NUKES INDIA - PAK- Dilemma over the N word : ‘NO FIRST USE ’

SOURCE: :
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/dilemma-over-the-n-word/336812.html

Dilemma over the N word

G Parthasarathy
India needs to make its nuclear doctrine relevant

Dec 15, 2016

Choose right: Does the ‘no first use’ 
                policy need revision? 


EVER since India commenced building a nuclear arsenal after the Pokhran tests of 1998, queries have been raised about what the size of its arsenal should be, accompanied by a discourse on how to fashion its nuclear doctrine. Quite clearly, India’s nuclear weapons have to be primarily targeted on its two neighbours, Pakistan and China, which possess nuclear weapons and with whom India has serious territorial and other differences. This strategy has also to take into account the fact that while Pakistan has relatively limited indigenous research and development capabilities, its nuclear weapons and missile programmes are predominantly based on Chinese designs and technology transfers.

India’s nuclear doctrine, first officially enunciated on January 4, 2003, asserts that it intends to build and maintain a “credible minimum deterrent”. While adopting a policy of “no first use”, the doctrine clarifies that India’s nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against an attack on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which nuclear weapons are used. India also retains the right to use nuclear weapons in the event of attacks on Indian territory, or on Indian forces anywhere, in which chemical or biological weapons are used. 

Pakistan has not officially enunciated its nuclear doctrine. It justifies its entire nuclear weapons programme as being an equaliser to balance Indian conventional military superiority. More importantly, it constantly uses nuclear blackmail by threatening to use nuclear weapons if India responds to cross-border terrorist attacks by military action on its soil. The sad reality is that substantial sections of our so-called “intellectual” and “liberal” elite panic at such Pakistani tantrums. Pakistan’s generals live too comfortably to commit collective suicide. Moreover, one has to rationally analyse what needs to be done to deal with Pakistan’s nuclear bluff, bluster and blackmail. One hopes some reality has dawned on this “elite” after the recent surgical strikes across the LoC. Pakistan should not be allowed to get the impression that this was a one-time occurrence.

While Pakistan has not formally enunciated a nuclear doctrine, Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s Strategic Planning Division of its National Command Authority, told a team of physicists from Italy’s Landon Network that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were “aimed solely at India”. According to the report of the Landon team, Kidwai added that Pakistan would use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan’s territory, or destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land and air forces. Kidwai also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if India tries to “economically strangle” Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation. 

General Kidwai, who is highly regarded internationally, enunciated these views over a decade ago, when he was head of the Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command. He has since retired. But, anyone who understands the strategic thinking of the Pakistan army, realises that the “red lines”, enunciated by General Kidwai, especially in regard to the fallout of an Indian attack, would remain the basic parameters of current strategic thinking. There is, however, one significant difference in Pakistan’s capabilities since then. Thanks to Chinese assistance, Pakistan has now built plutonium reactors and reprocessing facilities in the Fatehjang-Khushab plutonium complex, enabling it to assemble an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons and miniaturised plutonium warheads. But, in practical terms, Pakistan cannot use these tactical nuclear weapons in the Punjab area, which is densely populated. They can perhaps be used in the Sind/Rajasthan desert, with Pakistan presuming that such an attack will not prompt India to resort to a full-scale nuclear conflict as enunciated in India’s nuclear doctrine, as this would result in mutual destruction.

Viewed in a global context, the entire theology of a nuclear “no first use”, which was enunciated by the Soviet Union during the Cold War and rejected by the US and its NATO allies, has few adherents today. The Russian Federation does not subscribe to “no first use” of nuclear weapons. The US and NATO now aver that NATO members can use nuclear weapons against states armed with biological and chemical weapons, even if those states have signed the NPT. China has expressed its readiness to sign “no first use” agreements with the other “recognised” nuclear powers and affirmed its commitment not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, China thus appears to have maintained a measure of ambiguity on whether its “no first use” pledge will be applicable to India. An unambiguous clarification on this issue has to be sought from China.

The BJP manifesto in 2014 had declared that it would “study in detail” India’s nuclear doctrine and revise and update it to make it relevant to the challenges of current times. The manifesto spoke of a credible minimum deterrent in tune with “changing geostrategic realities”. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s response at a book launch in Delhi on November 10, 2016, brought the issue into public focus. Referring to India’s “no first use” doctrine, he said: “Why should I bind myself [to the nuclear no first use doctrine]? I should say I am a responsible nuclear power and I will not use it irresponsibly”. Given the change in the strategic scenario since the transfer of plutonium facilities from China to Pakistan for developing tactical, battlefield nuclear weapons, it is imperative to have a serious internal debate on our nuclear posture to consider available rational options. Moreover, our nuclear deterrent will not be “credible” in Chinese perceptions till the Agni 5 missile is operationalised and our sea-based nuclear missiles are positioned on the INS Arihant and future nuclear submarines built by us.

India has played an active role in nuclear disarmament. This gave us a moral stature. We should continue to initiate and promote measures for universal and complete nuclear disarmament. Moreover, there is growing concern in many parts of the world about the endless production in Pakistan of dangerous fissile material which could fall into wrong hands. We should join others to push for a non-discriminatory treaty ending the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. We should also reiterate our commitment for de-alerting all nuclear weapons and separating nuclear warheads from their explosive packages. Interestingly, the US and its NATO allies are likely to be the main opponents of such a move.

INDO- PAK NUKES : A Global Nuclear Winter: Avoiding The Unthinkable In India And Pakistan

SOURCE
http://www.eurasiareview.com/10122016-a-global-nuclear-winter-avoiding-the-unthinkable-in-india-and-pakistan-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

A Global Nuclear Winter: Avoiding The Unthinkable In India And Pakistan – Analysis

                                 By

                    Conn Hallinan*

Border personnel from India and Pakistan during the Wagah Border ceremony. Photo by Therealhiddenace, Wikipedia Commons.

DECEMBER 10, 2016

US President-elect Donald Trump’s off the cuff, chaotic approach to foreign policy had at least one thing going for it, even though it was more the feel of a blind pig rooting for acorns than a thought-out international initiative. In speaking with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the New York Timesreported, Trump said he wanted “to address and find solutions” to Pakistan’s problems.

And what big problems they are.

Whether Trump understands exactly how dangerous the current tensions between Pakistan and India are, or if anything will come from the November 30 exchange between the two leaders, is anyone’s guess. But it’s more than the Obama administration has done over the past eight years, in spite of the outgoing president’s 2008 election promise to address the on-going crisis in Kashmir.

Right now that troubled land is the single most dangerous spot on the globe.

War, Famine, and Radiation

India and Pakistan have fought three wars over the disputed province in the past six decades and came within a hair’s breadth of a nuclear exchange in 1999. Both countries are on a crash program to produce nuclear weapons, and between them they have enough explosive power to not only kill more than 20 million of their own people, but also to devastate the world’s ozone layer and throw the Northern Hemisphere into a nuclear winter — with a catastrophic impact on agriculture worldwide.

According to studies done at Rutgers, the University of Colorado-Boulder, and the University of California-Los Angeles, if both countries detonated 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs, it would generate between 1 and 5 million tons of smoke. Within 10 days, that would drive temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere down to levels too cold for wheat production in much of Canada and Russia. The resulting 10 percent drop in rainfall — especially in Asian locales that rely monsoons — would exhaust worldwide food supplies, leading to the starvation of up to 100 million or more people.

Aside from the food crisis, a nuclear war in South Asia would destroy between 25 to 70 percent of the Northern Hemisphere’s ozone layer, resulting in a massive increase in dangerous ultraviolent radiation.

Cold Start, Hot War

Lest anyone think that the chances of such a war are slight, consider two recent developments.

One, a decision by Pakistan to deploy low-yield tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons and to give permission for local commanders to decide when to use them.

In an interview with the German newspaper  Deutsche Welle, Gregory Koblentz of the Council on Foreign Relations warned that if a “commander of a forward-deployed nuclear armed unit finds himself in a ‘use it or lose it’ situation and about to be overrun, he might decided to launch his weapons.”

Pakistan’s current defense minister, Muhammad Asif, told Geo TV, “If anyone steps on our soil and if anyone’s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those [nuclear] weapons for our defense.”

Every few years the Pentagon “war games” a clash between Pakistan and India over Kashmir. Every game ends in a nuclear war.

The second dangerous development is the “Cold Start” strategy by India that would send Indian troops across the border to a depth of 30 kilometers in the advent of a terrorist attack like the 1999 Kargill incident in Kashmir, the 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, or the 2008 attack on Mumbai that killed 166 people.

Since the Indian army is more than twice the size of Pakistan’s, there would be little that Pakistanis could do to stop such an invasion other than using battlefield nukes. India would then be faced with either accepting defeat or responding.

India doesn’t currently have any tactical nukes, only high yield strategic weapons — many aimed at China — whose primary value is to destroy cities. Hence a decision by a Pakistani commander to use a tactical warhead would almost surely lead to a strategic response by India, setting off a full-scale nuclear exchange and the nightmare that would follow in its wake.

A Regional Arms Race

With so much at stake, why is no one but a Twitter-addicted foreign policy apprentice saying anything? What happened to President Obama’s follow through to his 2008 statement that the tensions over Kashmir “won’t be easy” to solve, but that doing so “is important”?

A strategy of pulling India into an alliance against China was dreamed up during the administration of George W. Bush, but it was Obama’s “Asia Pivot” that signed and sealed the deal. With it went a quid pro quo: If India would abandon its traditional neutrality, the Americans would turn a blind eye to Kashmir.

As a sweetener, the U.S. agreed to bypass the global nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow India to buy uranium on the world market, something New Delhi had been banned from doing since it detonated a nuclear bomb in 1974 using fuel it had cribbed from U.S.-supplied nuclear reactors. In any case, because neither India nor Pakistan is a party to the treaty, both should be barred from buying uranium. In India’s case, the U.S. has waived that restriction.

The so-called 1-2-3 Agreement requires India to use any nuclear fuel it purchases in its civilian reactors, but frees it up to use its meager domestic supplies on its nuclear weapons program. India has since built two enormous nuclear production sites at Challakere and near Mysore, where, rumor has it, it is producing a hydrogen bomb. Both sites are off limits to international inspectors.

In 2008, when the Obama administration indicated it was interested in pursuing the 1-2-3 Agreement, then Pakistani Foreign minister Khurshid Kusuni warned that the deal would undermine the Non-Proliferation Treaty and lead to a nuclear arms race in Asia. That is exactly what has come to pass. The only countries currently adding to their nuclear arsenals are Pakistan, India, China, and North Korea.

While Pakistan is still frozen out of buying uranium on the world market, it has sufficient domestic supplies to fuel an accelerated program to raise its warhead production. Pakistan is estimated to have between 110 and 130 warheads already, and it’s projected to have developed 200 by 2020, surpassing the United Kingdom.

India has between 110 and 120 nuclear weapons. Both countries have short, medium, and long-range missiles, submarine ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, plus nuclear-capable aircraft that can target each other’s major urban areas.

A New Uprising in Kashmir

One problem in the current crisis is that both countries are essentially talking past one another.

Pakistan does have legitimate security concerns. It has fought and lost three wars with India over Kashmir since 1947, and it’s deeply paranoid about the size of the Indian army.

But India has been the victim of several major terrorist attacks that have Pakistan’s fingerprints all over them. The 1999 Kargill invasion lasted a month and killed hundreds of soldiers on both sides. Reportedly the Pakistanis were considering arming their missiles with nuclear warheads until the Clinton administration convinced them to stand down.++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+

Pakistan’s military has long denied that it has any control over terrorist organizations based in Pakistan, but virtually all intelligence agencies agree that, with the exception of the country’s home-grown Taliban, that is not the case. The Pakistani army certainly knew about a recent attack on an Indian army base in Kashmir that killed 19 soldiers.

In the past, India responded to such attacks with quiet counterattacks of its own, but this time around the right-wing nationalist government of Narendra Modi announced that the Indian military had crossed the border and killed more than 30 militants. It was the first time that India publicly acknowledged a cross-border assault.

Meanwhile the Indian press has whipped up a nationalist fervor that has seen sports events between the two countries cancelled and a ban on using Pakistani actors in Indian films. The Pakistani press has been no less jingoistic.

In the meantime, the situation in Kashmir has gone from bad to worse. Early in the summer Indian security forces killed Burhan Wani, a popular leader of the Kashmir independence movement. Since then the province has essentially been paralyzed, with schools closed and massive demonstrations. Thousands of residents have been arrested, close to 100 killed, and hundreds of demonstrators wounded and blinded by the widespread use of birdshot by Indian security forces.

Indian rule in Kashmir has been singularly brutal. Between 50,000 and 80,000 people have died over the past six decades, and thousands of others have been “disappeared” by security forces. While in the past the Pakistani army aided the infiltration of terrorist groups to attack the Indian army, this time around the uprising is homegrown. Kashmiris are simply tired of military rule and a law which gives Indian security forces essentially carte blanche to terrorize the population.

Called the Special Powers Act — modeled after a British provision to suppress of Catholics in Northern Ireland and mirroring practices widely used by the Israelis in the Occupied Territories — the law allows Indian authorities to arrest and imprison people without charge and gives immunity to Indian security forces.

Avenues to Peace

As complex as the situation in Kashmir is, there are avenues to resolve it. A good start would be to suspend the Special Powers Act and send the Indian Army back to the barracks.

The crisis in Kashmir began when the Hindu ruler of the mostly Muslim region opted to join India when the countries were divided in 1947. At the time, the residents were promised that a UN-sponsored referendum would allow residents to choose India, Pakistan, or independence. That referendum has never been held.

Certainly the current situation cannot continue. Kashmir has almost 12 million people, and no army or security force — even one as large as India’s — can maintain a permanent occupation if the residents don’t want it. Instead of resorting to force, India should ratchet down its security forces and negotiate with Kashmiris for an interim increase in local autonomy.

But in the long run, the Kashmiris should have their referendum — and both India and Pakistan will have to accept the results.

What the world cannot afford is for the current tensions to spiral down into a military confrontation that could easily get out of hand. The U.S., through its aid to Pakistan — $860 million this year — has some leverage, but it cannot play a role if its ultimate goal is an alliance to contain China, a close ally of Pakistan.

Neither country would survive a nuclear war, and neither country should be spending its money on an arms race. Almost 30 percent of Indians live below the poverty line, as do 22 percent of Pakistanis. The $51 billion Indian defense budget and the $7 billion Pakistan spends could be put to far better use.

*Foreign Policy In Focus columnist Conn Hallinan can be read at dispatchesfromtheedge.wordpress.com and middleempireseries.wordpress.com.

TOPICS:
Foreign PolicyIndiaKashmirMilitaryNuclearPakistanSouth AsiaUnited States

NUKES :THE NUCLEAR MISSION MUST STAY MANNED

SOURCE
http://thebulletin.org/nuclear-mission-must-stay-manned9768








                                                                  20YY
                       PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE                         ROBOTIC AGE






GOOGLE/CLICK THE URL TO OPEN pdf  FILE




PREPARING FOR ROBOTIC WAR

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_20YY_WorkBrimley.pdf






PART-1


http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_RoboticsOnTheBattlefield_Scharre.pdf





PART-2

http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_TheComingSwarm_Scharre.pdf







                      NUKES :THE NUCLEAR MISSION                     MUST STAY MANNED

Opinion

9 August 2016

    The nuclear mission must stay manned

                                                              Alexander Velez-Green

Alexander Velez-Green

Alexander Velez-Green is a research assistant with the Defense Strategies and Assessments Program and 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at the Center...
 

A lot of things can and should be automated

—but nuclear bombers are not one of them.


Unfortunately, it’s not clear that Moscow agrees. Reports surfaced in July that Russia has begun development of a hypersonic nuclear bomber that can deliver nuclear strikes from outer space. Unnamed officials quoted in the semi-official Russian news organ Pravda say that the bomber will have an unmanned variant. Their statement has not been confirmed, but the idea that Russia would pursue an unmanned nuclear bomber is not new. The commander of Russia’s long-range aviation fleet, Lt. Gen. Anatoly Zhikharev, stated in 2012 that Russia was considering developing a “pilotless” sixth-generation nuclear bomber.


While it’s too soon to know for sure whether or not the new Russian bomber will be unmanned, it’s apparent that Russian military officials have been considering that option for some time. And Russian policymakers have made no public promises that the nuclear mission would only be carried out by a manned version of the bomber.


This development is deeply concerning. Deploying a highly autonomous unmanned nuclear bomber would significantly raise the risk of inadvertent or uncontrolled nuclear war. As the world prepares for war in the robotic age, the United States must take steps to ensure that the nuclear mission remains manned.


An unmanned nuclear bomber?

 The announcement from July of this year leaves much room for skepticism. One thing that should not be taken lightly, however, is the possibility that future Russian nuclear bombers may come with unmanned variants. The recent statement that Russia’s latest bomber will be capable of being unmanned has not been confirmed, but it would align strongly with influential Russian military strategists’ emphasis in recent years on the need for the Russian military to embrace unmanned and autonomous military systems in order to win future wars.


There are plenty of reasons why Russian military thinkers might consider de-manning their nuclear bomber. Most boil down to one thing: Russian policymakers think that having an unmanned nuclear bomber might one day be useful, if not necessary, to protect their country. Looking at the future air and space operating environments, they foresee the possibility that rapidly-improving enemy air and space defenses will make it impossible for manned aircraft—or small numbers of unmanned aircraft, for that matter—to get in range of their targets. To launch nuclear strikes from air or space, then, they might need to use large swarms of robotic systems capable of autonomously navigating to the target; evading or defeating any US and NATO countermeasures they encounter on the way; and releasing their nuclear payloads against previously designated targets. Given Moscow’s history of automating nuclear strike platforms, this calculus has clear precedent.



The problem with autonomy.

 Assigning the nuclear mission to highly autonomous, unmanned bombers would create an unprecedented risk of inadvertent or uncontrolled nuclear war between the United States and Russia. No matter their sophistication, autonomous systems can behave unexpectedly for a wide variety of reasons, including system malfunction; unanticipated interaction with the air, space, or cyber environments; or hacking by the enemy.


This creates two types of vulnerabilities when it comes to a nuclear bomber. The first is located early in the kill chain—the series of steps taken to find and ultimately destroy the enemy—at the point where the unmanned system is ordered to begin a nuclear strike mission. Due to any of these unexpected inputs, the unmanned bomber could initiate a nuclear strike mission completely against the will of its earthbound operators.


The second vulnerability is located near the end of the kill chain, where the bomber would launch its ordnance at pre designated targets. A frightening number of unforeseen inputs could cause the unmanned system’s original target coordinates to be scrambled or replaced. This could lead it to launch nuclear weapons at targets that were previously off-limits, like major cities.


Having a pilot onboard would create a “human circuit breaker” that could intercede to manually halt operations if something went awry, such as if orders were received to launch a nuclear strike during peacetime, or to hit civilian centers early on in a limited nuclear war. Soviet colonel  Stanislav Petrov  played this role in 1983 when the sun’s reflection off of the tops of clouds caused an automated early warning system to falsely report that the United States had launched a nuclear attack on Russia. Without a pilot, the bomber would be quite vulnerable to such manipulation.

It may be possible to design automated fail-safes for these systems. But automated fail-safes would be vulnerable to the same types of failures due to technical malfunction, environmental triggers, or hacking. And, depending on when and how the aircraft’s fail-safe engaged—for instance, if it kicked in after the bomber had already begun its final approach on to a target—it may be too late to prevent the defender from initiating its own retaliation sequence.


The potential ramifications of such unexpected behavior would be quite severe indeed. An unauthorized nuclear first-strike by an unmanned bomber would almost certainly trigger retaliation, rapidly forcing the United States and Russia down a path towards nuclear war. A similar effect would occur if a limited nuclear war were ongoing and an unmanned system struck a site beyond the designated set of targets, leading to unintentional escalation. And the potential for a third party to hijack an unmanned bomber in order to trigger nuclear war between the United States and Russia is increasingly real, particularly as advanced cyber capabilities become available to a greater number of state and non-state actors.


Keep the nuclear mission manned.

 Russian readers might receive this criticism with indignation and point out that the United States hasn’t firmly rejected the possibility of de-manning the nuclear mission either—and they’d be right. Indeed, the US Air Force has offered only ambiguous language on this point, suggesting that it is keeping its options open to de-man nuclear strike assets in the future. This is particularly concerning, given reports that the US Air Force is considering designing an unmanned variant of its own nuclear bomber—the Long-Range Strike Bomber—in the coming years.


But the United States is not immune to the same vulnerabilities that would imperil a Russian unmanned nuclear bomber. For example, it remains unknown why the US RQ-170 stealth drone went down in Iran in 2011. But there have been claims that it was brought down by enemy hacking —something that could not have happened with a pilot onboard. What if the RQ-170 had been a US unmanned nuclear bomber on patrol?


The truth is that no state is immune to the vulnerabilities inherent to autonomous systems—vulnerabilities that would dramatically undermine the reliability of the bomber leg of the nuclear triad. Now is the time to avoid needless catastrophe and set the precedent that the nuclear mission must remain manned during the robotic age.


The United States should clearly and unequivocally reject the possibility of using unmanned nuclear strike assets. It should state forcefully that no potential operational benefits afforded by an unmanned nuclear bomber could outweigh the potential costs of a nuclear conflict driven by the unexpected behavior of a highly autonomous unmanned system. The Defense Department should focus instead on developing ways to penetrate enemy air defenses using manned nuclear bombers, perhaps escorted by highly autonomous, unmanned wingmen.


Washington should then engage Moscow directly on these points. Its objective should be to secure Russia’s entry into an international agreement banning the automation of nuclear strike assets. The agreement should be premised on a mutual understanding of the risks of automating the nuclear mission and confidence-building measures assuring each state of the other’s continued adherence to the agreement.


And the United States should not stop there. With Russia and other partners’ support, the United States should lead arms control negotiations with China, India, Pakistan, and other nuclear-armed states to craft an international agreement prohibiting the de-manning of the nuclear mission. These talks will undoubtedly face significant hurdles, not the least when it comes to defining “autonomy.” But with the automation of nuclear strike assets just over the technical horizon, these discussions must begin now. If the world’s nuclear-armed states wait for real-world events to demonstrate the folly of integrating greater autonomy into their nuclear strike assets, it may be too late.


























 

NUKES : Critical Seoul NSG Meet Will Have Reverberations For India’s International Orientation

SOURCE:
http://blogs.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/critical-seoul-nsg-meet-in-2-days-will-have-reverberations-for-indias-international-orientation/

             NUKES : Critical Seoul NSG Meet
        in 2 days Will Have Reverberations
                                For
         India’s International Orientation
                                BY
 
    Dhruva Jaishankar in TOI Edit Page


JUNE 21, 2015


A decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on June 23-24 – as to whether to include India as a member – may be overshadowed in international media by other expected developments. These include the results of Britain’s referendum on staying in the European Union, an unprecedented US presidential election campaign, and the imminent ruling by an international court of arbitration in The Hague between China and the Philippines on the South China Sea.

But the NSG meeting is no less important, for the potential implications it could have for relations between India and China. A decision, particularly if it were not to go in India’s favour, would have reverberations for Asian security, climate change and global governance.

NSG is a 48-country cartel initially formed in 1974 after India’s first nuclear test, to control the flow of nuclear technology and supplies. A consensus decision at its next plenary meeting in Seoul, South Korea, to include India as a member would help India’s integration into the global nuclear order, completing its transition from an alleged rule-breaker to a formal rule-maker. India’s ability to export civilian nuclear materials and technology could also help lower the costs of nuclear energy and could boost the sector in energy-starved India.

By extension, it would facilitate India’s ability to deliver upon its commitment, made before the 2015 Paris climate summit, to source 40% of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. For the past several years India has been working to align its nuclear and dual-use export controls with NSG guidelines, to make a strong case for membership.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has in recent months become personally invested in the matter, visiting Mexico and Switzerland to secure those countries’ support and personally reaching out to leaders of other countries who have expressed hesitation. Support for India’s NSG membership has consequently become a litmus test of relations with India.


 Resistance to India’s inclusion has emanated from some predictable sources. Several smaller countries in Europe and elsewhere had earlier expressed concerns, echoed by non-proliferation groups in the US and elsewhere who believe that India’s entry somehow undermines the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and encourages Pakistan’s rapidly-growing nuclear arsenal. These are hollow arguments. NSG and NPT are distinct arrangements, while Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal is increasingly an insurance against US intervention.


However, the primary resistance to India’s inclusion comes from China. Beijing’s main argument is that India is a non-signatory of NPT, but it conveniently overlooks the fact that France was admitted as an NSG member before it joined NPT. India believes NPT is fundamentally unfair, permanently legitimising the nuclear weapons of certain countries, including China, while denying India for no reason other than its belated development of nuclear weapons.

China’s resistance to India’s membership is ultimately political, intended to constrain India’s rise as a global power. India is often described as a swing power in the evolving international system.

 While deepening its strategic partnership with the US as a fellow democracy and status quo power, New Delhi has found common cause with Beijing in many areas. China is India’s largest trade partner in goods, and is an increasingly important source of investment. India and China also cooperate in various international forums, including on matters of national sovereignty and on increasing representation for the emerging markets in global governance.

China’s decision to accept or deny India’s membership in the NSG is therefore crucial. Its marshalling resistance in the face of overwhelming support for India would severely set back its relations with India, with possible consequences for bilateral goodwill, cooperation on climate change and multilateral groupings such as Brics.

China’s actions would stand in stark contrast to the US, which has actively lobbied for India’s inclusion in NSG. This would have reverberations for India’s international orientation. The future of Asian geopolitics could well be determined later this year in The Hague. But just as easily, it could be shaped by a decision made at Seoul in a couple of days.

















 

INDO-PAK NUKES : Pakistan’s Army is Building an Arsenal of "tiny" Nuclear Weapons

SOURCE:
http://atimes.com/2015/12/pakistans-army-is-building-an-arsenal-of-tiny-nuclear-weapons-and-its-going-to-backfire/

http://qz.com/579334/pakistans-army-is-building-an-arsenal-of-tiny-nuclear-weapons-and-its-going-to-backfire/











TROUBLE BREWING

Pakistan’s Army is Building an Arsenal of "tiny" Nuclear Weapons—and it’s going to backfire

                            Written by

                                                 C. Christine Fair

Modern States

December 21, 2015

Pakistani soldiers test anti-aircraft weaponry    

Obsession

Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal and, within the next five to ten years, it is likely to double that of India, and exceed those of France, the United Kingdom, and China. Only the arsenals of the United States and Russia will be larger.

 

In recent years, Pakistan has boasted of developing “tactical nuclear weapons” to protect itself against potential offensive actions by India. In fact, Pakistan is the only country currently boasting of making increasingly tiny nuclear weapons (link in Urdu).

 

 

Pakistanis overwhelmingly support their army and its various misadventures. And the pursuit of tactical weapons is no exception. However, there is every reason why Pakistanis should be resisting—not welcoming—this development. The most readily identifiable reason is that, in the event of conflict between the two South Asian countries, this kind of weaponization will likely result in tens of thousands of dead Pakistanis, rather than Indians. And things will only go downhill from there

Why would Pakistan want “the world’s smallest nuclear weapons”?

In late 1999, Pakistan’s general Pervez Musharraf (who took power of Pakistan through a military coup in Oct. 1999 and remained in power until 2008), along with a tight cabal of fellow military officials began a limited incursion into the Kargil-Dras area of Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. While planning for this began in the fall of 1998, by the time Pakistani troops were discovered there in May of 1999 Pakistani forces had taken territory that was several miles into India-administered Kashmir.

 

 

Because the Pakistanis had the tactical advantage of occupying the ridge line, India took heavy losses in recovering the area from the invaders. The so-called Kargil War was the first conventional conflict between India and Pakistan since the two conducted nuclear tests in May 1998. International observers were wary that the conflict would escalate either in territory or aims, with the potential for nuclear exchange.

 

 

Fearing such escalation, then Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif sought support from China and the United States. Both were adamant that Pakistan respect the line of control, which separated the portions of Jammu-Kashmir administered by India and Pakistan.

 

 

Under international pressure and branded an irresponsible state, Pakistan withdrew its forces from Kashmir. It initially claimed that the intruders were mujahedeen—but this was later found to be pure fiction. While Pakistan was isolated internationally, the international community widely applauded India’s restraint. The Kargil War provided the United States with the opportunity to reorient its relations away from Pakistan towards India, while at the same time, demonstrated to India that the United States would not reflexively side with Pakistan.

 

 

In retrospect, the Kargil war catalyzed the deepening security cooperation between the United States and India. It also galvanized a serious rethink in India about its domestic security apparatus, intelligence agencies’ capabilities, and overall military doctrine.

 

 

Crucially, India learned from this conflict that limited war is indeed possible under the nuclear umbrella. In Oct. 2000, air commodore Jasjit Singh, who retired as the director of operations of India’s air force and headed India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses until 2001, laid out the lineaments of an India’s limited war doctrine. However, no apparent effort was made to make this a viable military concept immediately and India persisted with its defensive posture. In late Dec. 2001, Pakistani terrorists from the Pakistan-backed military group Jaish-e-Mohammad attacked India’s parliament in New Delhi.

 

 

In response, India’s government began the largest military mobilization since the 1971 war, which resulted in the liberation of Bangladesh, then East Pakistan. Just as the crisis was subsiding, another group of Pakistani terrorists, Lashkar-e-Taiba, attacked the wives and children of Indian military personnel in Kaluchak, Kashmir. India again seemed poised to take military action but ultimately backed down. The crisis was officially defused after India held elections in Kashmir later that fall. Pakistan concluded that its nuclear arsenal had successfully deterred India from attacking.

 

As Walter Ladwig has written, analysts identified several problems with India’s posture during that crisis. First, the Indian army took a long time to mobilize which gave Pakistan time to internationalize the conflict and to bring international pressure to bare upon India. Second, the mobilization of India’s strike corps had no element of surprise. Even Pakistan’s modest surveillance capabilities could easily detect their movements, and given their “lumbering composition,” could quickly discern their destination. Third, according to Ladwig, India’s holding corps’ were forward deployed to the border but lacked offensive power and could only conduct limited offensive tasks.

 

In response to these collective inadequacies, and the prospects of enduring threats from Pakistan, the Indian defense community began formalizing what came to be known as “Cold Start.” Ladwig, who wrote the first comprehensive account, claims that the doctrine aimed to pivot India away from its traditional defensive posture, and towards a more offensive one. It involved developing eight division-sized “integrated battle groups” that combined infantry, artillery, and armor which would be prepared to launch into Pakistani territory on short notice along several axes of advance.

 

These groups would also be closely integrated with support from the navy and air force. With this force posture, India could quickly mobilize these battle groups and seize limited Pakistani territory before the international community could raise objections.

 

India could then use this seized territory to force Pakistan into accepting the status quo in Kashmir. While Indians insist that this doctrine never existed, other analysts discount Indian demurrals and note slow—but steady—progress in developing these offensive capabilities. Irrespective of India’s protestations, Pakistanis take “Cold Start” to be a matter of Quranic fact.

 

Worried that its primary tools of using terrorism fortified by the specter of nuclear war, and fearing that India would be able to force acquiescence, Pakistan concluded that it could vitiate “Cold Start” by developing tactical nuclear weapons. As Pakistan’s former ambassador the United States and current ambassador to the United Nations, Maleeha Lodhi, explained, the basis of Pakistan’s fascination with tactical nuclear weapons is “to counterbalance India’s move to bring conventional military offensives to a tactical level.’’

 

Pakistani military and civilians often boast of their fast growing arsenal of the world’s smallest nuclear weapons and routinely update the world on the progress of the short-range missile, the Nasr, that would deliver this ever-shrinking payload.

 

Why should ordinary Pakistanis care?

While Pakistanis overwhelmingly applaud their army’s continued efforts to harass India in pursuit of Kashmir—a territory that Pakistan was never entitled to but fought three wars to acquire by force—there are numerous reasons why Pakistanis should be more sanguine, or even alarmed by Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons.

 

The first reality that should discomfit ordinary Pakistanis is that there is really no such thing as a “tactical nuclear weapon.” Even the smallest so-called tactical nuclear weapon will have strategic consequences. (Simply calling them “battlefield nuclear weapons” does not obviate this serious problem.) If Pakistan should use such weapons on India, there is virtually no chance that India will be left responding alone. The international community will most certainly rally around India. The response to Pakistan breaking a nuclear taboo that formed after the Americans used atomic bombs on Japan will most certainly be swift and devastating.

 

Second, as Shashank Joshi, a war studies researcher at the University of Oxford, has argued, these weapons do not have the military benefits that Pakistan’s military boasts, yet they exacerbate the enormous command and control challenges, including the possibility that nefarious elements may pilfer them once they are forward deployed. For one thing, tactical nuclear weapons do not have significant battlefield effects on enemy targets. For another, it is not evident that these weapons are in fact capable of deterring an Indian incursion into Pakistan.

 

Third, while Naeem Salik, a former director for arms control at Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Directorate, has said that Pakistan has shifted away from merely doctrinal thinking towards “actual nuclear war fighting,” such thinking is hardly viable for the simple reason of faulty math.

 

Even if, for the sake of argument, one assumes that Pakistan deploys its one hundred odd weapons of 15 to 30 kilotons at India’s major cities, it is unlikely that Pakistan would be able to deploy all of these weapons to conduct a “splendid first strike,” by which Indian capabilities are completely destroyed.

 

Moreover, it takes considerably fewer weapons of similar magnitude to utterly destroy Pakistan. Pakistan has thoughtfully concentrated all but three corps in central the Punjab region, which is also its most populous province and the country’s industrial and agricultural center. In short, Pakistan will cease to be a viable political entity while India, though grievously hurt, will survive as a state. Even if Pakistan obtains a functioning triad and retains launch capabilities from submarines, they will be launched in defense of a state that, simply put, no longer exists.

 

There is a fourth problem that should disquiet Pakistanis perhaps even more than the triggering of the destruction of their country through the deliberate or inadvertent use of their micro-weapons—these tactical nuclear weapons are intended to be used first against Indian troops on Pakistani soil. According to a conference report by the Naval Post School, which hosted Pakistan’s military and diplomatic officials, one Pakistani luminary opined that the “Nasr creates a balancing dynamic that frustrates and makes futile the power-maximizing strategy of India.”

 

He envisages the Nasr’s shells being used to carry atomic explosives that would annihilate advancing Indian armored thrusts in the southern deserts and blunt Indian advances toward major Pakistani cities, such as Lahore. Retired military general S. F. S. Lodhi, in the April 1999 issue of the Pakistan Defence Journal, laid out four stages of escalation in Pakistan’s use of tactical nuclear weapons which aligns with this view as well.

 

The consequences of Pakistan nuking itself to keep the Indians out should disturb Pakistanis. According to calculations by Jaganath Sankaran, Pakistan would have to use a 30-kiloton weapon on its own soil, as this is the minimum required to render ineffective fifty percent of an armored unit.

 

Using Lahore as an example, a 30-kiloton weapon used on the outskirts of the city could kill over 52,000 persons. As Indian troops move closer to Lahore and as the population increases, such a weapon could kill nearly 380,000. Sankaran notes, as an aside, that this would “genuinely destroy a larger battalion or brigade.” Consequently, many more Pakistanis would be likely to die than these horrendous figures suggest.

 

All of sudden, Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons don’t look so fun for any Pakistani who thinks through the math.

 

Fifth, Pakistanis should be derisive of this new weapon in the national arsenal because it cannot do what the army promises: protect Pakistan from an Indian offensive. Would any Indian military planner take seriously Pakistan’s threat to use nuclear weapons on its own soil when the casualties are so high? Pakistan may have been willing to eat grass to get its nuclear weapons, but is it willing destroy its own center of gravity to maintain its ability to harass India with terrorism over territory to which it never had any legal claim? If the Indians do not take this threat seriously, how is it a deterrent against them? What additional deterrent capability do these weapons afford Pakistan that its strategic assets do not that compensates for the enormous risks they convey?

 

Finally, if India took Pakistan’s threats seriously, it does not have to invade Pakistan to coerce the country’s leaders to detonate one of these weapons on its own soil. Presumably simply looking adequately likely to cross the international border and threaten a major Punjabi city could provoke a “demonstration detonation.”

 

I am not encouraging a nuclear Armageddon upon Pakistan; rather expositing the limited utility that these weapons confer upon Pakistan.

 

Even if Pakistan fully inducts these weapons in its arsenal, it still has an army that can’t win a conventional war against India and nuclear weapons it cannot use. This leaves only an industrial farm of terrorists as the only efficacious tool at its disposal. And given the logic of the above scenario, India and the international community should consider seriously calling Pakistan’s bluff. The only logical Pakistani response to a limited offensive incursion is to accept the fait accompli and acquiesce.
So far, the West has seen Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a proliferation threat rather than a security threat. The implications of this has largely been appeasement. The United States, worried that Pakistan’s weapons may fall into the hands of non-state actors or that Pakistan will once again reopen its nuclear weapons bazaar to aspirant nuclear powers, perpetually argues for engaging Pakistan diplomatically, militarily, politically, and financially. In essence, Pakistan has effectively blackmailed the United States and the international community for an array of assistance exploiting the collective fears of what may happen should Pakistan collapse.

 

In recent months, some US White House officials have even argued for a potential nuclear deal to reward Pakistan for making concessions in fissile material production, limiting the development and deployment of its nuclear weapons among other activates to address Washington’s proliferation concerns. Unfortunately, Washington has yet to seriously formulate punishments rather than allurements to achieve these ends, even though Pakistan has shown no interest in making such concessions.

 

There are reasons why the United States and the international community should begin to see Pakistan’s nuclear weapons as a direct security threat. For one thing, these nuclear weapons have always been intended to allow Pakistan to harass India through the use of militant proxies. Consequently, Pakistan has become an epicenter of Islamist terrorism.

 

Had Pakistan not had these nuclear capabilities, India could have sorted out Pakistan some time ago. Moreover, the critical time period for Pakistan’s nuclear program was in the late 1970s, when Pakistan was on the threshold of obtaining a crude weapon. (We now know that Pakistan had a crude nuclear weapon by 1984 if not somewhat earlier.) The United States even sanctioned Pakistan in 1979 for advances in its program.

 

The United States relented in its nonproliferation policy with respect to Pakistan after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Reagan, after getting sanctions waived in 1982, began supporting the so-called mujahedeen produced by Pakistan for use in Afghanistan. (Pakistan actually began its own jihad policy in 1974 on its dime without US assistance.)

 

Saudi Arabia matched America’s contributions. While al-Qaeda is not truly the direct descendent of the Afghan mujahedeen, there can be little doubt that the structures built to wage this jihad gave birth to the group. Had the United States remained focused on nuclear weapons in Pakistan, and used a different strategy in Afghanistan, a wholly different future could have been realized.

 

As tensions between the United States and Pakistan deepen, and as Pakistan’s arsenal expands and permits it to target US assets in South, Central, and Southwest Asia, the United States should begin considering Pakistan’s proliferation of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles as a direct threat to its security, rather than merely a proliferation problem to be managed