PART ONE of THREE PARTS
MACHINATIONS OF A MACHIAVELLIAN
CHAPTER -1
THE GENERAL OF THE GENERALS
MACHIAVELLIAN
" SHEKAR GUPTA "
Source:
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/national-interest-disarming-kashmir/1204466/3
National Interest: Disarming Kashmir
Use Modi's call for debate on Art 370 for a bold rethink —
begin with role of the army.
First, a disclosure. Narendra Modi's call for a fresh debate on Article 370 is not the provocation for this week's 'National Interest', though it could very well have been so.
My inspiration, on the other hand, was more personal. At breakfast in a hotel coffee shop in Mumbai last week, a guest walked up. After saying nice things to me about our paper, he said he had only one complaint: that we had paid no attention to the plight of Kashmiri Pandits, while we go on and on about the Gujarat riots of 2002. I argued it wasn't a zero-sum game and both were terrible contemporary tragedies, and that it wasn't fair to say that the media had underplayed one while exaggerating the other.
But an argumentative Indian doesn't give in so easily, particularly one who is a regular Indian Express reader. So he asked me how exercised anybody had been about the "half a million Pandits exiled" from Kashmir and "2,000 killed in cold blood", while "a thousand Muslims killed in Gujarat" was such a big story. He said he wasn't a Kashmiri Pandit either. He had merely married one.
Now, there is nothing more painful, even infuriating, than the idea that the lives and safety of one set of your countrymen be valued differently from another's, just because they happen to be from different faiths or regions. So I said, at the risk of over-simplification and with some convenient rounding off of numbers, that if you think a half million Pandits were exiled, a half million Indian soldiers armed with the most illiberal of laws have been fighting to "rectify" things in the state. And if you say that 2,000 Pandits have been killed, something like a hundred thousand Kashmiri Muslims have been killed (though not all necessarily by our soldiers) in Kashmir's 24-year maelstrom (remember, the attacks on Pandits started in 1989). So what are you complaining about? But if you think that was crude on my part (which it was), listen to his response: "Oh, really, that many Kashmiri Muslims have been killed! Then it's ok. But why isn't the media telling the world that?" I realised that this argument was going someplace I did not particularly want to go. Definitely not when a very busy day was just beginning.
It was the very same afternoon that Modi made his statement on Article 370, and it was interesting coming from somebody ranking at the very top of secular demonology. It is early days, but I'll stick my neck out and say it is the first time you have heard a new idea on India's most significant internal and external security challenge from a BJP leader since Atal Bihari Vajpayee's brilliant and statesmanly offer to talk to Kashmiris within the framework of "insaniyat" (humanity) and not limit himself to that cliched parameter, India's Constitution. Vajpayee knew better than most that the deepest, most painful scars are emotional. The healing touch for them has to be emotional too. It can't be a few more leaves out of your chequebook, nor any further tightening of the spiral of curfews and executions.
If you were a strategic affairs analyst, one of your biggest frustrations with the UPA would be that it has wasted 10 years of peace, so rare in India's history. In these 10 years, India could have embarked on an irreversible and visionary modernisation, re-equipping and re-orienting its armed forces. But given the Bapu Nadkarni-style leadership of our defence establishment, we have avoided any change or risk-taking altogether (Nadkarni rarely let anybody score or got him out, he also tried not to get out by not scoring. He holds the one Test cricket world record that will forever remain Indian: 21 consecutive maiden overs, against the usual suspect of the Sixties, England. And had figures of 32 overs, 27 maidens, 5 runs, and most importantly, no wickets). All three wings of our armed forces are doctrinally where they were in 2004 and have the same weaponry, too. But more importantly, this Nadkarni mindset has infiltrated strategic policymaking as well. A government that made such a revolutionary strategic shift by signing the nuclear deal with the US and was rewarded for it by voters in 2009 has not come up with one new idea or initiative on Kashmir. The one political initiative it took, the appointment of a team of interlocutors, was dumped and their report put in cold storage.
Because its politics is frozen, it has introduced an unprecedented new factor in Indian policymaking: a veto for the army. So the government, the prime minister, would want to settle Siachen and even think it is low-hanging fruit. But what to do, the army doesn't agree. Of course, with such relative peace and normalcy on the ground, there is scope for a partial thinning of army presence and at least some symbolic dilution of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. But no, the army vetoes it, and does so in public. So which country are we living in?
Nobody wishes to be confused with facts these days, so why blame my outraged new friend at breakfast. Yet, we must state them. At the peak of the Kashmir insurgency, we would lose up to 500 soldiers a year. The graph has declined so dramatically and progressively since 2003 that in all of 2012, only 17 of our uniformed men lost their lives in and around the Kashmir Valley. Civilian casualties have declined accordingly. An armed skirmish now takes place once in a few months. I am conscious of the protests this will bring. As also of the dangers of over-simplification. But I cannot help underlining what one of India's most respected former (and soldierly) generals, with five tenures in Kashmir, tells me. That in the past five years, the army has built more new golf courses and guest houses in Kashmir than the number of encounters it's had to fight.
If you are a student of modern military history, you can see how difficult armies find it to return home in victory. A retreat in defeat leaves you no choice. But a retreat in victory, get your head examined. But leaders, political and military, who are more far-sighted and large-hearted than this turn the course of history. As Indira Gandhi and Sam Manekshaw did after 1971. From the day of the Pakistani surrender, they embarked on a prompt and decisive withdrawal plan. On the other hand, Vajpayee, Brajesh Mishra and L.K. Advani lost their "victory" moment during Operation Parakram. On January 12, 2002, within the first month of the Parliament attack and military build-up, Pervez Musharraf made his most grovelling speech ever, even talking of handing over the 20 on India's most wanted list if they are found in Pakistan, because "we have not given asylum to anyone". That is when the NDA should have declared victory in coercive diplomacy, and without having to fight a war they had never intended to. But they missed it and wasted almost two years searching for face-savers.
In the Valley today, if there was a military objective, it has been achieved. You can't be so stupid as to suggest we declare victory against our own people. But the fact is, the Lashkars have been roundly defeated in the Valley while they play havoc in Pakistan and savour a big forthcoming victory in Afghanistan. Such a significant change on the ground has to reflect in our policy on Kashmir, and towards Kashmiris. If the people of Kashmir have given us back peace and tranquility, they deserve a thank-you note. And because the army has delivered as much as any tough modern army could, it needs a respite too. So strengthen the LoC even more than before, but do de-escalate within the Valley. Let the people of Kashmir also start enjoying the fruits of peace in dignity. And if any Hizb or Lashkar thugs again surface some place, you can easily confront them with overwhelming force within minutes. This war was not against our own Kashmiris, Hindu or Muslim, nor between them. This was a proxy war launched from Pakistan and they have been defeated. Why then should Kashmir remain frozen now? Why should the Kashmiris be condemned to even less aspiration than their fellow Indians in Chhattisgarh?
That is why the time to think creatively is now. Politics has to build on military success. Armies that stay on too long after fulfilling their immediate task tend to become lazy and complacent, even if not armies of occupation. Just to mention four recent examples: the 16 Cavalry HQ, raided by a Lashkar gang on September 26, had just one sentry at its entrance. The eight Assam Regiment soldiers killed in an ambush near Srinagar were returning from leave, in uniform, but were not carrying any arms. The five-man patrol annihilated on the night of August 5 in the Poonch sector, was probably caught napping, literally. And two soldiers of the 13 Raj Rif Regiment were earlier waylaid and killed in the Mendhar region in January. The lesson is, no army can stay fully at battle-stations even in times of peace. And no democracy can wait till its army can declare victory against its own people.
We have to learn from our own history of settling the Naga and Mizo insurgencies. You prove your military strength, but leave the final solution to open-minded negotiators and politicians. Kashmir is at that inflection point now. That is why Modi asking for a debate on Article 370, while his party has a six-decade-long holy commitment to abrogate it, is a welcome change. Kashmir is crying out for a new set of peacetime and political ideas. You cannot find a Kashmir settlement with Pakistan before embracing your own Kashmiris and restoring trust with them first.
sg@expressindia.com
PART TWO OF THREE PARTS
CHAPTER - 2
A FIGHTERS COMMENTS
Source:
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/-victory--in-the-valley/1206096/0
‘Victory’ in the Valley
Wed Dec 11 2013, 12:54 hrs
Define what it means before you decide what the army should do.
For the first time in years, a newspaper's leadership has thrown up a serious
strategic issue for debate. Kashmir is far too complex for inexperienced minds
to fully comprehend and there are so many stakeholders it confounds even those
who have a semblance of an idea. In a recent article in this paper ('Disarming
Kashmir', IE, December 7, goo.gl/SWPD7G), Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta talks
about victory in the 24-year standoff and the necessity of an early withdrawal
of the army from Kashmir's hinterland. We must first highlight what Gupta is
seeking through this thought-provoking article. He says the army has become
weary and therefore less professional, having lost soldiers in tactical
operations this year. He wants the army to strengthen the LoC and de-escalate in
the Valley, because Kashmiris, he says, must get a part of the "peace" dividend.
He takes a dig, saying that some respected general with five tenures in the
Valley had told him that, having defeated the Lashkar, the army has only been
building golf courses and guest houses for the last five years. He adds that if
any of these bad boys show their faces in Kashmir again, the army can come back
to sort them out. He claims that the military objective in Kashmir (if any was
spelt out) has been achieved and, that the UPA government has veritably
introduced a new concept of governance — veto power (on strategic decisions) for
the army. One of the most important points Gupta makes is, "you cannot find a
Kashmir settlement with Pakistan before embracing your own Kashmiris and
restoring trust with them first".
On the face of it, this article evokes negatives all the way but re-reads
throw up issues which need serious pondering.
Unfortunately, not many are aware
of the degree of intellectual analysis that the army itself has done of its role
in Kashmir. It recently organised a full deliberation on the concept of victory
at the Army War College, Mhow.
The first question is: have we ever enunciated an aim in Kashmir? In all
these years, there never has been a clearly stated political aim given to the
security forces. The informally stated military aim was stabilisation by
controlling infiltration and eliminating terrorists. No one realises that in
such situations, political and military aims cannot be separated. In 2011, we
enunciated our own joint politico-military aim for our commanders — "integrate
Jammu and Kashmir with mainstream India, politically, economically, socially and
psychologically". We were clear that eliminating terrorists was the easiest part
of this war, that eliminating "terrorism" was the real challenge. I wish Gupta
had faulted the army for not demanding the articulation of a politico-military
aim as fighting without an aim is actually unfair. The lack of such an aim
results in exactly what Gupta has done — declaring victory prematurely. Victory
has to be measured against an aim, or else all kinds of versions are thrown
around. We also have to measure victory against a realistic assessment of the
future. Afghanistan 2014 with all its imponderables looms before us; any idea of
victorious peace and subsequent actions has to be connected to it. Incidentally,
I am speaking of victory as not against the people of Kashmir but for them, and
against the intent of Pakistan, the separatists and terror groups.
It is essential to explain a few things to those with limited military
orientation. First, Kashmir is a case of rim-land insurgency. It is not the LoC
alone that needs to be strong. In the event of conventional war with Pakistan,
the hinterland of Kashmir is as important as the LoC. It is here that the
strategic assets exist, along with strategic arteries, which can be choked in
war. Remember, in each Indo-Pak war, Pakistan has depended on the Kashmiri
people to rise against us. Second, the larger number of incidents, and the loss
of brave soldiers, this year should make us re-evaluate the actual military
situation in the Valley. Ironically, this is least important in assessing
victory. In counter-insurgency/ counter-terrorism campaigns, the answer finally
lies in what the people think. Third, in all these years, no serious attempt was
made to project to the Kashmiri people how and why their future lay only with
India. The only agency that did this was the army. No government agency has ever
put together a psychological campaign to win the confidence of the people. The
army did it because it is a part of its professional responsibility and all
international military counter-insurgency experience talks of winning hearts and
minds (WHAM). The "hearts doctrine" articulated by the army in 2011-12 was the
first strategically oriented WHAM programme in Kashmir. Separatism and
radicalism run hand in hand in the Valley and it will take years of committed
campaigning before these are diluted — the on and off presence of terror groups
doesn't help. Who has the capability to strategise, plan and stay committed to
such a campaign but the army? To presume that the army has done its job and
should hand over the responsibility to civilian agencies is absolutely correct,
provided there are agencies who can take it forward to "peace". If there is
none, why rue the army's insistence that its work must not be undone?
Twenty-four years of institutional wisdom need not be sacrificed in the urgency
for declaring a premature victory.
A few other observations by Gupta are designed to provoke non-intellectual
minds, but they deserve a brief comment. The number of soldiers lost in negative
incidents in a year is never reflective of the capability of an army fighting
terrorism. Moreover, the deployment of the regular army in the hinterland is at
its minimum today. The army's Rashtriya Rifles (RR) operates in the hinterland
and its soldiers never get exhausted because it has a well-thought-out relief
programme. Tactical minds within the RR also rue their presence among the
populace, to neutralise just a handful of terrorists each year. This really is
the problem — a misunderstanding that the RR's task is to kill terrorists alone,
and not recognising that the task of a counter-insurgency force is to cement the
separatist population with the mainstream. There is something else that our
countrymen need to know about the RR: the highly professional and experienced
military force is our add-on resource for conventional operations, especially
now that 110 wings of Pakistan's Frontier Corps (the country's virtual RR) have
received operational experience and modern weaponry to make them force
multipliers. That is a major reason why the RR cannot be disbanded or
re-deployed for counter-insurgency tasks in Naxal-affected areas.
To claim victory over terror groups is premature also because the number of
surrendered terrorists in the Valley (all with different shades of antipathy to
the establishment) is much higher than the number of terrorists in holding camps
and launch pads in PoK. None of the promises (by the state government or the
police) to these surrendered terrorists has been fulfilled, creating a potential
resource for home terror.
Gupta's most potent statement is, "Because its (the government's) politics is
frozen, it has introduced an unprecedented new factor in Indian policymaking: a
veto for the army". Seeking and giving professional military advice is a part of
governance and on Siachen, Kashmir or Manipur, the army has offered just that.
If you go by this accusation, every proposal by the army should have been
accepted. In the case of Siachen, it is the trust deficit that prevents the
vacation of the Saltoro Ridge; on the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act, 1990, the government almost relented but the only organisation that
offered a rationale for its retention was the army. Its arguments went well
beyond the ordinary, explaining just how it was balancing hard and soft power in
the emerging situation and just how the AFSPA was only an umbrella to be used in
an emergency. The army likes a cemented victory and celebration for the people,
not a half-baked one which gives adversaries reason for glee.
The general with five tenures in Kashmir who says the army is out of a job
needs to revisit Kashmir. Not a single new golf course has come up and yes,
guest rooms are indeed necessary to ensure that more armchair strategists visit
Kashmir to be briefed at Keran, Machel, Gurez, Uri, Sopore, Tral and Shopian,
before passing judgement on their professional army. Don't just visit Srinagar,
Gulmarg and Pahalgam to make up your mind because the advice you will then
proffer will never meet the professional needs of our army or that of our
nation. Learn to trust your army — it is your army.
The writer Syed Ata Hasnain is a recently-retired Lt. General, is a
former general officer commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps
PART THREE OF THREE PARTS
CHAPTER - 3
"VIEWS OF A THINK TANK"
Source:
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/IsItTimetoWithdrawtheArmyfromKashmir_vchadha_131213
Is It Time to Withdraw the Army from Kashmir?
By
AUTH:
PART THREE OF THREE PARTS
CHAPTER - 3
"VIEWS OF A THINK TANK"
Source:
http://idsa.in/idsacomments/IsItTimetoWithdrawtheArmyfromKashmir_vchadha_131213
Is It Time to Withdraw the Army from Kashmir?
By
December 13, 2013
A study of insurgencies reveals that security forces tend to lose the support of intelligentsia and media, as the movement tends to prolong. It is often a result of either low levels of violence or casualties, beginning of an electoral process and the re-establishment of local administration machinery. More importantly, it is the result of missing the wood for the trees. This is especially true for Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
A recent opinion piece by the Editor of a major national daily, argued that it is time for the withdrawal of the army from Kashmir. In his article, he alludes to the army vetoing government proposals on Siachen troops withdrawal and dilution of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). He contends that past conditions represented “a proxy war launched from Pakistan and they have been defeated”. He further adds that if “Hizb or Lashkar thugs again surface some place, you can easily confront them with overwhelming force within minutes.” Finally, in order to illustrate peace on ground, he quotes a figure of 17 security force casualties in 2012.1
The spirit of the article rightly highlights the need to build upon the peace dividend, offered by the relative conditions of peace in the state. The need for bold and imaginative political initiatives, as must always be the case for final settlement of popular discontentment, is also seconded without reservation. However, the reading of the situation and solutions offered indicates a rather simplistic understanding of conditions in India’s neighbourhood and within the state.
The assertion that the army can veto a government proposal on issues like Siachen or AFSPA, is either a case of misunderstanding of constitutional powers and privileges, or an under estimation of parliamentary democracy. The last sixty years have proved on more occasion than one that the armed forces remain firmly under the control of civilian leadership in India. It has also been seen that decision making remains a function of elected representatives, albeit with advice from various state organs. Therefore, while the advice of the army on both issues is in public domain to deduce that this advice functions as a veto, is a gross overestimation of the powers and influence of the men in uniform. The government receives inputs from various sources, as a prelude to decision making. Critical inputs are provided by intelligence agencies, as well as state and central administrative representatives. Army happens to be one amongst these agencies.
The article also declares defeat of Pakistan’s proxy war in J&K. This would be the likely conclusion, if the basis of assessments are the violence figures between 2008 and 2012 (Table 1).
Source: Annual Report 2012-13, Ministry of Home Affairs2
However, a careful analysis of existing circumstances belies these claims and can often throw up misleading results. A brief look at the increased violence figures along the LoC, not only highlights this paradox, but also provides a sign of times to come in 2014. 2013 witnessed the highest ceasefire violations in eight years.
This was also accompanied by a sharp increase in security force casualties until August 18, 2013. By this time, 36 soldiers had already been killed, as compared to 15 during the complete 2012. This was also accompanied by higher numbers of successful infiltration, which is borne by an increase in security force casualties within the state. This is by no stretch of imagination a situation, which can be classified as return of normalcy in the state. The security situation in the state is not only linked with the conditions along the LoC but also geo-political realities in India’s neighbourhood.
A closer look at the events in the Af-Pak region suggest that the de-induction of US led forces from Afghanistan in 2014, is likely to become a tipping point for Pakistan to re-establish its control by proxy in that country. This could witness, a deflection of jehadi forces from Afghanistan towards their next battle ground in Kashmir. Irrespective of this possible deflection of jehadi forces, the end of war in Afghanistan is definitely likely to result in release of Pakistani forces deployed in the region and their re-deployment along traditional areas of the border with India. Both these factors will strengthen Pakistan’s ability to heighten tensions along the Line of Control (LoC), as also induct terrorists through vulnerable areas. This should in turn call for careful analysis and monitoring of the developing situation in India’s neighbourhood.
The call for de-induction of the army from the state is also misleading. The deployment in J&K follows a three tier pattern. The urban areas are provided security by the local police and central police forces. The rural hinterland has the deployment of Rashtriya Rifles (RR), which is a para military force. The army is deployed on the LoC, with the task of maintaining the territorial integrity of the country and stopping infiltration of terrorists. Therefore, any call for de-induction of the “army” is misleading. If it is presumed that the call actually pertains to the RR, then it needs careful analysis if its areas of deployment are peaceful enough for denudation of forces. It also needs to be questioned if the already stretched CRPF, which also looks after Naxal hit areas has the numbers and capacity to undertake this additional responsibility. The army has maintained for long that deployment in counterinsurgency areas adversely impacts its ability to concentrate on its primary role of guarding the nation’s borders. It is in the interest of the country and the army that the CRPF takes over these responsibilities. However, the question that begs an answer is, whether the CRPF is ready for this task?
The final assertion of the article deals with the ability to redeploy in case of an adverse situation in a matter of “minutes”. It needs to be understood that the mere deployment of a force is not a guarantee for its immediate effectiveness. Unlike flag marches in aid to civil authorities, deployment in terrorist infected areas requires the buildup of operational and intelligence network by units, which takes months if not years of diligent effort. Secondly, the initial deployment of security forces in an area is often referred to as the “kinetic” phase of operations, which is usually accompanied by heavier casualties and collateral damage, given the large presence of terrorists. Therefore, re-deployment is likely to be accompanied by not only greater security force casualties, but more importantly civilian ones as well. Therefore, any decision to de-induct forces must be deliberate, reasoned and well considered.
Over a period of time, some sections within the media and intelligentsia have misunderstood the army’s presence in disturbed areas as a reflection of its vested interests. It is time that the reality of its role and responsibility are better understood and articulated. The induction of the army in an internal security scenario is accompanied by the task of bringing violence down to levels, wherein, the elected representatives of the state and the administrative machinery can function effectively. At this stage, political negotiations attempt to find a respectable and long term solution to the problem at hand. Therefore, the timing of these negotiations and the call to undertake bold measures must be a decision guided by the elected representatives of the country. The army was and shall remain one of the cogs in the wheel that assists in the running of state machinery.
The reduction of the army’s numbers, visibility and presence must come. However, the prevailing realities in India’s neighbourhood, its impact on J&K, as well as the recent spurt in violence suggest that the time is not opportune for this decision. It would be appropriate to better understand the impact of US led de-induction from Afghanistan in 2014, along with the conditions both on the LoC and inside the state, before a decision on the issue is taken.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
A recent opinion piece by the Editor of a major national daily, argued that it is time for the withdrawal of the army from Kashmir. In his article, he alludes to the army vetoing government proposals on Siachen troops withdrawal and dilution of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). He contends that past conditions represented “a proxy war launched from Pakistan and they have been defeated”. He further adds that if “Hizb or Lashkar thugs again surface some place, you can easily confront them with overwhelming force within minutes.” Finally, in order to illustrate peace on ground, he quotes a figure of 17 security force casualties in 2012.1
The spirit of the article rightly highlights the need to build upon the peace dividend, offered by the relative conditions of peace in the state. The need for bold and imaginative political initiatives, as must always be the case for final settlement of popular discontentment, is also seconded without reservation. However, the reading of the situation and solutions offered indicates a rather simplistic understanding of conditions in India’s neighbourhood and within the state.
The assertion that the army can veto a government proposal on issues like Siachen or AFSPA, is either a case of misunderstanding of constitutional powers and privileges, or an under estimation of parliamentary democracy. The last sixty years have proved on more occasion than one that the armed forces remain firmly under the control of civilian leadership in India. It has also been seen that decision making remains a function of elected representatives, albeit with advice from various state organs. Therefore, while the advice of the army on both issues is in public domain to deduce that this advice functions as a veto, is a gross overestimation of the powers and influence of the men in uniform. The government receives inputs from various sources, as a prelude to decision making. Critical inputs are provided by intelligence agencies, as well as state and central administrative representatives. Army happens to be one amongst these agencies.
The article also declares defeat of Pakistan’s proxy war in J&K. This would be the likely conclusion, if the basis of assessments are the violence figures between 2008 and 2012 (Table 1).
Table 1 - Trends of Terrorist Violence in J&K
| Year | Incidents | SFs Killed | Civilians Killed | Terrorists Killed |
| 2005 | 1990 | 189 | 557 | 917 |
| 2006 | 1667 | 151 | 389 | 591 |
| 2007 | 1092 | 110 | 158 | 472 |
| 2008 | 708 | 75 | 91 | 339 |
| 2009 | 499 | 79 | 71 | 239 |
| 2010 | 488 | 69 | 47 | 232 |
| 2011 | 340 | 33 | 31 | 100 |
| 2012 | 220 | 15 | 15 | 72 |
Source: Annual Report 2012-13, Ministry of Home Affairs2
However, a careful analysis of existing circumstances belies these claims and can often throw up misleading results. A brief look at the increased violence figures along the LoC, not only highlights this paradox, but also provides a sign of times to come in 2014. 2013 witnessed the highest ceasefire violations in eight years.
This was also accompanied by a sharp increase in security force casualties until August 18, 2013. By this time, 36 soldiers had already been killed, as compared to 15 during the complete 2012. This was also accompanied by higher numbers of successful infiltration, which is borne by an increase in security force casualties within the state. This is by no stretch of imagination a situation, which can be classified as return of normalcy in the state. The security situation in the state is not only linked with the conditions along the LoC but also geo-political realities in India’s neighbourhood.
A closer look at the events in the Af-Pak region suggest that the de-induction of US led forces from Afghanistan in 2014, is likely to become a tipping point for Pakistan to re-establish its control by proxy in that country. This could witness, a deflection of jehadi forces from Afghanistan towards their next battle ground in Kashmir. Irrespective of this possible deflection of jehadi forces, the end of war in Afghanistan is definitely likely to result in release of Pakistani forces deployed in the region and their re-deployment along traditional areas of the border with India. Both these factors will strengthen Pakistan’s ability to heighten tensions along the Line of Control (LoC), as also induct terrorists through vulnerable areas. This should in turn call for careful analysis and monitoring of the developing situation in India’s neighbourhood.
The call for de-induction of the army from the state is also misleading. The deployment in J&K follows a three tier pattern. The urban areas are provided security by the local police and central police forces. The rural hinterland has the deployment of Rashtriya Rifles (RR), which is a para military force. The army is deployed on the LoC, with the task of maintaining the territorial integrity of the country and stopping infiltration of terrorists. Therefore, any call for de-induction of the “army” is misleading. If it is presumed that the call actually pertains to the RR, then it needs careful analysis if its areas of deployment are peaceful enough for denudation of forces. It also needs to be questioned if the already stretched CRPF, which also looks after Naxal hit areas has the numbers and capacity to undertake this additional responsibility. The army has maintained for long that deployment in counterinsurgency areas adversely impacts its ability to concentrate on its primary role of guarding the nation’s borders. It is in the interest of the country and the army that the CRPF takes over these responsibilities. However, the question that begs an answer is, whether the CRPF is ready for this task?
The final assertion of the article deals with the ability to redeploy in case of an adverse situation in a matter of “minutes”. It needs to be understood that the mere deployment of a force is not a guarantee for its immediate effectiveness. Unlike flag marches in aid to civil authorities, deployment in terrorist infected areas requires the buildup of operational and intelligence network by units, which takes months if not years of diligent effort. Secondly, the initial deployment of security forces in an area is often referred to as the “kinetic” phase of operations, which is usually accompanied by heavier casualties and collateral damage, given the large presence of terrorists. Therefore, re-deployment is likely to be accompanied by not only greater security force casualties, but more importantly civilian ones as well. Therefore, any decision to de-induct forces must be deliberate, reasoned and well considered.
Over a period of time, some sections within the media and intelligentsia have misunderstood the army’s presence in disturbed areas as a reflection of its vested interests. It is time that the reality of its role and responsibility are better understood and articulated. The induction of the army in an internal security scenario is accompanied by the task of bringing violence down to levels, wherein, the elected representatives of the state and the administrative machinery can function effectively. At this stage, political negotiations attempt to find a respectable and long term solution to the problem at hand. Therefore, the timing of these negotiations and the call to undertake bold measures must be a decision guided by the elected representatives of the country. The army was and shall remain one of the cogs in the wheel that assists in the running of state machinery.
The reduction of the army’s numbers, visibility and presence must come. However, the prevailing realities in India’s neighbourhood, its impact on J&K, as well as the recent spurt in violence suggest that the time is not opportune for this decision. It would be appropriate to better understand the impact of US led de-induction from Afghanistan in 2014, along with the conditions both on the LoC and inside the state, before a decision on the issue is taken.
Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India.
AUTH:
Annual Reports
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2012-2013.
(6.43 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2011-2012.
(8.66 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2010-2011.
(16.48 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2009-2010.
(7.8 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2008-2009.
(6.8 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2007-2008.
(13.14 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2006-2007.
(2.24 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2005-2006.
(1.85 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2004-2005.
(2.6 MB)
- Annual Report Ministry of Home Affairs 2003-2004. (1024
KB)
