O R O P : BULLETIN - UNITED FRONT OF EX-SERVICEMEN (ESM)

On Monday, 22 June 2015 11:10 AM, Satbir <satbirsm@gmail.com> wrote:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

      O R O P : BULLETIN UNITED FRONT OF

                   EX-SERVICEMEN(ESM)

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dated: 22 JUN 2015

 

UNITED FRONT OF EX-SERVICEMEN (ESM)

 ON RELAY HUNGER STRIKE AT JANTAR MANTAR NEW DELHI AND OTHER LOCATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITH EFFECT FROM 15 JUNE 2015 ONWARDS

 

Dear Friends

 

          There has been very enthusiastic response to the call of Relay Hunger Strike at Jantar Mantar New Delhi and more than 50 cities in the Country.  More ESM at other locations are also joining Relay Hunger Strike every day.

 

The Govt has once again betrayed the trust of the Soldiers by not implementing the OROP for the past fourteen months.  It has succumbed to the pressures and machination of bureaucracy.

 

          Three locations in Sikkim under Col Bhutia and one at Siliguri have joined in.

 

          Groups of ESM are requested to voluntarily come to Jantar Mantar for Hunger Strike to showcase solidarity with the cause of soldiers.  The Govt of the day for the past 67 years have been downgrading, degrading and mistreating the Military. This trend needs to be stopped.

 

          You are requested to volunteer to come in batches of 11 Ex-servicemen to sit on Hunger Strike at Jantar Mantar for 24 hours from 08AM to 08 AM next day when the new batch takes over.  Please book you choice of dates.  You can ring up the undersigned or Group Capt VK Gandhi co-coordinator of the Agitation on behalf of United Front of Ex-Servicemen Mob No 09810541222 and Email:    vk_gandhi@yahoo.com   

 

ESM in and around NCR are requested to volunteer in large number for the relay Hunger Strike.

 

It is now or never. 

 

The politico-bureaucratic machination to delay, dilute and finally deny OROP to the Defence Personnel is a serious cause of concern.  Assurances given to the Soldiers by no less than the then President of BJP Shri. Rajnath and the Prime Minister Mr. Modi have not been fulfilled. We have seven MPs and Ministers from  the Defence  Fraternity who,  it seems  have not yet  jointly gone to the PM asking him to implement OROP as per the approved definition  without any dilution whatsoever.

 

          Friends, OROP has only one Definition, One Implication and One Calculation ie :-

 

          “One Rank One Pension (OROP) implies that uniform pension be paid to the Armed Forces personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement in the rates of pension to be automatically  passed on to the past pensioners.  This implies bridging the gap between the rate of pension of the current pensioners and the past pensioners, and also future enhancements in the rate of pension to be automatically passed on to the past pensioners”.

 

 

These Ministers and MPs are :-

 

(a)	General VK Singh ((Retd),
(b)	Maj Gen Bhuwan Chandra Khanduri, (Retd)
(c)	Col Sona Ram Choudhary (Retd)
(d)	Capt Amarinder Singh (Retd)
(e)	Col Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore (Retd)
(f)	Shri Rajeev Chandrasekhar (S/O Air Force Officer)
(g)	Smt. Kirron Kher (D/O Army Officers)

 

          Every ESM, our members of the family and our supporters are requested to take this Relay Hunger Strike to logical conclusion.

 

 

          “NISCHE KAR APNI JEET KAROON”?

 

 

With regards,

                             Maj Gen Satbir Singh, SM (Retd)
                             Advisor of United Front of ESM & Chairman IESM
                             Mob: +919312404269, 0124-4110570                                                                     

                             Email: satbirsm@gmail.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PATIALA PEG

                                         PATIALA  PEG

In lighter vein...

A large group of Americans came in to a pub in Patiala one evening.

 
One of them said, in a loud voice, "I hear you Sikhs think you're great drinkers. I bet $5,000 that no-one here can drink 3 bottles of Jack Daniels in 10 minutes"
The bar was silent, the American noticed one big Sikhpanthi leaving, no-one took up the bet.

20 minutes later the Sikhpanthi left returned and said "Hey Yank, is yer bet still on?"

"Sure" said the American, "3 JD in 10 minutes for a bet of $5,000 ."

"Grand, " replied the Sikh, "so pour the whisky and start the clock."

It was very close but the last drop was consumed by Sikhpanthi, with 2 seconds to spare.

"OK Yank, pay up." said the Sikhpanthi.

"I'm happy to pay, here's your money" said the American. "But tell me, when I first offered the wager I saw you leave. Where did you go?'

"Well sir", replied the Sikhpanthi in all humility, "$5,000 is a lot of money to a man like me, so I went to the pub across the road to see if I could do it"

 

SOUTH ASIA : Understanding Myanmar

SOURCE:
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/understanding-myanmar/p14385?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief--link16-20150625&sp_mid=48959982&sp_rid=YmN2YXN1bmRocmFAaG90bWFpbC5jb20S1






     SOUTH ASIA : Understanding Myanmar





                                  

                 Understanding Myanmar

Author: Beina Xu
Updated: June 12, 2015

Introduction

After decades of political and economic isolation, in 2011, Myanmar's military government began to introduce gradual political, economic, and foreign policy reforms. The release of nearly two thousand political prisoners and the National League for Democracy's reengagement with the formal political process led to an easing of international pressure and a thawing relations with the United States, but concerns remain about the government's treatment of ethnic minorities, particularly that of its Rohingya Muslims, and the pace of constitutional reform.

Political History

A British colony for more than a century, Burma declared independence in 1948, a year after General Aung San, father of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was assassinated. The Union of Burma began as a parliamentary democracy like most of its other newly independent neighbors on the Indian subcontinent. Yet it was beset by ethnic strife from the start. Ethnic Burmans formed roughly two-thirds of its population; the remainder comprised more than a hundred ethnic groups, with Shan, Karen, Rakhine, and Mon among the largest, as well as significant Indian and Chinese populations.


Representative democracy lasted until the military coup of 1962, led by General U Ne Win. His party established a ruling council whose members were almost entirely drawn from the armed forces, and held power for the next twenty-six years. Ne Win instituted a new constitution in 1974 based on an isolationist policy with a socialist economic program that nationalized Burma's major enterprises.


The country's economic situation deteriorated rapidly as a result of Ne Win's policies, and a black-market economy soon took hold. By 1988, widespread corruption and food shortages led to mass protests, spearheaded by students. On August 8, 1988, the army cracked down on protestors, opening fire on dissidents and killing at least three thousand and displacing thousands more. Ne Win consequently resigned as chairman of his party, although he remained active behind the scenes until an even more repressive military junta took power in a coup in September 1988.


The United States imposed sanctions (PDF) in response to the junta's suppression of protests and detention of political prisoners in 1988. A year later, the new military regime changed the country's name from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar, and the capital Rangoon was renamed Yangon. In 2005, the military government moved the administrative capital to the newly built city Naypyidaw. The junta argued that the name "Burma" was a vestige of the colonial era and favored the Burman ethnic majority, while "Myanmar" was more inclusive. Although official U.S. policy still refers to the country as Burma, President Barack Obama has on occasion called it Myanmar during state visits, and the distinction between names has often become a political issue.
During the 1988 protests, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi rose to prominence as the leader of the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD). She was detained in 1989, and spent more than fifteen years in detention until being released for the last time in 2010. In 1990, the junta held elections in which the NLD won 392 of 485 parliamentary seats, despite Suu Kyi's house arrest. The military government refused to acknowledge the results, imprisoned many NLD politicians, forced others into exile, and continued to clamp down on dissent. In 1991, Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while still under house arrest.

 

Saffron Revolution, Cyclone Nargis, and the 2010 Elections

In September 2007, widespread protests erupted after the military government unexpectedly removed fuel subsidies, triggering massive price hikes. The Saffron Revolution posed a challenge for the junta, as the participating monks—venerated in Myanmar's majority-Buddhist society—lent a degree of moral authority to the movement.


The regime's legitimacy suffered a further blow when its slow response and initial blockade of international aid efforts for the victims of Cyclone Nargis, which killed more than 140,000 people in 2008, led some Western leaders and rights groups to call for humanitarian intervention.



In part driven by international pressure and its own "seven-step roadmap," the junta announced that a referendum on a new constitution would take place in May 2008, followed by multiparty elections in 2010. According to the junta, the constitutional referendum won an overwhelming majority, but rights groups called the vote a fraud. 


The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party declared a wide margin of victory in the 2010 general elections, though Suu Kyi and her NLD party boycotted the elections. In 2011, the military junta officially dissolved and established a civilian parliament, which appointed former army bureaucrat and then-prime minister Thein Sein as president. Many top officials in the new administration—including the president, two vice presidents, and speaker of the lower and upper houses of parliament—were former military officers, leading to concerns about continued military dominance.

Democratic and Economic Reforms

The new Thein Sein administration marked a period of reform and saw the return of international engagement. His government spearheaded a series of reforms, including the amnesty of most political prisoners, relaxation of censorship, establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, and efforts toward peace with ethnic rebel groups. In April 2012, Suu Kyi’s party agreed to compete in by-elections, held to fill vacancies between general elections; the NLD dominated, winning forty-four out of forty-six seats.


However, this election only filled a small percentage of seats in parliament: The NLD would control less than one-tenth of them. Under the 2008 Constitution, 25 percent of the parliament's seats are reserved for the military, and the military-backed USDP continues to control the vast number of elected seats, as well as the powerful defense, home affairs, and border affairs ministries. "By allowing the NLD to win a few seats—while ensuring that the military's favored party still controls parliament—the government is betting that it has done just enough to normalize relations with the West, get aid and investment, and still remain essentially in control," CFR's Joshua Kurlantzick writes.


President Thein Sein announced a second wave of economic reforms in mid-2012, vowing to reduce the government's role in sectors including energy, forestry, health care, finance, and telecommunications. A few months later, parliament passed a new foreign investment law that opened up overseas ownership of business ventures and offered tax breaks in a bid to improve its long-beleaguered economy. Myanmar's net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) increased from $900 million in 2010 to $2.3 billion in 2013, according to the World Bank. More recently, the government announced that FDI hit more than $8 billion in the first five months of fiscal year 2015.



As a result of these reforms, global powers began reengaging with Myanmar. The United States, European Union, Australia, and Japan dropped some economic sanctions, and multinational companies began showing interest in investment in the country. In April 2012, British Prime Minister David Cameron became the first major Western leader to visit Myanmar in twenty years. The World Bank subsequently earmarked $245 million in credit and grant funding for the country, marking the first international lending to the nation in twenty-five years.  

 

Evolution of U.S. Policy

The United States imposed initial sanctions on Myanmar after the 1988 military crackdown on protests, banning the export of financial services and freezing assets of certain institutions. Successive administrations intensified sanctions, including bans on investment and imports. In 2009, President Obama ushered in a new approach to U.S. relations with the country: Washington maintained sanctions, but indicated a willingness to engage in high-level dialogue with the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), including cooperation on international security issues such as nuclear nonproliferation and North Korean arms sales, according to a Congressional Research Service report (PDF).


Then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a 2011 visit to Myanmar on a goodwill mission, during which she met with President Thein Sein and Suu Kyi, boosted humanitarian aid, and announced that the United States would no longer block assistance from the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. In 2012, Washington announced further steps for cooperation, including the reestablishment of a USAID mission at its embassy in Yangon and easing the bans on the exportation of U.S. financial services and new investment. The administration also named its first U.S. ambassador to the country in twenty-two years.


U.S. relations with Myanmar further warmed with landmark visits by both President Obama to the former capital of Yangon in November 2012—the first time a sitting U.S. president visited the country—and by President Thein Sein to Washington in May 2013.


Thawing ties with Washington, along with the Obama's administration's pivot to Asia, has challenged Yangon's long-standing strategic and economic partnership with Beijing, and there is growing resistance within Myanmar to Chinese infrastructure investment, which remains the country's largest investor.  "China was taking over Myanmar economically and exploiting the country's rich natural resources—creating a 'national emergency,' that threatens the country's independence," writes Myanmar expert Bertil Lintner. "This—more than any high-minded ideological epiphany—appears to be what led Myanmar to reach out to the West, and, especially, China's main critic in the international community, the United States."

 

Continued Ethnic Strife

Myanmar's path toward democracy remains fraught by ethnic violence. In 2011, the Myanmar army launched a major offensive against the Kachin Independence Army, which is fighting for autonomy for ethnic Kachins, a predominantly Christian minority of roughly one million, or around 2 percent of the country's population, in Myanmar's north. The prolonged fighting has led to widespread displacements, and human rights groups have accused Myanmar's army of carrying out various human rights abuses in the region, including forced labor, rape, torture, use of child soldiers, and summary executions. In early 2015, fighting broke out in the northeast between the military and several minority militias, including the ethnic Kokang's Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, and Arakan Army.


Muslim Rohingyas in the Rakhine State, situated on the western coast of the country, have also faced extensive persecution. In June 2012, at least two hundred people were killed and hundreds of thousands driven from their homes as a spate of violence erupted between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and the Muslim Rohingya, who had been rendered stateless by the 1982 Citizenship Law. In a 2013 report, Human Rights Watch accused Burmese authorities of committing crimes against humanity in a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya, whose population in Myanmar stands at around one million. The state continues to deny Rohingyas citizenship, considering them illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Tens of thousands have fled Myanmar, seeking shelter in Bangladesh or save passage via human-smuggling boats to neighboring countries. Many of these countries directed their navies to refuse the refugees, leaving thousands stranded at sea.


Myanmar refused to accept blame for the Rohingya's flight, threatening to boycott a summit in Thailand aimed at easing the crisis. Amid international pressure, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed in May 2015 to take in thousands of stranded migrants until they could be repatriated or resettled in a third country.
Suu Kyi has remained conspicuously silent throughout the violence. Some experts contend that addressing the plight of the Rohingya would not be politically expedient for Suu Kyi, as the country approaches national elections in November 2015. However, a spokesperson for Suu Kyi's party told reporters in June 2015 that the rights of the Rohingya should be protected, and that Naypyidaw should consider granting them citizenship. "Although this statement does not make up for Suu Kyi's continued silence, and it does not change the situation on the ground in Arakan State, it is a small step forward for the NLD," writes Kurlantzick.

 

The Troubled Way Forward

Despite Myanmar's encouraging reforms in recent years, experts point to setbacks as it approaches multiparty elections in 2015. In its 2015 World Report, Human Rights Watch said the country's reform process "experienced significant slowdowns and in some cases reversals of basic freedoms and democratic progress in 2014." The government continues to deflect calls for constitutional reform, and in February 2015, revoked temporary voting rights from the Rohingya following an outcry from Buddhist nationalists.


Analysts say the next year will stand as a critical test for Myanmar. The government faces cease-fire negotiations with armed ethnic groups and the first nationwide, multiparty elections since parliament first convened in 2010. President Obama, on a late 2014 visit to the country, underscored continued U.S. engagement and urged President Thein Sein to pursue reforms. CFR's Kurlantzick says that a peaceful change in government would be a milestone for Myanmar, but new leadership alone will not be enough to address deeply entrenched problems.

 

Additional Resources

Amnesty International's 2014–2015 report (PDF) on Myanmar discusses the country's ongoing political, legal, and economic reforms.This timeline from Irrawaddy chronicles Myanmar's Kachin conflict.

The New Yorker's Evan Osnos covers the "Burmese Spring" in this 2012 article.
Congressional Research Service issued this 2013 report (PDF) that delves into U.S. policy towards Myanmar.

Stanley A. Weiss and Tim Heinemann discuss investment in Myanmar in this 2014 Foreign Affairs article.In this blog post, CFR's Joshua Kurlantzlick discusses Myanmar's rights records.
 

More on this topic from CFR

• Asia's Forgotten Crisis Authors: Michael Green, and Derek Mitchell
• The ASEAN Bloc's Myanmar Dilemma Author: Lee Hudson Teslik
• Revolt of the Spirit Author: Michael J. Gerson, Roger Hertog Senior Fellow

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INSURGENCY NE INDIA :The Truth Behind Insurgency on the Indo-Myanmar Border

SOURCE:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-truth-behind-insurgency-on-the-indo-myanmar-border/

            The Truth Behind Insurgency on

                  the Indo-Myanmar Border

                                  By

                        Sanjay Kumar

Image Credit: Sanjay Kumar for The Diplomat

 

 

 for The Diplom

June 21, 2015

The Diplomat‘s Sanjay Kumar speaks with Indian journalist Rajeev Bhattacharyya about the Indian northeast.

The Diplomat’s Sanjay Kumar speaks with journalist Rajeev Bhattacharyya about India’s northeast, including insurgency in the region, relations between northeastern Indian states and the central government, and more. Bhattacharyya recently visited the eastern Indian state of Nagaland where he met with separatist leaders in the region. The interview begins with a description of this journey. Bhattacharyya is the author of 
Rendezvous with Rebels: Journey to Meet India’s Most Wanted Men.




The Diplomat: What motivated you to take such a long and arduous journey?


Bhattacharyya: You see, I returned to Guwahati from Delhi after working there for seven years as a journalist. For the longest time we have been getting media reports about rebel bases in Myanmar. Sometimes the media would report that the rebel leaders have been attacked but very next day the rebels would come out with a statement that nothing has happened. I was keen to know what is the on-the-ground reality, what is actually happening and that is one reason why I wanted to go there as an investigative journalist and took all the risk and pain to go there. I wanted to see the situation first hand.

Secondly, I wanted to do something that no one has done before. What I have done is going to a foreign country secretly and meeting the rebel leaders in the jungles–I don’t think something like this has been done before in Indian journalism. I stayed there for four months in the rebel camp, I think no one has done this before.



When you visited the camp, what did you see? How was the reality different from what was actually reported?

What I saw and observed and assessed there is very different from what was actually coming out in media reports. I came to know that the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) had come to an understanding with the Myanmarese army in 2001. Since 2001, the Myanmarese army has never attacked any rebel base. What I have seen is that both have a very cordial relationship and a very close bond. They have a written agreement. This shows the importance that the Myanmarese government is giving to the Nagas. The NSCN(K) has formed an alliance with other northeastern insurgent groups, like the ULFA, NDBF, and UNLF. Their camps are all in close proximity with each other. There is no question of such camps being destroyed. Once or twice such things have happened, but I would say that they are at peace and there is no possibility of a raid by the Myanmarese army. Whatever has been coming out in the media is extremely false. I give an example: I left home for the journey in 2011 but just before I left there was a report in the media that the ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) chief Paresh Barua had been injured in a shelling by the Myanmarese army, but when I reached there I found him hale and hearty. These are all planted news and false stories. Now after coming back I have been able to portray the on-the-ground reality. At least people now believe that what was being planted in the media was absolutely trash and nonsense.


What do you make of Paresh Barua?

I had a lengthy discussion with Paresh Barua and he has a “never say die” attitude. He is a stubborn man. When I asked him about his organization, he said that the ULFA would revive itself and become stronger in future. But what I assess is that the ground reality is something different. After the split in the ULFA in 2010, after the senior rebel leaders, like Arvind Rajkhowa, surrendered, and others were arrested,  the situation for the ULFA has become very precarious. The ULFA is a weakened force. That is why there has been a drastic reduction in the insurgency related violence in the past five  or six years, be it in Manipur or Assam. Everywhere there has been a drastic reduction. I understand that the campaign for an independent Northeast by the rebel groups will keep on going but there would now be a different strategy for that, this is what I was able to understand after my interactions with these separatist leaders, including Barua.




Do you sense fatigue among the people of the region regarding these insurgent groups?

You are right. It is an undeniable reality that fatigue has set in among the people so far as insurgent groups are concerned. There has been a change in the mindset of the people. When you launch militant activities in an area, the entire locality gets affected. Insurgency in the Northeast has been there since 1947, right after India’s independence. So fatigue is bound to set in, people’s mindset has changed. But the fact is that there is a less employment opportunities in the Northeast and now there has been trend that people going all over the country looking for jobs and education. But such mobility does not address the question of alienation of the northeastern people. There is still less emotional attachment with the rest of India for them. Emotional attachment comes at the last and it is where the Indian government has been failing. The Indian government has not still understood the people of the Northeast. Just because there has been a cessation of violence, the government of India thinks that it has won the war against the insurgents. One has to understand that no one becomes an insurgent by choice. No one would like to spend their life in a jungle. There have been multiple reasons that the Northeast has been disturbed, but the Indian government refuses to understand the genuine problem of the region. If the people have stopped supporting the rebels, that does not mean people have started supporting the Indian government.



So the attitude of the Indian government has not evolved vis-a-vis the Northeast and its people?

The attitude of the Indian government has not changed towards the North East. It still views the region as an imperialist power, hell bent on exploiting the territory. I’ll give you an example: you know, 168 dams are being planned in Arunachal Pradesh: is this a normal thing? This entire zone is hyper sensitive geologically, ecologically, and politically. In this region, you should not promote industrialization. Not every region on earth is meant for industrialization. The government should promote tourism and focus on horticulture and bamboo. This region is a gem of a place for organic food. You don’t need industry here. Indian government should try to understand the region and it should not be bothered by the insurgency. Had the ULFA been so strong then they should have been able to take Assam out of India. Similarly, had the insurgents been so strong then they should have taken Manipur out of India by this time. But this is not the case.

Insurgency is seasonal but you have to win the hearts and minds of the people. Try to respect the local culture, promote their way of life. Try to harness local resources.



Why did the ceasefire between New Delhi and the NSCN(K) break down?

Based on the information I have received, it was a very well planned move by the Khaplang group. In Myanmar, 16-17 insurgent groups have come together to sign a nationwide ceasefire agreement with the government. Khaplang is one of the groups. They saw greater benefits in joining hands with the Myanmarese army. The army has 300,000 troops. The situation in the Kachin region is very tricky. A serious conflict is going on in the Shan province, close to the China border, and the Myanmarese government would not like to open another front with the Naga. Myanmar is a poor country and many children are being taken away for insurgent activities. Even the national army has many child soldiers. It’s poor country and a poor army.

Second, Myanmar distrusts the Indian government. It will have a greater degree of friendship with the NSCN(K) rather than accepting Indian government requests for eliminating these camps. These areas of the country, in the Upper Sagain division, are still no man’s land. There is no presence of the Myanmarese government or army there. But Khaplang has accepted the authorities of the Myanmarese government. There has been an agreement between these two and this is a big achievement for both of them. This means that all the separatist outfits staying under Khaplang in the territory are safe.

The question is can the Naga outfit or other insurgent groups escalate conflict in India for a separate land?

I dont think this will happen in the near future. Their strategy has changed. When I spoke to some of the leaders in the jungles, they told me that they are banking heavily on China. Chinese involvement with these groups is much greater than what the Indian government can think of. This I mention in my book.



What can China’s interests be in supporting these rebel groups?

China has been employing some of these groups for spying activities. Now you never know. China is a very unpredictable neighbor. For Beijing, Myanmar is very important. What Bhutan is to India, Myanmar is to China. The communist regime has commercial and strategic interests in Myanmar. It has already got two pipelines from the Arakan region to Yunnan province in China. Now, in the last few years, the situation in Myanmar has changed and China feels that its grip over Myanmar is loosening a bit. Earlier, the Myanmarese government was quite close to China now it is getting closer to the United States and European countries. This development China does not like. Also, earlier the Kachin Independence Army was pro-China, but very recently, a huge hydroelectric dam project, which China was supposed to build on the Irrawaddy river, was cancelled by the Myanmarese government because of local protests. So Beijing feels that it needs to cultivate more insurgent groups. I can say with certainty that China has been trying to cultivate a greater relationship with these insurgent groups so that it can have better hold over Myanmar’s Sagaing region.

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DRONES : India’s Armed Drone Fleet

Source:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/indias-armed-drone-fleet/

             India’s Armed Drone Fleet

                                    By

                              Saurav Jha for The Diplomat

 

 

June 25, 2015

Progress in weaponizing drones is in step with the country’s more robust defense doctrine.

With even Pakistan now sporting an armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) developed with Chinese assistance, India has decided to accelerate the development of its own weaponized drone fleet. The process of weaponizing an indigenously developed UAV has commenced and the elements required to operate an armed drone fleet, such as a high accuracy satellite-based augmentation system (SBAS) and dedicated military communication satellites, are being put in place anyway. Work is also underway on a stealthy unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).


Despite this, India still has to make some progress on the collision avoidance technology needed to give its drones the flexibility to use civilian airspace. It will also need to increase satellite bandwidth considerably to increase the tempo of armed UAV flights. In the next few years limited use of drone strikes near India’s borders on terrorist targets may be on the table, in keeping with the emerging Modi-Doval doctrine that authorized the recent cross-border strike in Myanmar.




Status

While the Indian military has long operated Israeli Searcher and Heron drones for C4ISTAR roles and even possesses anti-radiation suicide drones from the same source, it does not as yet have missile firing drones such as the Predator its inventory. India is now looking to change that with its Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) beginning serious work on weaponizing the indigenously developed Rustom-I Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV.


According to the DRDO, it has integrated a locally developed anti-tank missile called the HELINA with the Rustom-I. Taxi trials have been completed, with flight trials expected to commence this year. The idea is to have the weaponized configuration of the Rustom-I ready by the middle of next year. This sudden urgency is perhaps in no small measure due to the recent test-firing of a laser guided missile by Pakistan’s Burraq drone, which was developed with Chinese assistance and which resembles the CASC CH-3 drone.


While integration with missiles such as the HELINA also indicate a potential anti-armor role for the Rustom-I, it could certainly be used in strikes on remote terrorist camps or for that matter on small vessels on the high seas. Indeed, the first military user of the Rustom-I is likely to be the Indian Navy rather than the Indian Army, which still wants certain features added to the Rustom-I before it agrees to induct it.


A key enabler for armed UAV flights in India would be the new domestically developed SBAS called GAGAN, which has already received certification for both en-route navigation as well as precision vertical guidance for assisting planes to land safely and beamed its first signals earlier this year. While GAGAN was designed to assist civil aviation in India, the enhancement of satellite navigation (SATNAV) signals that it provides is obviously available to Indian military users as well. Indeed, Indian defense scientists along with local industry have also developed a lightweight GAGAN receiver module that can be fitted aboard UAVs and is capable of receiving “refined” signals from the American GPS, Russian GLONASS, and Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System which will become fully operational in the near future.



GAGAN is crucial for waypoint navigation of Indian UAVs and will assist them to both “get back home” in the event of a link failure with their ground control stations (GCS) as well as make emergency landings on alternate airfields. Both of these aspects naturally assume even greater importance when a UAV carries on board weapons. Of course, the availability of high quality SATNAV signals are also very important for precision strike purposes.


Indian armed drones in the future will also be able to operate over extended ranges as the Indian military inducts more dedicated military communication satellites. Again, the Indian Navy is a front runner in this department having fully integrated the GSAT-7 communication satellite in its order of battle and used it to network ships and aircrafts in missile firing exercises. GSAT-7 can also relay signals in the Ku-band and this can be used to control Indian UAVs, which will feature a Ku-band transmitter data link. The Indian Air force and Army are meanwhile looking forward to their own joint military communication satellite called GSAT-7A, which will also have Ku-band transponders.



In some ways the stage is being set for the indigenous UCAV program that is currently focused on developing a sufficiently stealthy platform, release of weapons from an internal weapons bay, and materials for all-aspect stealth. The first flight of this UCAV is expected to take place in the early 2020s. By that time, the support elements required to exploit such a system are likely to have matured in India.



Challenges

GAGAN notwithstanding, Indian armed UAV operations will remain restricted to military airspace until such time that India makes progress on a collision avoidance system. For this technology, India is currently tapping the U.S. and France, but it remains to be seen how much assistance will be forthcoming in this arena. Without a collision avoidance system, India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation will obviously not conclude an agreement with the military to allow UAVs to transit civil airspace. Moreover until the Indian military can put up a large enough constellation of military communication satellites, armed drone operations will be somewhat limited in scope and tempo. There will be a reliance on short distance VHF links unless greater satellite bandwidth is made available. This means that Indian armed UAV operations will take place close to Indian airspace in the early years of deployment. It will also limit basing options for Indian armed drones.


In any case, the Rustom-I is not a long-range system and it is perhaps the Rustom-II, still under development and expected to be able to fly for up to 30 hours at a stretch, which will assume the mantle of India’s frontline armed drone in the years ahead. Development of the Rustom-II has been delayed on account of challenges with efficient design as well as the cancellation of export licenses by the U.S. State Department of the American origin actuators that were being used in the Rustom-II. India has now had to develop indigenous replacements for those actuators and the Rustom-II will fly with those this year.


The episode may, however, have catalyzed India’s ongoing bid to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement, both of which seek to restrict the flow of dual-use items that go into UAV development. India had voluntarily chosen to synchronize its export-control regimes with the MTCR in 2008 during the heyday of the Indo-U.S. nuclear civil agreement and is now looking to use its excellent non-proliferation record to ensure that such events do not get in the way of its UAV development programs by formally joining that association.


Doctrine

Indeed, unlike China, India’s armed UAV fleet will essentially be for its own use and not meant for the export market, something that is being signaled via its bid to join the MTCR. Armed drones for India are actually both a symmetric response to what the Chinese and Pakistanis have been doing in this arena as well as a response to asymmetric tactics being used by India’s rivals. Armed drones are intended to expand the response options available to the Indian military as it has to mount more operations to neutralize terrorist elements based out of remote facilities in neighboring countries.


The employment of armed drones for precision strikes will make it easier for the Indian military to neutralize targets of opportunity in scenarios where sending in special forces would be too risky or complicated. Once lightweight UAV specific munitions that minimize collateral damage become available, armed drones could also potentially prosecute targets co-located with civilian hamlets. Overall, the pursuit of armed drones is in consonance with the Modi-Doval doctrine which seeks to position India as a state that is not averse to deploying hard power for national security requirements.


Saurav Jha is a commentator on energy and security affairs. Follow him on Twitter @SJha1618

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unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)