Don’t Lose The Information Battle

    Don’t Lose The Information Battle

Don’t Lose The Information Battle

Syed Ata Hasnain

Lt. Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain is the former Corps

 

Commander of the Srinagar based 15 Corps, and is

 

currently associated with Vivekanand International

 

Foundation and the Delhi Policy Group, two major

 

strategic think tanks of Delhi

 

 

10 Apr, 2015

1PoliticsAmarnath yatra /Jammu and Kashmir

 /Mufti Mohammad Sayeed



The disinformation campaign over the killing of Kashmiri policemen holds the government agencies responsible and seeks to counter the effectiveness of the Army-Police combine.

Even as the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed is settling into his job and the first session of the Assembly is nearing its end comes the news of a series of terrorist attacks on unarmed policemen of the J&K Police. The CM is seeking a full review of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and its progressive removal through de-notification of the ‘disturbed’ label from districts or areas where the terrorist-related violence is supposedly very low or completely absent.


The media in Kashmir hasn’t given any clear perception of who is behind the recent violence, or what the motives could be. However, one article has indirectly debated the possibility of the security forces and intelligence agencies themselves being involved. This article has carefully planted the idea in the minds of the Kashmir intelligentsia, and then negated it by pointing a finger at the terrorists.


By doing this, it has remained wonderfully withdrawn on the exact benefits that the terrorists could possibly gain from the acts of terror. Some in J&K are labeling it as the resurgence of terror after a relative period of calm. The current GOC 15 Corps has nipped the perception in the bud by clearly stating that, since terrorism had never been fully defeated, the question of resurgence does not arise. Between the varying perceptions in the state, there is as yet no assessment in the national media.


During 2011, after the failure of the NC-Congress Government to revoke AFSPA from the four districts it had desired, a similar chain of activities involving grenade attacks and other acts of violence had struck Kashmir in particular. The then CM’s close relative, Sheikh Mustafa Kamal, had made similar accusations against the security forces: that they calibrated the violence as per convenience to perpetuate their deployment. He was roundly condemned for his slanderous statements.


This approach of local leaders or intellectuals (to place blame for all return of violence on central government agencies) after short periods of relative peace is nothing new. Their propensity to get away with this disinformation smacks of the establishment’s and, in many ways, the Army’s inability to come into the information game with a greater measure of pro-activeness.


The Army has the loop of violence firmly under control, but it has been unable to enter the psychological space to influence the minds of the people in sufficient measure. The rationale that the terrorists would not achieve anything by upping the ante in violence just before the tourist season is the oldest argument in the game.


Since when have their masters across the LoC believed in promoting the tourist industry in J&K or considered the welfare of the people as their responsibility? In international terrorism (J&K’s terrorism is transnational as is well known), those who control the strings of violence have no respect for aspects as human rights, welfare and economic well-being. These are platitudes which sponsors of cross-border terror used to appear sensitive to the perception of the local population. Any professional will tell you that, and he will also inform you of the number of times terrorists and their sponsors use this route of perception management to gather sympathy and attain their local aim.


In mid-June 2008, the cost of a pony ride around Gulmarg was Rs 750. I could not get local ponies to lift some of the logistics requirements of my troops at a few difficult posts because I was paying lesser. By the end of June, 2008, the sponsored agitation revolving around the Sri Amarnathji land case was triggered, pushing tourists out of Kashmir and bringing down the cost of the pony ride to Rs 15. It was this opportunity the terrorist sponsors decided to exploit. Who bothered about the pockets of the locals who were so dependent on the tourist season?


Attaching a cause to the dastardly act of killing unarmed policemen in Shupian and Pattan is not difficult for any professional, especially one who knows the milieu of J&K. The J&K Police of the 80s and early 90s is not that of 2015. Today, it is a weathered, experienced and highly professional force. Its capability to react to adverse situations is at par, if not better, than any police force in India. The training facilities are excellent, and young trainees emerge from their facilities full of elan and spirit.


The effectiveness of the Army in eliminating large groups of terrorists since the inception of terror and right through much of this millennium was because of the sheer numbers its units encountered. However, as the numbers dwindled, the Army too changed tack and followed the dictum of intelligence-driven and surgical operations which cause minimum collateral damage.


To do that, it needs hard and actionable intelligence. No doubt it has its own intelligence arm, professionals in their own right. However, who can beat the intelligence-gathering capability of a local policeman, the beat policeman who has his ear to the ground, knows the language and is equally driven? As anti-terrorist operations progress towards a stage when kinetic operations become more and more difficult due to dwindling strength and ability of terrorists to merge with urban or rural populace, the dependence of the Army increases on the local police.


This is exactly what has happened in J&K. The degree of professional cooperation between the Army and the Police has never been higher than in the last few years, and it continues to increase to the advantage of the security forces. In such circumstances, survivability of terrorists and over ground workers depends on their ability to break the trust between the Army and J&K Police.


If policemen are apprehensive about their security and suspicious of the Army (suspicion sown by stories of Army and intelligence agencies being involved in targeted killing of local policemen), the resulting schism is going to dent that cooperation. It could even lead to a complete breakdown of the synchronized efforts of the security forces. No terrorist group has taken ownership for the recent killings, leading to the added suspicion that a synchronized effort to subvert the J&K Police force is on. J&K Police is a composite force comprising men and women from all three regions of J&K; such subversive activities are potentially much more dangerous than realized, for obvious reasons.


The degree of J&K Police’s effectiveness can be gauged from the little known fact that, during the height of the stone-throwing turbulence, the lowly constable from Pattan or Baramula would invariably report for duty even during curfew hours, carrying his uniform in a bag and fully mindful of the fact that his family was always vulnerable.


The wanton killing of Kashmiri policemen by terrorists in Kashmir with a subtle information campaign placing responsibility for such acts on government agencies is a malicious effort to counter the increasing effectiveness of the Army- Police combine in walking the last mile of the kinetic phase of the counter militancy/terror campaign. This is usually the most difficult phase of a long-drawn campaign of asymmetric warfare fought by proxy by sponsors across the LoC.  It is also aimed at breaking the enhancing political trust between the two political parties in power. It must not be allowed to succeed at any cost.

This can happen only if the establishment calls the bluff early, and remains aware of the shenanigans of a dying movement which is attempting to resurface. The information domain is the key in which this has to be fought. Subtle efforts even by mainline, less informed analysts to sow suspicion in the minds of the local populace must be challenged through the information loop. The nature of the J&K internal conflict is changing. Read the situation correctly before reacting.

 

 

 

That is a professional advice to the current conflict managers.