum.htm .
4. ^ “Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)” GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed on May 2, 2012 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hum.htm .
5. ^ http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19992.htm
6. ^ “Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)” GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed on May 2, 2012 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/hum.htm
7. ^ Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor 8 (2010). Accessed online on May 3, 2012 at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36005&cHash=1c4ef28fa3 .
8. ^ http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/hizbul_mujahideen.htm
9. ^ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: The relationship between the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM); recent human rights violations committed by HM; whether HM practices forced recruitment in Azad Kashmir, 24 July 2003, PAK41668.E, available at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f7d4df20.html . Accessed July 9, 2012.
10. ^ Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: The relationship between the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and Hizbul Mujahideen (HM); recent human rights violations committed by HM; whether HM practices forced recruitment in Azad Kashmir, 24 July 2003, PAK41668.E, available at:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f7d4df20.html . Accessed July 9, 2012.
11. ^ http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19992.htm
12. ^ “Al-Badr,” GlobalSecurity.org. Accessed on May 2, 2012 athttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/Al-Badr.htm .
13. ^ Bill Roggio, “Hizbul Mujahideen chief: Pakistan allows terror group to run ‘hundreds of training camps,” The Long War Journal, May 27, 2011. Accessed on may 2, 2012 athttp://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2011/05/hizbul_mujahideen_ch.php

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MAP HIZB-UL-MUJAHIDEEN

Click on the maps below to visualize this group's interactions with other militant organizations

On Pakistan -- All map

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CONTENTS

• Basic Information
• Narrative Summary
• Leadership
• Ideology & Goals
• Size Estimates
• Relationships with Other Groups

SEARCH

---

TERRORISM The Profile Of an Urban And Educated Jihadists Of South Asia (r)

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13012017-the-urban-and-educated-jihadists-of-south-asia-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

      The Profile Of an Urban

                              & 

Educated JihadistsOf South Asia 

                             By 

                    Abdul Basit*

 Dhakka Bangladesh

BY RSIS JANUARY 13, 2017

Contrary to popular perception that the jihadists in South Asia come from poor socio- economic backgrounds with madrasah education, a new breed of educated and urban militants with the urge for a sense of belonging has emerged in the region. The desire to create a global Sunni caliphate, among other factors, has contributed to their violent-radicalisation.

Traditionally jihadists in South Asia have been associated with militant organisations like the Afghan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and Harkatul Jihadul Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B). These jihadist outfits recruited people from the rural and poor socio-economic backgrounds with madrasah education.

Contrary to these perceptions, in the last two years, a new breed of educated jihadists from urban middle and upper middle class has emerged in South Asia. This breed of South Asian jihadists is manifested in self-radicalised cells and lone-wolf individuals.

Driving Factor: Double Alienation

For instance, the pro-IS cell in Karachi that targeted members of the Ismaili Shia community in Karachi in May 2014 and the five-member cell which carried out the Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka in July 2016 were educated scions of rich families. More recently, the terrorists who targeted the Quetta police-training academy in Balochistan were college and university educated students except for the suicide bomber who was a madrasah student.

Similarly, in November last year, Sri Lanka’s Justice Minister Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe briefed the parliament that 32 Sri Lankan Muslims from well-educated and elite families joined Islamic State in Syria. Likewise, the aspiring jihadists who travelled to Syria and Iraq from India had educated and urban backgrounds.

The path to violent-extremism of these jihadists has been paved by an identity crisis, quest for a sense of belonging, a struggle for recognition and resentment towards their respective states due to unemployment, corruption, and bad governance. They suffer a double alienation: from the irresponsive states failing them as citizens and societies where a lack of consensus on what constitutes a ‘good Muslim’ pushes them to extremist discourses for answers. This set of grievances falls within the broader parameters of contemporary

Political Islam and the Salafist narrative.

Traditionally, the Jihadist and sectarian organisations in South Asia have been grassroots movements linked to madrasahs and mosque networks whose target audience remained poor and lower-income class segments of the society. Meanwhile the educated middle- and upper-middle class sections of urban areas have been targeted by evangelical and missionary organisations like Hizbut Tahrir, Al-Huda and Tanzeem-e-Islami whose teachings and lectures revolve around contemporary discourses on political Islam.

Three Reasons

Three reasons account for the emergence of educated and urban militants in South Asia. Firstly, the deeper Internet penetration and the onset of social media that has decreased the distance between local and global developments, accelerated the flow of communication, democratised violence and eroded states’ monopoly on information. The unregulated cyber space in South Asia of 480 million users is the second largest in the world. IS has exploited it to further its ideological narrative. This has had a huge impact on patterns of violent-extremism and terrorism.

The IS’ ability to universalise local grievances in its meta-narrative of global-jihad and offer a putative solution in the revival of the so-called Caliphate has resonated with some of the educated population in urban areas. Other than addressing individual grievances, such rhetoric also provided them with a stronger sense of belonging and empowerment.

Secondly, the lower-threshold of radicalisation and violence because of IS’ violent and cinematic tactics has also played a critical role in mobilising the South Asian-educated and urban youth. They may have harboured radical thoughts but they did not find Al Qaeda and its associates’ jihadist platforms attractive. IS’ radical message provided them an alternative jihadist platform to create a global “Sunni Caliphate” and a spiritual fight for the glory of Islam.

Thirdly, the generational shift undergone by social, political and religious movements creating a rift between the old and the new generations. This rift can lead to the creation of splinter factions by the young and rebellious membership impatient and hungry for change and driven by grand ambitions while the older generation is seen as status quo-oriented and rigid.

Traits and Characteristics of Urban Jihadists

Characteristically, this generation of South Asian urban militants is tech and media savvy, compared to the traditional South Asian jihadists, and has Salafi-Takfiri leanings.

Most of the militants of this generation are between 18-30 years and they have gone through a relatively shorter period of radicalisation. They all seem to be obsessed with ideas of the so-called Caliphate, hijrah and the end-times narratives. 

It is extreme in its methods, unapologetically brutal and morally consequentialist: for them the ends justify the means.

In the rapidly changing global and regional environment, especially the reshaping of the Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East arising from civil wars in Yemen, Iraq and Syria, the disaffected and disfranchised Muslim youth in South Asia are facing an ideological dilemma. This unique challenge, in addition to operational and traditional law enforcement responses, requires counter-narrative and counter-ideological responses.

The existing policy frameworks for counter-terrorism and extremism will have to be revised in line with the evolving trends and patterns. However, the counter-ideological components within the broader Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) frameworks do not need to borrow foreign concepts. The answers to the ideological threat are local and enshrined within the pacifist tradition of Sufi Islam in South Asia.

Sufi Islam promotes communal and sectarian tolerance and preaches peaceful-co-existence which needs to be promoted and strengthened. The concept is indigenous to the South Asian socio-cultural milieu and political environment.

*Abdul Basit is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

TOPICS:BangladeshIslamPakistanSouth AsiaSri LankaSufismTerrorism

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

RSIS

RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the author/s are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, which produces the Commentaries.