Wednesday, April 1, 2015

Lee Kuan Yew And The Survival Of Micro States

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/31032015-lee-kuan-yew-and-the-survival-of-micro-states-analysis/











Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. Photo Credit: USGov-Military, Wikipedia Commons.
 
Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew. Photo Credit: USGov-Military, Wikipedia Commons

 

                         Lee Kuan Yew

                                  And

                The Survival Of Micro States

                                    By

               Dr. Chunjuan Nancy Wei*


By


Lee Kuan Yew adopted a “poisonous shrimp” policy to national defense and blazed a trail fosmall countries in international stage.



A Chinese proverb vividly captures the Darwinist world described by realists, where great powers have an advantage in surviving fierce international competition. It goes: “the big fish eat small fish and the small fish eat shrimps.” For micro states that fear being overrun by larger nations, Singapore’s founding father may have blazed a survival trail.


Lee Kuan Yew was a pathfinder statesman. He ruled one of the smallest countries in the world, a nation with a population of 5 million ensconced in a small territory just three times larger than Washington, DC. The former British outpost lacked almost all meaningful resources—not even water. It was not Lee’s decision to go independent; however, being poor and racially divided, his city-state was turfed out by Malaya in 1965 after a bitter ethnic riot.


Yet, despite such ominous challenges, Lee’s visionary leadership transformed his Southeast Asian country in a rags-to-riches legend. There, national income and a life expectancy are higher than in the United States. Singapore’s GDP per capita (measured in purchasing power parity) now stands twice larger than its colonial master, the Great Britain—despite Singapore’s myriad of adversities. In the interest of self-preservation, Lee not only cured racial divisions, but he also helped unite his region. He proved instrumental in founding a vital regional institution, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), by mending fences with Malaysia and Indonesia. He played a constructive role, at the 1983 Commonwealth Summit, in saving Caribbean leadership from recrimination and humiliation over their support of the U.S. invading Grenada. The former prime minister walked an unusual tightrope between Taiwan and Mainland China by hosting, in the 1990s, the two side’s first face-to-face meetings in nearly half a century. Upon retirement, Lee continued to serve as senior minister and eventually minister mentor, shuttling between global giants to provide insights and advice. At his death, prominent world leaders from Barack Obama to Xi Jinping paid their tribute. Two-dozen states sent representatives to attend his funeral, with tens of thousands of citizens lining the streets, despite torrential rain.




What did Singapore do right that other countries might emulate? Micro nations around the world might consider seven philosophical points derived from the example provided by the Lion City’s successful leap from the Third World to the First.



No. 1: Thou shouldst be a realist. Since time immemorial small countries have always been vulnerable in an anarchic world. As Lee said, inequality is a fact of life. Understand one’s own vulnerability, such as Singapore’s lack of water. Make long-term plans. Singapore signed a 100-year water agreement with Malaysia, but it does not rely solely on that arrangement. Instead, it invested heavily in achieving water independence.


No. 2: Study thee changes therein of power dynamics, but makest not enemies. In a confrontational bi-polar world (that is, during the Cold War), Lee and his ministers determined that Singapore could little afford to make enemies with either the Americans or the Soviets. In 1966, barely a year after independence, Lee analyzed global realpolitik in his speech “Big and Small Fishes in Asian Waters.” When the British troops were withdrawn, Singapore adopted a pro-Western non-alignment policy. A key theme of anti-communism indirectly cemented his nation’s strategic relationship with Washington through ASEAN, where American treaty allies, the Philippines and Thailand, are also members.


In a post-Soviet unipolar world where the U.S. enjoys unmatched power in security and economy, Singapore permits U.S. ships to use its naval base for a fee of millions, and separately pursues economic growth worth billions. Both measures bring revenue—large, and much larger. Money brings power. Pragmatism affirms that commerce trumps ideology. While Singapore does enjoy business relations with China, it urges the United States to remain in the region. In 2011, Lee advised that smaller countries ought constantly to “be alert to whichever forces are at work.” He added, “When the forces are in your favor, use it, take the wind and sail with it. And if it is against you, bring your sails down, and wait for the wind to pass.”


No. 3: Rely on thyself. Singapore has world-class armed forces. The twin pillars of Singapore’s defense policy remain deterrence and diplomacy. As leader of a Chinese enclave in a Muslim-concentrated Malay peninsula, Lee felt persistent insecurity for his country. He initially advocated a “poisonous shrimp” strategy in case bigger fish, be they regional or global, might attempt to devour his nascent city-state. In the 1980s, he upgraded this strategy to porcupine-style deterrence. Singapore tends to invest heavily on defense, which continues even after Lee’s 2011 retirement. The Lion City, ever cautious of big fish, did not sign a formal alliance treaty with the United States for fear of losing strategic autonomy.



No. 4: Grow thy economy. Democratic or authoritarian, Lee believed a government serves best by forging consensus on key economic policies and by creating jobs. Speaking in 2005 at the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial lecture in New Delhi, Lee shared his evolved growth strategy: “I had been influenced by the ideas of the British Fabian society. But I soon realized that before distributing the pie I had first to bake it. So I departed from welfarism because it sapped a people’s self-reliance and their desire to excel and succeed. I also abandoned the model of industrialization through import substitution. When most of the Third World was deeply suspicious of exploitation by western MNCs (multinational corporations), Singapore invited them in. They helped us grow, brought in technology and know-how, and raised productivity levels faster than any alternative strategy could.” Since the 1980s, even China has sent batches of officials to learn from the city-state.


No. 5: Deviseth a political system based on thine own circumstance. Democracy, while best for the United States and Great Britain, may not be viable for Singapore, at least initially. In a 2010 interview, Lee articulated a self-evident but much-ignored phenomenon related to developing countries that have adopted western-style democracy. That is, in order to win elections, politicians have every incentive to play up racial politics. That would be true in Singapore where Chinese represent three quarters of the population. He said “the easiest way to get majority vote is vote for me, we’re Chinese, they’re Indians, (and) they’re Malays.” The result of that approach would be abundantly clear: “Our society will be ripped apart. If you do not have a cohesive society, you cannot make progress.” Worse, neighboring powers could have taken this division as pretext for invasion, citing that their minority groups were unfairly treated. Should that have occurred (as in Ukraine), Singapore would have been wiped off the map. This represents one reason why Singapore changed its “poisonous shrimp” thinking to a more aggressive “porcupine” strategy. As a long time friend to Mr. Lee, Henry Kissinger agreed: “Had Singapore chosen the road of its critics, it might well have collapsed among its ethnic groups, as the example of Syria teaches today.”


No. 6: Thou shalt craft wise social policies and implement them with ruthlessness. Aiming toward developing a non-communist social democracy, but with few resources, Lee focused on science and education to allure multinationals to Singapore. To prevent communism from infesting his society, he imposed heavy penalties for racial discrimination, and improved health and public housing. Kishore Mahbubani, former Singaporean diplomat and a noted academic, pointed out that of the five decolonized multi-racial states by the British, Singapore is the only one that managed to avoid racial discord.


Lee’s dual language policy encouraged citizens to be bilingual—with English for all and one of the three ethnic languages remaining to choose from. This achieved great efficiency in communication. The bilingualism also provided an advantage for his population in doing business: commerce with neighbors (Malaysia) and commerce with the world’s largest markets—the United States, China, and India. Further example of Lee’s far-sightedness: Adoption of simplified Chinese script as standard for his dialect-speaking Chinese population, a move still ahead of Taiwan and others.


No. 7 and last: Be ye honest in all things. Singaporeans view Lee’s unassuming Oxley Road home as a testament to his integrity, and a symbol of his resolve to achieve a corruption-free nation. Ethical and efficient governance represents one of the most difficult challenges for all nations. Singapore’s experience provides rich lessons for all states—big and small. Perhaps a phrase from the Confucian Analects could well summarize the Singaporean model: “Virtue never dwells in solitude, it will always attract neighbors.”


So, you are a Micro State and you wish to know more? For a Singaporean take on Lee Kuan Yew’s legacy, it is worth consulting Kishore Mahbubani’s recent speech in Dili, East Timor, where he distills ten lessons based on his own not inconsiderable experience.



*Dr. Chunjuan Nancy Wei, currently a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan, teaches in the M.A. East Asian & Pacific Rim Studies and the B.A. International Political Economy & Diplomacy programs at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut. She has published on the South China Sea disputes, U.S.-China relations, East Asian political economy, and cross-Taiwan Strait politics in such journals as the Harvard Asia Quarterly, Yale Journal of International Affairs, the Southeast Review of Asian Studies, and The Diplomat
















 

No comments:

Post a Comment