UK Parliament passes resolution dleclaring Gilgit-Baltistan as integral part of India illegally annexed by Pak

SOURCE;
http://www.defencenews.in/article.aspx?id=251186


            [  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ESgMqvLtxZc ]

UK Parliament passes resolution dleclaring Gilgit-Baltistan as integral part of India illegally annexed by Pak

A motion was passed in the British Parliament condemning Islamabad's announcement declaring Gilgit-Baltistan as its fifth frontier, saying the region is a legal and constitutional part of Jammu and Kashmir illegally occupied by Pakistan since 1947.

The motion which was tabled on 23 March and sponsored by Conservative Party leader Bob Blackman, stated that Pakistan by making such an announcement is implying its attempt to annex the already disputed area.

"Gilgit-Baltistan is a legal and constitutional part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India, which is illegally occupied by Pakistan since 1947, and where people are denied their fundamental rights including the right of freedom of expression," the motion read.

It was further noted that the attempts to change the demography of the region was in violation of State Subject Ordinance and the 'forced and illegal construction' of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) further aggravated and interfered with the disputed territory.

Meanwhile, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Affairs Ministry has said that Beijing was ready to work with Islamabad to take forward the CPEC to benefit the people of both countries.

The CPEC is a 51.5 billion dollar project that aims to connect Kashgar, in China's western province of Xinjiang, with the port of Gwadar in the Pakistani province of Balochistan.

Baloch political and human rights activists have demanded a special rapporteur in the United Nations to probe gross human rights violations in Balochistan province.

With Pakistan planning to declare Gilgit-Baltistan region as its fifth province, the Baloch leaders have warned Islamabad of serious repercussions stating that this development will only lead to massive resistance by the people of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).

The Gilgit-Baltistan area is Pakistan's northernmost administrative territory that borders the disputed Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

A committee headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Advisor on Foreign Affairs Sartaj Aziz recommended to grant the region a provincial status, reports the GeoNews.

Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Sindh are four provinces of Pakistan.

However, India claims the Gilgit-Baltistan area as an integral part of its territory.

The area is significant to both Pakistan and China as the $46 billion CPEC passes through the region.

New Delhi has fervently maintained that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, which includes areas currently under Pakistan occupation, is an integral part of the Union of India

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J&K : The Army Need Not Worry about Criticism, Its Media Engagement Is Welcome

SOURCE:
http://swarajyamag.com/ideas/jandk-the-army-need-not-worry-about-criticism-its-media-engagement-is-welcome

J&K : The Army Need Not Worry about Criticism, Its Media Engagement Is Welcome                                     BY

                                         Syed Ata Hasnain

March 2, 2016.  ,

Snapshot

The nation is suddenly deeply excited about how its men in uniform function and operate under challenging circumstances. There is questioning and there is information seeking.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation.

The academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military. The Army need not be defensive about it and should involve itself in debate by moving more than halfway.

It must start on a positive note. Gone are the days of ignorance of what is happening on India’s frontlines and insurgency ridden areas; the decided disinterest in what the Armed Forces do is fast becoming history. The nation is suddenly deeply excited about how its men in uniform function and operate under challenging circumstances. There is questioning and there is information seeking.
Unfortunately it is also ending up with much unsavory and ill-informed advice to the warriors up in front and much disinformation to the public. That is because the advice is coming from quarters where experience is lacking. I still consider this a positive development because the information revolution is creating interest in matters military and not everyone can have a boots on ground experience to accompany his academic pursuits. It is just that the information being generated needs to be authentic.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation. This ongoing phenomenon, a positive development no doubt, should be seen from an angle of the media taking security related issues beyond emotional rhetoric and satiating the latent patriotic fervor which is being seen all around.
The other positive from this is the fact that the warriors are once again entering the eye of the citizen as a segment apart; people to be trusted and in possession of values that are worth emulating. The OROP movement (can’t call it an agitation) has also contributed its bit. The recent havoc brought about by the Jat agitation and the speed with which the Army had to move as first responder has brought even greater recognition for the Army being the core institution in which all Indians repose faith. A media report questions why 5,000 Army troops perform better than 50,000 cops.


I strongly believe that the academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military because unless ‘conflict’ (and not geopolitics alone) is recognized as a proper academic subject in India and treated as an entity for research it will remain rooted in the world of non-intellectualism in India. One does not have to be a driver first to be the managing director of a taxi or bus company.
In other words ground experience is not necessarily the only criteria for advice on matters military and especially in a hybrid warfare environment. There is so much more in conflict, especially the hybrid variety, to which academia can contribute but the realm of tactics and operations should preferably remain the domain of specialists.


Recent articles in leading dailies and online media however, betray the readers and the warriors. Let us take a few examples. One piece referring to the Pampore operation states, ‘the terrorists, equipped with the latest techniques, are now prepared for the long haul. Old tactics cannot work.’
In my experience of J&K, terrorists have always come for the long haul, do not give themselves up and are willing to bite the bullet while attempting to cause as much mayhem and inflicting maximum casualties on the security forces. So what’s new about that; it has been the maxim for years especially since the suicide attacks commenced in July 1999.

This piece wanted the Army to be prepared for the long haul in tactical operations forgetting that the Army’s stamina is immense and it works on a simple principle of ‘relief of troops in contact.’ Units can remain deployed for months and be effective throughout. It is obvious the perception of the writer was linked to the criticism that the Army hurried the operation at Pampore thus leading to the casualties. This issue is explained later in this essay.
The same article goes on to state - “the Army has taken certain things for granted and taken its eyes and ears off the ground, where Kashmiris have developed a psyche of drawing a vicarious pleasure from the prolonged exploits of militants in their fight against the security forces.”

To add further insult it states that Sadbhavna, the hearts and minds campaign has almost become an obsession and which is what has forced the Army to virtually become benign. If there is anything further from the truth this is it. The Indian public cannot be misled and needs the opinion of those who have been practitioners and continue to advise on doctrinal and conceptual aspects of the operations.

Authors who write on J&K’s security environment must understand the dynamic nature of the sponsored conflict there. From 1989 to 1997 the Army sequentially used hard power and contained terrorism to manageable levels. In 1997 it introduced Sadbhavna, an institutionalized hearts and minds program with a separate budget.

It was based on the recognition that in such conflicts the people are the Center of Gravity and therefore need to be kept away from influence of the terrorists, separatists and the Deep State of Pakistan. It was a run-away success. However, at no stage of the balancing act between hard and soft power did the Army ever take its eyes off the main task it was to perform until the situation became manageable.

The Army’s intent must be known to all; it has never changed except for minor modifications in priorities based on the dynamics of the times. The intent has and will remain the elimination of ‘terrorism’ and ‘not terrorists’ alone. This implies eliminating terrorists in the hinterland and at the LoC from where they infiltrate and having such controls as to deny them space to operate, recruit fresh terrorists or influence the population.

It also implies the creation of such conditions in cooperation with the government of the day and its agencies that prevent the people supporting the terrorists and in fact assist in isolating them. With this task in hand it is clear that it is not by killing alone that the conflict will be won. For the Army, there is no rest until normalcy returns in the lives of the people and that can only happen once people stop supporting terrorists in their mission.

Thus the notion that the Army must leave everything else aside and concentrate on killing terrorists is instantly a misnomer smacking of utter ignorance of the principles of fighting a hybrid conflict.The death of the two Captains of the Special Forces has drawn criticism from many armchair strategists with no ear to the ground.

This unfair criticism needs to be effectively countered. To think that there will be foolproof measures available to negate every possible action by the terrorists is utopian to say the least. Questioning where was the quick reaction team of the CRPF convoy, which was ambushed, is like asking for copybook actions which will never take place in such an environment.

It is the QRT which chased the terrorists and the first entry to eliminate them was made by the CRPF, an action which needs to be lauded. The CRPF had lost men and legitimately wished to conduct the operation to hunt down the perpetrators. The entry by terrorists into the EDI building was just situational and not preplanned. It became a completely new situation because the building has a structure never addressed before.

The armchair strategists question why the Army and the CRPF did not have a contingency for that. Contingency planning has its limitations and is based on ongoing experience gained from time to time. Post the 1999-2003 period, when suicide attacks were the norm, security at entry points to major buildings and to institutions was strengthened. However, it did not imply that every building was catered for in contingency planning.


Intervention was usually the last resort; huts, cow sheds and small houses in villages where terrorists holed up were regularly destroyed using rocket launchers and flame throwers. However, this was a five floor building and to bring it down meant wiring up explosives all around which itself makes the explosive handling parties extremely vulnerable. RLs could have been fired for the next three days at every window to no avail.


It was the norm to do intervention only where destruction of buildings could not be executed and that is exactly what Victor Force of the Army’s RR did. That there will be no casualties can never be a guarantee in such operations. Even with revised procedures, if any, no commander at any level will ever give you a guarantee. 

  
The fairness of critique gets further marred when it is pointed out that senior officers are more involved with media briefs than operations. Whatever may be said there is no doubt that we are at the dying stages of a terror campaign. The LoC is well controlled to prevent infiltration although here too there will never be a guarantee of a hundred percent effectiveness; from the arm chairs in New Delhi there will be much questioning again once a terrorist track succeeds in reaching Sopore or Baramula.

The ups and downs will continue with much regularity unless the political leadership gets into the act of effective governance. The Army can take the situation up to this point and work towards preventing slippages; a few will invariably take place because such situations cannot remain in suspense. The media act by the Army is something to be lauded. It has got into the information game at last. In hybrid conflicts of this nature the information domain is nearly as important as the kinetic operations.

For long the Army was shy in engaging media and employing social media as part of the outreach and countering of adversary propaganda. Dealing with media does not mean that eyes are not focused on intelligence and operations. Even in the heyday of militancy there could never be a hundred percent actionable intelligence. With lesser quantum of terrorists than ever before intelligence is far better but again not enough to prevent terrorist acts of this nature.
There is a fallacious notion that today’s new militancy is far more violent and dangerous than during the peak of the campaign. This is believable by people who have no memory or those who never ever studied the militancy and the manner it panned out. Undoubtedly, there is no room for dilution of the quantum and quality of operations but at the same time there is no scope for believing that it is back to the Nineties.


The J&K model remains one of the most solid case studies of cooperation between the various security forces led by the Army and with the intelligence agencies. It needs to be only tweaked from time to time. The agencies are adept at handling the ‘intifada’ like demonstrations and stone throwing which has now taken a new turn over the last two years.


There is clear understanding of division of prime responsibility among the forces on handling this and it is maturing by the day. There will be glitches along the way recalling that even the Israeli Defence forces (IDF) who are the most proficient in handling such strife, combining civil disorder and terrorist operations, still continue to suffer failures from time to time.

Take it from experienced practitioners that the Indian Army’s flexibility goes along with its ‘gung ho’. Both are necessary in this complex conflict situation where the dying embers are sometimes hotter than the logs which kindled the fire. Yet, the advent of academic and media interest in war fighting techniques is a welcome departure from the past.


The Army need not be defensive about it and should involve itself in debate by moving more than halfway. It could well be the beginning of the search for the elusive strategic culture witnessed all these years.

• Indian Army
• Jammu and Kashmir

Syed Ata Hasnain

Lt. Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) is the former Corps Commander of the Srinagar based 15 Corps, and is currently associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and the Delhi Policy Group, two major strategic think tanks of Delhi

Don’t Lose The Information Battle

    Don’t Lose The Information Battle

Don’t Lose The Information Battle

Syed Ata Hasnain

Lt. Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain is the former Corps

 

Commander of the Srinagar based 15 Corps, and is

 

currently associated with Vivekanand International

 

Foundation and the Delhi Policy Group, two major

 

strategic think tanks of Delhi

 

 

10 Apr, 2015

1PoliticsAmarnath yatra /Jammu and Kashmir

 /Mufti Mohammad Sayeed



The disinformation campaign over the killing of Kashmiri policemen holds the government agencies responsible and seeks to counter the effectiveness of the Army-Police combine.

Even as the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed is settling into his job and the first session of the Assembly is nearing its end comes the news of a series of terrorist attacks on unarmed policemen of the J&K Police. The CM is seeking a full review of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and its progressive removal through de-notification of the ‘disturbed’ label from districts or areas where the terrorist-related violence is supposedly very low or completely absent.


The media in Kashmir hasn’t given any clear perception of who is behind the recent violence, or what the motives could be. However, one article has indirectly debated the possibility of the security forces and intelligence agencies themselves being involved. This article has carefully planted the idea in the minds of the Kashmir intelligentsia, and then negated it by pointing a finger at the terrorists.


By doing this, it has remained wonderfully withdrawn on the exact benefits that the terrorists could possibly gain from the acts of terror. Some in J&K are labeling it as the resurgence of terror after a relative period of calm. The current GOC 15 Corps has nipped the perception in the bud by clearly stating that, since terrorism had never been fully defeated, the question of resurgence does not arise. Between the varying perceptions in the state, there is as yet no assessment in the national media.


During 2011, after the failure of the NC-Congress Government to revoke AFSPA from the four districts it had desired, a similar chain of activities involving grenade attacks and other acts of violence had struck Kashmir in particular. The then CM’s close relative, Sheikh Mustafa Kamal, had made similar accusations against the security forces: that they calibrated the violence as per convenience to perpetuate their deployment. He was roundly condemned for his slanderous statements.


This approach of local leaders or intellectuals (to place blame for all return of violence on central government agencies) after short periods of relative peace is nothing new. Their propensity to get away with this disinformation smacks of the establishment’s and, in many ways, the Army’s inability to come into the information game with a greater measure of pro-activeness.


The Army has the loop of violence firmly under control, but it has been unable to enter the psychological space to influence the minds of the people in sufficient measure. The rationale that the terrorists would not achieve anything by upping the ante in violence just before the tourist season is the oldest argument in the game.


Since when have their masters across the LoC believed in promoting the tourist industry in J&K or considered the welfare of the people as their responsibility? In international terrorism (J&K’s terrorism is transnational as is well known), those who control the strings of violence have no respect for aspects as human rights, welfare and economic well-being. These are platitudes which sponsors of cross-border terror used to appear sensitive to the perception of the local population. Any professional will tell you that, and he will also inform you of the number of times terrorists and their sponsors use this route of perception management to gather sympathy and attain their local aim.


In mid-June 2008, the cost of a pony ride around Gulmarg was Rs 750. I could not get local ponies to lift some of the logistics requirements of my troops at a few difficult posts because I was paying lesser. By the end of June, 2008, the sponsored agitation revolving around the Sri Amarnathji land case was triggered, pushing tourists out of Kashmir and bringing down the cost of the pony ride to Rs 15. It was this opportunity the terrorist sponsors decided to exploit. Who bothered about the pockets of the locals who were so dependent on the tourist season?


Attaching a cause to the dastardly act of killing unarmed policemen in Shupian and Pattan is not difficult for any professional, especially one who knows the milieu of J&K. The J&K Police of the 80s and early 90s is not that of 2015. Today, it is a weathered, experienced and highly professional force. Its capability to react to adverse situations is at par, if not better, than any police force in India. The training facilities are excellent, and young trainees emerge from their facilities full of elan and spirit.


The effectiveness of the Army in eliminating large groups of terrorists since the inception of terror and right through much of this millennium was because of the sheer numbers its units encountered. However, as the numbers dwindled, the Army too changed tack and followed the dictum of intelligence-driven and surgical operations which cause minimum collateral damage.


To do that, it needs hard and actionable intelligence. No doubt it has its own intelligence arm, professionals in their own right. However, who can beat the intelligence-gathering capability of a local policeman, the beat policeman who has his ear to the ground, knows the language and is equally driven? As anti-terrorist operations progress towards a stage when kinetic operations become more and more difficult due to dwindling strength and ability of terrorists to merge with urban or rural populace, the dependence of the Army increases on the local police.


This is exactly what has happened in J&K. The degree of professional cooperation between the Army and the Police has never been higher than in the last few years, and it continues to increase to the advantage of the security forces. In such circumstances, survivability of terrorists and over ground workers depends on their ability to break the trust between the Army and J&K Police.


If policemen are apprehensive about their security and suspicious of the Army (suspicion sown by stories of Army and intelligence agencies being involved in targeted killing of local policemen), the resulting schism is going to dent that cooperation. It could even lead to a complete breakdown of the synchronized efforts of the security forces. No terrorist group has taken ownership for the recent killings, leading to the added suspicion that a synchronized effort to subvert the J&K Police force is on. J&K Police is a composite force comprising men and women from all three regions of J&K; such subversive activities are potentially much more dangerous than realized, for obvious reasons.


The degree of J&K Police’s effectiveness can be gauged from the little known fact that, during the height of the stone-throwing turbulence, the lowly constable from Pattan or Baramula would invariably report for duty even during curfew hours, carrying his uniform in a bag and fully mindful of the fact that his family was always vulnerable.


The wanton killing of Kashmiri policemen by terrorists in Kashmir with a subtle information campaign placing responsibility for such acts on government agencies is a malicious effort to counter the increasing effectiveness of the Army- Police combine in walking the last mile of the kinetic phase of the counter militancy/terror campaign. This is usually the most difficult phase of a long-drawn campaign of asymmetric warfare fought by proxy by sponsors across the LoC.  It is also aimed at breaking the enhancing political trust between the two political parties in power. It must not be allowed to succeed at any cost.

This can happen only if the establishment calls the bluff early, and remains aware of the shenanigans of a dying movement which is attempting to resurface. The information domain is the key in which this has to be fought. Subtle efforts even by mainline, less informed analysts to sow suspicion in the minds of the local populace must be challenged through the information loop. The nature of the J&K internal conflict is changing. Read the situation correctly before reacting.

 

 

 

That is a professional advice to the current conflict managers.