Wednesday, March 15, 2017

PARIKKAR DEFENCE MATRIC FAIL HO GYA, GRADED TO THIRD CLASS WITH GRACE MARKS

SOURCE:
http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/parrikar-only-added-to-list-of-status-quoists/377081.html




PARIKKAR DEFENCE  MATRIC  FAIL HO GYA, GRADED TO THIRD CLASS                  WITH GRACE MARKS





 Mar 15, 2017,

              Parrikar only added 

                                   to 

                 list of status-quoists


         Lt Gen Vijay Oberoi (retd)

At the behest of bureaucracy, Parrikar started interfering in the internal affairs of the armed forces, instead of leaving them to the chiefs. It was also during his helmsman-ship that the defence budget touched a nadir, at less than 1.6% of the GDP.




Speculation about the change of the current Defence Minister had been going on even before the recently held elections in many states were announced. With the Goa Governor inviting Manohar Parrikar to form the government, it is no longer speculation.

Parrikar remained Defence Minister for less than two and a half years, which, of course, is just a statistic. More important is how his tenure has been as the political head of the Indian military.Before one carries out an analysis, it may be pertinent to have a look at the task a Minister of Defence is required to perform and how his predecessors have fared.

Since Independence, the country has had a total of 25 defence ministers, of which six were also prime ministers. Like other ministers, there is no fixed tenure for the defence minister, who is appointed or removed by the prime minster. The minister is often assisted by a minister of state for defence and, less commonly, the lower-ranked deputy minister of defence. The first defence minister of independent India was Baldev Singh, who was appointed even in the Interim Government, from September 2, 1946, and then continued after Independence till 1952.

If one were to make a broad statement, it appears to a military person like me that the Indian armed forces have not been singularly lucky in having wise, efficient and professionally knowledgeable defence ministers most of the time. This is despite the fact that the minister has an extremely important role to play in the council of ministers. The reason is that a Defence Minister is a member of the powerful Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) — the earlier avatar was the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs — and which is the highest policy making body in the country on all aspects of national security.


If one were to ask the officials of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) the same question, they will either refuse to commit themselves or express happiness at each one of them, because they continued to rule the roost irrespective of who defence minister was! That, in brief and without any further explanation, is the difference between the outlooks of military and civil officials.

Returning to who has been the most effective defence minister, I will with out any hesitation take the name of Arun Singh, without any  hesitation was only a minister of state as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had kept the portfolio of defence with himself.
The reason was that he appreciated the nuances of security issues; was aware of the requirements of the military and what made it tick; and did not pander to the foibles and intrigues of the generalist bureaucracy.

‘Kicking upstairs’ is a well-known phrase; I wonder if there an expression such as ‘kicking downstairs’! Be that as it may, there is also no clarity relating to the inter se importance between a Cabinet minister at the Centre and a chief minister of a state.

 Even in the past, there have been cases of movements to and from the Centre to the states, and vice versa. Sharad Pawar was appointed Defence Minister on June 26, 1991, but in March 1993 he was moved to Maharashtra as chief minister.

When Parrikar took over as defence minister from Arun Jaitley on November 9, 2014, there was a sense of relief as well as optimism. Jaitley, then wearing two hats, had his eyes only on the North Block. The country in general and the military in particular could not understand why these two important ministries had been placed under one incumbent, especially one who had been rejected by the people in the elections and had come by the Rajya Sabha route.

The military welcomed Parrikar for being more professional and technically sound than a politician. They reposed their faith in him and expected that he would ensure a better deal for them; would assist them in regaining their pride and élan that had been severely eroded over the past two decades; and were looking forward to moves towards modernisation that had virtually stopped. However, they were disappointed to see that his party colleagues saw him as a provincial politician and he was unable to change the dispensation or the system.

Parrikar’s tenure as defence minister had its ups and downs; perhaps more of the latter as far as the military is concernedAt the behest of the bureaucracy,he started interfering in the internal affairs of the armed forces, instead of leaving them to the chiefs of the Services, which is rightly their domain. He made somewhat of a mess of the long-pending and highly emotive issue of granting OROP as it was meant to be, because of succumbing to the balderdash of inadequacy of funds — the excuse given by the Finance Ministry as well as bureaucrats of the MoD. 

In the bargain, he not only alienated the armed forces but also affected the morale of the forces. 
Ultimately, while the military continued to struggle to get their dues in financial terms, the bureaucrats, police and other civil administrative services walked away smugly with all kinds of enhancements, perks and the like. Even the so-called NFU is being denied, despite a judicial ruling on the issue!

Besides financial matters, it was during the helmsman-ship of Parrikar that the plummeting of the defence budget reached a nadir, with less than 1.6 per cent of the GDP being allotted in this year’s budget. That brings down the military to the same level as it existed in 1962, the outcome of which is well-known to the nation. Even in percentage terms, the year-on-year growth of 5.6 per cent is ridiculously low. In the previous year too, it was equally bad. Other parameters on which the defence budget could be assessed are also dismal, e.g., it is only 12.77 per cent of the Central government expenditure (CGE). The Army, Navy and Air Force have received only 60, 67 and 54 per cent, respectively, of the funds they had sought for modernisation. In addition, out of the total outlay of Rs 2.74 lakh crore, only Rs 86,488 crore has been earmarked for modernisation. What makes it worse is that the bulk of this capital outlay will be used to pay “committed liabilities” of earlier arms contracts, instead of new projects.


When a Defence Minister joins the committee culture of the bureaucracy, as Parrikar has done, with recommendations of the committees either pending or extended or lying in cupboards without any action, then all is obviously at a standstill on the security of the nation.



Perhaps the worst action that Parrikar took was joining his party colleagues in grossly taking credit for the professionally competent actions of the army in its much publicised surgical strike and virtually politicising the Indian military, which takes pride in its apolitical ethos.

Parrikar is a well-meaning, intelligent and highly educated person, but he was perhaps too much of a gentleman to squarely face his well-entrenched colleagues in the party and the government. This resulted in his doing very little to assist the armed forces in many aspects, some of which have been highlighted above.

—The writer is a former vice chief of army staff.

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PS"
[http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/editorials/defence-minister-leaves/377059.html ]
Opinion » Editorials

 Mar 15, 2017. 



Defence Minister leaves


A job not even half done

In Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ordered way of doing things, Manohar Parrikar was ordained to accomplish several radical makeovers in the Defence Ministry. Plucked from the obscurity of the politically lightweight state of Goa, the IIT graduate was brought to Delhi to wipe off the sloth and sleaze that had supposedly accumulated in the Defence Ministry during AK Antony’s stewardship. There was the question of uplifting the soldier’s morale that had been dented because of the UPA Government’s pusillanimity; speeding up purchases held up because of Antony's indecisiveness; rearranging the higher defence management; and of course ensuring that all major weapon systems are manufactured in India. It seemed that all Parrikar had to do was to come up with approach papers and in Modi’s linear world of instant solutions, implementation could start straight away.

Now that Parrikar has returned to the more familiar world of Goa, were his two years in the Defence Ministry well spent? Parrikar did accomplish the larger political purpose of equating the armed forces with the BJP’s concept of nationalism. So the Army’s surgical strike was tom-tommed all over the country, especially in poll-bound Uttar Pradesh, as the ruling party’s Brahmastra to violence emanating from unresolved political questions. Any grievance against public policy was shouted down by comparing the soldier’s perseverance and sense of loyalty against all odds with the citizen’s inability to take an inconvenience in his stride.


But in his Ministry, Parrikar will earn a C grade with the remarks, “showed sincerity but needed to apply himself to the job.” Indeed murmurs from the Defence Ministry all through his tenure were about Parrikar readily forsaking the perseverance required for the job for the joys of settling petty political squabbles in Goa.
 Was it any wonder that all through his tenure, the Ministry fell short in purchasing equipment? The suicide rate is again in the worrying range and a radical rearranging of defence management awaits another minister. Modi might have won a resounding victory in UP, but a mid-term evaluation of the Defence Ministry would indicate it has been all sound and very little actual work.

TERRORIST STATE PAKISTAN: Terrorist and Extremist Groups of Pakistan

SOURCE:
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm

                                TERRORIST STATE PAKISTAN


                 (Updated till March 5, 2017)


  

                                                                  Hafiz Saeed 

                                                     

 
                                    CLICK /GOOGLE TO READ  


                       TERRORIST  ORGANIZATIONS  
                                          OF 
                         TERROR IN PAKISTAN


Terrorist and Extremist Groups of Pakistan


Terrorist Groups

Extremist Groups
Domestic Organisations
  1. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
  2. Lashkar-e-Omar (LeO)
  3. Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
  4. Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP)
  5. Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi(TNSM)
  6. Lashkar-eJhangvi (LeJ)
  7. Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan (SMP)
  8. Jamaat-ul-Fuqra
  9. Nadeem Commando
  10. Popular Front for Armed Resistance
  11. Muslim United Army
  12. Harkat-ul-Mujahideen Al-alami(HuMA)
Trans-national Organisations
  1. Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
  2. Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA, presently known as Harkat-ul Mujahideen)
  3. Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
  4. Jaish-e-Mohammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem (JeM)
  5. Harkat-ul Mujahideen (HuM, previously known as Harkat-ul-Ansar)
  6. Al Badr
  7. Jamait-ul-Mujahideen (JuM)
  8. Lashkar-e-Jabbar (LeJ)
  9. Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami(HUJI)
  10. Muttahida Jehad Council (MJC)
  11. Al Barq
  12. Tehrik-ul-Mujahideen
  13. Al Jehad
  14. Jammu & Kashir National Liberation Army
  15. People’s League
  16. Muslim Janbaz Force
  17. Kashmir Jehad Force
  18. Al Jehad Force (combines Muslim Janbaz Force and Kashmir Jehad Force)
  19. Al Umar Mujahideen
  20. Mahaz-e-Azadi
  21. Islami Jamaat-e-Tulba
  22. Jammu & Kashmir Students Liberation Front
  23. Ikhwan-ul-Mujahideen
  24. Islamic Students League
  25. Tehrik-e-Hurriat-e-Kashmir
  26. Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqar Jafaria
  27. Al Mustafa Liberation Fighters
  28. Tehrik-e-Jehad-e-Islami
  29. Muslim Mujahideen
  30. Al Mujahid Force
  31. Tehrik-e-Jehad
  32. Islami Inquilabi Mahaz


    1. Al-Rashid Trust
    2. Al-Akhtar Trust
    3. Rabita Trust
    4. Ummah Tamir-e-Nau





Tuesday, March 14, 2017

TERRORIST STATE PAKISTAN : Pakistan Terror Data Sheets

SOURCE:
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm







                      TERRORIST STATE PAKISTAN

               

                Pakistan Terror Data Sheets


                   
(Updated till March 5, 2017)




                      CLICK /GOOGLE TO READ  
                                              
                STATE  SPONSORED TERRORIST 
              STATICS OF TERROR IN PAKISTAN





Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2017
Fatalities in Pakistan Region Wise: 2011-2017, 2017, 2016 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011
Major incidents of terrorist violence in Pakistan
1988-2004 , 2005-2006 , 2007 , 2008 , 2009 , 2010 , 2011, 2012 , 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017
Suicide Attacks in Pakistan since 2002
Bomb Blasts: 2017, 2016, 2015, 2014 ,2013 , 2012, 2011, 2010 , 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, 2005, 2004, 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000
Post 9/11-attacks on Western targets in Pakistan
NATO Related attacks in Pakistan since 2008
Drone attack in Pakistan: 2005-2017
Sectarian Violence in Pakistan since 1989
Sectarian attacks in mosques in Pakistan since 2002
Shia killing Data
Terrorist attacks on Railway in Pakistan
Doctors killed in Pakistan
Lawyers Killed in Pakistan
Attack on Tribal Elders in Pakistan
Terrorist attacks on Journalists in Pakistan
Elections 2013 - Results
Elections 2008 - Results
Elections 2002 - Results

Monday, March 13, 2017

TERRORIST STATE PAKISTAN: How Pashtun Insurgency Being Portrayed As Terrorism In Pakistan

SOURCE:
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13032017-how-pashtun-insurgency-being-portrayed-as-terrorism-in-pakistan-oped/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+eurasiareview%2FVsnE+%28Eurasia+Review%29



             TERRORIST STATE PAKISTAN



How Pashtun Insurgency Being Portrayed As Terrorism In Pakistan








Location of Punjab in Pakistan. Source: Wikipedia Commons.


In Pakistan, there are three distinct categories of militants:
[A] the Afghan-centric Pashtun militants; 
[B] the Kashmir-centric Punjabi militants; and 
[C] the transnational terrorists, like al-Qaeda. 

Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is mainly comprised of Pashtun militants, carries out bombings against Pakistan’s state apparatus. The ethnic factor is critical here. Although TTP likes to couch its rhetoric in religious language, but it is the difference of ethnicity that enables it to recruit Pashtun tribesmen who are willing to carry out subversive activities against Punjabi-dominated state establishment.
Here, the reader should bear in mind that insurgency anywhere cannot succeed, unless insurgents get some level of popular support from local population. For example: if a hostile force tries to foment insurgency in Punjab, it would not be able to succeed, because Punjabis don’t have any grievances against Pakistan. On the other hand, if an adversary tries to incite insurgency in the marginalized province of Balochistan and tribal areas, it will succeed because the local Baloch and Pashtun population has grievances against the heavy-handedness of Pakistan’s security establishment.
I have knowingly used the term ‘Pashtun tribesmen’ instead of ‘Taliban’ here, because this phenomena of revenge has more to do with tribal culture than religion, per se. In the lawless tribal areas, they don’t have courts and police to settle disputes and enforce justice; justice is dispensed by the tribes themselves: the clans, families and the relatives of the slain victims seek revenge, which is the fundamental axiom of their tribal ‘jurisprudence.’

Notwithstanding, as well informed readers must be aware that military operations have been going on in the tribal areas of Pakistan since 2009; but a military operation – unlike law enforcement or Rangers operation, as in Karachi – is a different kind of operation; it’s an all-out WAR. The Pakistan army surrounds the area from all sides and orders the villagers to vacate their homes. Then the army calls in air force and heavy artillery to carpet bomb the whole area; after which ground troops move in to look for the dead and injured in the rubble of towns and villages.
Air-force bombardment and heavy artillery shelling has been going on in the tribal areas of Pakistan for several years; Pashtun tribesmen have been taking fire; their homes, property and livelihoods have been destroyed; they have lost their families and children in this brutal war, which has displaced millions of tribesmen who have been rotting in the refugee camps in Peshawar, Mardan and Bannu districts since 2009, after the Swat and South Waziristan military operations.
More to the point, excluding religion, all the diverse and remote regions of Asia and Africa that have been beset by militancy share a few similarities: firstly, the weak writ of respective states in their faraway rural and tribal areas; secondly, the marginalization of different ethnic groups; and thirdly, intentional or unintentional weaponization of militant outfits that have been used as proxies, at some point in time in history, to further the agendas of their regional and global patrons. When religious extremism blends with militancy, it can give birth to strands as deadly as the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabab in Somalia.
After invading and occupying Afghanistan and Iraq, and when the American “nation-building” projects failed in those hapless countries, the United States policymakers immediately realized that they have been facing large-scale and popularly-rooted insurgencies against foreign occupation, consequently the occupying military altered its CT (counter-terrorism) doctrines in the favor of a COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy. A COIN strategy is essentially different from a CT approach and it also involves dialogue, negotiations and political settlements, alongside coercive tactics of law enforcement and paramilitary operations on a limited scale.
The goals for which Islamic insurgents have been fighting in insurgency-wracked regions are irrelevant for the debate at hand; it can be argued, however, that if some of the closest Western allies in the Middle East, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, have already enforced Sharia as part of their conservative legal systems and when beheadings, amputation of limbs and flogging of criminals are a routine in Saudi Arabia, then what is the basis for the United States declaration of war against the Islamic insurgents in the Af-Pak, Middle East and North Africa regions, who are erroneously but deliberately labeled as “terrorists” by the Western mainstream media to manufacture consent for the Western military presence and interventions in the energy-rich region under the pretext of the so-called “war on terror?”
Regardless, what bothers me is not that we have not been able to find the solution to our problems, what bothers me is the fact that neoliberals are so utterly unaware of real structural issues that their attempts to sort out tangential problems will further exacerbate the main issues. Religious extremism, militancy and terrorism are not the cause but the effect of poverty, backwardness and disenfranchisement.
Coming back to the topic, the Pashtuns are the most unfortunate nation on the planet nowadays, because nobody understands and represents them; not even their own leadership, whether religious or ethnic. In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are represented by the Western stooges, like Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, and in Pakistan, the Pashtun nationalist party, Awami National Party (ANP), loves to play the victim card and finds solace in learned helplessness.
In Pakistan, however, the Pashtuns are no longer represented by a single political entity, a fact which has become obvious after the 2013 parliamentary elections in which the Pashtun nationalist ANP was wiped out of its former strongholds. Now there are at least three distinct categories of Pashtuns:

 [a] firstly, the Pashtun nationalists who follow Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s legacy and have their strongholds in Charsadda and Mardan districts;

[ b ] secondly, the religiously-inclined Islamist Pashtuns who vote for Islamist political parties, like Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam in the southern districts of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa; and 

 [ c ] finally, the emerging new phenomena, i.e. the Pakistani nationalist Pashtuns, most of whom have recently joined Imran Khan’s PTI in recent years, though some of them have also joined the Muslim League.
Additionally, it should be remembered here that the general elections of 2013 were contested on a single issue: that is, Pakistan’s partnership in the American-led war on terror, which has displaced millions of Pashtun tribesmen. The Pashtun nationalist Awami National Party was routed, because in keeping with its supposedly “liberal” ideology, it stood for military operations against Islamist Pashtun militants in tribal areas; and the people of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province gave a sweeping mandate to the newcomer in the Pakistani political landscape: Imran Khan and his Tehreek-e-Insaf, because the latter promised to deal with tribal militants through negotiations and political settlements.
Although Imran Khan and Nawaz Sharif both have failed to keep their election pledge of using peaceful means for dealing with the menace of religious extremism and militancy, but the public sentiment was, and still is, firmly against military operations in tribal areas. The 2013 parliamentary elections were, in a way, a referendum against Pakistan’s partnership in the American-led war on terror in the Af-Pak region, and the Pashtun electorate gave a sweeping mandate to pro-peace political parties against the pro-war Pakistan People’s Party and Awami National Party.
Regarding the Pashtun nationalists’ much-touted victim card, it’s a misconception to assume that Pakistan’s security establishment used Pashtuns as cannon fodder to advance their strategic objectives in the region. The establishment’s support to Islamic jihadists back in the ’80s and ’90s during the Cold War against the erstwhile Soviet Union had been quite indiscriminate. There are as many Kashmir-centric Punjabi militants in south Punjab as there are Afghan-centric Pashtun jihadists in the rural and tribal regions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province.
The only difference between these two variants of militancy is that the writ of state in Punjab is comparatively strong while in the tribal areas of KP, it is weak; that’s why militancy in KP has mutated into full-fledged Pashtun insurgency. Furthermore, the difference of ethnicity and language between the predominantly Punjabi establishment and the Pashtun insurgents has further exacerbated the problem, and the militants do find a level of popular support among the rural and tribal masses of Pashtun-majority areas.



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Saturday, March 11, 2017

China’s Warning: Give Us Tawang, Or Else

SOURCE:
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.eurasiareview.com/11032017-chinas-warning-give-us-tawang-or-else-analysis/&gws_rd=cr&ei=axTEWJT9JseZ8QXwxIGIAQ


China’s Warning: Give Us Tawang, Or Else –                                      By  

                  Bhaskar Roy*


India-China relations have broadened over the years with not a single shot fired along the disputed borders since the signing of the Peace and Tranquillity Treaty between the two sides. Military exchanges and other high level visits have become a regular affair. There is convergence of interest in several regional and international affairs.

But there are many sticking points which impinge upon India’s core interests. The latest is the issue of Arunachal Pradesh and its capital Tawang, on India’s border with Tibet, which China claims as its Autonomous Region under China’s sovereignty. 

India endorsed this position in 2003 when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited China.  [  !!!??? ]

In an interview with a Beijing based publication recently, Dai Bingguo, a former high ranking diplomat and communist party leader said, “The major reason the boundary question persists is that China’s reasonable requests (for Tawang) have not been met (by India) … if the Indian side takes care of China’s concerns on the eastern section of the border, the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India’s concerns elsewhere”.


Responding to news from India that the 14th Dalai Lama will be allowed to visit Tawang in March as a pilgrim and the junior minister for Home Affairs of the central government Kiran Rijiju will be there to receive him, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang issued (March 03) a warning to India. Geng saidChina is gravely concerned” over this development, holding out the threat that the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang willcause serious damage to peace and stability of the border region and China-India relations”.


Geng Shuang’s statement is the official position of the Chinese government, which is governed by the communist party of China. How serious is China about this threat? When they challenge India in the words of the foreign ministry, do they say if the Dalai Lama visits Arunachal Pradesh, the agreement of the 1993 Peace and Tranquillity Treaty, the Confidence Building Measures and the 2005 agreement of political modalities for settling the border issue will be torn to bits? In none of these treaties and agreements has the question of the Dalai Lama been mentioned. Gradually the Chinese authorities began protesting against visits of Indian leaders including the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Arunachal Pradesh. That too, in sharp words.

The sharp edge and aggressive posture of the Chinese foreign ministry was quickly toned down the next day by the spokeswoman of the ongoing annual National People’s Congress (NPC), Fu Ying. At a press conference for the NPC Fu specifically addressed India-China relations and how it had broadly expanded over the years in a large number of areas from trade to military and frequent high level exchanges to consensus on regional and international issues. She agreed that while some disputes remain, they have been properly discussed through diplomatic channels. She appealed for more understanding of each other and not let disputes stand in the way of cooperation.


Three statements on India by three different high level Chinese officials in different tones make things very interesting in the context of India-China relations. Nobody in China speaks on such important issues without clearance of every word from a sufficiently high level. Are there two views on India among the Communist Party Central Committee and its politburo? This is very unlikely in foreign policy. Or did the South Asia Division of the Chinese foreign ministry overstep their brief, given their long time close relations with Pakistan? Because, it appears, they have been pulled back. Or, is it the old blow hot, blow cold policy?

Dai Bingguo’s proposal on Tawang is not new. It has been held out before and allowed to cool or taken back like some others on the border issue. Clear parameters have never been stated as to what they will cede in the Western Sector. If India agrees to a discussions do not go China’s way, they can withdraw on the grounds that it was only a thought or an idea, and Dai was not the government’s official representative. If anyone believes that China may be willing to opt for Tawang only and give up its claim over the rest of Arunachal Pradesh, which it now calls South Tibet, is day dreaming on the beaches of Hawaii.

According to the 2005 agreement on political modalities for reserving the border issue between the two countries, 

no populated areas on either side will be transferred. 

Tawang has a settled population. Since the signing of this agreement China has been trying to either eliminate or dilute this particular clause by some means or the other. The danger is that if one agreement is tampered with, others will follow. Whatever has been achieved since late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s path breaking visit to China in 1988, late Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit in 1993, and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s in 2003, and other confidence building measures, all will begin to unravel. Back to 1962 is not wanted by either of the two countries, or the regional and international actors.

China’s argument that since the 6th Dalai Lama Tsangyang Gyatso was born in Tawang, it is close to the hearts and religious sentiments of the Tibetan people, and India should make this concession. According to Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama may be born anywhere but his seat is at the Drepung Monanstery in Lhasa, Tibet. It is a Gelug School of Mahayana Buddhism tradition.

The Tawang monastery, known as the Galden Namgey Lhatse Monastery in Tibetan, was founded by Lama Lodre Gyatso in 1680-81 according to the wishes of the 5th Dalai Lama, Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso. It is also the seat of the Karma-Kargyu sect. The Galden monastery had a religious association with the Drepung monastery that is all.


China, simply, does not have any claim on Tawang. Under such specious arguments the Vatican can claim all Roman Catholic countries.

The Global Times (March 6), a mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, placed further pressure on the 14th Dalai Lama’s upcoming pilgrimage to Tawang. The commentary by Yu Ning said “These Indian officials apparently didn’t realize, or deliberately ignored, the severe consequences the Dalai Lama’s trip (to Tawang) would bring”. The words are not only misleading but also disparaging about Indian officials. This is a handover from the Maoist era when intemperate language was used against foreign countries and leaders.

The commentary went on to say that “Leveraging the Dalai Lama issue to undermine Beijing’s core interest (emphasis added) risks dragging the two countries into a state of hostility”.

These comments come at a time when the two sessions of the CPPCC and NPC are being held in the capital, Beijing, to have the maximum impact on the large number of deputies gathered. India has not given the Dalai Lama any privilege which was not accorded to him earlier. The only difference is that India used to sweep Chinese attacks under the carpet in the interest of stability and promoting good relations. The Indian people are no longer willing to suffer the Chinese onslaughts. The Dalai Lama is a highly revered spiritual leader.


China appears to be very frustrated with India’s disinclination to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and their “One Road, One Belt” (OBOR) initiative. Persuasive pressure through diplomatic channels and media offensive on India has sharply increased. India has its own foreign policy and economic policy interest, and improving relations with China is one of them. And this is in China’s interest, too.

Raising the temperature at this time is an ill- advised move. India has its own core interests and strategic interests. China is yet to address them positively.