Showing posts with label TOUR OF DUTY. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TOUR OF DUTY. Show all posts

Monday, June 27, 2022

AGNIVEERS AND THE CORPORATE CHOIR

 SOURCE; 

  (a)     avayshukla.blogspot.com/2020/07/the-lo




Must read:

Rajnath Singh may have gone to the buffer zone in Lakakh (which is on the Indian side). But the Duffer zone is truly in India & Made in India. One 'Make in India' project succeeded!


AGNIVEERS AND THE CORPORATE CHOIR


         Avay Shukla'sView from [Greater] Kailash "


Friday, 24 June 2022

This govt. for giving CORPORATE HOUSES   the corporate tax break a couple of years ago, something which this country can ill afford- almost Rupees 2 lakh crores per annum, which is more than the total pension bill of the armed forces ( including the civilian defense employees). The corporate worthies were supposed to have used these savings for capital investment, increase production and manufacturing, and create some of those 20 million jobs every year that had been promised us in a jumla moment. 

They haven't done that yet and have pocketed the savings. Why should they, in fact, when................... 

                  it's cheaper to sing in a CHOIR?  


 I belong to the 1950 batch of homo sapiens, and wasn't singled out for any special favours by the Creator when He was dishing out His divine gifts. So, as you can guess, I'm a pretty average Joe- average intelligence, average physique, average health, average abilities and skills; this last one is borne out by my 35 ACRs ( Annual Confidential Reports) in govt. service, all of which categorize me as Average. In the IAS, by the way, Average means Outstanding as I have yet to see an IAS officer who is not graded as Outstanding, but that's a story for another day!

   More relevant to the present, however, is the fact that God did not give me a singing voice- no baritone, no tenor, no soprano, no alto, no bass, no counter-tenor. I could not, therefore, find a place in any choir, a lasting regret I shall carry to the electric crematorium in the fullness of time. ( I hope there's no power cut at the appointed hour). It has been a great disappointment but my admiration for the choir persists, and therefore I was thrilled to hear the rising sounds of a new choir last week, ascending almost to the level of a Wagnerian climax by the weekend, before it petered away into a whine.

  This choir was not comprised of your usual singers but of the captains of Indian industry, the Old Money types and the Covid billionaires, the Panama papers and Pandora papers types, those who tweet more often than the sparrows in my garden and dish out more advice on a daily basis than the Sadhguru. There was total silence till the 19th of the month, but suddenly on the 20th there was a chorus of synchronised voices, all singing to the BJP tune of  "Hum Honge Agniveer".

  It was a masterful performance, extolling the mythical qualities of the Agniveers, how their six month training would revolutionise Indian industry, fill all the gaps in operations, marketing, supply chains and technical back-ups; how their commitment and patriotism would usher in a 5 trillion dollar economy in four years. I couldn't see the Conductor but he must have been waving his baton- or truncheon- somewhere backstage because all the singers were looking back over their shoulders while singing, a standard precaution with choir boys, I learn.

  But something was not right- the choir was singing in a high castrato, which sounds more like bleating than singing. The lyrics lacked conviction, as in a Prasun Joshi song. And the reason soon became clear, when eminent veterans and social media began asking uncomfortable questions. By then, however, it had become amply clear that Big Capital in India is as spineless as the media, that they don't give a damn about our youth or about unemployment as long as they can keep cornering more of the country's wealth and ascending the billionaire ladder, that their ballad to the Agniveer was nothing but a command performance, singing for their dinner, as it were.

  The Agnipath scheme has more holes than a target in a shooting range, but that can be better left to the experts to dissect. I am more concerned with the duplicity, hypocrisy and sycophancy of our corporates. Take for instance their offer to provide unlimited number of jobs to the Agniveers discharged after four years: as a number of veterans have asked: how many jobs have they provided to ex-servicemen so far? Given their unrestrained excitement at the prospect of employing these youth with just six months of basic training and three years of hunkering down at Siachen or the Arunachal border, surely they would have employed thousands of existing ex-servicemen with 15 years of experience and far more training? It's been a week since this question was asked of them, but not one has tweeted a reply or provided any figures!

  The DG (Resettlement), the govt agency tasked with finding jobs for ex-servicemen is able to place about 45000-50000 retirees every year, but here's the catch- 90% of them are as Security Guards! That too on contract, with no job security or pensions. So much for Mr. Anand Mahindra and FICCI's tweets about "blend of experience and discipline" and " creating a talent pool" for industry. Admit it, gentlemen- ex-servicemen are a cheap labour force for you, even with their 15-20 years of training/ experience. The Agniveer minnows, with just 4 years, will be even cheaper fodder for your industrial appetite- if you employ them at all, that is.

  But let us not make the mistake of thinking that the government has a better track record. An Indian Express report of 20th June by Harikishan Sharma ( digital format) reveals a bitter truth. According to rules, the ex-serviceman quota in central PSUs is 14.50% in Group C jobs and 24.50% in Group D category. But information provided by 90 PSUs shows that the actual utilisation of this quota is only 1.15% and 0.3% respectively! So much for the latest assurance of 10% quota in CAPFs and Ministry of Defence undertakings.

  Just about all corporates require a graduation degree for any job above the D, or lowest, grade. The Agniveers will at best be 10+2, and will have little or no meaningful technical skills or training, notwithstanding the Army Chief's tall claims. They will be soldiers after all, needed at our borders, and the Army will not have the luxury of keeping them in training institutes beyond the very basic training. Are our corporates, therefore, ready to take them on as interns, pay for their skill reorientation and give them jobs in management, and on the shop floor? Their past does not hold out much hope for this: social media these days is full of posts from ex-servicemen- even retired officers- whose applications were not even acknowledged, and who remain unemployed even after years.

  But hold on! Maybe I'm being too harsh on our billionaires: perhaps they are just reciprocating the largesse and generosity of this govt. for giving them that corporate tax break a couple of years ago, something which this country can ill afford- almost Rupees 2 lakh crores per annum, which is more than the total pension bill of the armed forces ( including the civilian defense employees). The corporate worthies were supposed to have used these savings for capital investment, increase production and manufacturing, and create some of those 20 million jobs every year that had been promised us in a jumla moment. They haven't done that yet and have pocketed the savings. Why should they, in fact, when its cheaper to sing in a choir ?

  But even a nonchoir type like me can notice that they have struck the wrong note, a falsetto. You can sing for your supper, but it makes for lousy music.


Agnipath : The Kindergarten Mathematics


 SOURCE: 

(a)  https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/agnipath-the-kindergarten-mathematics/2573285/lite/ 

(b)  https://www.gunnersshot.com/?m=1

(c) https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/agniveer-an-army-veterans-detailed-argument-against-agnipath-scheme-part-1/2566452/lite/?utm_source=fe&utm_medium=article3&utm_campaign=relatedstories



I had the opportunity to moderate a CASA webinar on
 Agnipath : The Path Ahead
It was a fascinating discussion. It covered ground hitherto glossed over. The panel was very knowledgeable. To have a  panel comprising of a C-in-C, an AOP and a DGMO going into various issues professionally from different perspectives was enriching. If you are really interested in the Agnipath Scheme and how to take it forward spend time going through the video. It will be worth your while.    







Agnipath : The Kindergarten Mathematics

The nation is embarking on a military transformation of a mammoth order.


What has this got to do with Agnipath and Agniveers? 
                                   It’s the maths.

                                            By 
                          Lt Gen P R Shankar (R)





The movie ‘Hidden Figures’  recounts the time when NASA was first attempting to put a man in space. Scientists are not sure that the orbit they had figured out would enable them to get their astronauts back to earth. An African American lady who is a whizz at maths and space geometry is called upon to work out a safe orbit. She examines the problem and says words to the effect 

              “The answer will be in the maths. Maths cannot be wrong”. 

In the event, she re-works the orbit mathematically using complex equations (including Euler’s and Navier Stokes equations I guess) and presents a solution. The astronaut is launched into space based on her maths. He completes the space orbit and enters back safely into the earth’s atmosphere. This is a true story. However, the hidden truth is in Maths.  


What has this got to do with Agnipath and Agniveers?

It’s the maths.

 Let us not have any doubts. The nation is embarking on a military transformation of a mammoth order. It is similar to entering a space orbit. Full of uncertainties with doubtful outcomes. However as in the movie, if we get the maths right, we can enter the current orbit. Failure to get the Sahi Ganit will leave us stranded in no man’s land. Good maths keeps us in our desired orbit with due course corrections. Look at it this way. I have long been of the opinion that the Indian Armed Forces are strong enough to defend the nation but are not modern enough to enable India’s rise, to be a regional power of consequence. Hence we must get the maths right in this transformational orbit. Otherwise, we might be left struggling to defend the sovereignty and integrity of the nation. Being a regional power of consequence is a later day story.

As against previous articles, time, more inputs and better understanding,  have led to an evolutionary model based on first principles. The model is in four-year blocks from 2022 to 2034. Earlier methods and figures have been applied differently to evolve an easy-to-understand model with relatable timelines. The focus is on the Army, due to its sheer size, the centrality of India’s continental compulsions and its long unresolved land borders with belligerent adversaries. One can never forget that India has always been invaded from its land borders. It has never been invaded from the sea or air. If we get the Indian Army equation right, then we are on our way. Our transformation has to be right from two perspectives. At the top,  we must have the right mix of man and machine in balance. This includes technology, training, age profile, experience, and leadership, in tailormade organisations to meet perceived threats. However all this has to enable the fighting end to execute its tasks. Hence the fighting end, which is represented by units and sub units – companies, squadrons and batteries, must be in harmony and well-honed to face the enemy. After all they are in the business end of “theirs but to do and die, theirs not to reason why”.

In this context, I have heard all the head honchos of India’s military enunciate some issues repetitively. The Agnipath Scheme will stabilise with time…It is a far reaching transformation…It will reduce the age profile of the Army and make it youthful…It will enable better induction of hi-technology…The reduced pension outgo will enable the nation to spend more on modernisation…Those who criticise it cannot understand its vision…Veterans are fixated…This is an era of modern warfare…We have studied models of other armies…so on and so forth. All that is fine. However, we have not seen the maths. The orbit is hazy.

This model analyses  Agnipath quantitatively to identify the problem. Once identified, solutions can be worked out. The model is based on certain assumptions. The four year block principle is based on the four year tenure of the Agniveers. It gives great clarity across time lines. The first and reasonable assumption is that the yearly intake into the Army is 65000 soldiers. This figure has been applied across the entire 17 years of colour service of a soldier in a uniform manner. This intake has stopped for 2020, 2021 and 2022 due to Covid. The resultant shortfall is 65000 x 3 soldiers (which is 1.95 lakhs). This shortfall is not factored for being made up. I think the government will not let this opportunity go. Hence the strength of the Army is being maintained at 10.05 lakhs (12 lakhs – 1.95 lakhs) in the model. If this strength is made up, the imbalances creep up faster. Also,  the government has announced 46000 vacancies for Agniveers. That is for the first six month cycle. The Army share of these vacancies is presumed to be 32500 at present. Over the annual period, it will be 65000. This is assumed to be sustained for the first four year block. After that, it will have to be increased. Incidentally, this model can be tweaked with varying numbers to get different outcomes.   

With these assumptions in place, it is relevant to understand the current structure in the Army. In the basic block of 0-3 years’ service there is no one at present. This three year  block will only go up the ladder without any personnel in that service bracket. In all subsequent blocks, till 17 years of service, there are 65000 personnel per year. Depending upon a two / three year block (as depicted) , each block has 2.6/1.3 L soldiers as can be seen in the graphic below. Once distributed in this fashion there are 0.95 lakhs personnel above the 17 year bracket who are mainly JCOs and senior NCOs. This figure will be constant through time since the highest ranks are always kept filled. It does not mean that there are no JCOs / senior NCOs in lower service blocks. 



In the next four year period, up to 2.6 lakhs Agniveers will be inducted (yellow block AGNI 1 in graphic ). At that time there will be 7.45 lakhs experienced soldiers with more than 4 years’ service. For every three experienced soldiers, there will be one Agniveer. In fact till 2026 there is no adverse effect on the Army. The growth corelationship between the 2022 and 2026 structure is visible through a common colour code for each block and the slanted arrows connecting blocks. This is applicable for all further graphics also    


In the period 2026 – 2030, 75% of the first lot of Agniveers (AGNI 1)would have exited and only 25% (0.65 lakhs) would have been retained. Taking into account the normal exit pattern and the 75% exit of the first lot of Agniveers, there will be a necessity to increase the intake to 4.5 lakhs Agniveers (AGNI 2)in the period up to 2030. If this is not done, the strength of the Army will fall drastically. In this period between 2026 -2030, there will be an ‘experience’ reduction. There will be 5.5 Lakhs experienced soldiers as against 4.5 lakhs experienced soldiers in the system. Experienced vs inexperienced Agniveers will be almost at parity at the macro level.       

The period 2030- 2034  there will be an experience inversion. Taking the model forward it can be seen in the graphic that there will be 4.675 Lakhs of experienced soldiers for 5.375 Agniveers (AGNI3). Beyond this period,  the figures tend to stabilise within in a narrow band. By then the situation will almost be stable and largely irreversible.   



Prima facie it will appear that if the experience vs inexperience ratio is 1:1, it is manageable. However, this is at a macro level. The major issue to understand is that what will be the effect on the unit or subunit due to this changing macro profile. The devil is always in the detail. Let’s us look at the devil.


As modelled previously, the rostered strength of a unit is a taken as 500. It implies five hundred people are held on the unit roster.  Of these, 10% , are permanently sent on Extra Regimental Employment like NCC, HQs, R&D establishments, MCOs etc. These 10% vacancies are given to units on a rotational basis. All those sent out have to be above 5 years’ service and are mostly JCOs/NCOs. Hence the residual War Establishment strength of the unit is 450. In this effective strength, those posted in the unit HQs and specialist sub units are taken as around 120 (27%). This is a conservative assumption.  Resultantly, the number of soldiers in  fighting sub units ie coys/btys/sqns is 330. That makes it about 110 soldiers per sub unit, assuming an uniform triangular pattern of three subunits per unit. The composition of these 110 soldiers is the crux of the issue. It is also a common practice in units to keep the youngest soldier in fighting companies / sabre squadrons / gun batteries. Hence all Agniveers will bunch up at the fighting end. That detailing can be seen in the table below.


In 2026, the macro ratio of 75:25 converts into 62 experienced soldiers for 38 Agniveers in a subunit.   That is fine and stable. As per my experience and wisdom of others, serving and retired, there is no way that the number of inexperienced Agniveers can be more than experienced soldiers in a subunit. If the happens, the fighting capability of the sub unit is suspect. However in the period between 2026 and 2030, there is a sharp inversion. By 2030, while the macro ratio will be 55:45; at subunit level, there will be only 32 experienced soldiers and 68 Agniveers  as can be seen in the table. The inversion will happen around 2028 and the kindergarten will be established. Beyond 2030 and specifically in 2034, the number of experienced soldiers in a subunit will further reduce to only 18.  At that time,  the kindergarten will be filled to the brim. The trick and the solution is to ensure that the experience ratio is always maintained in favour of the experienced. It can be done if flexibility is built in the scheme.   

I have been going by numbers and maths in all my analysis. Incidentally, the gross check on my numbers are that the VCOAS has confirmed that by 2032, there will be 50% Agniveers in the Indian Army. When that figure is reached, the experienced people at the subunits will be around 25 only. If this be so, the repeated assertion by the Political, Security and Military leadership that the operational effectiveness of the Indian Army and the Indian Armed Forces will not be adversely affected but will improve is a mirage in the desert. Further, if we think that by 2028, we will modernise adequately through injection of  high end technology to offset   the reduction in quality of manpower as a result of half-trained  Agniveers; it is being pretty unrealistic. Our track record in modernization and procurement is rather uninspiring. Hence there is an undeniable need for a tweak to make the Agnipath scheme, workable and successful.    

I would beseech those who think I am being pessimistic or am underestimating the prowess of your youth, to rethink. Overall, the maths does not add up. The Agnipath scheme has not been stress-tested by a formal study or trial.  This ‘transformation’ is most likely to enter an orbit without re-entry options. In this article, I have dwelt upon numbers only to identify when the problem will occur. There is also a huge qualitative issue related to reduced training and inadequate time for the mental transformation of a village boy to an effective Agniveer. Both these issues compound the problem severely. These issues need to be attended to holistically. It also needs analysis as to why this has happened and what is the stable way forward. Wisdom needs to prevail on cold logic, facts, and figures. That is what many of us were taught at DSSC were we not? Good old staff work based on diligence. I will attempt that in my next article.    


==============================



INDEX


( )  AG MATHS:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/06/a-b-httpswww.html

( ) AG SELF IMMOLATION: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/06/fitness-for-soldiering-not-just-about.html

( ) AG CIVIL WAR:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/06/agnipath-is-ember-that-can-consume.html

( ) AG CORPORATE:  https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/06/agniveers-and-corporate-choir.html

( ) AG YOUTFULNESS: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/06/fitness-for-soldiering-not-just-about.html

( ) AG INVITATION TO DEFEAT: https://bcvasundhra.blogspot.com/2022/06/snatching-defeat-from-victorys-jaws.html





Friday, June 24, 2022

Agnipath is an Ember that can consume India. Why it’s an invitation to Civil War

 source :

Agnipath an ember that can consume India. Why it’s an invitation to civil war (theprint.in)

https://theprint.in/opinion/agnipath-an-ember-that-can-consume-india-why-its-an-invitation-to-civil-war/1003022/


VIDEO ONE

                                                  [  https://youtu.be/xKFjqbUSwjI ]




 VIDEO TWO                           

                                                    [ https://youtu.be/tHXSdg-jMHA ]


देश के लिए चुनौती बन जाएंगे Agniveer, Agnipath Scheme पर बोले Defence Expert। Aaj Tak 


Agnipath is an Ember that can consume India. Why it’s an invitation to Civil War

SHRUTI KAPILA


The Farakka Express was set on fire by youth protesting against the Centre's Agnipath recruitment scheme for the armed forces at Bihar's Danapur railway station Friday | ANI

( https://youtu.be/jQpcw57A07g )

Param Vir Chakra विजेता Captain Bana Singh बोले,
 देश को खिलौना बनाकर रख दिया है। Agnipath Scheme

The Agnipath scheme poses threat to the Indian national State itself as it can disperse violence and weaponry back to the social order.



Would you like to live in a society where young men have training and access to weapons? This is the fundamental question that the government’s latest Army recruitment scheme Agnipath compels us to ask. The question, and its answer, however, have been obscured by the fires raging across India. Yes, it’s also about India’s youth and employment but others have already weighed in on this.

The Agnipath scheme poses the greatest threat, in fact, to the Indian national State itself as it will disperse violence and weaponry back to the Indian social order. It will create more, not fewer challenges, to the State’s monopoly of violence. 

   Violence is an essentially political question. Who gets to prosecute violence, and towards what end has defined the making of the modern age of the nation-State? The modern State emerged as the correct and sole author of legitimate violence.

Simply put, the modern State bled out internal strife or possibilities of social and religious violence while literally pushing violence to the borders where it is conducted in State uniforms. The simple but hard-won idea is that for societies to be free to flourish, internal peace is a pre-condition and as such, access to violence must be negated in every respect.

This passage to modern life created our era of national armies, based on loyalty, that replaced mercenary armies of princes, pirates, popes, and whatnot that were based on ultimately the ability to pay. The modern State makes social violence illegitimate but also, rather impossible. In short, wars between States, indeed even catastrophic World Wars are ethically wrong yet legitimate. But internal violence such as civil wars, are rendered as wars that only deplete order, are deemed illegitimate but above all, can produce no real winners. 

Who wields the stick?

The primary social exception to the Indian State’s monopoly on violence remains the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). As the largest paramilitary volunteer body, it wields sticks in your neighborhood. You might even approve of this and maybe are even a member. But you need to think about it a little bit beyond any passionate attachment to the RSS. That danda might turn on you!

Consider no other than the original Indian strongman Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. He ensured that the RSS was not dismantled in 1948 but cautioned that their danda in the social body had to be defanged and won over. For Patel, who forged the Indian State’s monopoly over violence, to be sure, their access to violence in society was unacceptable. This was because the evidence before him was overwhelming.

The lifting of the bans on voluntary paramilitary forces of both the Muslim League and the RSS in early 1947 had fuelled the civil war of Partition. New evidence also demonstrates that de-mobbed soldiers after the Second World War were active in the lethal spread of that civil combat that ushered in India’s freedom.

But banning the RSS was, for Patel, not going to be a lasting solution, it needed a change of hearts of the body’s members. If the Modi government is serious about a strong India, it would dissolve the RSS in its centenary year and cut off a competing source of violence to the Indian State. It will be a true tribute to its hero Sardar Patel. Though no writer himself, Patel was all too aware of India’s path to deep colonization.

British Brutal India

India’s colonization by the British was in large measure due to multiple sources of violence in the polity and society. By contrast, the State’s monopoly on violence has ensured the ascendancy and domination of the West even as it exported violence offshore to colonies.

With the loss of central Mughal authority, India became a society at war even though it was a commercial boom-time. Petty and not-so-petty-kings and big zamindars marshaled maneuvered violently against one another for supremacy. The East India Company (from c.1750 -1857) aggressively maneuvered through India’s decentralized but heavily militarized society. India’s loss of freedom to the British was not simply at the rather small battle of Plassey in 1757 when the Company Bahadur gained through that shameful victory the right to collect and spend taxes.

A major driver was the rise of middle castes and groups that created a new dynamic of a large market in military service plus the arrival of new paymasters. Within short years, regional magnates such as those in Awadh, and even sub-empires such as the Marathas were in debt to Indian moneylenders and commercial groups only to keep up the internal warfare. The East Company systematically and aggressively cut through this chase by getting first into business with the moneylenders while fuelling the wars that it finally took over.

By 1770, as the bugles of freedom and democratic revolution were raised in France and America, India became fully colonized and the East India Company became the largest standing army in the world. It became the supreme paymaster with easy access, thanks to slavery and spices, to the world’s silver at its disposal. Tellingly, from 1800 onwards, the Company turned its attention to de-militarising Indian society that included the large and wandering Indian warrior groups, including small rulers, tribal groups including the Bhils and Gosains, and militarised monks such as the gorakhpanthis. It focused on and pursued the prized wars for ultimate supremacy over the big two contenders to the Indian crown, the Marathas and the Sikhs, that were in effect also new warrior-states.

The year 1857 was the last hurrah of the standing order. Soon after that, the British Indian army was created on a strict pattern of recruitment and discipline based on detailed social engineering, and that by and large exists to date.

By usurping and controlling but redirecting and centralizing violent authority, the British Empire became supreme as India was fully de-politicized. For the next 100 years, Indians had no access to commerce or freedom but routinely waged and won wars on behalf of the British Empire. India’s founding fathers understood this all too well.

They produced a new and difficult compact that undid the Empire but crucially equated violent capacities with the Indian national State. You don’t have to read my book but suffice to say that the arch-political antagonists Gandhi and Ambedkar jointly prosecuted a new and democratic compact that squarely addressed the political question of violence as it steered Indian society to nonviolence. Needless to say, and since Independence, there have been violent challenges to India’s order and with varying costs, the Indian State has, by and large, prevailed.

But now, to have opened a scheme of temporary military recruitments where large numbers of men are trained to kill only to return to society after four years without the supervening authority and discipline of the State is to invite and open the door to civil war.

The exact motivations of this dramatic policy announcement are far from clear. Is the RSS the model of a new militarized society, one wonders? That it has been done without consensus or consultation is now an entirely predictable pattern for Narendra Modi’s style of leadership. It has already set large parts of India ablaze and that in itself serves as a red hot and clear warning.

Agnipath is an ember that will, without a doubt, ignite and could consume India. If not rolled back, be warned, that every Indian will become vulnerable to violence.

----------------------------

Shruti Kapila is Professor of Indian history and global political thought at the University of Cambridge. She tweets @shrutikapila. Views are personal.

(Edited by Anurag Chaubey)


Thursday, June 23, 2022

Fitness for Soldiering not just about Youthfulness

 SOURCE:

VIDEO ONE:  

Agnipath: The Inside Story 

https://youtu.be/cy39z6jgJpo


--------------------------------------------------------------

VIDEO TWO:  

Why anti-Agnipath protestors don’t belong in our disciplined army 

: Gens (R) Ata Hasnain & Campose

                                                       https://youtu.be/2vo10goplvU


--------------------------------------------------------------
MISCONCEIVED EXERCISE IN FUTILITY

A lot is emerging both in News media and Social media on AGNIPATH. There is an attempted and immature or not-so-confident effort by the Government and the affected Establishments [Army, Navy & Air Force to justify and convince the apprehension of the Consumers ie aspirants, would be , AGNIVEERS and their Parents/ families ] At times specific questions were asked on the NEED for CHANGE, the SHAPE of FINAL Template at the end of four years and further , Disposal of released 75 percent and their future with reference to the existing job market. ESTABLISHMENT is totally vague on the Pattern and Shape of units and composition with reference to composition percentages of AGNIVEERS, REGULARS, and some even have uttered the word very vaguely ON CONTRACT. From the clues and data having spoken in the media, it looks that this AGNIPATH is heavily modeled on "the RUSSIAN MODEL". Below is an ARTICLE REPRODUCED on RUSSIAN MODEL AND UTTER FAILURE OF THIS MODEL. IN THE ONGOING WAR IN UKRAINE for perusal. NO COMMENTS ARE OFFERED AND IT HAS BEEN LEFT TO THE READERS TO MAKE THEIR OWN OBSERVATIONS AND JUDGEMENT. It will not be a surprise that this may even result in the COLLAPSE & DISINTEGRATION OF RUSSIA 👇🏿👇🏿












Fitness for Soldiering not just about Youthfulness

                                   Lt Gen NPS Hira (Retd)

                            Former Deputy Chief of Army Staff



This whole argument that the Indian Army soldiers are old and, therefore, the military needs a reform of the Agnipath type is a made-up argument. Individuals normally don’t do very well in their first exposure to fire. Operations need battle-hardened soldiers and not greenhorns. The word ‘veteran’ when used in the context of the Army, signifies exactly that. It is the combination of physical fitness, endurance, and experience which delivers in the battle.




TRANSFORMATION: The health of most recruits starts improving only after they start getting proper nutrition in the Army. - File photo


THE Agnipath scheme has become one of the most discussed schemes related to the military. Since the government has taken a decision to implement it, the services chiefs were at pains to describe its benefits during its launch ceremony. The benefits stated are, a more youthful profile, more technology-savvy and more diverse manpower available to the military. The age profile planned for entry is 17.5 to 21 years (raised to 23 as a one-time relaxation). A youngster who is physically and academically good, normally, makes it in the first chance. The age bracket of the majority of the Agniveers in the unit is likely to be 18 to 23 years. The average age of a sepoy will be around 21-22 years.

The requirement of physical fitness in the Army is utmost in the infantry, they being foot soldiers. Therefore, it is appropriate to discuss this issue in the context of an infantry battalion. I am an infantry officer. I have served with my unit across all terrains, including in active operations, therefore, I may share my first-hand experience. The soldiers, on whom we actually depend for the better part, for the most difficult of the tasks, including those which require extreme physical challenges, are not the raw soldiers. With some exceptions, the most adapted soldiers are in the age bracket of 22 to 35 years.

 Before I discuss the reasons, I would explain the foreign armies that have adopted such measures. In developed countries, their folks are not willing to join the armed forces as a full career. Some of those countries had to resort to conscription and the others had to incentivize the military service for getting their people to serve a short stint in the military. We have seen that these militaries are not doing very well in operations. The argument being put forward in favor of Agnipath does not rest on any substantiated merit.

The kind of physical fitness required of a soldier is not just related to age. An infantry soldier needs to carry 30 to 35 kg of weight in battle because he needs to be self-sustained for logistics as well as ammunition. Some of them have to carry machine guns, mortars, and other man-pack weapon systems. The additional loads are shared within the entire fighting sub-unit. Even in the most advanced countries armies, the soldiers have to carry that much weight. Technology has provided no succor to that. Technology has made some of the equipment lighter than before, but at the same time, it has added some more technical equipment for battlefield situational awareness and so on. The soldiers need to have the necessary mass and strength in their bodies so that they can carry that much weight into the battle.

Anyone who has visited any Indian Army recruitment training center would have noticed that almost 80 percent of our recruits do not have the muscle mass necessary for a soldier. We are genetically not as well-built as the people in western countries. Only a small percentage of our recruits have had enough milk or ghee at home. The others come from very modest backgrounds. Their health actually starts improving after they start getting proper nutrition in the Army. In the Indian Army, the graph of physical fitness of a soldier actually starts going up after he joins the Army. It moves up through his 20s, then it flattens and starts going down at around 35 years. This is the reason why a soldier is taken into the Army for 15 years and not allowed beyond that.

On the issue of physical fitness, western countries are better placed than we. Even at a young age, their citizens have much higher body mass, including arms’ strength. Our recruits are good at long-distance running, but they are very lightly built, particularly in the upper body. It takes around five years of service for them to build their bodies and toughen up to carry the battle loads.

The infantry units hold regular professional weapons competitions, like mortars firing, MMG firing, anti-tank weapons, commando platoon and so on. They need to carry complete battle loads and fire their weapons to the best of accuracy. One will not see many jawans below 21 or 22 years taking part in those competitions. Our most adopted lot of soldiers, even in the infantry which needs the most physically fit jawans as compared to any other arm, do not mostly belong to the Agnipath service bracket. It is not just for competition, this factor applies across the board, whenever we need to pick up jawans for the most sensitive operations on the Line of Control or in insurgency areas.

 If the crunch issue is youthful profile, why would the infantry not pick the young soldiers for the most sensitive tasks? When the whole sub-unit has to take part, then everyone goes, but that does not prove the point that we are taking the younger ones because of their youthful profile. This whole argument that the Indian Army soldiers are old and, therefore, the military needs a reform of the Agnipath type is a made-up argument. Individuals normally do not do very well in their first exposure to gunfire. Operations need battle-hardened soldiers and not greenhorns. The word ‘veteran’ when used in the context of the Army, signifies exactly that. It is the combination of physical fitness, endurance and experience which delivers in the battle.

The second issue is about technology adoption. The younger generation is definitely more technology-savvy, but the Army will not gain by changing its soldiers every four years. Some of the weapon systems are so complex that the jawans need a fairly long time to learn to exploit them and gain confidence.

Agnipath will help the government save on its pension bill. However, the other two arguments put up in support of Agnipath do not stand scrutiny against past experience.

The government has also decided to do away with caste-based regiments in the Army. Our experience with the all-India regiments has been as good. At the same time, we need to appreciate that regimentation in a mixed unit is a function of long service in the unit. Therefore, there is a direct link between the changes proposed by the government. Strong regimentation, be it through the caste bond or long service together, is one of the reasons why the Army units can take on much heavier casualties, as compared to most western armies.

Taking the performance of military for granted can be disastrous like Russian President Putin has realized. Four years of service for a jawan in our context is too less. It is likely to be disruptive and will need modification down the line.