Sunday, March 15, 2015

GWADAR: A STRATEGIC SEAPORT

SOURCE
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143227/syed-fazl-e-haider/a-strategic-seaport?cid=nlc-foreign_affairs_this_week-031215-a_strategic_seaport_5-031215&sp_mid=48214866&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1



      GWADAR: A STRATEGIC SEAPORT

Is Pakistan Key to China's Energy Supremacy?





Pakistan's President Mamnoon Hussain and China's President Xi Jinping talk after a signing ceremony at the Xijiao State Guesthouse in Shanghai, May 2014.
(Kenzaburo Fukuhara / Courtesy Reuters)


A seaport in southwest Pakistan may hold the key to China’s energy supremacy. At least, that’s what China hopes. The Gwadar port, which China has built and will operate in the province of Balochistan, is situated near the Strait of Hormuz, a major oil-shipping lane that can serve as an energy corridor from western China through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf.

Beijing’s pivot to Pakistan is a substantial one. The story goes back to 2008, when Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf proposed a railroad and an oil pipeline to link Gwadar to the Kashi port in Xinjiang—allowing China to take advantage of the shortest possible route to the Middle East. In exchange, Pakistan would get an influx of Chinese investment. Indeed, in 2014, the Chinese government committed to spending $45.6 billion over the next six years to build the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which will include the construction of highways, railways, and natural gas and oil pipelines connecting China to the Middle East.

China’s stake in Gwadar will also allow it to expand its influence in the Indian Ocean, a vital route for oil transportation between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

( CONSIDER? SIMULTANEOUSLY IN CONJUNCTION WITH PAK NAVY DENY THE SAME TO INDIA!!!! )

Another advantage to China is that it will be able to bypass the Strait of Malacca. As of now, 60 percent of China's imported oil comes from the Middle East, and 80 percent of that is transported to China through this strait, the dangerous, piracy-rife maritime route through the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas.
The United States fears that China will come out of its dealings with Pakistan with more power. But it need not be worried:

China’s involvement in Balochistan, a restive area prone to insurgencies, will not end well. Many believe Quetta, Balochistan’s capital, is hiding wanted leaders from the Afghan Taliban. Meanwhile, small towns in Balochistan are the breeding grounds for a decades-old separatist movement targeting federal agencies.

Increasingly, China has been caught up in the violence. In 2004, three Chinese engineers were killed and nine wounded when separatists attacked their van in Gwadar. In 2009, China shelved its $12 billion plans to build an oil refinery and an oil city in Gwadar due to security concerns.

China’s involvement in the region’s politics can only be bad news. In 2012, U.S. Congressman Dana Rohrabacher introduced a resolution that asked the United States to support Baloch separatists as freedom fighters. The resolution was tabled, but if the United States ever does decide to involve itself in the conflict, China’s strategic interests will be at risk.



The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, or ISIS, poses another threat. Last year, an intelligence report from the Balochistan government revealed that ISIS had begun aligning itself with splinter groups of mainstream militant organizations. Balochistan borders Iran’s restive Sistan-e-Balochistan province, where anti-Shia groups such as Jundallah are active and may be linked to sectarian outfits in Pakistan.

As the possibility of violent escalation grows, Pakistan looks like a weaker and weaker key to China’s energy dominance. 





 


 




 

Friday, March 13, 2015

Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012

Source:
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/68/4/96.full

                               




Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012
  By                                    
Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris




 

 

Abstract

In April 2012, India successfully test-launched the Agni V ballistic missile—and though the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment, the Agni V introduces a new dynamic to the already complex triangular security relationship among India, Pakistan, and China. India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, sufficient for 100–130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, the authors estimate that India has produced 80–100 nuclear warheads. In this article, the authors explore how the country will need even more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing.
 
India’s drive to develop a nuclear triad proceeds apace, with New Delhi developing or deploying several weapon systems to realize its goal of achieving offensive nuclear forces on land, at sea, and in the air. India took a significant step forward with the successful test-launch of the Agni V ballistic missile on April 19, 2012. With a range reportedly greater than 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles), the Agni V can reach any target in China; however, the missile needs more testing and is still several years away from operational deployment. Nevertheless, the Agni V introduces a new dynamic to the already complex triangular security relationship among India, Pakistan, and China; a week after India’s April test-launch, Pakistan (somewhat predictably) responded by test-firing its nuclear-capable Shaheen-1A medium-range ballistic missile.

              
India is estimated to have produced approximately 520 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium (IPFM, 2011), sufficient for 100–130 nuclear warheads; however, not all of the material has been converted into warheads. Based on available information about its nuclear-capable delivery vehicles, we estimate that India has produced 80–100 nuclear warheads. It will need more warheads to arm the new missiles it is currently developing. In addition to the Dhruva plutonium production reactor near Mumbai, India plans to construct a second reactor near Visakhapatnam, on the east coast. India is building an unsafeguarded prototype fast-breeder reactor at the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research near Kalpakkam (about 1,000 kilometers or 620 miles south of Visakhapatnam), which will significantly increase India’s plutonium production capacity once it becomes operational. 
              

Aircraft


India has the fourth-largest air force in the world. Its fighter-bombers constitute the backbone of India’s operational nuclear strike force, and it likely assigns nuclear missions to Mirage 2000H, Jaguar IS/IB, and possibly MiG-27 aircraft.

                 
Last year, New Delhi approved an upgrade for the Indian Air Force’s 51 Mirage 2000H aircraft—an update for which the single-seat, multi-role fighter-bomber is long overdue—which is scheduled for completion by mid-2021 (Government of India, 2012c; Waldron, 2012). The aircraft are deployed at Maharajpur (Gwalior) Air Force Station with Squadrons 1 and 7 of the 40th Wing; we estimate that one of the squadrons has a secondary nuclear mission. In early 2012, two of the fighters crashed in separate incidents, reducing the Mirage 2000H force to 49. One of the aircraft crashed during a February 24 training flight near Bhind, approximately 60 kilometers (37 miles) northeast of Gwalior; the other crashed on March 5 (Government of India, 2012a). Neither accident was fatal. The cost of the Mirage upgrade has been reported as $43 million per aircraft (Waldron, 2011). 



                 
India has four operational squadrons of Jaguar IS/IB aircraft with approximately 76 aircraft; two of the squadrons may be assigned a secondary nuclear strike mission. The Jaguar, designed jointly by France and Britain, was nuclear-capable when deployed by those countries. An upgrade of India’s Jaguar fleet is scheduled for completion in December 2017 (Government of India, 2012c); it has been reported that, in addition to new engines, the upgrade will also include modernized avionics, nighttime sensors, and integrated helmet sights (Defence Now, 2011). 


                 
The domestically manufactured, Soviet-origin MiG-27 Flogger fleet, sometimes suspected of having a nuclear-strike mission, is also undergoing an upgrade (Government of India, 2012c).   In January 2012, the Indian government announced that it planned to buy 126 Rafale fighter-bombers from France, which uses its Rafale jets in a nuclear strike role (George, 2012). India intends to take delivery of 18 of the jets in ready-to-fly condition and to build the rest through Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., a state-owned company (George, 2012). The contract has not yet been finalized, but the cost is estimated at between $10 billion and $15 billion. 


                 

Land-Based  MISSILES 

India has three types of land-based missiles that may be operational: the short-range Prithvi I, the short-range Agni I, and the medium-range Agni II. The Prithvi I has been deployed for almost 15 years, but the Agni I and II, despite being declared operational, both have reliability issues that have delayed their full operational service.


                 
India has been busy growing its missile program, with four more Agni versions in progress: an Agni II+ was test-launched in 2010 but failed; the longer-range Agni III, after at least four flight-tests, remains under development; and the Agni IV may be a technology bridge to the newest type, the long-range Agni V, which had its first test-launch in April. Some of these Agni programs may serve as technology-development platforms for longer-range versions. 

                 
The bulk of the Indian ballistic missile force is comprised of three versions of Prithvi missiles, but only one of these versions, the army’s Prithvi I, has a nuclear role. Given its small size (9 meters long and 1 meter in diameter), the Prithvi I is difficult to spot on satellite images, and therefore little is known about its deployment locations. The Prithvi I is a short-range missile (up to 150 kilometers or 93 miles) and is the mainstay of the Strategic Forces Command, India’s designated nuclear weapons service. 

                 
In December 2011, India successfully test-launched its two-stage Agni I missile, which has a range of 700 kilometers (435 miles), for the eighth time—suggesting that the missile might finally have become fully operational. But a ninth test-launch scheduled for early May 2012 was postponed due to a technical glitch. 

                 
The road- or rail-launched Agni II, an improvement on the Agni I, can fly up to 2,000 kilometers (1,243 miles) and can carry a 1,000-kilogram payload, and it takes just 15 minutes for the missile to be readied for firing. The missile has been test-fired eight times with several failures, but more recent test-flights, on May 19, 2010 and September 30, 2011, were successful, demonstrating some progress toward making the Agni II fully operational. A 2010 test-launch of an extended-range Agni II, known as the Agni II+, failed. 


                 
Still under development is India’s rail-mobile Agni III, a two-stage, solid-fuel missile with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles). Several years ago, an army spokesperson remarked, “With this missile, India can even strike Shanghai” (India Today, 2008). To do so, however, would require the missile to be launched from the very northeastern corner of India. After the fourth Agni III test-launch in February 2010, defense officials said that the missile was “declared operational” (Chakravarty, 2010), but before the missile can become operational with the army, it will need additional flight-testing. 


                 
The Agni IV’s first flight-test, on November 15, 2011, was a success. According to scientists at the Defense Research and Development Organization, the missile, designed to fly up to 3,500 kilometers (2,175 miles) and carry up to 1,000 kilograms, “has opened a new era” for Indian missiles (Subramanian, 2011). The Agni IV might be a “technology demonstrator” between the Agni III and V missiles, meaning that India is using it as a step toward creating the Agni V and that it will never be deployed. 


                 
India test-launched the Agni V for the first time on April 19, 2012 at a range of approximately 5,000 kilometers (3,107 miles). Although widely referred to as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a range of 5,000 kilometers does not quite meet the internationally accepted definition of an ICBM as having a range of at least 5,500 kilometers (3,418 miles). Still, the Indian government stated that the missile had a range of “more than 5,000 kilometers” (Government of India, 2012b). The Agni V needs several additional test-flights, but once it is deployed it will enable the Indian military to hold Beijing at risk for the first time. Unsurprisingly, rumors and speculation abound regarding the capability and role of the Agni V, including reports that the missile could be used to launch India satellites—or be used as an antisatellite weapon (Sharma, 2012). 

                 
Rumors are also widespread that the missile might be equipped with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The government did not mention a multiple-warhead capability in its announcement of the test, but when asked if India was developing a capability for an Agni V variant to hit multiple targets, Defense Research and Development Organization chief V. K. Saraswat said: “We are working in this area. It will take time for us to develop, but our work is on” (Economic Times, 2012). Some have even suggested that the Agni V would be capable of carrying up to 10 MIRVs (Deccan Herald, 2012a; IBN Live, 2012). However, there is good reason to doubt that India can or will add MIRVs to its missiles in the near future. The Agni V is estimated to be capable of delivering a payload of 1.5 tons (the same as the Agni III and IV), but India’s first- and second-generation warheads, even modified versions, are relatively heavy compared with warheads developed by other nuclear weapon states that deploy MIRVs. It took the Soviet Union and the United States hundreds of nuclear tests and 25 years of effort to develop re-entry vehicles small enough to equip a ballistic missile with MIRVs. These were expensive programs fueled by the Cold War, a security environment very different from the one that faces India. Moreover, deploying missiles with multiple warheads would invite serious questions about the credibility of India’s minimum-deterrent doctrine; using MIRVs would reflect a strategy to quickly strike many targets and would also run the risk of triggering a warhead race with India’s adversaries. 

                 

Naval Nuclear Weapons

India is developing two naval nuclear weapon systems: a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and a ship-launched ballistic missile. 

                                                           
Table 1. 
                                               
Indian Nuclear Forces, 2012.
India’s ballistic missile submarine, the Arihant, has been under development since 1984.1 Defense Minister A. K. Antony stated in May 2012 that the Arihant would be “inducted by the middle of next year” (Deccan Herald, 2012b); Pakistan has warned previously that it views an operational Indian nuclear submarine as “destabilizing” (Times of India, 2009). The Arihant is believed to have 12 tubes designed to launch the Sagarika submarine-launched ballistic missile. US intelligence has reported the range of the Sagarika at more than 290 kilometers or 180 miles (US Air Force, National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 2009), but media reports widely set the range around 700 kilometers (435 miles). It is also rumored that India is developing a longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missile called the K-4 that is based on the Agni III design and supposedly has a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles); however, such a missile would probably be too big for the Arihant to launch. 

                 
India’s Dhanush, a ship-launched ballistic missile rumored to have nuclear capability, was successfully test-launched from the Survana patrol vessel on March 11, 2011—the seventh test-launch of the missile. The utility of the Dhanush, however, is severely limited by its short range (just 350 kilometers or 217 miles) and its payload capability (500 kilograms, just half that of the Prithvi I). These restrictions raise doubts about the Dhanush’s nuclear capability; however, there is also the possibility that India has developed a smaller warhead to work within the Dhanush’s limitations.2 

                                      

Funding

This research was carried out with a grant from the Ploughshares Fund and Carnegie Corporation of New York.

 

Article Notes

References

Author biographies

Hans M. Kristensen is the director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. His work focuses on researching and writing about the status of nuclear weapons and the policies that direct them. Kristensen is a co-author to the world nuclear forces overview in the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford University Press) and a frequent adviser to the news media on nuclear weapons policy and operations. Inquiries should be directed to Federation of American Scientists, 1725 DeSales St. NW, Sixth Floor, Washington, DC, 20036 USA; +1 (202) 546-3300. 
                 
Robert S. Norris is a senior fellow with the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, DC. His principal areas of expertise include writing and research on all aspects of the nuclear weapons programs of the United States, Soviet Union/Russia, Britain, France, and China, as well as India, Pakistan, and Israel. He is the author of Racing for the Bomb: General Leslie R. Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man (Steerforth, 2002). He has co-authored the Nuclear Notebook column since May 1987.


Articles Citing This Article

LESSONS FOR INDIAN ARMED FORCES ON " MILITARY OBSOLESCENCE: : The Greatest Battleship Ever Built?

Source:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/imperial-japans-musashi-the-greatest-battleship-ever-built/




                   Imperial Japan's Musashi


            : The Greatest Battleship Ever Built?






The HIJMS Musashi Has An Important Lesson                                  To Teach

               INDIAN ARMED FORCES
                                   ON

         " MILITARY OBSOLESCENCE"







Imperial Japan's Musashi: The Greatest Battleship Ever Built?

 

The Musashi's sister ship, the Yamato, nearing completion in 1941. Image Credit: Flickr/ Horatio J. Kookaburra


Paul Allen, founder of Microsoft, appears now to have found the wreck of HIJMS Musashi. To claim that Musashi was the most powerful battleship ever built would court needless controversy, but she was by most accounts the largest (very marginally larger than her sister, HIJMS Yamato).


The sinking of HIJMS Musashi in October 1944 made depressingly clear what many observers had suspected since 1941, and even as early as the 1920s: sufficient numbers of committed carrier aircraft could sink a battleship, even when that battleship carried a heavy anti-aircraft armament and could maneuver at speed. But a more careful look at the story offers some insights into how we understand the relationship between
"military innovation"  and “obsolescence.”

In one telling, the sinking of Musashi was the final answer to the challenge that Billy Mitchell made to the utility of warships in the early 1920s. American  " level bombers"  sank the hulk German battleship Ostfriesland in July 1921, leading airpower advocates to claim that the battleship, and really all naval vessels, had become “obsolete.” Taranto and Pearl Harbor, where carrier aircraft sank battleships at anchor, were part of this story, but an even more important milestone was the sinking of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, under steam, by Japanese aircraft on December 10, 1941.

Another telling offers more complexity. Musashi reportedly took 19 torpedoes and 17 bombs (in comparison, the eight battleships under attack at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 took 15 torpedoes and 19 bombs collectively) before sinking into the Sibuyan Sea. No air force in the world was capable of inflicting such damage on a moving, well-defended target before mid-1944, when the U.S. Navy accumulated a fleet of pilots, attack aircraft, and carriers of a size and lethality that no one had envisioned in 1942, much less 1921.


Musashi entered service in August 1942, and remained in service for just over two years. Was she obsolete before completion (and perhaps even before being laid down)? In one sense, yes; simply in terms of maximizing lethality, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) would have done better to concentrate its efforts on submarines and naval aviation. In hindsight, the construction of Musashi and her counterparts seems wasteful and stupid. But then aircraft carriers were considerably more vulnerable than battleships, even toward the end of the war. Damage that would have left a battleship still operational could cripple or destroy an aircraft carrier.


This narrative of obsolescence, commonly told of the battleship, serves to obscure more than it illuminates. It’s impossible to argue that Musashi represented a wise allocation of Japanese national resources. At the same time, tagging Musashi as “obsolete” leads to a misunderstanding of military utility. The navies of World War II found many uses for “obsolete” battleships, some intended by their designers, others not. The rapid eclipse of the battleship in the post-war era owed as much to the structure of international politics (and the destruction of the great navies of World War II) as it did to the obsolescence of the platform.


The strategic bomber offers a useful contrast/comparison. The B-52 Stratofortress is as obsolete for its intended mission as HIJMS Musashi would be for its, and new purpose-built aircraft will have virtually no resemblance to the old BUFF. But nobody gets to start from scratch, and the ability of a military to find uses for its legacy platforms is often as important as its ability to harness new technological innovations.

The final legacy of Musashi and the other great battleships that led navies is perhaps the belief that the only defense lays in not getting hit; no degree of armor or structural resilience could prevent the destruction of a surface ship by aircraft or submarine. This lesson was perhaps overlearned; the experience of British destroyers in the Falklands indicated that naval architects needed to pay some attention to resilience. Indeed, the next war may demonstrate that “stealth” fighters are every bit as “obsolete” as armored battleships