O R O P :Delay in OROP Implementation Could Affect Morale of Soldiers

Source:
http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/delay-in-orop-implementation-could-affect-morale-of-soldiers/article1-1364959.aspx

Delay in OROP Implementation Could Affect Morale of Soldiers

                                        By

                          Gurmeet Kanwal

 Jul 01, 2015

The fast for justice being held by India’s ex-servicemen at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi and in over 50 other cities has now entered its third week. The protesting veterans are demanding the rollout of the One Rank One Pension (OROP) scheme, which has not been honoured by successive governments.

The quest of the veterans for OROP, a term coined by a Parliamentary committee headed by KP Singh Deo in 1983, goes back several decades.

 In 1973, while implementing the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission, the government reduced the pensions of armed forces personnel from 73% of the last pay drawn to 50%.


The concept of ‘military pension’, designed to provide monetary compensation for truncated service due to early retirement, was diluted. Soldiers, sailors and airmen opt to retire between 35 and 37 years of age when most of their family responsibilities are still ahead of them, while most of the officers retire at the age of 54.



Despite their discipline, dedication and talent, they find it difficult to get jobs.


Personnel in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) like the BSF, CRPF, ITBP, CISF, SSB and the state police retire between the ages of 57 and 60 years.

The Fifth Pay Commission had recommended that armed forces personnel be laterally transferred to the CAPFs after five to seven years of service.


This would enable the armed forces to maintain a young profile and reduce the pension bill of the government.

However, the government of the day lacks the political will to push through this win-win measure.



Officers of the CAPFs and all other civilian officers (IAS, IFS, IPS, IRS) retire at the age of 60 years, while only 0.84% of armed forces officers make it to the rank of major general, who retire at 58. A still smaller number are lieutenant general and retire at 60.

Incidentally, every IAS officer is routinely promoted to the position of joint secretary, considered equal to a major general. 


The national consensus favours the implementation of OROP for the armed forces. The Congress-led UPA government gave a commitment to implement OROP and even allotted a sum of Rs 500 crore in the interim budget for FY 2014-15. Union finance minister Arun Jaitley doubled it to Rs1,000 crore when he presented the budget in July 2014.


Prime Minister Narendra Modi unequivocally promised to implement OROP while addressing the veterans at an election rally at Rewari in September 2013.

 However, in a surprise to 25 lakh veterans and three lakh widows, the prime minister recently said that it was a “complex” issue and that there were several definitions of OROP.


                   [ ( MARK MY WORDS 

           " MODI  IS  A  NAVTANKI " ) ]

                                                                 - Vasundhra


Veterans, however, agree to an unambiguous definition of OROP. In February 2014, the following definition of OROP was approved in a meeting chaired by the defence minister: “OROP implies that uniform pension be paid to the armed forces personnel retiring in the same rank with the same length of service, irrespective of their date of retirement and any future enhancement in the rates of pension be automatically passed on to the past pensioners.”


The recommendations made by the defence minister, in consultation with the chiefs of the armed forces and the veterans, are reportedly being opposed by the finance ministry on the grounds that the annual cost of Rs8,400 crore is unaffordable and that a similar demand may spring from the CAPFs. It appears that the issue might be referred to the Seventh Pay Commission for a ‘holistic’ overview.

Often, the personnel in CAPFs serve much longer than the ones in the armed forces, which means that they earn more increments and therefore must not be equated for pension. The additional expenditure on OROP is less than 10% of the pension bill of Rs88,521 crore for 2015-16, which is much less than other subsidies.
 
           

Hence, the recommendation of referring the issue to the Seventh Pay Commission is seen as an insidious plot to scuttle the OROP scheme.


Civil-military relations in India have a troubled past and any attempt to indefinitely delay a long-pending welfare measure will only aggravate the situation.



As it is, the serving and retired members of the armed forces feel wronged at having been deprived of their dues in several cases in the past, including the ‘rank pay’ case, 36 pending anomalies in the implementation of the awards of the Fifth and the Sixth Pay Commissions, and the withholding of non-functional upgradation (NFU) of pay for officers denied promotion for lack of vacancies.

Also, the ministry of defence has repeatedly appealed against the court judgements that favour the veterans and soldiers’ widows — often contesting that the award of paltry sums, even as the cost of litigation exceeds the amount at stake.


The government must take note of the impact of the prolonged delay in the implementation of OROP on morale — not only of the veterans, but also of the serving soldiers; it may also affect many second or third generation soldiers who are witness to the sad plight of those before them.

The day a soldier takes his oath, he undertakes to selflessly serve his nation and even make the supreme sacrifice when necessary. He swears allegiance to Naam, Namak, Nishan and has never faltered.



In turn, the nation’s covenant is that no effort will be spared to look after his welfare and that of his family. Addressing the United States servicemen some years ago, US President Barack Obama said,


“…when you take off the uniform, we will serve you as well as you’ve served us — because no one who fights for this country should have to fight for a job, or a roof over their heads, or the care that they need when they come home.”



Indian veterans also need to be given a similar assurance, but one that is credible. 
  
Gurmeet Kanwal is an army veteran and a Delhi-based strategic analyst

(The views expressed are personal)  

                     BUT  ARE  BITTER  TRUTH 

                                                            -Vasundhra

Tags
• OROP
• Narendra Modi
• NDA
• UPA
• BSF

OROP :'One Rank One Pension' Row: Ex-servicemen Prepare Battle Plan to Take Government Head On

Source:
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/one-rank-one-pension-row-ex-servicemen-prepare-battle-plan-to-take-government-head-on/articleshow/47889302.cms

'One Rank One Pension' Row: Ex-servicemen Prepare Battle Plan to Take Government Head On

                                        By

                           Deepshikha Hooda
                                
                                 ET Bureau 

1 Jul, 2015.


The government's refusal to commit to a time frame for implementing One Rank One Pension policy in the armed forces has prompted organisations representing ex-servicemen to resort to new tactics to press for their demand even as their members continue the relay hunger strike that they began in Delhi on June 15.

The United Front of Exservicemen, a conglomerate of all veterans' organisations, has decided to hold protests outside homes of parliamentarians, send teams to election-bound states to discourage people from voting for the ruling National Democratic Alliance and hold flash mobs across Delhi to generate awareness about the issue. In addition to this, war widows will express their frustration by sending the President letters signed with blood along with a bangle.

"The government is not realising the demoralising effect that its ignorance is causing on servicemen across the country," said Colonel (retd) Devinder Bahl, spokesperson of the Indian Exservicemen Movement, the organisation spearheading the protests around the country.
Meanwhile, ex-servicemen from the National Capital Region are continuing their relay hunger strike at Delhi's Jantar Mantar, where many participants expressed dismay over the government's apparent failure to take notice of their protest. "We will stop fighting only when implementation of OROP takes place," said Krishan Kumar, a 1965 war veteran from Rajasthan, who is among those participating in the hunger strike.


Several other organisations have also joined hands with the ex-servicemen to fight for the implementation of the scheme. According to data given by IESM, eight farmers' organisations are now part of the nationwide protests, finding resonance in the historic 'Jai Jawan Jai Kisan' slogan.


Stressing on the raising anger among other ranks, Bahl said that the protesters are considering both direct action and indirect action to make the government sit up and take notice. Direct action will involve blockade of roads across cities and public transport or fasting unto death, whereas indirect action will take a more calculated approach, with spot mobs across the country, protest letters and large demonstrations.


According to the members of the group, the majority is leaning towards the indirect approach though Bahl said that the floodgates cannot be held back for a long time, implying that the growing resentment may prompt widows of decorated servicemen, for instance, to begin a fast unto death.

 



















 

SILK ROUTE :China’s Belt And Road Diplomacy – Analysis

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/28062015-chinas-belt-and-road-diplomacy-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

China’s Belt And Road Diplomacy – Analysis

                                        By

                      Rakhahari Chatterji*

 

 

China flag

 

    June 28, 2015




By Observer Research Foundation

The just concluded Third China-South Asia Think-Tank Conference at Kunming, China (12-13 June) marked an important step for China’s forward “Belt and Road’ (BAR) diplomacy. The conference, which coincides with the impressive China and South Asia Expo, is regarded as a major event for the organisers the Yunnan Academy of Social Sciences. This year,. India had a sizeable representation at the Think-Tank Forum. The other countries that were represented from the region were Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar, Maldives and Singapore in addition to a very large representation from different parts of China.


Economic Belt and Silk Road has been a pet idea of Xi Jinping ever since he took over as China’s President. He first mooted the proposal in Kazakhstan in September 2013 and since then he has been discussing, even promoting, the plan in course of his visits to Central and South Asia. The earlier idea of a BCIM-Economic Corridor appears to have been subsumed by it. In this diplomatic blitzkrieg into South Asia, China looks upon the Think-Tanks in the region as important instruments for generating consensus on the issue not only among top-level leaders and policy-makers but also among the common people. China regards the Belt and the Road project as capable of generating common benefits for the whole region so that countries in the region could go forward ‘neck by neck’ in ensuring infrastructure, industries and economic development.


China’s representatives have agreed that BAR is ‘the most complex’ concept that Beijing has ever projected. A lot remains to be done before BAR attains fruition. For instance, the points to be connected on the BCIM route need to be discussed among the countries concerned. The route may have to pass through regions of natural disasters and terrorist activities. The feasibility of the methods will determine the sustainability of the projects to be undertaken. There is also the issue of financial assessment which, if not done in a pragmatic manner, will result in half-finished projects. Raising money for the projects is another vital area of concern. Obviously, funds from the Asian Development Bank will be inadequate. AIIB (China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) funds as well as market borrowing would have to be accessed. An information data-base through micro-research is imperative.


Representatives of South Asian think-tanks have generally welcomed BAR as a laudable idea even though they have expressed certain apprehensions. A particular cavil was that the idea was both ‘under-explained and oversold’. The Chinese side needed to explain it further. The perspectives of individual countries needed to be understood and appreciated. It was pointed out that the ‘dispute in the South China Sea’ raised the issue of ‘one country doing something not acceptable to another country’ and it was important to know how BAR would deal with similar situations. Some described it as a ‘grand strategy’ and a ‘bold initiative’ though not historically a new concept. It needs to be a ‘shared concept’ taking everybody on board. The concept of “Mausam’, advanced by India and endorsed by a number of South Asian representatives, also calls for reflection.


The general view was that BAR should not be ‘thrust upon’ any country. Some argued there was scope for bringing together the silk route and the spice route.


While Chinese and Pakistani representatives emphasised that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was a ‘bilateral issue’, some others, including the Indian think-tank representatives, felt that it raised several controversial issues. Both Chinese and South Asian speakers agreed that to make BAR a success, greater mutual trust was necessary. Although the idea had the potentiality, its effectiveness would depend on how China’s national interest and common interests converge. This is not easy to achieve in an era of nation-states.


Of course, over the past three decades China has strengthened cooperation with South Asian countries. Its bilateral relations in the spheres of energy, transportation and trade have achieved considerable headway in recent times. China’s imports play a beneficial role for the economy of its neighbouring countries. At the same time it cannot be denied that it has registered a downward trend. It is time that China, instead of looking towards the USA and Europe as export targets, should attempt to redirect her exports and infrastructural investment to her Asian neighbours. For China, the significance of the BAR initiative lies in its promise to bolster its own sluggish growth through integrating its domestic economy with that of regional economies. The regional countries will have to carefully scrutinize whether it will be the most efficient way to benefit, keeping both short and long-term interests in mind.


The ancient silk route connected China with Central and Western Europe… up to Rome. The southern silk route and the maritime silk route connected China with South and South-East Asia. These were two-way trade routes which were also used by itinerant pilgrims and religious preachers.


Today, to draw lines on the map along these ancient trade routes and to claim that they marked an exclusive zone of trade and dense economic relationship centering around and led by China will beg a number of questions. Does it mean that countries within the zone will sever their trade and economic relations with countries outside the zone? Would, for instance, China terminate its robust trade relations with the USA which will be outside the zone? If it only means an assertion that countries within the zone will try to develop closer economic relations with each other, then it is redundant because trade relations will develop whenever and wherever there are opportunities. Or does it mean a covert attempt by China to mark a sphere of influence for herself in which case it would be dangerous? The scholars representing the Think-Tanks at the Forum will certainly have to ponder over these issues.



 *The writer is an Advisor to Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata Chapter
Courtesy: The Statesman
















 

TEESTA INDO BANGLADESH : India-Bangladesh Politics Over Teesta River Water Sharing

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/28062015-india-bangladesh-politics-over-teesta-river-water-sharing-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29

India-Bangladesh Politics Over Teesta River Water Sharing – Analysis

                                                      By

                                        Ram Kumar Jha*

 

 

Teesta River. Photo by PP Yoonus, Wikipedia Commons

South Asia Monitor 

 June 28, 2015

  

The Teesta is the fourth largest river in South Asia. This river is said to be the lifeline of the upper catchment of the Teesta, i.e., Sikkim. Teesta flows for almost the entire length of the state, carving out verdant Himalayan temperate and tropical river valleys. The river then forms the border between Sikkim and West Bengal before joining the Brahmaputra as a tributary in Bangladesh. The total length of the river is 309 km. It drains an area of 12,540 sq km. The economy in Teesta river basin is predominantly agrarian and this sector employs the maximum number of people. In this region, agriculture is highly dependent on the monsoon which bring in excessive rainfall during peak season while there is very little water in the lean season. But, there is great dependence on the Teesta river water for irrigation, agriculture, fishing, and navigation.

As the economy urbanizes, there is a visible shift away from agriculture towards the industry and service sectors. In this basin, the Indian side area is not highly industrialised but when compared to Bangladesh side it seems to be more developed. In the Teesta river basin, the population is mostly rural as of now, but is urbanizing at a rapid rate. The population density is very high in this basin and it is growing at a fast pace. It is estimated that over 32 percent of the population will reside in urban centres by 2025, with the percentage going up to 47.3 percent by 2050. It is likely that the pressure on the river system will increase rapidly in tandem with its growth.



It is also estimated that the Teesta river has a mean annual flow of 60 billion cubic metres, but a significant amount of this water flows only during the wet season, i.e., between June and September, leaving scant flow during the dry season, i.e., October to April/May when the average flow gets reduced to about 500 million cubic metres (MCM) per month. Every year, the river floods its bank during the monsoon months, causing harm to people and property. Likewise, every dry season, the river shrinks considerably. This variability is causing damage to the economy of the region. The issue of equitable water sharing during the lean season is the longstanding dispute between the two countries.


People living in the Teesta river basin are waiting for a long time for a permanent solution to Teesta river water sharing. But the political efforts initiated end with no result. It shows the political ineffectiveness of both countries on the decision making process. Although, it is critical to understand the winners and losers in any transboundary agreement, it is also important to identify opportunities for greater cooperation for development.


Since 1972, water relations between the two countries has been a work in progress for achieving equitable water sharing. India and Bangladesh signed the ‘Statute of the Joint Rivers Commission’ on March 17, 1972 which governs all rivers common to both nations. The Commission liaises with the two governments to ensure joint efforts and also works on the sharing of water resources, irrigation and flood control measures.


In 1983, for solving the immediate purpose of water utilisation, a water sharing agreement was reached between India and Bangladesh. Both countries were allocated 39 percent and 36 percent of the water flow respectively. In 2011, a new bilateral treaty expanded upon this agreement by proposing an equal allocation of the Teesta river water during the lean season, leaving aside 20 percent of the total flow of the river as environmental flow. But the water deal could not be ratified after India’s argument that water is a state issue, and the then newly-elected West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee declined to approve the treaty at the last minute. The reason behind this was that providing higher volume of water to the lower riparian country (Bangladesh) would cause problems in the northern region of West Bengal, especially during the drier months. This issue was not discussed during the India-Bangladesh bilateral meeting on June 6-7, 2015 in Dhaka, capital city of Bangladesh.



In the political discourse, the question of sharing of Teesta does not focus on the lean and monsoon water flow, besides lacking clarity in approach during the discussion. Political debates and methods of water sharing are based on the annual flow of water and do not account for seasonal variability. This approach makes it difficult for the two nations to agree upon a specific water sharing method. Further, it is notable that the problem with regard to sharing of the Teesta river water during the lean period is felt in very specific parts of India and Bangladesh, i.e., northwest Bangladesh and northwest Bengal. In the political arena the specifics in terms of region is also not addressed. If these specific details are highlighted then both countries will realise that instead of delaying the signing of the Teesta agreement, they should sign it at the earliest.



In the current geopolitical scenario, efforts at trans-boundary river cooperation have largely failed, even as the growing scarcity of water in the region and the effects of climate change demand shared approaches for the proper utilization and management of trans-boundary water resources. This needs special focus on realistic facts and approaches to solve the Teesta river water sharing as early as possible at the political level. This may also help to address agricultural development and rural poverty reduction in the Teesta region.



*Ram Kumar Jha is working as Policy Analyst, CUTS International, Jaipur. He can be contacted at rkj@cuts.
















 

O R O P : OPS MAHASANGRAM SEVENTEENTH DAY

         O R O P : OPS MAHASANGRAM SEVENTEENTH DAY

Anil Kaul July 1 at 5:50pm   Dear Sir/ Ma'am, The seventeenth day of the relay hunger strike. The fasting at Jantar Mantar continued today with 45 volunteers from Punjab,Haryana, UP & Delhi undertook relay hunger strike. The strength at Jantar Mantar today was 250 with 50 officers present. 11 veteran General officers and their ladies sat in support of OROP. PTROTEST MARCHES WERE CARRIED OUT AT ALL DISTRICTS OF kERALA, West Bengal & Karnataka. by members of NEXCC a constituent of UFESM. A delegation of ESM marched to and presented a memorandum to the DM's of Dindigul in Tamil Nadu and Halar District of Gujarat..Similar activities were reported from 60 cities across the country. The names of the General Officers, some with their wives who observed RHS today are: - Lt Gen's SS GREWAL, JBS YADAV, HARI UNIYAL, AK SAINI, & Maj Gen's BS DHILLON, PL SOORMA, RN WADHWA, VK TIWARI, SURJIT SINGH & SATBIR SINGH.  One day Rally was held in Takluka Chikodi, District - Belgaum on 29 Jun 2015 under the guidance of Hony Capt Thitagudbi and Cpl BM Sangroli. The ESM and Veer Naries, numbering about 1,200, gathered in the main ground and took a procession to the Tehsildar's office where they handed over the Protest Letter expressing their anger about the failure of the Central Govt in issuing the notification of OROP implementation. The participants came from all villages of Chikodi. The presence of Shri Rajeev Chandrashekhar, an Independant MP of Rajya Sabha at the site of the RHS at Jantar Mantar will act as a great morale booster for the veterans.    Col Anil Kaul, VrC Veteran Media Advisor & Spokesman UFESM                                                         Hindi Version प्रिय सर / मैडम, रिले भूख हड़ताल के सत्रहवें दिन। जंतर-मंतर पर उपवास भूख हड़ताल रिले चलाया पंजाब, हरियाणा, उत्तर प्रदेश और दिल्ली से 45 स्वयंसेवकों के साथ आज भी जारी रहा। जंतर-मंतर पर शक्ति आज 50 अधिकारियों वर्तमान के साथ 250 था। 11 दिग्गज जनरल अधिकारियों और उनकी महिलाओं के OROP के समर्थन में बैठ गया। PTROTEST मार्च बिल्कुल केरल, पश्चिम बंगाल और कर्नाटक के जिलों से बाहर किए गए। NEXCC के सदस्यों UFESM के एक घटक के द्वारा। ईएसएम के एक प्रतिनिधिमंडल के लिए मार्च किया और देश भर में 60 शहरों से सूचित किया गया है कि तमिलनाडु और Gujarat..Similar गतिविधियों की Halar जिला डिंडीगुल के डीएम को एक ज्ञापन प्रस्तुत किया। जनरल अधिकारियों के नाम, आज आरएचएस मनाया जो अपनी पत्नियों के साथ कुछ इस प्रकार हैं: - लेफ्टिनेंट जनरल के एस एस ग्रेवाल, जे बी एस यादव, हरि उनियाल, एके सैनी, और मेजर जनरल के बी एस ढिल्लों, पीएल SOORMA, आर.एन. वाधवा, वीके तिवारी, सुरजीत सिंह व सतबीर सिंह। मानद कैप्टन Thitagudbi और कारपोरल बी.एम. Sangroli के मार्गदर्शन के तहत 29 जून 2015 पर बेलगाम - एक दिन रैली Takluka Chikodi, जिले में आयोजित किया गया था। ईएसएम और वीर Naries, के बारे में 1200 नंबर, मुख्य भूमि में एकत्र हुए और वे OROP कार्यान्वयन की अधिसूचना जारी करने में केंद्र सरकार की विफलता के बारे में अपने गुस्से को व्यक्त विरोध पत्र सौंपा जहां तहसीलदार के कार्यालय में एक बारात ले लिया। प्रतिभागियों को Chikodi के सभी गांवों से आए थे। जंतर-मंतर पर आरएचएस के स्थल पर श्री राजीव चंद्रशेखर, राज्य सभा की एक स्वतंत्र सांसद की उपस्थिति दिग्गजों के लिए एक महान मनोबल बूस्टर के रूप में कार्य करेगा। कर्नल अनिल कौल, वीर चक्र वयोवृद्ध मीडिया सलाहकार और प्रवक्ता UFESM

VIETNAM : Vietnamese People's Navy

SOURCE :
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/vietnam/navy.htm
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2015/06/mil-150630-tass01.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1457%2eka0ao00b2h%2e1c6n

 

                Vietnamese People's Navy

The Vietnam People's Navy is the core service in protecting Vietnam's maritime sovereignty. The Navy's Responsibility is to strictly manage and control the waters and islands in the East Sea under Vietnam's sovereignty, to maintain security, to counter any Acts of violating Sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests of Vietnam at sea, to secure normal activities of Vietnam in its waters and islands in Conformity with Vietnamese and international laws, to ensure maritime safety and participate in search-and-rescue operations in accordance with Vietnam's laws and the international conventions Adopted by Vietnam, to be ready for joint and combined operations to defeat Aggression from any and at sea.


In 1953 PAV assigned 500 soldiers to a Coastal Defence Bureau; this force had grown to 600 in 1955 and 1,000 in 1958. The PAVN Navy, begun in 1955 as the PAVN Riverine and Maritime Force, in 1959 became the Coastal Defense Force. Although PAV was prohibited from forming a navy, it expanded its Coastal Defence Bureau into the Navy Directorate and Coastal Defence Force on 12 October 1959. Officially the navy remained a 'branch' of PAV, and had no representation at the ministerial level.


By 1964, when North Vietnamese vessels were involved in the Tonkin Gulf Incident, the PAV Navy had grown to 2,500 men. Its "tradition day" is celebrated annually on August 5 to mark the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident in the Second Indochina War. The PAVN Navy began a buildup in the mid-1960s with the arrival of twenty-eight gunboats from China and thirty patrol torpedo boats from the Soviet Union. Aside from occasional resupply missions to the south, however, the navy was not a factor in the Second Indochina War.


At the end of the Second Indochina War, it assumed the normal dual missions of a navy, that is, coastal defense and sea surveillance. Following the fall of Saigon the PAVN inherited 1,300 ex-South Vietnamese vessels. Some of these, including two Admiral-class corvettes, were used extensively during the 1978 invasion of Cambodia, as were two Soviet Petya II-class frigates which had been delivered in November 1978 immediately following the signing of the Soviet-Victnamese Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.


During the 1980s Soviet aid focused on modernizing the PAVN Navy. From 1978 to 1990 the PAVN Navy received Soviet assistance and encouragement and was the largest naval force in Southeast Asia, in exchange they allowed the Soviets to use Cam Ranh Bay as a naval base. Including some 1,300 former United States and South Vietnamese naval vessels, naval and civilian junks, and coasters, the PAVN Navy had a total of about 1,500 vessels. Its inventory contained two principal combat vessels, 192 patrol boats, 51 amphibious warfare ships, 104 landing ships, and 133 auxiliary craft.


Although the largest navy in South-East Asia, it remain s totally outclassed by the Chinese fleet; most recently, Hanoi was embarrassed when the Chinese navy was able to sink at least two Vietnamese supply ships attempting to operate in the disputed Spratly Islands in March 1988.


By 2006, the Vietnamese Navy consisted of about 27,000 naval infantry, 9,000 regulars, and 3,000 conscripts. The fleet was arranged into four main regions as follows: Haiphong (headquarters), Da Nang, Nha Trang, and Cân Tho. Ther are also bases in Cam Ranh Bay, Hue and Ha Tou. By 2012 the Vietnamese People's Navy numbered in the region of 42,000 sailors and officers.


Although Vietnam terminated the lease of Cam Ranh Bay to the Russian Navy in mid-2001, there did not seem to be any clear indication of them making this base available to other countries, even though its size is attractive to the US, China, and India, who would all be able to provide significant funding and training opportunities. US-Vietnam relations hint at improvement over recent years with at least three port visits by US warships since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. Namely, the 2003 visit to Ho Chi Minh City, the 2004 visit to Da Nang, and again in 2005 at Ho Chi Minh City marking the 30th anniversary of the end of the war.


Despite Vietnam's significant maritime interests such as its claim to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, a heavily disputed area, the People's Navy was relatively weak. With a short supply of spares and many of its ships barely able to claim operational ability, its operational capability failed to live up to the Navy's Order of Battle. The relationship which began during the Cold War with the Moscow was still of great importance, at the very least in order to maintain a minimal operational readiness.









































The Navy Headquarters takes command of the entire Navy. The Headquarters includes the Commander and Vice Commanders, the Commissar and the Deputy Commissar. It also consists of Agencies responsible for military affairs, Political Party and work, technical and logistic issues. The Navy is organized into five Naval Regions (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) and affiliated units. The main forces of the Navy are the units of surface ships, coastal artillery and land-to-sea missiles, marine, naval commando forces and Defence island. The Navy has been reinforced with personnel and equipment to effectively conduct search-and-rescue operations. In the future, the Navy will be equipped with modern weapons and further enhanced combat power to be sufficiently capable of accomplishing the task of successfully protecting Vietnam's sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national interests at sea.
    
The command structure of the PAVN Navy originated in Hanoi, where the commander in chief of naval forces was located. His office, the Naval Directorate, reported to the Military general Staff Directorate, i.e., the high command. The top operational Commander was the Commander, Vietnam Naval Forces, headquartered in Haiphong. The two posts were usually held by the same individual. Regulations issued in April 1982 established three flag-rank officers: rear admiral, equivalent to a major general; vice admiral, equivalent to a lieutenant general; and full admiral, equivalent to a colonel general.


Five naval regions made up the operational command. Headquartered at Haiphong, Vinh, Da Nang, Vung Tau, and Rach Gia, each region had two or more naval installations or facilities for which it was responsible. Within this structure were the navy fleets or navy groups, in turn divided into navy brigades. In 1987 the Ham Tu Fleet patrolled the northern Gulf of Tonkin as a strategic deterrent to China; its Chuong Duong Brigade was designed to oppose amphibious landings; its Kiet Brigade was assigned to defend the offshore islands and to perform troop transport duties. The Bach Dang Fleet served in the South. Its Ham Tu Naval Brigade (with 80 percent of its personnel South Vietnamese Navy veterans) operated almost entirely in Cambodian waters.


The Vietnamese People's Navy consisted of combat and logistic elements having more and more modern vessels, weapons, and equipment which enable it to carry out combat operations in Vietnamese waters. The Vietnamese People's Navy played an important part in protecting national waters, islands, the continental shelf, and special economic zones and in ensuring the interests of maritime economy. The Vietnamese People's Navy was the lead force in maintaining coordination with other forces such as the police, customs service, border defense force, and maritime police to strictly control national waters and economic activities at sea in compliance with Vietnamese and international laws.

Further Reading

People's Navy People's Navy - Warships People's Navy - Modernization People's Navy - Bases People's Naval Aviation People's Naval Infantry DRVN Navy East Sea South China Sea Resources Vietnamese People's Navy Vietnamese People's Navy Vietnamese People's Navy Vietnam's Naval Modernization Vietnamese People's Navy

 

Russia's 4th Varshavyanka Class Submarine Delivered to Vietnam

TASS

In-Depth Coverage

June 30, 9:39 UTC+3

To date, Vietnam's naval forces include the first three boats supplied by Russia - the Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and Haiphong


HANOI, June 30. /TASS/. The fourth of a total of six Varshavyanka class submarines of Project 636.1 that Vietnam ordered from Russia has been delivered to Cam Ranh Port in the central part of the country on Tuesday.


The Da Nang submarine was transported by the Dutch heavy load carrier vessel Rolldok Star. Its unloading and the submarine's putting afloat will be carried out within the next two days after all the necessary administrative formalities and customs documentation execution are completed.


To date, Vietnam's naval forces include the first three boats supplied by Russia - the Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh and Haiphong. The submarines equipped with the standard package are supplied to the Vietnamese side with the Club-S missile strike system.


The delivery to the customer of the entire batch of the boats that are built at Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg is planned to be completed in 2016.


Russia is a traditional partner of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) in the sphere of military-technical cooperation. In recent years the sides have signed contracts worth more than $4.5 billion on the supply of Russia's newest weapons to Vietnam. The most significant deals were the contract on the supply of a batch of the Sukhoi Su-30MK2 fighters to Vietnam, which is estimated at some $1 billion, and a $2 billion contract on the sale of 6 Varshavyanka class submarines to Vietnam.


This year, Russia will deliver to Vietnam 10 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 fighters, and so the number of this type of aircraft in the Vietnamese People's Army will reach to 36.

According to the Vietnamese government, Vietnam's annual defence spending amounts to some $1.5 billion, which is equivalent to 1.8% of national GDP.









































 

O R O P : JCOs NCOs & ORs OROP BE PAID AT SEVENTY PERCENT

SOURCE:
http://www.gconnect.in/defence-services/one-rank-one-pension-may-not-increase.html?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzEmail&utm_content=408382&utm_campaign=0

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/behind-orop-delay-worry-about-small-hike-for-jawans/





                    SARKARI  DISINFORMATION
                             REFER  TO

  ( http://bcvasundhra.blogspot.in/2015/06/orop.html )
                   


                    OROP MADE EASY


   O R O P :  FOR JCOs NCOs & ORs
OROP BE PAID AT SEVENTY PERCENT


THE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM NARRATED BELOW IS SIMPLE.  FIX THE PENSIONS OF JCOs, NON COMMISSIONED OFFICERS (NCOs) & ORs TO  70 PERCENT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OROP. THIS WAS WHAT IT WAS PRIOR TO 1973. OFFICERS NO CHANGE AT 50 PERCENT. -Vasundhra

Present One Rank One Pension Scheme may not increase Army Personnel’s Pension much – As per News Paper reports Govt is delaying OROP on the apprehension of Protest by Ex-Servicemen

 

 

Behind One Rank One Pension scheme delay, worry about small hike for jawans

MoD sources said that the main reason behind the delay is the minuscule increase that jawans may get if OROP is implemented in its present form.

 

 

The fear within political decision-makers is that OROP, if implemented in present form, may result in many dragging the government to courts, and may even create a political crisis. (Source: PTI)

 

 

As ex-servicemen steadfastly press for the implementation of One Rank One Pension (OROP), top Ministry of Defence (MoD) sources have said that the main reason behind the delay is not funds, but the minuscule increase that jawans may get if OROP is implemented in its present form.

 

 

 

 

Sources said that the concern within the government is that the jawans may get an increase of just about “few hundred” rupees per month — a raise that may not justify the decade long OROP agitation. 

 

 

 

           The fear within political decision-makers is that OROP, if implemented in present form, may result in many dragging the government to courts, and may even create a political crisis. “It is no longer a budgetary concern. The formula to arrive at Rs 8,300-odd crores has already been approved. The real worries within South Block are political. Under the present formula, the jawans may just get about few hundred rupees of increase per month in their present pensions. This amount, the political class within the present government believes, is too small to pacify the agitation that has been spread over almost three decades,” a top Defence Ministry official said. 

 

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Related

 

Letters to the Editor: Political realists

OROP protests enter 2nd week

One Rank One Pension: Ex-servicemen hold nationwide protests


- See more at: http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/behind-orop-delay-worry-about-small-hike-for-jawans/#sthash.vMqHeHj6.dpuf

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

According to the official, the implementation — which is just short of being announced any moment, may trigger dissatisfaction and will result in soldiers dragging the government to courts and become a political issue. Citing the reason behind the small increase for jawans, the official said: “The government, in 2009, corrected the pensions of retired armed forces personnel to parity as per Sixth Central Pay Commission.

 

 

The jawans largely benefited out of the correction as the pension amounts increased. So the gap that earlier existed has largely been bridged. Rs 5000 crore has already been spent on bringing about the parity,” the official said. According to Indian Ex-Servicemen Movement (IESM) data, OROP — if implemented in its present form — will ensure an increase of between Rs 525 and Rs 1,720 to jawans in their monthly pensions by virtue of percentage of their low basic pensions. Widows will get a hike of Rs 1,500 per month. The officers are likely to get a per month pension increase between Rs 10,000 to Rs 20,000.

 

 

 According to sources, UPA too was worried about the political and legal consequences of these “relatively small” monthly increments after implementing OROP and had carried out “three rounds of equalisation” to work out a solution.

 

 

 

The MoD official said that so far, the present government, though committed, has not carried out any such equalization.

 

 Group Captain V K Gandhi, general secretary, IESM said, “Our present demands have been agreed upon not only by officers but even by jawans. We are not willing to accept any dilution in the demands.”

 

 

     

 

As ex-servicemen steadfastly press for the implementation of One Rank One Pension (OROP), top Ministry of Defence (MoD) sources have said that the main reason behind the delay is not funds, but the minuscule increase that jawans may get if OROP is implemented in its present form.

 

 

Sources said that the concern within the government is that the jawans may get an increase of just about “few hundred” rupees per month — a raise that may not justify the decade long OROP agitation.

 

 

The fear within political decision-makers is that OROP, if implemented in present form, may result in many dragging the government to courts, and may even create a political crisis. “It is no longer a budgetary concern. The formula to arrive at Rs 8,300-odd crores has already been approved. The real worries within South Block are political. Under the present formula, the jawans may just get about few hundred rupees of increase per month in their present pensions. This amount, the political class within the present government believes, is too small to pacify the agitation that has been spread over almost three decades,” a top Defence Ministry official said.

 

 

According to the official, the implementation — which is just short of being announced any moment, may trigger dissatisfaction and will result in soldiers dragging the government to courts and become a political issue. Citing the reason behind the small increase for jawans, the official said: “The government, in 2009, corrected the pensions of retired armed forces personnel to parity as per Sixth Central Pay Commission.

 

 

The jawans largely benefited out of the correction as the pension amounts increased. So the gap that earlier existed has largely been bridged. Rs 5000 crore has already been spent on bringing about the parity,” the official said. According to Indian Ex-Servicemen Movement (IESM) data, OROP — if implemented in its present form — will ensure an increase of between Rs 525 and Rs 1,720 to jawans in their monthly pensions by virtue of percentage of their low basic pensions. Widows will get a hike of Rs 1,500 per month. The officers are likely to get a per month pension increase between Rs 10,000 to Rs 20,000.

 

 

According to sources, UPA too was worried about the political and legal consequences of these “relatively small” monthly increments after implementing OROP and had carried out “three rounds of equalisation” to work out a solution.

 

 

The MoD official said that so far, the present government, though committed, has not carried out any such equalisation. Group Captain V K Gandhi, general secretary, IESM said, “Our present demands have been agreed upon not only by officers but even by jawans. We are not willing to accept any dilution in the demands.”

 

Source: The Indian Express