FOR INDIA GOING NUCLEAR AT SEA: MURKY WATERS-NAVAL NUCLEAR DYNAMICS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

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http://www.msn.com/en-in/news/national/going-nuclear-at-sea/ar-BBipsNc

MURKY WATERS:

NAVAL NUCLEAR DYNAMICS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

 

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More than five years have passed since India launched its first ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in July 2009. Meanwhile, Pakistan formally inaugurated a Naval Strategic Force Command headquarters in 2012 and has declared its intent to develop its own sea-based deterrent. As India and Pakistan develop their naval nuclear forces, they will enter increasingly

murky waters. By further institutionalizing relations between their navies and by insisting on stronger transparency with regard to naval nuclear developments, both countries may succeed in adding a greater degree of stability to what otherwise promises to be a dangerously volatile maritime environment. 
Ongoing Naval Nuclear Dynamics in South Asia

•• India’s pursuit of a sea-based nuclear strike

force is the next logical step in its quest for an assured retaliatory capability.
 

•• India has conducted a series of test firings of

Dhanush-class short-range ballistic missiles
from offshore patrol vessels. It appears that
for the Indian Navy, the Dhanush program

is a stopgap measure until the SSBN fleet

comes to fruition.

 

•• The submarine-based leg of India’s nuclear

triad will have a major impact on the nation’s
existing command-and-control arrangements.

 

••   To enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent vis-a-  vis China, India’s other prospective nuclear

adversary, New Delhi has to develop larger

SSBNs with greater missile carriage capacity
and more powerful nuclear reactor

 

•• Pakistan’s naval nuclear ambitions are

fueled primarily by the sense of a growing
conventional, rather than strategic, imbalance
between New Delhi and Islamabad.
 

 ••By dispersing low-yield nuclear weapons

across a variety of naval platforms,
Islamabad aims to acquire escalation
dominance and greater strategic depth and to
reduce the incentives for a preemptive strike
on its nuclear assets.

Takeaways for India and Pakistan

 

•• Naval nuclear operations during the Cold War hold an immense value in terms of thinking more deeply about issues such as conventional operations under a nuclear shadow, naval nuclear signaling, and escalation control

 

•• In order to avert misunderstanding, India’s nuclear management would gain from clearer

communication and greater transparency, particularly with regard to the Dhanush program.

•• As Pakistan seeks to nuclearize its fleet, it will encounter a number of challenges. Chinese assistance could provide a way for Islamabad to more rapidly alleviate some of these difficulties. Considering the potential risks, however, Beijing may wish to maintain a greater distance from Pakistan’s military nuclear enterprise.

•• Over the past decade, India’s and Pakistan’s coast guards have enacted a number of confidence building

measures. Going forward, decisionmakers in New Delhi and Islamabad might consider

extending initiatives to their navies as well


 
              FOR INDIA: Going Nuclear at Sea

The Indian Express

 

                                          

Going forward, the Indian navy will face three sets of nuclear challenges.

The first set is in the technological domain, as the navy struggles to acquire the capability for continuous at-sea deterrence.
 

The second set of difficulties will need to be addressed within the navy itself, as its officers begin to grapple with the importance of their service’s new nuclear role.

Finally, Indian naval planners will also have to contend with their Pakistani counterparts’ development of what can best be described as a “naval nuclear force-in-being”.

When the Arihant is finally commissioned, it will be fitted with 12 Sagarika K-15 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Sagarika, however, only has a strike radius of about 750 to 800 km, which many analysts rightly consider inadequate.
Indeed, with such a short range, the Arihant could not reach Islamabad, let alone China’s strategic centres.

 

The DRDO is currently working on two longer-range SLBMs: the 3,500-km range K-4, which recently underwent a successful test launch from an underwater pontoon, and the 5,000-km range K-5, which is still in the design phase. According to sources, the Arihant is fitted with four universal tube launchers, which can each carry either three K-15 missiles or one K-4 missile.

 

Observers have raised questions, however, over the compatibility of the K-4’s height with the submarine’s 10.4-m hull. If the length of the K-4 cannot be shortened, the Arihant may need to be retrofitted with a hydrodynamic outer development, or “bump.” Even if the DRDO’s engineers do succeed in squeezing the K-4 aboard, the missile’s range remains somewhat unsatisfactory.

It would require India’s nuclear submariners to operate on the northeastern fringes of the Bay of Bengal in order to effectively target China’s major metropolises, rather than within the more sanitised waters abutting India’s eastern seaboard. The K-5 is rumoured to stand at a height of about 12 m, which rules out its deployment aboard the Arihant.

 

The second major technological limitation is that of the Arihant’s nuclear reactor. Reportedly based on first- or second-generation Soviet technology, the 83-megawatt pressurised water reactor has a short refuelling cycle, thus limiting the length of the Arihant’s deterrent patrols.

 

In short, in order to enjoy an effective sea-based deterrent with regard to China, India will need to deploy larger SSBNs with greater missile carriage capacity and more powerful nuclear reactors. The fourth planned submarine in the series is projected to possess such characteristics, but it may take more than a decade for it to be successfully developed and launched, and even longer for it to be commissioned.

 

While India’s submarine fleet has been taking shape, Delhi has also conducted a series of test firings, starting in 2000, of Dhanush-class short-range ballistic missiles from surface ships. For the time being, however, it appears that the Dhanush programme is merely a stopgap measure until the SSBN fleet comes into full fruition.

 

Second, history has shown that all newly nuclear navies face some difficult tradeoffs. As India’s SSBN fleet gradually grows in size and importance, the challenge will be to ensure that the navy’s new nuclear role develops alongside, rather than to the detriment of, its conventional missions.

As in all nuclear navies, a debate will no doubt unfold within the service as to how many resources and platforms should be devoted to the ballistic missile submarine fleet’s protection. Tough decisions may need to be made, particularly if India’s underwater environment becomes more contested. India’s nuclear command and control procedures will also almost certainly undergo a revision, as the SLBMs will be canisterised and ready for launch, rather than de-mated.

 

© Provided by Indian Express As India’s nuclear submarine fleet gradually grows in size and importance, the challenge will be to ensure that the navy’sp new nuclear role develops alongside, rather than to the detriment of, its conventional missions. 

            

Finally, India’s naval and nuclear planners will also have to contend with the progressive materialisation of a nuclearised Pakistani navy — albeit one with much less orthodox characteristics and undergirded by a very different nuclear posture. Indeed, Islamabad aims to eventually disperse nuclear-tipped cruise missiles across a variety of naval platforms, ranging from surface ships in the short term to conventional diesel-electric submarines in the long term. Unlike India, Pakistan’s naval nuclear ambitions are fuelled primarily by the sense of a growing conventional imbalance in the maritime domain.

By nuclearising — or by appearing to nuclearise — a large portion of their fleet architecture, Pakistani military planners hope to neuter India’s growing naval power, inject ambiguity and acquire escalation dominance in the event of a limited conflict at sea. Since Independence, Indian naval officers have been accustomed to operating within a purely conventional maritime setting.

Dealing with such a prospective adversary will no doubt necessitate a fundamental rethinking of the navy’s operational concepts. Perhaps more importantly, it will also require an effort on the part of both countries to further institutionalise the maritime component of their relations so as to ensure that in future, isolated incidents don’t spiral out of control.

 

The writer, a nonresident fellow in the South Asia Programme at the Atlantic Council, is author of the report ‘Murky Waters: Naval Nuclear Dynamics in the Indian Ocean’.

 

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