ORBAT : RUSSIAN REGULAR GROUND FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE

 Source:  

(  ) https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-regular-ground-forces-order-battle-russian-military-10 

 (   )     October 12, 2023 Russian Orbat_Final.pdf :   https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/October%2012%2C%202023%20Russian%20Orbat_Final.pdf                                    

(    )   RUSSIAN NEW GENERATION WARFARE HANDBOOK:  https://info.publicintelligence.net/AWG-RussianNewWarfareHandbook.pdf

ORBAT 

RUSSIAN REGULAR GROUND FORCES 

ORDER OF BATTLE RUSSIAN MILITARY 101 

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Russian Regular Ground Forces Order of Battle: Russian Military 101

                            Mason Clark and Karolina Hird

October 12, 2023

Click here to download the full report.

Click here to explore the Russian military units discussed in this report via an accompanying interactive map.

This report contains two sections: an introductory essay on the regular Russian ground forces; and a fully sourced order of battle (ORBAT) of Russia’s regular ground forces down to the brigade and regiment echelon (with select independent battalions), including the army, ground forces controlled by the the navy, Airborne (VDV) units, and GRU Spetsnaz formations.

The following essay is intended as an introduction to the regular Russian ground forces for security studies professionals, policymakers, and journalists who are not necessarily Russia specialists. This report covers the federal-level structure of Russia’s armed services and General Staff; Russia’s personnel system; general characteristics of Russian ground capabilities; Russian organizational structure from the Military District to the brigade/regiment level; and a brief discussion of the Battalion Tactical Group (BTG). This report draws on the sources in the accompanying annotated bibliography and the authors’ study of the Russian armed forces, supplemented where necessary with footnotes exploring exceptions and adding further context.

This order of battle of the Russian regular ground forces is ISW’s assessment of the on-paper structure of the regular Russian ground forces as of January 2023. It covers the Army, ground forces of the Navy, VDV, and GRU Spetsnaz down to the regiment and brigade level. It does not cover the Aerospace (VKS) forces (including air and air defense armies); Navy surface warfare and submarine assets; or the strategic rocket forces. We have excluded the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (the armed forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] and Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR], informally run by the Southern Military District [SMD] since 2014 and formally acknowledged as such in December 2022) and the 3rd Army Corps (a new formation of volunteer units created under the Western Military District [WMD] in June 2022) from this regular forces ORBAT. While these formations are part of the Russian Army on paper, we assess that they are closer in organization and purpose to irregular formations such as PMCs, Rosgvardia, BARS Combat Reserve units, and other forces. We will assess the structure and capabilities of these three Corps in our forthcoming irregular Russian ground forces ORBAT and the capstone forecasting report in this series.

This ORBAT is intended to provide an updated open source baseline of the Russian ground forces and is intentionally backdated to January 2023. Existing open source ORBATs of the Russian ground forces are missing several units, do not provide individual sourcing for each unit, and largely leverage the now defunct mikavkaz.com. This report does not address Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu's intended force changes announced in January 2023, including the reintroduction of the Leningrad and Moscow Military Districts and the intended formation of 12 new maneuver divisions. It also does not attempt to assess the actual strength of highly degraded Russian units. While the Russian military is in the process of establishing these new formations and in some cases already deploying them to Ukraine, we elected to provide a fully sourced baseline to  support future ISW reports and as an open source baseline for practitioners other researchers.

All units are listed with their formal title, в/ч number (“voyskovaya chast” or “military unit,” a unique five-digit numerical code assigned to each administrative entity in the Russian armed forces), and permanent basing location, when confirmable. Units that we assess likely exist but whose existence we cannot confirm are listed in [brackets]. The authors developed this ORBAT by using strictly open sources to confirm the existence and permanent basing locations of Russian regular ground forces units. The authors focused on all maneuver and combat support units at the regiment and brigade level and above, with the exception of a few significant battalion-level units. The majority of units are multi-sourced with data identifying their name and basing location. The authors endeavored to include two reliable sources since 2021 per listed unit, but this standard was not tenable for many combat support elements and units from less well-resourced military districts, in which case the sourcing standard was amended to allow for sourcing since 2013. Leveraged sources include news articles from both local and state outlets; government press releases; blogs and commentary pages run by military enthusiasts or veterans of given units; social media outlets (such as Odnoklassniki [OK] and VKontaktke [VK]); address registration pages; local government bulletins; and various message boards. A small number of units, primarily combat support elements, only include one source due to limited data meeting these standards confirming their basing. All sources used for each individual unit are available in the endnotes of the text ORBAT later in this report.

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THE ORDER OF BATTLE OF HAMAS’ IZZ AL DIN AL QASSEM BRIGADES, PART 1: NORTH AND CENTRAL GAZA

 SOURCE:

(   ) THE ORDER OF BATTLE OF HAMAS’ IZZ AL DIN AL QASSEM BRIGADES, PART 1: NORTH AND CENTRAL GAZA;      https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/order-battle-hamas%E2%80%99-izz-al-din-al-qassem-brigades-part-1-north-and-central-gaza

THE ORDER OF BATTLE OF HAMAS’ IZZ AL DIN AL                                          QASSEM BRIGADES, 

        PART 1: NORTH AND CENTRAL GAZA 

The Order of Battle of Hamas’ Izz al Din al Qassem Brigades, Part 1: North and Central Gaza

Author: Brian Carter, Analyst, Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute

Contributor: Daniel Mealie, Geospatial Researcher, Institute for the Study of War

December 8, 2023

The al Qassem Brigades are the military component of Hamas and the means by which Hamas seeks to destroy the Israeli state and form an Islamic state in Palestine. Hamas is a highly organized group that views terrorism and military action as the only method through which it can destroy the Israeli state.[1] The al Qassem Brigades are commanded by Mohammad Deif and are subordinated to the overall Hamas political leadership responsible to Ismail Haniyeh.[2] They coordinate closely with the Hamas political leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar.[3] Hamas defines itself as a "Palestinian national liberation and resistance movement” intent on establishing an Islamic Palestinian state that stretches “from the River Jordan...to the Mediterranean and from Ras al Naqurah...to Umm al Rashrash.”[4] It is also a member of Iran’s ”Axis of Resistance,” the regional coalition of states and groups that Tehran has built as part of its effort to destroy Israel and expel the United States from the Middle East.[5] Hamas states that "armed resistance” is a "strategic choice” to protect the Palestinian people and rejects "any attempt to undermine [Hamas’] resistance.”[6] Hamas is fighting alongside other Palestinian resistance groups such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, with which it engages in operational and tactical coordination.[7]

Hamas sees itself in a multi-generational fight against Israel and some other Palestinian groups that will consist of multiple distinct phases.[8] Hamas sought to undermine secular Palestinian groups in the 1980s and 1990s to Islamicize the Palestinian people as part of the Hamas effort to form an Islamic state[.9] Hamas then opposed the Oslo Peace Process to prevent Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the international community from blocking the hypothetical pathway to an Islamic Palestinian state covering the entirety of historic Palestine.[10] Hamas sees control of “some parts” of Palestine as an interim goal prior to the establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state.[11] 

The al Qassem Brigades state that they will “tolerate” only a temporary truce and that a permanent truce or recognition of the Israeli state is forbidden.[12]

Hamas launched the October 7 attacks in this larger context to derail Arab-Israeli normalization efforts, to destabilize Israel, and eventually to destroy it.[13] Israel began a ground operation into the Gaza Strip on October 27 with the stated aim of destroying Hamas’ governing and military capabilities.[14] Israeli ground forces first partially cleared the northern Gaza Strip before moving south after an seven-day cessation of fighting that ended on December 2 and 3.[15]

The United States is reportedly encouraging Israel to move from Israel’s current “high intensity” military operations to an approach centered on targeted killings to remove key Hamas leaders from the battlefield.[16] This strategy will reportedly “resemble...narrow” US campaigns to target terrorist leaders in Iraq and Afghanistan.[17] This US strategy was not successful in destroying terrorist organizations in either country. ISIS and al Qaeda retained the ability to reconstitute themselves multiple times in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.[18] Targeted killings can degrade a terrorist organization, but cannot destroy one, particularly one as large, established, and well-organized as Hamas.

The stated Israeli objective is the destruction of Hamas’ governing and military capabilities.[19] ISIS reconstituted itself from the remnants of al Qaeda in Iraq after the US withdrawal in 2011, building an army of its own that shattered two Iraqi Army divisions and captured Iraq’s second largest city barely three years later.[20] The commander of US Central Command said in March 2023—less than two years after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan—that the Islamic State’s affiliate in Afghanistan was “six months” from being able to conduct a major attack on short notice.[21] This strategy of leadership decapitation can degrade terrorist groups to a point for as long as the targeted strikes continue but has shown itself ineffective in destroying well-organized, resilient military organizations. Such a strategy is therefore incompatible with the stated Israeli objectives vis-a-vis Hamas, and its adoption would require Israel to reduce its war aims substantially.

Hamas is a terrorist organization that uses formal military structures, not a clandestine organization operating networked, decentralized cells. Hamas’ leaders structured the al Qassem Brigades to survive Israeli military action by building a resilient military organization with doctrinally correct unit echelons and command hierarchies to facilitate recovery in the face of the loss of leaders or the destruction of elements of units.[22] The al Qassem Brigades organize themselves into echelons from the squad all the way to the brigade level just as conventional militaries do.[23] Militaries design their command structures to ensure continuity of command during combat as units take casualties and leaders die. Commanders prepare their subordinates throughout the chain of command to absorb command duties in the event that a commander is killed or incapacitated. Targeted killings alone will thus not permanently degrade or destroy Hamas. Hamas very likely retains a deep bench of experienced military commanders, most of whom will be prepared to rebuild the organization and train new tactical-level leaders. The commander of Hamas’ North Brigade, for example, held his position for 18 years prior to his death on November 26.[24] Hamas will almost certainly replace him with another capable senior commander as soon as the situation allows if it has not already done so. Hamas has replaced at least one battalion commander killed by the IDF during the current operations within about two weeks.

This report presents an initial order of battle (ORBAT) of the al Qassem Brigades at the brigade and the battalion level. The lack of adequate reporting on Hamas’ units at the company level and below precludes a more detailed presentation of those echelons. This ORBAT presents the formal structure of the al Qassem Brigades during the Israeli ground operation in Israel. The actual structure of the al Qassem Brigades may change as the ground operation progresses and Israeli forces destroy Hamas units or render them combat ineffective. This report presents three of Hamas’ five geographic brigades: the North Brigade, the Gaza Brigade, and the Central Brigade. CTP-ISW will publish the ORBATs of the other two Hamas territorial brigades at a later date.

This report presents CTP-ISW's assessment of the approximate estimated combat effectiveness of Hamas’ military forces based on Israeli military reporting and CTP-ISW's assessments of the Israeli ground operation into the Gaza Strip that began on October 27, 2023.[25] The report identifies the commanders of the brigades and battalions where feasible, noting which are reportedly still alive and which have reportedly been killed.

CTP-ISW presents the Hamas’ battalions using the names that Hamas itself or Palestinian sources use. Israel describes these forces using different names.[26] Hamas and Palestinian sources name these units for geographic locations and important Hamas “martyrs,” including Imad Aql, a mentor of Mohammed Deif, the current commander of Hamas’ military wing.[27] Hamas supporters and other Palestinian sources sometimes use these names interchangeably, referring to one battalion by several different names.[28]

This report draws on open-source information from Hamas and its supporters, Palestinian journalists and activists, Western media, and the Israel Defense Forces. Where possible, this report correlates reports and statements by the IDF and Hamas to confirm the existence of Hamas units. The sourcing for commanders, however, relies heavily on the IDF as Hamas has not regularly reported out its casualties during the ongoing Israeli ground operation. Hamas has notably reported the deaths of several brigade commanders, however, including both the North and Central Brigade commanders. When possible and appropriate the ORBAT gives context to Israeli reports of Hamas casualties by providing Hamas denials and counterclaims. CTP-ISW is generally unable to adjudicate competing claims.

The maps below display the notional locations of battalion areas of responsibility in Hamas’ military wing, the al Qassem Brigades. Each battalion is depicted on the major settlement in the battalion’s area of responsibility or on the location for which the battalion is named.

The maps also show CTP-ISW's assessment of the relative combat capability of Hamas battalions and brigades. CTP-ISW categorizes Hamas units into two groups: combat effective and degraded. CTP-ISW does not currently assess that any Hamas battalion or brigade has yet been rendered combat ineffective as of the date of publication of this report. Combat effectiveness measures a unit’s ability to perform its mission; a unit is combat ineffective when it is no longer able to complete its mission.[29] CTP-ISW defines “degrade” as a temporary effect whereby a unit’s losses seriously impede its ability to continue executing assigned missions while the unit remains able to operate.

CTP-ISW assesses that at least seven of 19 Hamas battalions in the three brigades covered by this report are degraded and at least six are currently under intense IDF pressure. Battalions of one or both of the two Hamas brigades in southern Gaza are also under intense IDF pressure. CTP-ISW will expand this ORBAT to include those units in coming days.

The Islamic Resistance Movement—Hamas

Hamas political leader: Ismail Haniyeh (currently located in Qatar)[30]

Hamas political leader in the Gaza Strip: Yahya Sinwar (reportedly in Gaza)[31]

Yahya Sinwar is a Hamas hardliner who served previously as a liaison between the group’s political and military wings prior to assuming leadership of Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 2017.[32] Sinwar was personally close to Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin.[33] Sinwar was the leader of Hamas’ internal security apparatus, which Hamas used to violently suppress other Palestinian political groups during the 1990s.[34] Israel imprisoned Sinwar in 1988 for murdering two Israeli soldiers.[35] Israel released Sinwar in an exchange in 2011.[36] Sinwar opposed the prisoner exchange that freed him and was one of the masterminds of the October 7 attacks, alongside Mohammed Deif.[37]

The Izz al Din al Qassem Brigades

Commander: Mohammed Deif[38]

Deputy Commander: Marwan Issa[39]

North Brigade—North Gaza Governorate

Commander: Ahmed Abu Ghandour (KIA 26 NOV 2023)[40]

• Beit Lahia Battalion—Beit Lahia, North Gaza Governorate[41]
  • Status: Degraded.
  • Commander: Wael Rajab (KIA 26 NOV 2023)[42]
  • Beit Hanoun Battalion—Beit Hanoun, North Gaza Governorate[43]
    • Status: Degraded.[44]
    • Commander: Abu Hamza Fayyad (Alive as of 29 OCT 2023)[45]
    • al Khalifa al Rashidun Battalion—Jabalia Camp, North Gaza Governorate[46]
      • Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
      • Commander: Ibrahim Biari (KIA ? 31 OCT 2023).[47] Hamas denied that the IDF killed Biari on 31 OCT.[48]
      • Martyr Suhail Ziadeh Battalion—East Jabalia, North Gaza Governorate[49]
        • Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
        • Commander: Rafaat Salman Abu Abdullah (KIA 26 NOV 2023).[50] Abu Abdullah also served as the deputy commander of the North Brigade.[51]
        • Jabalia al Balad (Abdul Raouf Nabhan) Battalion—Jabalia City, North Gaza Governorate[52]
          • Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
          • Commander: Unknown
          • Imad Aql (Western) Battalion—Western Jabalia Camp and the Tawam area, North Gaza Governorate[53]
            • Status: Degraded.
            • Commander: Unknown
            • The IDF said that this battalion is responsible for the northwestern coast of the Gaza Strip in North Gaza Governorate.[54] The IDF killed the battalion operations officer on November 20.[55]
            • Elite Battalion[56]
              • Status: Unknown.  loc ?

Gaza Brigade—Gaza Governorate

Commander: Izz al Din al Haddad (Abu Suheib) (Alive as of 7 OCT 2023)[57]

• Sabra-Tal al Islam Battalion—Sabra and Tal al Hawa neighborhoods, Gaza Governorate[58]
  • Status: Degraded.
  • Commander: Mustafa Daloul (KIA 3 NOV 2023)[59]
  • Daraj wal Tuffah Battalion—Daraj and Tuffah neighborhoods, Gaza Governorate[60]
    • Status: Degraded.[61] This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
    • Commander: Rafat Abbas (KIA 26 OCT 2023)[62]
    • The IDF said it “severely degraded” the battalion and eliminated its leadership on 26 OCT 2023.[63]
    • Radwan Battalion—Sheikh Radwan neighborhood, Gaza Governorate[64]
      • Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
      • Commander: Unknown
      • The IDF said it killed the Radwan Battalion’s deputy commander on 24 OCT 2023.[65] The IDF refers to this battalion as the “al Furkan” Battalion.”[66]
      • Shujaiya Battalion—Shujaiya neighborhood, Gaza Governorate[67]
        • Status: Combat Effective. This battalion is under active and intense IDF pressure.
        • Commander: Wissam Farhat (KIA 02 DEC 2023)[68]
        • The Shujaiya’s Battalion new commander is Amad Abdullah Ali Qariqa, who previously served as Wissam Farhat’s deputy.[69] The IDF said on December 2 that it “significantly damaged” the battalion’s capabilities.[70]
        • Zaytoun Battalion—Zaytoun Neighborhood, Gaza Governorate[71]
          • Status: Degraded.
          • Last known commander: Ahmed Abdul Ahl (KIA 16 MAY 2021)[72]
          • Shati Battalion—al Shati Refugee Camp, Gaza Governorate[73]
            • Status: Degraded.[74]
            • Commander: Khalil Mahjad Samjad (KIA on or before 13 NOV 2023).[75] The IDF said that it killed a second Shati Battalion commander, Haitham al Hawari, on December 3, suggesting that Hamas had promoted a replacement for Samjad within roughly two weeks of his death.[76]
            • IDF operations “significantly damaged” the al Shati Battalion, which suffered at least 200 killed. The IDF also destroyed the battalion’s strongholds and a key headquarters.[77] The IDF reported on November 13 that it killed the battalion commander and his two deputies on an unspecified date.[78]
            • Elite Battalion.[79]Neither Hamas nor the IDF has confirmed an “Elite Battalion” within the Gaza Brigade. The Gaza Brigade may control an Elite Battalion, given independent reporting from Gulf Arab media and the existence of an Elite Battalion in the North Brigade.
              • Status: Unknown. loc ?

Central Brigade—Central Governorate

Commander: Ayman Nofal (KIA 17 OCT 2023).[80] Nofal previously served on Hamas’ military council, led the al Qassem Brigades intelligence service, and served as a liaison with other Palestinian resistance factions in the joint operations room.[81] Palestinian factions formed this operations room in 2020 and it helped plan the October 7 attacks.[82] Nofal said that drills coordinated by the operations room sought to “tell the enemy that the walls and engineering measures on the borders of Gaza will not protect them.”[83] 

The Central Brigade released a training video in July 2023 called “We Are Coming” showing its forces practicing close quarters combat in urban environments, which is notable in the context of the October 7 attacks.[84]

• Deir al Balah Battalion—Deir al Balah, Central Governorate[85]
  • Status: Combat Effective.
  • Commander: Wael Asfa (KIA 05 NOV 2023)[86]
  • Al Bureij Battalion—al Bureij, Central Governorate[87]
    • Status: Combat Effective.
    • Commander: Iyad al Tayyib (Abu Bilal) (Likely KIA, date unknown). An anti-Hamas, Rafah-based blogger on Twitter said on November 27 that Iyad al Tayyib “fell in the war.”[88]
    • Al Maghazi Battalion—al Maghazi, Central Governorate[89]
      • Status: Combat Effective.
      • Commander: Unknown
      • Nusairat Battalion—Nusairat, Central Governorate[90]
        • Status: Combat Effective.
        • Commander: Unknown
        • The IDF announced on October 24 that it killed the Nusairat Battalion’s deputy commander.[91]
        • Elite Battalion.[92]Neither Hamas nor the IDF has confirmed an “Elite Battalion” within the Gaza Brigade. The Central Brigade may control an Elite Battalion, given independent reporting from Gulf Arab media and the existence of an Elite Battalion in the North Brigade.
          • Status: Unknown. Loc ?

 

---

REFERENCES

[1] https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86

[2] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86; book sourcing

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-secretive-hamas-commander-...

[4] https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf; https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86;

[5] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Pivot-to-Offense-How-Iran...

[6] https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf

[7] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67480680; https://www.critic...

[8] https://irp.fas.org/world/para/docs/hamas-2017.pdf

[9] Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 50, 55, 119.

[10] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/oslo-accords-held-pr... Beverley Milton-Edwards and Stephen Farrell, Hamas (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 67.

[11] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86

[12] https://alqassam dot ps/arabic/%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%AD%D9%86

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-editio...

[14] https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/27/middleeast/israel-gaza-ground-operations-...

[15] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-2-2023; h....

[16] https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/05/politics/israel-ground-operation-us-warni...

[17] https://www.cnn.com/2023/12/05/politics/israel-ground-operation-us-warni...

[18] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-clos....

[19] https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-10-28-2023-c9bd7ecc5f4a...

[20] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-secure-mosul-les...

[21] https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-clos...

[22] https://www.memri.org/reports/izz-al-din-al-qassam-brigades-weapons-and-...

[23] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/3416

[24] https://paltimeps dot ps/post/371754/أحمد-الغندور-ثالث-أبرز-قادة-كتائب-القسام-شهيدا

[25] https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/27/middleeast/israel-gaza-ground-operations-...

[26] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[27] https://www.reuters.com/article/mideast-gaza-deif/deep-underground-moham...

[28] https://twitter.com/salehdardona99/status/1725970632007934354

[29] https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm1-02-1.pdf

[30] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67103298; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-leader-ismail-haniyeh-le...

[31] https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/84538

[32] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/13/hamas-elects-hardliner-yah...

[33] https://www.ft.com/content/de78c7a0-f8f0-403e-b0db-eb86d6e76919

[34] https://www.ft.com/content/de78c7a0-f8f0-403e-b0db-eb86d6e76919

[35] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2017/02/gaza-palestinians-hamas-isr...

[36] https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/09/246686.htm; https://www...

[37] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hiding-plain-sight-hamas-leade...

[38] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/how-secretive-hamas-commander-...

[39] https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/marwan_issa/

[40] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/48173; https://paltimeps dot ps/post/371754/أحمد-الغندور-ثالث-أبرز-قادة-كتائب-القسام-شهيدا

[41] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/martyrs/details/2294

[42] https://t.me/hamaswestbank/48179; https://t.me/hamasps/17969; https://...

[43] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg; https://twitter.com/ibmadh...

[44] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1726994076174860482

[45] https://t.me/rooh_2022/10133; https://t.me/rooh_2022/10132; https://tw...

[46] https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=646520960962469; https://twitter.com/... net/2023/11/01/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%AA-7-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7; https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1719416813333704819; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[47] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1719409750452871649; https://twitt...

[48] https://www.alhadath dot net/2023/11/01/%D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%AA-7-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%89-%D8%A8%D9%82%D8%B5%D9%81%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%85%D8%AE%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AC%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%A7

[49] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg; https://twitter.com/MAHmoo... com/?p=35731; https://t.me/ah12mad3/31584; https://t.me/bintalqasaam22/3950; https://twitter.com/MAHmoodRashdi/status/1728808626901377094

[50] https://twitter.com/MAHmoodRashdi/status/1728808626901377094

[51] https://twitter.com/MAHmoodRashdi/status/1728808626901377094; https://t.me/hamaswestbank/48180

[52] https://t.me/Qassam_1/32815; https://t.me/dtwjg/22993; https://twitter...

[53] https://t.me/dtwjg/22993; https://twitter.com/shohadaa03/status/1605485... net/f/node/314486;

https://t.me/Qassam_5/77417; https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/شهداء-القسام/1431/مخلص-محمود-عدوان; https://paldf dot net/f/node/696229

[54] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[55] https://hona dot co.il/post/1932

[56] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/شهداء-القسام/3073/وسيم-سمير-عزام; https://highwia dot com/مؤسس-كتائب-عز-الدين-القسام/

[57] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/شهداء-القسام/2996/وليد-موسى-خالد-شمالي; https://news.easydownload21 dot com/مقرب-من-الضيف-ويلقب-بعميد-التصنيع-من-ه/; https://felesteen dot news/post/109038/%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AF-%D9%84%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AD%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A3-%D8%A8%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%A9-%D9%88%D9%83%D8%AB%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%AB%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%AE%D9%86

[58] https://web.telegram.org/#/im?p=c1353149269+7171146954826906038

[59] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1720331957152751891

[60] https://alray dot ps/ar/post/134163/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9; https://metras dot co/غزّة-كيف-نقرأ-جغرافيا-المعركة؟/

[61] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[62] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1717582831218504168;

[63] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1717582831218504168; https://www.idf dot il/150310

[64] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/martyrs/details/559; https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/شهداء-القسام/3079/علي-حسني-عرفة; https://t.me/hsona01/49613; https://metras dot co/غزّة-كيف-نقرأ-جغرافيا-المعركة؟/

[65] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1716670784779755944; https://twitt...

[66] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[67] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg; https://alray dot ps/ar/post/134163/%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%A8%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%83%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%BA%D8%B2%D8%A9; https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/martyrs/details/868; https://metras dot co/غزّة-كيف-نقرأ-جغرافيا-المعركة؟/

[68] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1731037918515388636?s=20

[69] https://x.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1731242995964326161?s=20

[70] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1731037930217459865?s=20

[71] https://x.com/ibmadhun/status/1725944279447511494?s=20; https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/martyrs/details/2732; http://www.alyaum dot com/article/4118970; https://metras dot co/غزّة-كيف-نقرأ-جغرافيا-المعركة؟/

[72] https://twitter.com/AvichayAdraee/status/1393793909336289280

[73] https://t.me/telged/1397; https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/6361323ddea5a810/Article-7ce8e22a988cb81027.htm; https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/شهداء-القسام/510/أحمد-خضر-بحر; https://metras dot co/غزّة-كيف-نقرأ-جغرافيا-المعركة؟/

[74] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[75] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[76] https://t.me/RasadAlmedan/136621; https://x.com/idfonline/status/1731402152981967141?s=20

[77] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/6361323ddea5a810/Article-7ce8e22a988cb81027.htm

[78] https://www.mako dot co.il/news-military/6361323ddea5a810/Article-7ce8e22a988cb81027.htm; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GOepEpuCTg

[79] https://highwia dot com/مؤسس-كتائب-عز-الدين-القسام/

[80] https://felesteen dot news/post/144651/القسام-تنظم-مؤتمرا-علميا-لتعزيز-ثقافة-المقاومة-لدى-طلبة-الجامعات; https://t.me/xs_vj/1854; https://26sep dot net/index.php/global/66141-2023-10-17-15-36-00

[81] https://t.me/xs_vj/1869; https://t.me/xs_vj/1854; https://26sep dot net/index.php/global/66141-2023-10-17-15-36-00

[82] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67480680

[83] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67480680

[84] https://t.me/ggiaigjdnyjsnd/50793

[85] https://t.me/ah12mad3/20540

[86] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1721523669850087455; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1721523457496650233

[87] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/martyrs/details/2250

[88] https://x.com/talalovech/status/1729031134686900328?s=20

[89] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/شهداء-القسام/2455/إبراهيم-محمد-الماشي

[90] https://www.alqassam dot ps/arabic/martyrs/details/1859; https://t.me/hsona01/49543

[91] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1716670778127552882; https://twitt...

[92] https://highwia dot com/مؤسس-كتائب-عز-الدين-القسام/

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