Tuesday, March 15, 2016

WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OFFICERS WEARS "KHAKI SHORTS" !!!






    WHY PAKISTAN ARMY OFFICERS              WEAR  "KHAKI SHORTS" !!!



A long time ago, Britain and France were at war. During one battle, the French captured an English colonel.

They took him to their headquarters, and the French general began to question him.

Finally, as an afterthought, the French general asked, 'Why do you English officers all wear red coats? Don't you know the red material makes you easier targets for us to shoot at?'

In his bland English way, the officer informed the general that the reason English officers wear red coats is if they are shot the blood won't show, and the men they are leading won't panic.

Coming to know this and acknowledging the excellent idea, Pakistani Army officers wear khaki pants.







 

Monday, March 14, 2016

INDIAN ARMED FORCES PROCUREMENT::-India will spend $6.1 billion dollars for five S-400 Missile Systems

SOURCE:
http://www.defencenews.in/article/India-will-spend-$61-billion-dollars-for-five-S-400-Missile-Systems-3507




India will spend $6.1 billion dollars for five S-400 Missile Systems

                                          By
                           www.DefenceNews.in                                                



Monday, March 14, 2016
                                           






After a rare intervention by Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, India's Air Defence Acquisition plans for the next decade has been altered helping the country save 49,300 crores of taxpayers money.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar ordered a review of the 15 year long term plan to purchase new air defence systems upto 2027.

The concluded review which involved a technical study and an evaluation of all available air defence systems in the world has resulted in a decision by the air force to induct the Russian S-400 Missile System to protect Indian skies for the next decade.

Air defence strategy hinges around three layers - a short range system that protects high value installations upto 25 km, a medium range system that covers an area of around 40 km and a long range system for threats coming from further.
The review and evaluation suggest that with the S400 acquisition, the long term acquisition plan for over 100 each Medium and Short range systems have been cut down. The Air Force would not need greater number of Medium and Short Range Missiles if threats could be eliminated by the S-400 at longer ranges.

Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar is in favour of inducting the S-400 that can cover a larger area compared to other Medium and Short Range Missile Systems.


Five S-400 Systems to be inducted for $6.1 bn ::
With the current review process completed, the Ministry of Defence has come to a conclusion of inducting five Russian S-400 Missile Systems at a total cost of $6.1 billion.

It will be the most expensive air defence system ever bought by India.

A price tag of $6.1 billion may seem to be staggering but on a per square km covered basis, the S-400 is the cheapest of all known systems available globally.

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This article has been exclusively written by Darshil Patel for www.DefenceNews.in
Bsc. in CASFX - U.K.
Location : Mumbai

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INDO - TIBET :Expanding Chinese Infrastructure On Indian Border

SOURCE:http://www.eurasiareview.com/14032016-expanding-chinese-infrastructure-on-indian-border-analysis/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29




Expanding Chinese Infrastructure On Indian Border – Analysis

                                 By

                 Jhinuk Chowdhury*

                         

 
 
 

Location of China and India. Source: Wikipedia Commons.Locations of China and India. Source: Wikipedia Commons.
 

  • The Central Highway connects Xining in Qinghai Province to Lhasa. Also called the Qinghai-Tibet Highway, this road network was opened along with the Eastern Highway in 1954. It was asphalted in 1985 and is said to be the world’s longest asphalt road. More than 80 percent of freight transport go via this highway. Three major overhauls of the highway has cost nearly three billion yuan ($362 million).
  • The Western Highway connects Xinjiang Province to the TAR, by linking Kashgar and Lhasa. After a diversion to Khunjerab Pass it subsequently becomes the Karakoram Highway and touches Gilgit in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). It is 3,105 kilometres long.
  • The 716 kilometres-long Yunnan-Tibet Highway connects the provinces of Yunnan and the TAR. It branches off from the Eastern Highway and then connects to Yunnan and the







Fig1_Tibet-Road-Map


TAR.(Figure 1: Road Map of Tibet, Source: Tibet Travel Planner) 




In November 2013, China opened an all weather road linking Medog County in the TAR, which is also close to the Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh (referred as ‘South Tibet’ by China), to the rest of China. With this, every TAR county is connected to a highway network in China. In July 2013, the Chinese government announced that it will spend about 200 billion Yuan or $32.3 billion to build a road network centred around Lhasa and extend the combined length of the TAR’s highways to over 110,000 kilometres.


Expanding its communication network is yet another important  feature of integrating the border region with the Chinese mainland. As many as 665 townships of the TAR have been connected with Optic Fibre Cable (OFC). This project effectively covers 97.5 percent of all townships in the TAR. About 3231 villages (61.4 percent of all villages) have access to broadband internet.

Support system for border forces

As per a 2015 estimate, China has positioned about 300,000 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops and six Rapid Reaction Forces or RPF at Chengdu in the TAR. The focus seems to be on creating a reliable and robust support system for this front line force. For instance all Military Supply Depots are connected to Lhasa by radio and OFC establishing real-time connectivity. China has a single unified Commander responsible for the armed forces in the TAR and along Indian border.

The most important line of support for the border forces, however, is the air mobility and helicopter-borne military operations. China already has five operational airfields in the TAR region- at Gongar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping, and Gar Gunsa.


Plans are underway to construct newer airfields and upgrading advanced landing grounds (ALGs) and helipads which will strengthen People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) fighter aircrafts’ striking range. The PLAAF operations has apparently intensified since 2012 when it carried out weapon firing trials at high altitude ranges in the TAR for the first time. Currently, two regiments of 24 aircraft, J-10s and J-11s, operate virtually on a permanent basis from the TAR airfields. Their operational philosophy in TAR is said to be focusing on strong air defence to create local air dominance, and support to ground forces primarily for integrated airborne assault operations.

Karakoram Highway

The Karakoram Highway (KKH) that connects Abbottabad in Punjab (Pakistan) to Kashgar in Xinjiang region of China has generated much concerns in New Delhi. The Karakoram ranges also form the de facto border along the LAC.  It consists of the Ladakh region in India, Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and touches the Aksai Chin region occupied by China. The construction of Karakoram Highway, China’s only overland link to Pakistan, began in 1967. Initially built jointly by Pakistan and China, it is maintained by China. There are proposals to transform KKH into an economic corridor, also referred to as the Karakoram Corridor (KC), by making it into an all-weather expressway. Five 7( seven )kilometre-long tunnels have been constructed to ensure year-round land connectivity. In September 2015, the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif inaugurated the tunnels, also called Also called the Pakistan-China Friendship Tunnels. Fears have been expressed in New Delhi that these tunnels could be used not only for rapid movement of troops and material from China and Pakistan or for stationing missiles in PoK. During the Soviet War in Afghanistan the highway was used to equip the Taliban.

Pakistan had also used this road network to ship American weapon systems to China for reverse engineering. China can indeed use the KKH network to watch over Indian activities in the region through listening posts and advanced surveillance bases in PoK. The air fields in PoK might be used against India by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to its benefit.


With the unveiling of the $46 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in April 2015, the KKH has assumed a new strategic dimension. The corridor will extend the KKH till Pakistan’s port city of Gwadar in Balochistan. Once the Gwadar port is connected to the KKH through the CPEC, it will help transport of goods docked at Gwadar port directly to China. Analysts suggest the corridor will help China evade any threat from Indian or US naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

Trains to LAC



Railway networks seem to be the next line of strategy for China to enhance accessibility to the LAC. Networks like the well known Qinghai-Tibet Railway connecting to Lhasa, is said to be focusing on mobility of troops in the LAC.


Fig2Railway-Map

(Figure 2: Qinghai Tibet Railway Map, Source: Tibet Discovery)  [ http://www.tibetdiscovery.com/train-to-tibet/ ]



The Lhasa–Shigatse or Lari Railway line, which was completed in July 2014, connects Lhasa to the city of Shigatse or Xigaze, which borders India’s Sikkim, apart from Nepal and Bhutan. Similarly, China has also started construction of the Lhasa-Nyingchi railway line in 2012. Nyingchi is a prefecture-level city in southeast of the TAR. As per reports, the Lhasa to Nyingchi line will be 402 kilometers long, costing $6 billion.



Fig3-China-Tibet-Train-Route


(Figure 3: China-Tibet train route, Source: Tibetan Review)



Efforts are also on to complete construction of the Lhasa-Yatung railway line by 2020. Yatung sits at the entry point of Chumbi Valley in Tibet and is connected to the Indian state of Sikkim via the Nathula Pass. Similarly, work on the Lhasa-Linzhi railway line is also work in progress. Linzhi is located at about 70-80 kilometres from the Indian border. Of particular interest is the 770-kilometre Lhasa-Khasa railway line which China began constructing in 2008. Located near Nepal border this line extends from Kashgar in the Xinjiang Province to Aksai Chin.


With China’s increasing profile in Nepal, the Lhasa-Khasa railway line could strategically strengthen Beijing’s hold on Aksai Chin, the territory claimed by India as its own. The rail link is likely to be aligned with the Friendship Highway from Shigatse or Xigaze to Khasa, and further till Kathmandu.

Conclusion

Contrary to this, report of the Indian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence, released in 2013-2014 terms the Indian infrastructure along the Sino-Indian border to be in a dismal state.


 Of the 73 all-weather roads, along the Sino-Indian border that India had identified for construction in 2006, just 18 have been completed. Of the 27 roads that were to be constructed by the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) forces deployed along India’s border with Tibet just one is complete with “as many as eleven roads behind schedule” and even their detailed project reports not yet finalized. The plans to construct 14 strategic railway lines near the border have registered “nil achievement.” Even though border infrastructure has received precedence under the Modi government, even the task of catching up with China appears to be mired in glorious uncertainties.


*Jhinuk Chowdhury is a project intern with Mantraya. This Special Report is a part of Mantraya’s Borderlands; and China and South Asia projects.)

Saturday, March 12, 2016

OROP KRANTI: INFIGHTING or SABOTAGE STYLE "JAI CHAND"






 
 
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Anil Kaul posted in Indian Ex Servicemen Movement.
 
   
Anil Kaul
March 12 at 8:42am
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9LCarOLn5sQ

Those who missed live.
Ex-serviceman arrested: Infighting within the veteran community?
A 75 year old Wing Commander, part of the OROP mission, is picked up from his bed at night by the po...

OROP KRANTI : OROP BEING DRAGGED INTO A NEW PHASE OF GOONDAISM

SOURCE:
http://www.newslaundry.com/2016/03/11/orop-activist-retd-wing-commander-sharma-whisked-away/




!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!


Hey,
I just signed the petition "most disciplined : OROP. WE TRUST THE J M TEAM. WE OPPOSE ARREST OF WG CDR C. K SHARMA. J M IS FAITHFUL ." and wanted to see if you could help by adding your name.
 
 
Our goal is to reach 100 signatures and we need more support. You can read more and sign the petition here:
 
 
 
Thanks!

 Major  XXXXX
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

OROP Activist Retd Wing Commander Sharma Whisked Away

No warrant, wife not informed where veteran taken by police

Friday, March 11, 2016

J&K : The Army Need Not Worry about Criticism, Its Media Engagement Is Welcome


SOURCE:
http://swarajyamag.com/ideas/jandk-the-army-need-not-worry-about-criticism-its-media-engagement-is-welcome


J&K : The Army Need Not Worry about Criticism, Its Media Engagement Is Welcome                                     BY

                                         Syed Ata Hasnain





March 2, 2016.  ,



Snapshot

The nation is suddenly deeply excited about how its men in uniform function and operate under challenging circumstances. There is questioning and there is information seeking.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation.

The academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military. The Army need not be defensive about it and should involve itself in debate by moving more than halfway.





It must start on a positive note. Gone are the days of ignorance of what is happening on India’s frontlines and insurgency ridden areas; the decided disinterest in what the Armed Forces do is fast becoming history. The nation is suddenly deeply excited about how its men in uniform function and operate under challenging circumstances. There is questioning and there is information seeking.
Unfortunately it is also ending up with much unsavory and ill-informed advice to the warriors up in front and much disinformation to the public. That is because the advice is coming from quarters where experience is lacking. I still consider this a positive development because the information revolution is creating interest in matters military and not everyone can have a boots on ground experience to accompany his academic pursuits. It is just that the information being generated needs to be authentic.
Three events of the recent weeks have combined to give information on military matters a fillip; first was the Pathankot air base sneak action, second the unfortunate tragedy wrought by the avalanche at Sonam post in Siachen Glacier and third the Pampore anti-terrorist operation. This ongoing phenomenon, a positive development no doubt, should be seen from an angle of the media taking security related issues beyond emotional rhetoric and satiating the latent patriotic fervor which is being seen all around.
The other positive from this is the fact that the warriors are once again entering the eye of the citizen as a segment apart; people to be trusted and in possession of values that are worth emulating. The OROP movement (can’t call it an agitation) has also contributed its bit. The recent havoc brought about by the Jat agitation and the speed with which the Army had to move as first responder has brought even greater recognition for the Army being the core institution in which all Indians repose faith. A media report questions why 5,000 Army troops perform better than 50,000 cops.


I strongly believe that the academic world and the media have much to contribute to the affairs of the military because unless ‘conflict’ (and not geopolitics alone) is recognized as a proper academic subject in India and treated as an entity for research it will remain rooted in the world of non-intellectualism in India. One does not have to be a driver first to be the managing director of a taxi or bus company.
In other words ground experience is not necessarily the only criteria for advice on matters military and especially in a hybrid warfare environment. There is so much more in conflict, especially the hybrid variety, to which academia can contribute but the realm of tactics and operations should preferably remain the domain of specialists.


Recent articles in leading dailies and online media however, betray the readers and the warriors. Let us take a few examples. One piece referring to the Pampore operation states, ‘the terrorists, equipped with the latest techniques, are now prepared for the long haul. Old tactics cannot work.’
In my experience of J&K, terrorists have always come for the long haul, do not give themselves up and are willing to bite the bullet while attempting to cause as much mayhem and inflicting maximum casualties on the security forces. So what’s new about that; it has been the maxim for years especially since the suicide attacks commenced in July 1999.

This piece wanted the Army to be prepared for the long haul in tactical operations forgetting that the Army’s stamina is immense and it works on a simple principle of ‘relief of troops in contact.’ Units can remain deployed for months and be effective throughout. It is obvious the perception of the writer was linked to the criticism that the Army hurried the operation at Pampore thus leading to the casualties. This issue is explained later in this essay.
The same article goes on to state - “the Army has taken certain things for granted and taken its eyes and ears off the ground, where Kashmiris have developed a psyche of drawing a vicarious pleasure from the prolonged exploits of militants in their fight against the security forces.”

To add further insult it states that Sadbhavna, the hearts and minds campaign has almost become an obsession and which is what has forced the Army to virtually become benign. If there is anything further from the truth this is it. The Indian public cannot be misled and needs the opinion of those who have been practitioners and continue to advise on doctrinal and conceptual aspects of the operations.

Authors who write on J&K’s security environment must understand the dynamic nature of the sponsored conflict there. From 1989 to 1997 the Army sequentially used hard power and contained terrorism to manageable levels. In 1997 it introduced Sadbhavna, an institutionalized hearts and minds program with a separate budget.

It was based on the recognition that in such conflicts the people are the Center of Gravity and therefore need to be kept away from influence of the terrorists, separatists and the Deep State of Pakistan. It was a run-away success. However, at no stage of the balancing act between hard and soft power did the Army ever take its eyes off the main task it was to perform until the situation became manageable.

The Army’s intent must be known to all; it has never changed except for minor modifications in priorities based on the dynamics of the times. The intent has and will remain the elimination of ‘terrorism’ and ‘not terrorists’ alone. This implies eliminating terrorists in the hinterland and at the LoC from where they infiltrate and having such controls as to deny them space to operate, recruit fresh terrorists or influence the population.

It also implies the creation of such conditions in cooperation with the government of the day and its agencies that prevent the people supporting the terrorists and in fact assist in isolating them. With this task in hand it is clear that it is not by killing alone that the conflict will be won. For the Army, there is no rest until normalcy returns in the lives of the people and that can only happen once people stop supporting terrorists in their mission.

Thus the notion that the Army must leave everything else aside and concentrate on killing terrorists is instantly a misnomer smacking of utter ignorance of the principles of fighting a hybrid conflict.The death of the two Captains of the Special Forces has drawn criticism from many armchair strategists with no ear to the ground.

This unfair criticism needs to be effectively countered. To think that there will be foolproof measures available to negate every possible action by the terrorists is utopian to say the least. Questioning where was the quick reaction team of the CRPF convoy, which was ambushed, is like asking for copybook actions which will never take place in such an environment.

It is the QRT which chased the terrorists and the first entry to eliminate them was made by the CRPF, an action which needs to be lauded. The CRPF had lost men and legitimately wished to conduct the operation to hunt down the perpetrators. The entry by terrorists into the EDI building was just situational and not preplanned. It became a completely new situation because the building has a structure never addressed before.

The armchair strategists question why the Army and the CRPF did not have a contingency for that. Contingency planning has its limitations and is based on ongoing experience gained from time to time. Post the 1999-2003 period, when suicide attacks were the norm, security at entry points to major buildings and to institutions was strengthened. However, it did not imply that every building was catered for in contingency planning.


Intervention was usually the last resort; huts, cow sheds and small houses in villages where terrorists holed up were regularly destroyed using rocket launchers and flame throwers. However, this was a five floor building and to bring it down meant wiring up explosives all around which itself makes the explosive handling parties extremely vulnerable. RLs could have been fired for the next three days at every window to no avail.


It was the norm to do intervention only where destruction of buildings could not be executed and that is exactly what Victor Force of the Army’s RR did. That there will be no casualties can never be a guarantee in such operations. Even with revised procedures, if any, no commander at any level will ever give you a guarantee. 

  
The fairness of critique gets further marred when it is pointed out that senior officers are more involved with media briefs than operations. Whatever may be said there is no doubt that we are at the dying stages of a terror campaign. The LoC is well controlled to prevent infiltration although here too there will never be a guarantee of a hundred percent effectiveness; from the arm chairs in New Delhi there will be much questioning again once a terrorist track succeeds in reaching Sopore or Baramula.

The ups and downs will continue with much regularity unless the political leadership gets into the act of effective governance. The Army can take the situation up to this point and work towards preventing slippages; a few will invariably take place because such situations cannot remain in suspense. The media act by the Army is something to be lauded. It has got into the information game at last. In hybrid conflicts of this nature the information domain is nearly as important as the kinetic operations.

For long the Army was shy in engaging media and employing social media as part of the outreach and countering of adversary propaganda. Dealing with media does not mean that eyes are not focused on intelligence and operations. Even in the heyday of militancy there could never be a hundred percent actionable intelligence. With lesser quantum of terrorists than ever before intelligence is far better but again not enough to prevent terrorist acts of this nature.
There is a fallacious notion that today’s new militancy is far more violent and dangerous than during the peak of the campaign. This is believable by people who have no memory or those who never ever studied the militancy and the manner it panned out. Undoubtedly, there is no room for dilution of the quantum and quality of operations but at the same time there is no scope for believing that it is back to the Nineties.


The J&K model remains one of the most solid case studies of cooperation between the various security forces led by the Army and with the intelligence agencies. It needs to be only tweaked from time to time. The agencies are adept at handling the ‘intifada’ like demonstrations and stone throwing which has now taken a new turn over the last two years.


There is clear understanding of division of prime responsibility among the forces on handling this and it is maturing by the day. There will be glitches along the way recalling that even the Israeli Defence forces (IDF) who are the most proficient in handling such strife, combining civil disorder and terrorist operations, still continue to suffer failures from time to time.

Take it from experienced practitioners that the Indian Army’s flexibility goes along with its ‘gung ho’. Both are necessary in this complex conflict situation where the dying embers are sometimes hotter than the logs which kindled the fire. Yet, the advent of academic and media interest in war fighting techniques is a welcome departure from the past.


The Army need not be defensive about it and should involve itself in debate by moving more than halfway. It could well be the beginning of the search for the elusive strategic culture witnessed all these years.