Showing posts with label NUCLEAR WARFARE. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NUCLEAR WARFARE. Show all posts

Friday, April 28, 2017

NUKES : South Asia is not the Most Dangerous place on Earth

SOURCE:
http://thebulletin.org/south-asia-not-most-dangerous-place-earth10720






                South Asia is Not 

  the Most Dangerous place on Earth

                              By

          Ramamurti Rajaraman




Nuclear weapons are arguably among the most dangerous inventions of man. The scale and rapidity of the destruction they can cause is unparalleled, as evidenced by the two occasions that they were used on civilian populations and by the numerous tests conducted on testing ranges. It follows that any country choosing to possess nuclear weapons is creating an existential threat, not only for its adversaries but also for itself and for its general neighborhood. Such places are all very dangerous to be in.

Given the immensity and gravity of this danger, it might seem silly and ghoulish to quibble over which nuclear weapon country is a greater danger than the others. Nevertheless, in the 70-year history of nuclear weapons such comparisons have often been made by diplomats, national leaders, scholars, and the media. Motivations have varied. Mostly they come from genuine concern for the safety of that region and of the world in general. But sometimes it is part of the thrust and parry of diplomatic engagement, or a strategic step to name and shame a country. It can also be a strategy for individuals and nongovernmental organizations specializing in that region to enhance the importance of their scholarly niche and ensure the next tranche of grant money.

In this genre, the flavor of the decade has been the notion that “South Asia is the most dangerous place on Earth.” This view was launched after a remark by President Bill Clinton, about two years after the nuclear tests by both India and Pakistan in May 1998. Shortly before he was to make his first state visit to India, Clinton said: “The most dangerous place in the world today, I think you could argue, is the Indian subcontinent and the line of control in Kashmir.” The statement quickly gained wide currency.
Since then it has become customary for analysts in think tanks and Western media to routinely and casually use this phrase or something equivalent.
This perception, however, is not widely shared in the Indian sub-continent. In fact, soon after Clinton made his statement and during a formal banquet in India honoring Clinton’s visit, Indian President K.R.Narayanan cautioned:
“It has been suggested that the Indian sub-continent is the most dangerous place in the world to-day and Kashmir is a nuclear flash-point. These alarmist descriptions will only encourage those who want to break the peace and indulge in terrorism and violence.” 
A similarly sober assessment continues to be provided by experts in India. These include not just politicians and civilian officials who could conceivably be expected to paint a reassuring picture, but also senior military officers who would seem to be inclined to be hawkish and belligerent.
.
For example, Lt. Gen. Vijay Oberoi, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, has written:

 “Keeping rhetoric, verbal statements, and saber rattling aside, both India and Pakistan know that even a single use of a nuclear weapon—whether in [its] own or [on the] adversary’s side of the border, would invite massive retaliation and destruction, not only for both countries or substantial parts of both countries, but also have severe adverse impact for the region and many parts of the world. Consequently, it is illogical to conclude that the escalatory ladder will climb to the nuclear level as a matter of course.”

Such sober views are not limited only to Indian analysts who, one might say, are compelled by regional pride to be biased in favor of thinking highly of their ability to handle nuclear responsibility in a crisis. Some analysts in the Western media have taken a similar stance, such as the BBC’s Defence Correspondent Jonathan Marcus
: “In going nuclear, and in a sense in getting away with it, they [India and Pakistan] have provided a dangerous precedent. That is certainly the way western analysts would view it. Though local experts in the region would probably echo their own governments in insisting that if nuclear deterrence is okay for Britain, France, Russia, and the United states—not to mention China—then it should be fine for India and Pakistan as well.”
Meanwhile, other Westerners took a very different view. In 2007, four very distinguished elder statesmen of the US establishment—George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn—published a very influential article in the Wall Street Journal calling for a world free of nuclear weapons. Such a call for total disarmament by veterans of the Cold War was widely welcomed around the world. But one of the arguments they used to advocate this goal was less than universally welcome

: “New nuclear states do not have the benefit of years of step-by-step safeguards put in effect during the Cold War to prevent nuclear accidents, misjudgments or unauthorized launches. The United States and the Soviet Union learned from mistakes that were less than fatal. Both countries were diligent to ensure that no nuclear weapon was used during the Cold War by design or by accident. Will new nuclear nations and the world be as fortunate in the next 50 years as we were during the Cold War?”

Although the distinguished authors used very diplomatic language in attributing the prevention of nuclear disasters to good fortune, the undertone was that the “new nuclear states” may not have the same technical capability or the nuclear maturity that the two Cold Warriors had to safely maintain their nuclear arsenals. That is a bit rich, given that the time when we came closest to a nuclear exchange was during the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, which lasted for 13 days as the world waited with bated breath to see who would blink first, the United States or the Soviet Union. No threat of remotely similar proportions has emerged from South Asia in the 19 years since Pakistan announced that it had conducted nuclear warhead tests and the region can be said to be nuclearized by both parties.
Our weapons are not on a ready-to-launch state of alert. In India, and as far as I know also in Pakistan, the warheads are kept de-mated from the missiles.

Despite this, outbreaks of alarmist comments about South Asia recur from time to time from think tanks and scholars in the West. One recent example was reportedly a talk at the prestigious Carnegie Conference held at Washington in March 2017, which in turn led to a flurry of articles in major US newspapers. The talk and a subsequent New York Times article about it drew their conclusions from some re-interpretations of our No First Use doctrine by some retired Indian officials to permit a first strike in some circumstances. True, these officials are highly respected people who had held apex positions in the government‘s strategic establishment. But there is no evidence that their post–retirement views represent in any way the policies of the government currently—or for that matter, even when they held office.
In fact, one can cite several examples of restrained behavior in the subcontinent in support of India's claim that nuclear weapons, while very dangerous anywhere, are no more so in the hands of the Indians and Pakistanis. Situations that could have escalated from the conventional level to a nuclear exchange did not do so. The first example, the Kargil “war” of 1999, happened just a year after the two countries had turned nuclear. It began with the Indian discovery that Pakistani soldiers had occupied some strategic mountain peaks on the Indian side and had to be evicted. 

Although it was limited to a narrow 100-mile long strip of uninhibited mountain ridges abutting the Line of Control, or de facto border, in Kashmir, it went on for three months, involving not only ground troops but also the Indian Air force. If there ever was a time to seriously worry about a nuclear war, it was then. The two countries, after conducting their respective nuclear tests in May 1998, were presumably in possession of a few warheads each. One could have legitimately worried that with little prior experience in possessing nuclear arsenals, one or the other side might have erred on the side of excessive military action or aggressive bluster, and take them both down the treacherous slope towards nuclear exchange.
But that did not happen.
The war was not allowed to escalate. The Indian government had given firm orders to its Air Force that beyond evicting the intruders, its airplanes should not cross the border in hot pursuit. The Pakistanis in turn, with reportedly some counseling by the Americans, withdrew from the remaining occupied areas. Cease fire followed.
The next few years witnessed what could be viewed as far more serious challenges to nuclear stability in the subcontinent. First came the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, by the Pakistan-supported terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Fortunately, it was repelled by the Indian security detail, but even if a single terrorist had managed to enter the building, there were a hundred unarmed members of the parliament inside, ready for picking. Despite the massive uproar this caused in India, with calls for immediate revenge, the Indian government kept its cool and took no military action. For purposes of comparison, imagine the dilemma President Trump would face if some armed outfit from Mexico snuck across the newly renovated border wall and attacked the Capitol building while the US Congress was in session.
What the Parliament attack in New Delhi did result in was a show of strength by India through a military mobilization (“Operation Parakram”) at the border the following summer, leading to a similar response by Pakistan. The troops were lined up on their respective sides of the border in a face-to-face confrontation which lasted for months. From time to time sporadic incidents on the border or a burst of overheated rhetoric from either side would generate rumors in the foreign media that war between the two nuclear armed neighbors was imminent.
I recall being on a brief visit to the United States in that summer of 2002. My American friends expressed concern over the situation back in India and were equally concerned over my nonchalance on the matter, given that my family was living in New Delhi. So, mostly to reassure my friends, I called my wife that evening and was informed that there was no feeling of imminent danger, let alone panic on the streets of Delhi. The poor were as usual worried about their next meal, while the middle classes was pre-occupied with upward mobility in a growing economy!
It must be acknowledged that during this face-to-face standoff, leaders of other nations, especially the United States, contacted their counterparts in India and Pakistan, expressing their concern and urging them not to let the situation go out of control. While their concern and advice did contribute to the resolution of that crisis, it does not follow that without their input the two protagonists would have not have, on their own, avoided stepping into the abyss.
Terrorist attacks continued to be launched even after that, not only within Kashmir but also on the Indian mainland. The worst of them was the attack in Mumbai in 2008 in which over 160 people were killed. This attack also received more attention than usual in the West, because several foreigners from the United States and Israel were among the casualties. The Indian public reaction to this attack was stronger than ever before and, as credible evidence of the involvement of Pakistan-based outfits grew, so did calls for reprisal. Yet once again the Indian government resisted pressures to retaliate. Instead, it was content to register its outrage through diplomatic channels, by providing evidence on how and by whom the attacks were planned.
It is not as though India has been the only one to exercise restraint. The other side has, in its own way, done that too. Once it became clear, after Mumbai, that the Indian government might be forced by public opinion to launch a punitive strike the next time there was a major act of terror on India, there have in fact been no more attacks of that magnitude for several years since. Whoever organizes and funds these attacks from Pakistani soil has been told to refrain from doing so. How much of this is because of pressure from the world community and how much due to the wisdom of Pakistani strategists, we do not know. But the fact is that nothing close to the Mumbai or Parliament attack in size or significance has happened since then.
Another instance which effectively became an act of Pakistani restraint was their response to the Indian surgical strikeson Pakistani infiltration camps last November. Although terrorism on the scale of Mumbai has not happened since then, there has been a resurgence of attacks on Indian military bases near the border, first at the Pathankot airbase on January 2016 and then at Uri on September 18, 2016. Seven Indian soldiers were killed at the former and 18 at the latter. The Indian government decided that this time a calibrated punitive measure was finally called for and launched a set of coordinated strikes across the border on the launch pads of the infiltrators. The scale of that counterattack was not much higher than standard cross-border attacks that have been taking place for years in Kashmir. The difference this time was that the Indians publicly announced these counter strikes. In Asia, where saving face is as important a criterion as any other in deciding foreign policy, the announcement of the Indian counterattack was also a public reprimand to Pakistan. Such an “insult” could easily have generated an uncontainable public demand in Pakistan for a tit-for tat response and the whole situation could easily have escalated to something bigger. But the Pakistani government chose not to retaliate, either with military action or even threatening rhetoric. Instead they chose to ridicule the Indian claims of a major “surgical strike” and declared that no such things had happened. Now, I do not know what exactly motivated the Pakistani army to take such a position of denial. But the net result, once again, was that matters were prevented from escalating.
No one is arguing that the nuclearization of South Asia has not been a very dangerous development. It certainly has. There is also no doubt that all the nuclear weapon nations of the world, including those in South Asia, should relentlessly strive to get rid of these weapons. Specifically, making South Asia a nuclear weapons-free region is primarily the responsibility of us Indians and the Pakistanis. In support of this ongoing effort by right-thinking people here, advice, counsel, and analysis coming from other nations are of course very welcome. But such inputs will be counter-productive if they are condescending and simplistic. That will only put the backs up of conservatives and ultra-nationalists in South Asia, and make the prospects of arms reduction even more distant.



Thursday, December 15, 2016

NUKES INDIA - PAK- Dilemma over the N word : ‘NO FIRST USE ’

SOURCE: :
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/dilemma-over-the-n-word/336812.html




Dilemma over the N word

G Parthasarathy
India needs to make its nuclear doctrine relevant

Dec 15, 2016






Choose right: Does the ‘no first use’ 
                policy need revision? 


EVER since India commenced building a nuclear arsenal after the Pokhran tests of 1998, queries have been raised about what the size of its arsenal should be, accompanied by a discourse on how to fashion its nuclear doctrine. Quite clearly, India’s nuclear weapons have to be primarily targeted on its two neighbours, Pakistan and China, which possess nuclear weapons and with whom India has serious territorial and other differences. This strategy has also to take into account the fact that while Pakistan has relatively limited indigenous research and development capabilities, its nuclear weapons and missile programmes are predominantly based on Chinese designs and technology transfers.
India’s nuclear doctrine, first officially enunciated on January 4, 2003, asserts that it intends to build and maintain a “credible minimum deterrent”. While adopting a policy of “no first use”, the doctrine clarifies that India’s nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against an attack on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which nuclear weapons are used. India also retains the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of attacks on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which chemical or biological weapons are used. 
Pakistan has not officially enunciated its nuclear doctrine. It justifies its entire nuclear weapons programme as being an equaliser to balance Indian conventional military superiority. More importantly, it constantly uses nuclear blackmail by threatening to use nuclear weapons if India responds to cross-border terrorist attacks by military action on its soil. The sad reality is that substantial sections of our so-called “intellectual” and “liberal” elite panic at such Pakistani tantrums. Pakistan’s generals live too comfortably to commit collective suicide. Moreover, one has to rationally analyse what needs to be done to deal with Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, bluster and blackmail. One hopes some reality has dawned on this “elite” after the recent surgical strikes across the LoC. Pakistan should not be allowed to get the impression that this was a one-time occurrence.
While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division of its National Command Authority, told a team of physicists from Italy’s Landon Network that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. According to the report of the Landon team, Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation. 
General Kidwai, who is highly regarded internationally, enunciated these views over a decade ago, when he was head of the Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command. He has since retired. But, anyone who understands the strategic thinking of the Pakistan army, realises that the “red lines”, enunciated by General Kidwai, especially in regard to the fallout of an Indian attack, would remain the basic parameters of current strategic thinking. There is, however, one significant difference in Pakistan’s capabilities since then. Thanks to Chinese assistance, Pakistan has now built plutonium reactors and reprocessing facilities in the Fatehjang-Khushab plutonium complex, enabling it to assemble an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons and miniaturised plutonium warheads. But, in practical terms, Pakistan cannot use these tactical nuclear weapons in the Punjab area, which is densely populated. They can perhaps be used in the Sind/Rajasthan desert, with Pakistan presuming that such an attack will not prompt India to resort to a full-scale nuclear conflict as enunciated in India’s nuclear doctrine, as this would result in mutual destruction.
Viewed in a global context, the entire theology of a nuclear “no first use”, which was enunciated by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and rejected by the US and its NATO allies, has few adherents today. The Russian Federation does not subscribe to “no first use” of nuclear weapons. The US and NATO now aver that NATO members can use nuclear weapons against states armed with biological and chemical weapons, even if those states have signed the NPT. China has expressed its readiness to sign “no first use” agreements with the other “recognised” nuclear powers and affirmed its commitment not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, China thus appears to have maintained a measure of ambiguity on whether its “no first use” pledge will be applicable to India. An unambiguous clarification on this issue has to be sought from China.
The BJP manifesto in 2014 had declared that it would “study in detail” India’s nuclear doctrine and revise and update it to make it relevant to the challenges of current times. The manifesto spoke of a credible minimum deterrent in tune with “changing geostrategic realities”. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s response at a book launch in Delhi on November 10, 2016, brought the issue into public focus. Referring to India’s “no first use” doctrine, he said: “Why should I bind myself [to the nuclear no first use doctrine]? I should say I am a responsible nuclear power and I will not use it irresponsibly”. Given the change in the strategic scenario since the transfer of plutonium facilities from China to Pakistan for developing tactical, battlefield nuclear weapons, it is imperative to have a serious internal debate on our nuclear posture to consider available rational options. Moreover, our nuclear deterrent will not be “credible” in Chinese perceptions till the Agni 5 missile is operationalised and our sea-based nuclear missiles are positioned on the INS Arihant and future nuclear submarines built by us.
India has played an active role in nuclear disarmament. This gave us a moral stature. We should continue to initiate and promote measures for universal and complete nuclear disarmament. Moreover, there is growing concern in many parts of the world about the endless production in Pakistan of dangerous fissile material which could fall into wrong hands. We should join others to push for a non-discriminatory treaty ending the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. We should also reiterate our commitment for de-alerting all nuclear weapons and separating nuclear warheads from their explosive packages. Interestingly, the US and its NATO allies are likely to be the main opponents of such a move.

Tuesday, December 13, 2016

INDO- PAK NUKES : A Global Nuclear Winter: Avoiding The Unthinkable In India And Pakistan

SOURCE
http://www.eurasiareview.com/10122016-a-global-nuclear-winter-avoiding-the-unthinkable-in-india-and-pakistan-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29













A Global Nuclear Winter: Avoiding The Unthinkable In India And Pakistan – Analysis

                                 By

                    Conn Hallinan*



Border personnel from India and Pakistan during the Wagah Border ceremony. Photo by Therealhiddenace, Wikipedia Commons.
Border personnel from India and Pakistan during the Wagah Border ceremony. Photo by Therealhiddenace, Wikipedia Commons.

US President-elect Donald Trump’s off the cuff, chaotic approach to foreign policy had at least one thing going for it, even though it was more the feel of a blind pig rooting for acorns than a thought-out international initiative. In speaking with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the New York Timesreported, Trump said he wanted “to address and find solutions” to Pakistan’s problems.














And what big problems they are.
Whether Trump understands exactly how dangerous the current tensions between Pakistan and India are, or if anything will come from the November 30 exchange between the two leaders, is anyone’s guess. But it’s more than the Obama administration has done over the past eight years, in spite of the outgoing president’s 2008 election promise to address the on-going crisis in Kashmir.
Right now that troubled land is the single most dangerous spot on the globe.

War, Famine, and Radiation

India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the disputed province in the past six decades and came within a hair’s breadth of a nuclear exchange in 1999. Both countries are on a crash program to produce nuclear weapons, and between them they have enough explosive power to not only kill more than 20 million of their own people, but also to devastate the world’s ozone layer and throw the Northern Hemisphere into a nuclear winter — with a catastrophic impact on agriculture worldwide.

According to studies done at Rutgers, the University of Colorado-Boulder, and the University of California-Los Angeles, if both countries detonated 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, it would generate between 1 and 5 million tons of smoke. Within 10 days, that would drive temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere down to levels too cold for wheat production in much of Canada and Russia. The resulting 10 percent drop in rainfall — especially in Asian locales that rely monsoons — would exhaust worldwide food supplies, leading to the starvation of up to 100 million or more people.

Aside from the food crisis, a nuclear war in South Asia would destroy between 25 to 70 percent of the Northern Hemisphere’s ozone layer, resulting in a massive increase in dangerous ultraviolent radiation.

Cold Start, Hot War

Lest anyone think that the chances of such a war are slight, consider two recent developments.
One, a decision by Pakistan to deploy low-yield tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons and to give permission for local commanders to decide when to use them.
In an interview with the German newspaper  Deutsche WelleGregory Koblentz of the Council on Foreign Relations warned that if a “commander of a forward-deployed nuclear armed unit finds himself in a ‘use it or lose it’ situation and about to be overrun, he might decided to launch his weapons.”
Pakistan’s current defense minister, Muhammad Asif, told Geo TV, “If anyone steps on our soil and if anyone’s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those [nuclear] weapons for our defense.”
Every few years the Pentagon “war games” a clash between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. Every game ends in a nuclear war.
The second dangerous development is the “Cold Start” strategy by India that would send Indian troops across the border to a depth of 30 kilometers in the advent of a terrorist attack like the 1999 Kargill incident in Kashmir, the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, or the 2008 attack on Mumbai that killed 166 people.
Since the Indian army is more than twice the size of Pakistan’s, there would be little that Pakistanis could do to stop such an invasion other than using battlefield nukes. India would then be faced with either accepting defeat or responding.
India doesn’t currently have any tactical nukes, only high yield strategic weapons — many aimed at China — whose primary value is to destroy cities. Hence a decision by a Pakistani commander to use a tactical warhead would almost surely lead to a strategic response by India, setting off a full-scale nuclear exchange and the nightmare that would follow in its wake.

A Regional Arms Race

With so much at stake, why is no one but a Twitter-addicted foreign policy apprentice saying anything? What happened to President Obama’s follow through to his 2008 statement that the tensions over Kashmir “won’t be easy” to solve, but that doing so “is important”?
A strategy of pulling India into an alliance against China was dreamed up during the administration of George W. Bush, but it was Obama’s “Asia Pivot” that signed and sealed the deal. With it went a quid pro quo: If India would abandon its traditional neutrality, the Americans would turn a blind eye to Kashmir.
As a sweetener, the U.S. agreed to bypass the global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow India to buy uranium on the world market, something New Delhi had been banned from doing since it detonated a nuclear bomb in 1974 using fuel it had cribbed from U.S.-supplied nuclear reactors. In any case, because neither India nor Pakistan is a party to the treaty, both should be barred from buying uranium. In India’s case, the U.S. has waived that restriction.
The so-called 1-2-3 Agreement requires India to use any nuclear fuel it purchases in its civilian reactors, but frees it up to use its meager domestic supplies on its nuclear weapons program. India has since built two enormous nuclear production sites at Challakere and near Mysore, where, rumor has it, it is producing a hydrogen bomb. Both sites are off limits to international inspectors.
In 2008, when the Obama administration indicated it was interested in pursuing the 1-2-3 Agreement, then Pakistani Foreign minister Khurshid Kusuni warned that the deal would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and lead to a nuclear arms race in Asia. That is exactly what has come to pass. The only countries currently adding to their nuclear arsenals are Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea.
While Pakistan is still frozen out of buying uranium on the world market, it has sufficient domestic supplies to fuel an accelerated program to raise its warhead production. Pakistan is estimated to have between 110 and 130 warheads already, and it’s projected to have developed 200 by 2020, surpassing the United Kingdom.
India has between 110 and 120 nuclear weapons. Both countries have short, medium, and long-range missiles, submarine ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, plus nuclear-capable aircraft that can target each other’s major urban areas.

A New Uprising in Kashmir

One problem in the current crisis is that both countries are essentially talking past one another.
Pakistan does have legitimate security concerns. It has fought and lost three wars with India over Kashmir since 1947, and it’s deeply paranoid about the size of the Indian army.
But India has been the victim of several major terrorist attacks that have Pakistan’s fingerprints all over them. The 1999 Kargill invasion lasted a month and killed hundreds of soldiers on both sides. Reportedly the Pakistanis were considering arming their missiles with nuclear warheads until the Clinton administration convinced them to stand down.++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+
Pakistan’s military has long denied that it has any control over terrorist organizations based in Pakistan, but virtually all intelligence agencies agree that, with the exception of the country’s home-grown Taliban, that is not the case. The Pakistani army certainly knew about a recent attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir that killed 19 soldiers.
In the past, India responded to such attacks with quiet counterattacks of its own, but this time around the right-wing nationalist government of Narendra Modi announced that the Indian military had crossed the border and killed more than 30 militants. It was the first time that India publicly acknowledged a cross-border assault.
Meanwhile the Indian press has whipped up a nationalist fervor that has seen sports events between the two countries cancelled and a ban on using Pakistani actors in Indian films. The Pakistani press has been no less jingoistic.
In the meantime, the situation in Kashmir has gone from bad to worse. Early in the summer Indian security forces killed Burhan Wani, a popular leader of the Kashmir independence movement. Since then the province has essentially been paralyzed, with schools closed and massive demonstrations. Thousands of residents have been arrested, close to 100 killed, and hundreds of demonstrators wounded and blinded by the widespread use of birdshot by Indian security forces.
Indian rule in Kashmir has been singularly brutal. Between 50,000 and 80,000 people have died over the past six decades, and thousands of others have been “disappeared” by security forces. While in the past the Pakistani army aided the infiltration of terrorist groups to attack the Indian army, this time around the uprising is homegrown. Kashmiris are simply tired of military rule and a law which gives Indian security forces essentially carte blanche to terrorize the population.
Called the Special Powers Act — modeled after a British provision to suppress of Catholics in Northern Ireland and mirroring practices widely used by the Israelis in the Occupied Territories — the law allows Indian authorities to arrest and imprison people without charge and gives immunity to Indian security forces.

Avenues to Peace

As complex as the situation in Kashmir is, there are avenues to resolve it. A good start would be to suspend the Special Powers Act and send the Indian Army back to the barracks.
The crisis in Kashmir began when the Hindu ruler of the mostly Muslim region opted to join India when the countries were divided in 1947. At the time, the residents were promised that a UN-sponsored referendum would allow residents to choose India, Pakistan, or independence. That referendum has never been held.
Certainly the current situation cannot continue. Kashmir has almost 12 million people, and no army or security force — even one as large as India’s — can maintain a permanent occupation if the residents don’t want it. Instead of resorting to force, India should ratchet down its security forces and negotiate with Kashmiris for an interim increase in local autonomy.
But in the long run, the Kashmiris should have their referendum — and both India and Pakistan will have to accept the results.
What the world cannot afford is for the current tensions to spiral down into a military confrontation that could easily get out of hand. The U.S., through its aid to Pakistan — $860 million this year — has some leverage, but it cannot play a role if its ultimate goal is an alliance to contain China, a close ally of Pakistan.
Neither country would survive a nuclear war, and neither country should be spending its money on an arms race. Almost 30 percent of Indians live below the poverty line, as do 22 percent of Pakistanis. The $51 billion Indian defense budget and the $7 billion Pakistan spends could be put to far better use.
*Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Conn Hallinan can be read at dispatchesfromtheedge.wordpress.com and middleempireseries.wordpress.com.



Friday, August 12, 2016

NUKES :THE NUCLEAR MISSION MUST STAY MANNED

SOURCE
http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-mission-must-stay-manned9768








                                                                  20YY
                       PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE                         ROBOTIC AGE






GOOGLE/CLICK THE URL TO OPEN pdf  FILE




PREPARING FOR ROBOTIC WAR

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_20YY_WorkBrimley.pdf






PART-1


http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_RoboticsOnTheBattlefield_Scharre.pdf





PART-2

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf







                      NUKES :THE NUCLEAR MISSION                     MUST STAY MANNED



9 August 2016

    The nuclear mission must stay manned

                                                              Alexander Velez-Green

Alexander Velez-Green

Alexander Velez-Green is a research assistant with the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program and 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at the Center...
 
A lot of things can and should be automated

but nuclear bombers are not one of them.


Unfortunately, it’s not clear that Moscow agrees. Reports surfaced in July that Russia has begun development of a hypersonic nuclear bomber that can deliver nuclear strikes from outer space. Unnamed officials quoted in the semi-official Russian news organ Pravda say that the bomber will have an unmanned variant. Their statement has not been confirmed, but the idea that Russia would pursue an unmanned nuclear bomber is not new. The commander of Russia’s long-range aviation fleet, Lt. Gen. Anatoly Zhikharev, stated in 2012 that Russia was considering developing a “pilotless” sixth-generation nuclear bomber.


While it’s too soon to know for sure whether or not the new Russian bomber will be unmanned, it’s apparent that Russian military officials have been considering that option for some time. And Russian policymakers have made no public promises that the nuclear mission would only be carried out by a manned version of the bomber.


This development is deeply concerning. Deploying a highly autonomous unmanned nuclear bomber would significantly raise the risk of inadvertent or uncontrolled nuclear war. As the world prepares for war in the robotic age, the United States must take steps to ensure that the nuclear mission remains manned.


An unmanned nuclear bomber?

 The announcement from July of this year leaves much room for skepticism. One thing that should not be taken lightly, however, is the possibility that future Russian nuclear bombers may come with unmanned variants. The recent statement that Russia’s latest bomber will be capable of being unmanned has not been confirmed, but it would align strongly with influential Russian military strategists’ emphasis in recent years on the need for the Russian military to embrace unmanned and autonomous military systems in order to win future wars.


There are plenty of reasons why Russian military thinkers might consider de-manning their nuclear bomber. Most boil down to one thing: Russian policymakers think that having an unmanned nuclear bomber might one day be useful, if not necessary, to protect their country. Looking at the future air and space operating environments, they foresee the possibility that rapidly-improving enemy air and space defenses will make it impossible for manned aircraft—or small numbers of unmanned aircraft, for that matter—to get in range of their targets. To launch nuclear strikes from air or space, then, they might need to use large swarms of robotic systems capable of autonomously navigating to the target; evading or defeating any US and NATO countermeasures they encounter on the way; and releasing their nuclear payloads against previously designated targets. Given Moscow’s history of automating nuclear strike platforms, this calculus has clear precedent.



The problem with autonomy.

 Assigning the nuclear mission to highly autonomous, unmanned bombers would create an unprecedented risk of inadvertent or uncontrolled nuclear war between the United States and Russia. No matter their sophistication, autonomous systems can behave unexpectedly for a wide variety of reasons, including system malfunction; unanticipated interaction with the air, space, or cyber environments; or hacking by the enemy.


This creates two types of vulnerabilities when it comes to a nuclear bomber. The first is located early in the kill chain—the series of steps taken to find and ultimately destroy the enemy—at the point where the unmanned system is ordered to begin a nuclear strike mission. Due to any of these unexpected inputs, the unmanned bomber could initiate a nuclear strike mission completely against the will of its earthbound operators.


The second vulnerability is located near the end of the kill chain, where the bomber would launch its ordnance at pre designated targets. A frightening number of unforeseen inputs could cause the unmanned system’s original target coordinates to be scrambled or replaced. This could lead it to launch nuclear weapons at targets that were previously off-limits, like major cities.


Having a pilot onboard would create ahuman circuit breakerthat could intercede to manually halt operations if something went awry, such as if orders were received to launch a nuclear strike during peacetime, or to hit civilian centers early on in a limited nuclear war. Soviet colonel  Stanislav Petrov  played this role in 1983 when the sun’s reflection off of the tops of clouds caused an automated early warning system to falsely report that the United States had launched a nuclear attack on Russia. Without a pilot, the bomber would be quite vulnerable to such manipulation.

It may be possible to design automated fail-safes for these systems. But automated fail-safes would be vulnerable to the same types of failures due to technical malfunction, environmental triggers, or hacking. And, depending on when and how the aircraft’s fail-safe engaged—for instance, if it kicked in after the bomber had already begun its final approach on to a target—it may be too late to prevent the defender from initiating its own retaliation sequence.


The potential ramifications of such unexpected behavior would be quite severe indeed. An unauthorized nuclear first-strike by an unmanned bomber would almost certainly trigger retaliation, rapidly forcing the United States and Russia down a path towards nuclear war. A similar effect would occur if a limited nuclear war were ongoing and an unmanned system struck a site beyond the designated set of targets, leading to unintentional escalation. And the potential for a third party to hijack an unmanned bomber in order to trigger nuclear war between the United States and Russia is increasingly real, particularly as advanced cyber capabilities become available to a greater number of state and non-state actors.


Keep the nuclear mission manned.

 Russian readers might receive this criticism with indignation and point out that the United States hasn’t firmly rejected the possibility of de-manning the nuclear mission either—and they’d be right. Indeed, the US Air Force has offered only ambiguous language on this point, suggesting that it is keeping its options open to de-man nuclear strike assets in the future. This is particularly concerning, given reports that the US Air Force is considering designing an unmanned variant of its own nuclear bomber—the Long-Range Strike Bomber—in the coming years.


But the United States is not immune to the same vulnerabilities that would imperil a Russian unmanned nuclear bomber. For example, it remains unknown why the US RQ-170 stealth drone went down in Iran in 2011. But there have been claims that it was brought down by enemy hacking —something that could not have happened with a pilot onboard. What if the RQ-170 had been a US unmanned nuclear bomber on patrol?


The truth is that no state is immune to the vulnerabilities inherent to autonomous systems—vulnerabilities that would dramatically undermine the reliability of the bomber leg of the nuclear triad. Now is the time to avoid needless catastrophe and set the precedent that the nuclear mission must remain manned during the robotic age.


The United States should clearly and unequivocally reject the possibility of using unmanned nuclear strike assets. It should state forcefully that no potential operational benefits afforded by an unmanned nuclear bomber could outweigh the potential costs of a nuclear conflict driven by the unexpected behavior of a highly autonomous unmanned system. The Defense Department should focus instead on developing ways to penetrate enemy air defenses using manned nuclear bombers, perhaps escorted by highly autonomous, unmanned wingmen.


Washington should then engage Moscow directly on these points. Its objective should be to secure Russia’s entry into an international agreement banning the automation of nuclear strike assets. The agreement should be premised on a mutual understanding of the risks of automating the nuclear mission and confidence-building measures assuring each state of the other’s continued adherence to the agreement.


And the United States should not stop there. With Russia and other partners’ support, the United States should lead arms control negotiations with China, India, Pakistan, and other nuclear-armed states to craft an international agreement prohibiting the de-manning of the nuclear mission. These talks will undoubtedly face significant hurdles, not the least when it comes to defining “autonomy.” But with the automation of nuclear strike assets just over the technical horizon, these discussions must begin now. If the world’s nuclear-armed states wait for real-world events to demonstrate the folly of integrating greater autonomy into their nuclear strike assets, it may be too late.