Conducting India-Sri Lanka relations the Modi way

               

Conducting India-Sri Lanka Relations
                         the Modi Way 
                                  By
                           G. Padmaja    

 

 

India's Narendra Modi and Sri Lanka's Maithripala Sirisena. Photo Credit: Sri Lanka government.

            
Mar 30, 2015                                                        

                                                   

         On March 18, 2015, the Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj made a statement in parliament on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka which took place from March 10-14. She began by saying: “The importance of these visits can be gauged from the fact that an Indian prime minister has paid a bilateral visit to Seychelles after 34 years, Mauritius after 10 years and Sri Lanka after 28 years.”

 

 Prior to Modi’s visit and after that too these facts have been repeated by many. This statement no doubt brings out the significance of the visit, but implicit in it is also the acceptance that the Indian foreign policy has either failed in conducting its relations with these countries at the highest level or faces challenges which prevent it from doing so.  The immediate question which arises is what has changed that the Modi government is undertaking these visits where the earlier governments hesitated to do so. In this context it is argued that the new government at the centre believes that India’s national, regional and global interests are best served by having these bilateral visits at the highest level. This article looks specifically at India-Sri Lanka relations to bring this out.

 

 Like the earlier governments, the Modi government too has been influenced by domestic interests and pressure groups from Tamil Nadu, especially with regard to the issues related to Sri Lankan Tamils.  Modi swept to power with an overwhelming majority in May last year. His government has not allowed the Tamil Nadu parties to dictate foreign policy. Whereas the earlier government could not resolve domestic dilemmas and undertake bilateral visits at the highest level, the Modi government did.  While conducting relations with Sri Lanka, Modi in no way diluted India’s stated position on important issues. On the contrary the prime minister, throughout his visit to the island nation, forcefully articulated India’s concerns. It’s only on the basis of strong trust and continuous engagement at the highest level will India’s long term political, economic and maritime strategic interests be served. Not engaging at the highest level is no longer a policy option for Indian foreign policy. It will only result in other external political actors actively engaging with Sri Lanka, which in the long run is not beneficial for India.

This paper looks at some specific issues to bring this out.

 

Overcoming Domestic Dilemmas

 

 The former Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh after much debate did not attend the CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet) which took place in Sri Lanka in November 17-18, 2013. In October 2013, the Tamil Nadu assembly passed a unanimous resolution demanding that India completely boycott the meet in Sri Lanka and seek temporary suspension of the island nation from the Commonwealth till Tamils are given rights on par with the Sinhalese and are able to live freely. All political parties, including the Congress, had supported this resolution. They argued that participation would give legitimacy to the then Mahinda Rajapaksa government which they believed had carried out human rights violations in its war against the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam). The then foreign secretary Sujatha Singh had said: “Foreign policy is an extension of domestic policy. It is meant to protect domestic interests and any decision that will be taken will be keeping in view the domestic interests, foreign policy and international obligations.” Finally the then external affairs minister Salman Kurshid participated.

 

 
In May 2014, when the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) leaders were invited to attend the swearing-in-ceremony of Prime Minister Modi, the major political parties in Tamil Nadu once again criticised the decision. The Modi government however went ahead with the decision and all the SAARC leaders, including then president of Sri Lanka Mahinda Rajapaksa participated.
 

 

The ‘neighbourhood first’ policy of the Modi government, which he once again articulated in Sri Lanka by saying, “I am convinced that the future of any country is influenced by the state of its neighbourhood”, clearly implied engaging with the immediate neighbourhood at the highest level without compromising on India’s interests. The bilateral visit gave him an opportunity to address the Sri Lankan parliament and share his views on political, economic, maritime security issues concerning the two countries. He spoke of India’s own experience in centre-state relations. He said: “Today, my top priority is to make the states in India stronger. I am a firm believer in cooperative federalism. So, we are devolving more power and more resources to the states. And, we are making them formal partners in national decision making processes.”

Later in his media statement he said: “We stand with you in your efforts to build a future that accommodates the aspirations of all sections of society, including the Sri Lankan Tamil community, for a life of equality, justice, peace and dignity in a united Sri Lanka. We believe that early and full implementation of the 13th Amendment and going beyond it would contribute to this process.”

 

 He became the first Indian prime minister to visit Jaffna. He participated in the various rehabilitation activities being undertaken by India for the Sri Lankan Tamils. He now gave a ‘face’ to those activities. By being there, he once again championed their cause and India’s commitment to them. He further said, “For India, the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka are paramount. It is rooted in our interest. It stems from our own fundamental belief in this principle.” This statement would surely allay any fears from any quarters regarding India’s intentions.

 

 Other Issues

 

 A sense of realism too guided the complex fishermen’s issue where Modi was of the opinion that since it concerns livelihood and humanitarian concerns on both sides, the fishermen associations of both countries should meet and work out a mutually acceptable solution. Economic relations was also given focus. Modi while urging Sri Lankan businessmen to benefit from India’s growth story also agreed that the trade gap which is to India’s advantage needs to be addressed. He called for the early conclusion of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.

 

Modi also spoke of how the Indian Ocean was critical to the security and prosperity of both the countries. He referred to the maritime security cooperation between India, Sri Lanka and Maldives and how it needs to be expanded. It is important to note here that in July 2013, these three countries had signed an agreement on Trilateral Cooperation on Maritime Security (TCMS) to address common maritime security threats and challenges and enhance security through cooperative measures. In March 2014, the third National Security Advisor- level Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation was held in Delhi where delegations from Mauritius and Seychelles participated as guest countries. Meaningful maritime security cooperation with other countries is indeed of critical importance. However, it cannot work in isolation of the nature of bilateral relations India has with them. They need to be built on strong bilateral relations and Modi’s visit sought to achieve this.

 

 Looking Ahead

 

 The sensitive issues involved in India-Sri Lanka relations make it one of the most difficult bilateral relations for both the countries. However, it can become the most beneficial for both countries if constant engagement at the highest level takes place to build trust which helps in resolving issues. 

 

 China is an important factor in India–Sri Lanka relations. China has close economic, political and security relations with Sri Lanka which at many times is perceived as being detrimental to India’s security concerns. One of the mechanisms for India to safeguard its interests while Sri Lanka–China relations are carried out is by actively engaging at the highest level. Prime Minister Modi’s visit sought to exactly do this. In this context Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena’s bilateral visit to China from March 26 will be eagerly watched by India.

 

(G. Padmaja, a former UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) Visiting Research Fellow at the United Nations, Geneva, is presently an independent researcher writing on SAARC and India’s policy towards its immediate neighbours.  She is based in Visakhapatnam. She can be reached at: sri2003ja@yahoo.com)

 




1, Analysis, India, Sri Lanka











 

India’s Maritime Awakening? Modi Endorses A Blue Revolution

Source:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/18032015-indias-maritime-awakening-modi-endorses-a-blue-revolution-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

The Indian Ocean is bounded by India's Lakshadweep Islands to the north

1, Analysis, India

India’s Maritime Awakening? Modi Endorses A Blue Revolution – Analysis

 

                                      By
                            C Uday Bhaskar*

South Asia Monitor




March 18, 2015


The three island-nation trip that took Prime Minister Modi to Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka in mid-March may well mark the beginning of India’s long overdue maritime awakening. For a nation so richly endowed with a distinctive maritime geography, the paradox has been the tenacious indifference, often veering towards inexcusable sea-blindness, that has characterised Delhi’s policy orientation as regards the Indian Ocean.


However the very fact that Modi embarked upon such a trip to three strategically important island states in the Indian Ocean which have been long neglected by way of a summit visit reflects a political determination that has the potential to become the beginning of the end of this self-inflicted strategic myopia.



In Mauritius, Modi handed over an Indian built off-shore patrol vessel (OPV) to that country’s Coast Guard and this marks the first such export of a naval ship designed and built in India. Christened the MCGS Barracuda, the 1350 tonne ship, valued at US $50, million was commissioned by Modi on March 12 and his speech at this ceremony could well be described as the most lucid and comprehensive articulation of India’s resurrected maritime vision for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).


Highlighting the centrality of a cooperative strategy to manage the vast water body of the Indian Ocean and the role of the smaller island nations, Modi drew attention to the strategic significance of the IOR and noted: “Because, the Indian Ocean is critical to the future of the world. This Ocean bears two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments, one-third of its bulk cargo; and half of its container traffic. Over three-fourths of its traffic goes to other regions of the world.”

 

 

PM Shri Narendra Modi speech at Civic Reception in Mauritius: 12.03.2015  


This overview is familiar to the professionals but what is instructive is the manner in which Modi invoked rich symbolism related to the national flag and endorsed the need for India to embark upon a Blue Revolution. In the course of his remarks at Port Louis, Modi observed: “To me the blue chakra or wheel in India’s national flag represents the potential of Blue Revolution or the Ocean Economy. That is how central the ocean economy is to us.” The speech writers in the prime minister’s stable warrant praise for the manner in which form and substance have been leavened.


India has witnessed two seminal revolutions that transformed the profile of the nation and the well-being of its people – namely the Green Revolution that began in 1963 and transformed India from a ‘basket-case’ to becoming self-sufficient in food production; and later the White Revolution (also referred to as Operation Flood) of 1970 that made India into the world’s largest milk producer.


The Blue Revolution endorsed by Modi, if realized in its entirety, has the potential to transform India in similar manner and both the normative vision and the policy clarity are laden with deep import. Asserting that the “Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities”, Modi added that the regional vision “is rooted in advancing cooperation in our region; and, to use our capabilities for the benefit of all in our common maritime home.”


The five elements prioritize the core security interests of India and yet combine the collective well-being of the IOR. Inter alia, they include: “We will do everything to safeguard our mainland and islands and defend our interests; we will deepen our economic and security cooperation with our friends in the region, especially our maritime neighbours and island states; collective action and cooperation will best advance peace and security in our maritime region; we also seek a more integrated and cooperative future in the region that enhances the prospects for sustainable development for all; and those who live in this region have the primary responsibility for peace, stability and prosperity in the Indian Ocean but we recognize that there are other nations around the world, with strong interests and stakes in the region.”


This maritime pentagon provides the foundation for the Modi vision of the IOR and is in many ways a logical extension of the modest but relatively still-born ‘sagar mala’ (ocean garland ) enunciated by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in August 2003 that sought to revitalize the moribund Indian ports sector and inland connectivity.


India’s comprehensive national power that includes the economic and trade sinews and the military component can be robustly advanced by sustained investment in the maritime sector. This is a well-trodden path taken by many major powers before India and the symbiotic relationship between ship-building, port efficacy and inland cum coastal connectivity lie at the core of such national endeavor.


China, which is the most recent of the major powers to focus on the maritime sector, offers many policy cues for India. One of the first priorities is to review and rationalize the myriad ministries and departments that have sectoral and insular responsibility in managing India’s maritime assets.


This is a subject worthy of immediate cabinet and legislative attention and Modi would be well-advised to fast-track the implementation of the Blue Revolution. Furthermore, the coastal states need to become committed stakeholders in this national endeavor and this in turn will strengthen the federal character of the Indian polity – an often stated Modi objective.

The Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean alone but the Modi vision is laudable:

“We seek a future for the Indian Ocean that lives up to the name of SAGAR – Security and Growth for All in the Region.”


Acronyms are addictive but the challenge now is to walk the talk and convert rich rhetoric into tangible reality.




*C Uday Bhaskar is Director, Society for Policy Studies. He can be contacted at cudyabhaskar@spsindia.in
IANS, March 17, 2015

 

IANS on March 17, 2015 at 1:58 pm

India’s maritime awakening? Modi endorses a Blue Revolution






















 

Modi's Trip and China’s Islands: The Battle for the Indian Ocean

Source:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/modis-trip-and-chinas-islands-the-battle-for-the-indian-ocean/

         Modi's Trip and China’s Islands

        : The Battle for the Indian Ocean

                                      By

                       Darshana M. Baruah

 

Image Credit: REUTERS/Dinuka Liyanawatte

 

 

 

With his Indian Ocean tour, the PM aims to counter Chinese influence among small island nations.

 for The Diplomat

March 11, 2015

 

 

As China continues to draw attention to the South China Sea with its land reclamation and creation of artificial islands, it is also important to look at Chinese activities in the not-so-contentious but strategically important Indian Ocean Region. Beijing, with the help of economic and commercial initiatives, is mapping out a web of influence by increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean. As I argued in a previous article published by The Diplomat, access to and control of the islands in the Indian Ocean is crucial for Beijing to secure its strategic interests in the region.


There are two reasons for China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. First, some of these islands — such as Kyaukpyu — can prove to be China’s answer to its Malacca Dilemma, strengthening its energy security by reducing its dependence on the Strait of Malacca. Second, an increasing presence in the Indian Ocean is crucial in strengthening Beijing’s role as a key actor in the emerging security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.

There is no doubt that China aspires to be a Maritime Power.

Beijing realizes that to be considered as a great power, it must have a role and stake beyond its region — beyond the Western Pacific and throughout the Indo-Pacific.


Having attained a favorable status quo in the Western Pacific, China is now engaging with the island nations of the Indian Ocean through its investments and commercial initiatives. It is through its relationship and investments with these nations that Beijing aims to project itself as a resident power of the Indian Ocean, leading to a greater security role throughout the Indo-Pacific. However, unlike in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean is already home to many resident middle powers, wary of China’s unilateral and hostile maritime policies. As a result, the possibility of increased Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is leading to competition for geostrategic space, especially between India and China.


This article looks at the island nations of
Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles,
against the backdrop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Indian Ocean tour.




Maldives

The Republic of Maldives is strategically located in the Indian Ocean, close to some of the critical trading routes passing through the region. Though a small island nation, its strategic importance can be relayed from the fact that instability in the waters of Maldives can essentially affect critical global trading routes. While Male is far from flexing any military muscle in the region, access to and influence over this island can help another nation project power through the region. This is perhaps the reason why Male is comfortably sitting in the middle of a geostrategic tussle between India and China unfolding in the Indian Ocean.

Though geographically closer to India and historically within its sphere of strategic influence, Maldives is increasingly strengthening its relationship with Beijing. Chinese investments in the Maldives have increased over the years, ranging from housing projects to infrastructure projects such as building roads and airports. The China-Maldives economic cooperation has experienced a boost ever since the Abdulla Yameen government came into power in November 2013. The Chinese ambassador to the Maldives, Wang Fukang, mentioned three critical areas where Beijing and Male should increase their cooperation, indicating an expansion of their economic and strategic ties. The three areas mentioned by Wang are tourism, infrastructure projects, and, finally, closer maritime cooperation between the two nations.


Noting the Chinese impact on the Maldivian tourism sector, the Ambassador stated, “Since 2010, China has remained the largest source of tourist arrivals in the Maldives. In 2013 alone, more than 330,000 Chinese tourists visited Maldives. In the future, both sides could encourage more Chinese tourists to visit Maldives. Maldives could attract potential Chinese companies to invest in the tourism sector of the country.”


Investing in infrastructure projects in the Indian Ocean appears to be Beijing’s preferred approach for obtaining a strong foothold in the region. The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative (which still lacks clear details or a clear intent) further boosts this policy. Maldives is an important player in China’s Indian Ocean game and hence infrastructure projects on this island nation are critical.  When President Xi Jinping traveled to the Maldives in September 2014, agreement on infrastructure projects in the country was a key outcome.  It is equally important to note that this was the first ever visit by a Chinese leader to the Maldives. Along with housing and road projects, the two leaders also agreed to upgrade the main airport and to build a bridge connecting Male to Hulhule — the island where the Male International Airport is located. While initially the agreement was to upgrade the existing airport, reports now suggest the building of a whole new airport with a second runway.


The Chinese presence in Maldives is very prominent through its housing and development projects, so much so that their Ministry of Foreign Affairs building was designed and constructed by Beijing. Increase in Chinese investments in Maldives will provide Beijing with a legitimate platform to increase its military presence in the area. China will have every right to protect its commercial interests in the region both during war and peace times. These infrastructure investments also carry the possibility of being turned into military installations. There is palpable fear, especially in India, of China dominating the foreign investment sector in Maldives.



While the previous government tilted toward Indian influence in the Indian Ocean, the current government seems to favor China. With the arrest of former President Mohamed Nasheed, Maldives is descending into political turmoil. While countries such as India and the U.S. have expressed concerns over the arrest and political dissent in the country, Beijing refused to comment on the issue stating that “We are committed to non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs.” China’s stance has been well appreciated by the Yameen government, while pro Nasheed supporters have expressed their concerns about anti democratic trends.

Speaking at a conference hosted by the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, Ahmed Naseem (former foreign minister of Maldives) stated, “For Maldives it is imperative to stand together with India to balance Indian Ocean security and protect the interests of the Maldives in a growing gamble for power in the Indian Ocean.” The Maldivian delegation led by the Naseem was in India to urge New Delhi to play its role in stabilizing Maldives and in balancing Beijing’s presence in the country. Thanks to growing investments joined with its “non-interference in domestic affairs” policy, Beijing appears to be a favorite for the current government in the Maldives.


Male’s reliance on China for an economic boost under the current government is dangerous for both Maldives and India. China increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean through the Maldives is no longer a distant possibility and New Delhi must wake up to the strategic changes taking place so close to home. However, the Narendra Modi government is taking note of these developments and seem to be willing to shoulder its responsibility as a security actor in the Indo-Pacific. Maldives was one of the countries that Modi was supposed to visit during his travels beginning March 11, in an attempt to revive India-Maldives ties and balance increasing Chinese presence in its Indian Ocean neighborhood.

 Unfortunately due to the ongoing political turmoil, Maldives has been dropped from Modi’s itinerary. Modi will still tour Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius.



Seychelles


The republic of Seychelles is another player in the emerging geostrategic competition in the Indian Ocean. The 115-island nation located in the Indian Ocean constantly fights to keep its EEZ secure and safe from pirates. Seychelles’ location and proximity to the coast of Africa make it a lucrative option for Beijing to establish a naval base in the country. China is already participating in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and has growing economic interests in Africa.


In 2011, it was widely reported that Seychelles offered China maritime bases for refueling purposes while conducting its anti piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. The reports created a significant amount of unease in New Delhi; such a move would give Beijing the opportunity to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean, facilitating Chinese naval operations far beyond its shores. While China was quick to dismiss any possibility of a military base overseas, the possibility of such a development is higher today.

It is not news that Beijing aspires to extend its influence to the Indian Ocean. What is alarming is the use of commercial and economic initiatives to create a reason to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean Region. China is quick to dismiss any plans of creating military bases overseas, but Chinese maritime strategists such as Shen Dingli advocate the need for China to set up overseas military bases. In an article titled

“Don’t shun the idea of setting up overseas bases,”

Shen asserts that “[s]etting up overseas military bases is not an idea we have to shun; on the contrary, it is our right.” Encapsulating the reason behind China’s need to expand into the Indian Ocean, Shen further argues, “The real threat to us is not posed by the pirates but by the countries which block our trade route.”    Shen continues:

“The threats also include secessionism outside the Chinese mainland. The situation requires us be able to hit the vulnerable points of our potential opponents by restricting their international waterway. So we need to set up our own blue-water navy and to rely on the overseas military bases to cut the supply costs.”

China is gearing up to protect its energy imports that pass through the Indian Ocean. Evidently, Beijing is not comfortable with Washington and New Delhi being the security providers in the region. Inability to sustain troops in the region would mean that China’s energy imports will be highly vulnerable in the event of a military standoff with either the United States or India. Currently, India and Seychelles share close military ties as New Delhi helps the island nation secure its EEZ by presenting surveillance aircrafts and patrolling ships.


By increasing its economic investments in the Indian Ocean Region, Beijing is creating a legitimate reason to maintain a military presence in the Indian Ocean. While New Delhi cannot stop China from making inroads into the Indian Ocean, it must step up its game and increase cooperation with these island nations in order to balance the situation. This is why New Delhi is looking to increase its security cooperation with Seychelles and hopes to balance the situation through Narendra Modi’s ongoing Indian Ocean tour.



Sri Lanka


India’s ties with Sri Lanka date back to historical and cultural linkages in ancient times. Geographically located at the tip of India, the island nation is considered to be within New Delhi’s sphere of strategic influence. However, strengthening ties with Beijing through infrastructure projects are creating tension in the Indian Ocean politics between China and India.  An area of great discomfort for India has been the frequent docking of Chinese submarines in Colombo.


The previous government of Mahinda Rajapaksa appeared fairly China-friendly, awarding many infrastructure development projects to Beijing.  The Maithripala Sirisena government is now reviewing all Chinese investments in the country, especially the $1.5 billion port city project. Explaining the reason for the re-assessment, Sri Lanka’s investment promotion minister, Kabir Hashim, noted that
 “The port city project has to be completely looked at… You cannot have land given on freehold basis to another country in a high security zone.” According to reports, the project would give China around 100 hectares of land “an outright basis and the rest on a 99-year lease.”



The issue of Chinese submarines docking at Colombo is a perfect example of Beijing using its commercial initiatives to gradually increase and maintain its military presence in the Indian Ocean. It is interesting to note that the submarine docked at the Colombo International Container Terminals Ltd., (CICT), a terminal constructed by China Merchants Holdings (International) Co., Ltd. (CMHI), much to India’s surprise and concern. CMHI holds
85 percent ownership of the terminal.



The Sirisena government is now reassuring India that such “incidents, from whatever quarter, do not take place under our tenure.”


In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s upcoming visit to Sri Lanka from March 13-14 is of great significance to reassert India’s ties with Colombo. Prime Minister Modi will also be addressing the Sri Lankan Parliament along with a visit to Jaffna. While the new government in Colombo reviews its relationship with Beijing, New Delhi must be available to assert its support and strengthen its ties with the tear drop nation of the Indian Ocean.


Modi will also be traveling to Mauritius, another small but significant country in the Indian Ocean. As the island nation looks to attract investments from China, India is stepping up its game by providing a 1,300-tonne Indian-built patrol vessel, the Barracuda, to Mauritius to help the island nation protect its coastline. Modi will also address the National Assembly and will attend the Mauritius National Day on March 12. Narendra Modi’s Indian Ocean tour comes at a much needed time to re-assure the Indian Ocean islands that New Delhi is present and willing to shoulder its responsibility in maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean.


It is quite clear that China is engaging with the island nations in the Indian Ocean Region through small but significant projects, leveraging its strategic interests. What Beijing essentially aims to do is create an atmosphere where Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean becomes inevitable. While India may not indulge in any China containment policy, there is a dire need for New Delhi to reengage with these islands and secure its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific.



Darshana M. Baruah is a Junior Fellow at the New Delhi based think, the Observer Research Foundation.

 

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